THE
END
OF
THE
CAMPAIGN
The evidence of the UK's contribution to the air
campaign suggests that its air forces here were significantly
stretched. And while it is plausible that the UK might have contributed
50,000 troops to a ground attack force, this would have almost
exhausted its resources, and such a force could not have been
replaced or reinforced. Engaging in Kosovo risked bringing the
UK to the very limits of, and quite possibly exceeding, the concurrency
criteria set out in the Strategic Defence Review. This serves
to remind us that the Territorial Army is more than a public relations
exercise - without it, making a significant UK contribution to
an invasion force could not have even been contemplated.
(Para 308).
72. As made clear in paragraph 28 above, the UK was
prepared to provide additional air assets if requested by NATO,
and the majority of forces deployed were in any case not utilised
to full capacity due to the nature of the operation. The Government
is confident that a force of 50,000 could have been provided for
a possible opposed ground entry force, but confirms the assumption
that such a force could not have been replaced fully. On the assumption
that such an operation had concluded successfully, however, the
force would not need to have been replaced on the same scale in
any case, and other partners could have been expected to find
the required forces for at least the initial stage of the subsequent
operation. The Strategic Defence Review planning assumptions provide
guidance, among other things, on scales of effort, concurrency
and endurance but, as explained during the review, in particular
circumstances we may be able to do more (or choose to do less)
than assumptions provide for. These assumptions were tested and
vindicated during the Kosovo crisis. The Government acknowledges
the role which would have been played by the Reserves (including
the Territorial Army) in the operation foreseen, and considers
this good evidence of the valuable contribution made by the Reserves
to our Armed Forces, and their integral role in expanding regular
forces in times of crisis.
We are extremely doubtful however, in the absence
of a decision by early June to assemble a force for a ground invasion,
whether NATO could have mounted and concluded such an operation
successfully, and returned the refugees to their homes, before
the onset of winter. We suspect that keeping the air campaign
going prior to mounting a forced entry operation could have created
considerable logistical and practical difficulties. There would
also, of course, have been significant presentational difficulties
for NATO which might have severely tested both the cohesion of
the Alliance and its credibility. The threat of ground invasion
was real and credible, but came too late.
(Paras 270, 271 & 279).
73. UK and NATO planning assumed that a decision
to put preparations in hand in June for an opposed entry ground
force operation would have enabled such an operation to be mounted
in September. If (as was predicted) the campaign was relatively
short, this gave time for refugees to return to Kosovo before
the onset of winter, although considerable preparation would have
been required by humanitarian agencies in order to support the
likely need for heavy support within a limited timescale. We are
confident that the air campaign could have been sustained prior
to, and during, the ground campaign. Preparations were being made
to ensure this. The potential threat to NATO cohesion was real.
The Government welcomes the Committee's view that the threat of
a ground invasion was real and credible, and firmly believes that
the increasing prospect of a ground operation, including signals
by the United States in early June that it was willing to consider
options beyond the air campaign in order to achieve Alliance objectives,
played an important role in persuading Milosevic to concede.
The battle was not won by airpower alone.
(Para 278).
74. Agreed, as there were many other factors in play,
consistent with the international community's broad-based approach.
It is certain, however, that air power had a substantial effect.
Alliance unity was, undoubtedly, a key factor
in persuading Milosevic of the hopelessness of his situation,
especially when confronted by the reality that Russia was not
coming to his aid. But the Key role played by Russia in these
final stages should not be underestimated. (Paras
277 & 280).
75. Agreed.
Although Alliance unity was only one factor amongst
those which eventually enabled NATO to prevail, it was a necessary
condition for the others to have effect. Unity was, in the end,
the Alliance's greatest strength. At the same time it was NATO's
weakest point. The perceived need to defend NATO's credibility
was, in itself, a major factor in driving the process whereby
the Alliance found itself painted into a corner by March 1999
from which its only way out was to pursue a military campaign
against Serbia. Yet the maintenance of its unity was the factor
which most significantly restricted the military campaign against
Serbia. Yet the maintenance of its unity was the factor which
most significantly restricted the military options open to the
Alliance to pursue an efficient and successful coercive strategy
against Milosevic. (Para 281).
76. The maintenance of Alliance unity was a key factor
in the success of the Alliance in achieving its objectives. This
sometimes required compromise, but continued unity of purpose
and effort was essential, and a significant achievement. Milosevic's
inability to divide the Allies is likely to have been a contributory
factor in his decision to concede. As discussed in paragraph 11
above, the Alliance was not inspired to act in order to defend
its credibility: the decision to act in March 1999 was directed
towards halting the violent attacks being committed by the Yugoslav/Serbian
security forces, and disrupting their ability to conduct future
attacks against the population of Kosovo, thereby averting a humanitarian
catastrophe.
COSTS
Parliament needs to be informed of the extent
to which the costs of the Kosovo conflict and its post-conflict
commitment are being refunded to the MOD by other government departments
and by the Treasury, or whether substantial costs are ultimately
being borne by defence budget. We will be continuing our annual
monitoring of the MOD's Estimates and annual reporting documents
to ensure that the Defence budget is fully reimbursed for the
costs of operations in Kosovo, as well as other critical operations.
We will also be examining how the proposed joint MOD/Foreign Office/DfiD
'Conflict Prevention' budget announced in the 2000 Spending review,
will allow a proper planning and provision for the resources needed
to defuse or (if need be) to tackle future crises."
(Paras 289 & 290).
77. MOD has identified and forecast the additional
expenditure incurred through operations in Kosovo. The additional
costs identified and claimed by MOD in 1999-2000 for the Kosovo
crisis were met in full through access to the Treasury Reserve.
MOD expects a similar procedure to operate in 2000-2001. A claim
for 2000-01 will be included in the Spring Supplementary Estimates.
MOD welcomes the Committee's interest in the functioning of the
'Conflict Prevention' budget and looks forward to its operation
next year.
During the Kosovo crisis the UK military provided
emergency humanitarian assistance, at the request of DFID. The
costs incurred were approximately £3.5M, the main elements
being food, medical supplies, refugee camp construction and aid
flights. All this money has now been recovered from DFID. After
the crisis the military embarked on a series of reconstruction
projects with contracts being placed directly with KFOR by DFID.
The payment for these tasks has been proceeding on a rolling basis.
Recovery of costs from NATO has been successfully completed.
Ministry of Defence
8 January 2001
