STRATEGY
The expectation amongst many in NATO and in the
UK was that Milosevic, when faced with a credible threat or the
use of significant and potentially damaging force against him,
such as air strikes, would quickly concede to NATO's demands.
The hope that the campaign would last only a few days helped
to shape a strategy that proved to be flawed. (Para 60).
20. As the Government has stated previously, there
was, naturally, widespread hope that
the air operation would be short and Milosevic
would again, as he had before, back down. But we did not take
this for granted in our expectations or our planning.
Political, humanitarian, legal and public relations
considerations had a profound effect on the nature of the strategy
adopted by the Alliance. (Para 61)
21. Agreed.
It is clear, however, that whatever pre-planning
was involved, once attacked Milosevic deliberately tried to manipulate
the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians into neighbouring countries
as part of his counter-coercive strategy to overwhelm the allied
forces in place and put pressure on neighbouring governments.
It is also evident that the scale and brutality of the expulsions
took NATO by surprise - which must be counted a failure of imagination
in assessing how effectively an adversary like Milosevic was likely
to identify the Alliance's Achilles heel.
Insufficient military planning of consequence in 1998/early
1999 was directed towards the provision of humanitarian support.
(Paras 63 & 64).
22. The Government agrees that Milosevic prompted
the expulsion of Kosovo Albanians in an attempt to apply asymmetric
pressure to the Alliance and neighbouring states, while also seeking
to change the demographic structure of Kosovo. As the Committee
was informed, although the possibility of further atrocities by
Yugoslav/Serbian security forces was foreseen, their full extent
could not reasonably have been predicted. This was the largest
movement of population in Europe since the Second World War, and
the scale of the forced displacement was unprecedented. In the
event, the brutal tactics of the Yugoslav/Serbian security forces
succeeded only in reinforcing the resolve of the Allies to bring
the conflict to an end in a way which ensured the safe and unconditional
return of all refugees to their homes and unhindered access to
the international relief organisations. As the report acknowledges
elsewhere, NATO had warned the UNHCR of the possibility of refugees.
The Alliance also acted with great speed in co-operation with
the UNHCR to provide relief when the scale of the expulsions became
apparent. Provision of humanitarian support is not a primary function
of UK military forces, but nevertheless they made a very substantial
contribution in Kosovo, particularly in the period before UNHCR
and other civil agencies were able to take the lead responsibility.
NATO's dependence upon achieving consensus amongst
member states for its actions will inevitably require individual
nations to accept what are, from their perspective, less than
ideal solutions. During the Kosovo crisis these compromises cut
both ways - overcoming the reluctance of some Allies to commit
themselves to military action while curtailing the willingness
of others to use what seemed to them appropriate force.
(Para 68).
23. Agreed. This is a key aspect of elective multinational
operations of all kinds. To achieve NATO's objectives, the maintenance
of Alliance unity was essential.
The compromises forced upon the North Atlantic
Council by the need to find consensus meant that the politicians
and diplomats directing the NATO military planners did not demonstrate,
by 24 March 1999, a clear grasp of the nature of the strategy
they had committed themselves to pursuing.
(Para 71).
24. Further to paragraph 14 above, the international
community, including the Alliance, was clear as to the objectives
of NATO action, and the NATO military authorities had clearly
presented to NATO's political authorities how the planned
military operation would contribute to the achievement of these
objectives.
This failure to demonstrate a credible capacity
to escalate to Milosevic, or convince him of the Alliance's resolve
and preparedness for the campaign to endure more than a few days,
was due, at least in part, to the lack of an unambiguous determination
in all members of the Alliance to see the job through to the end.
(Para 72)
25. It is unlikely that Milosevic would have been
under any misconception from his dealings with representatives
of the international community in the lead up to the air operation
that NATO would act if required, and would continue for as long
as necessary in order to achieve its objectives. The fact that
the Alliance was considering a broader range of air operations,
to provide for intensification of pressure, was public knowledge.
Among the tensions within the Alliance, it is
evident that there was initially little enthusiasm in the US to
become engaged on the ground in Kosovo. The US Defense Secretary
had said in October 1998 that he would not even commit American
ground troops to a peacekeeping force. No doubt the US position
would have served to encourage other doubting NATO nations to
adopt similar positions. To most if not all nations, it would
have been inconceivable to engage in forced entry into Kosovo
without the participation of US ground forces. US influence undoubtedly
played a major part in shaping decision-making during the military
planning process (as well as during the military campaign itself).
It would have been surprising if it had been otherwise.
(Para 78).
Two views of the US within NATO can be taken -
that its dominance pushes the Alliance in directions for which
there is less than full consensus; or that its willingness to
work with NATO acts as an almost self-imposed constraint on US
military might in which European views of the world carry more
weight than they otherwise would. We favour the latter view.
(Para 202).
26. The key role played by the United States in NATO
and the international community more widely is undeniable, and
its contribution to the resolution of the crisis was vital. The
UK will continue to work closely with the US in NATO and elsewhere
in the development of international policy on many different subjects.
We conclude that, although they represented the
only politically acceptable position within the Alliance, the
public pronouncements made throughout 1998 and well into 1999
giving the impression that Alliance leaders, including those in
the UK, had discounted a forced entry ground option as part of
their military strategy, were in military terms a serious error
of judgement. They signalled a lack of resolve on NATO's part;
they resulted in serious military planning and preparation for
such an option effectively being discontinued between August 1998
and April 1999; they hamstrung the Alliance's diplomatic leverage
for securing Milosevic's compliance without recourse to military
means; and they removed a critical element of uncertainty and
danger from Milosevic's assessment of the Alliance's intentions.
Moreover, they are likely to have given comfort to Milosevic and
strengthened his hand on the domestic front, and so to have been
a significant factor in encouraging the Serbian élite to
continue to support him in defying NATO. Finally, they enabled
Milosevic to shelter his military equipment underground, rather
than leaving it deployed to meet the possibility of a ground attack.
This severely weakened the impact of the air attacks against forces
in the field. (Para 80).
Maintaining NATO unity carried a high price. The
lack of enthusiasm in most allied governments for justifying to
their electorates the case for a forced ground entry caused inhibitions
to be placed by politicians on NATO's military staff even to plan
for a ground option. Given the failure of NATO to plan and prepare
earlier, even if the threat of a ground attack had been made publicly
before 24 March 1999, it would have taken time
to become credible to Milosevic and his generals.
(Paras 81 & 82).
27. As suggested above, until Milosevic had rebuffed
the last attempt to reach a negotiated settlement on the eve of
the air campaign, NATO's role was to act in support of the political
and diplomatic tracks. Planning for ground options had been examined
in some depth in the summer of 1998, and although it was not seen
as a preferred option, this early work provided the basis for
later planning. The Government agrees that, whenever possible,
operational planning should aim to encompass the widest possible
range of options, taking into account all relevant diplomatic,
legal and political considerations, as this will help to maintain
flexibility of action and the greatest possible uncertainty in
the minds of adversaries. The maintenance of Alliance unity was
essential to the achievement of NATO's objectives.
