Select Committee on Defence Sixth Report

RESTRUCTURING THE RESERVE FORCES

Progress of TA Restructuring

4. The Secretary of State emphasised in 1998 that the aim of the restructuring was that the—

... Territorial Army should become more relevant, more usable and better integrated with the rest of our forces.[13]

and the MoD has assured us that—

The TA now conducts more training with the Regular Army than before, reflecting the more usable and integrated role that was envisaged for the TA under SDR.[14]

5. In our February 1999 Report we asked the MoD to provide us with quarterly reports on the progress of TA restructuring.[15] We received our first quarterly report on 26 July 1999[16]; and since then the MoD has provided a further six. We asked for the reports to include: the recruited strength of the Territorial Army and the Cadets; wastage levels; the number of regular and non-regular Permanent Staff Instructors; and the numbers of unit level command posts held by territorials.[17] The latest, for the period up to 1 October 2000, states that—

... the strength of the TA (excluding NRPS [Non-Regular Permanent Staff] and 790 TA soldiers mobilised for operations), as at 1 October 2000, was 40,382.[18]

The strength of the Army Cadet Force rose from 42,758 at 1 April 2000 to 43,266 at 1 July 2000 but had fallen back to 42,491 at 1 October 2000.[19] A breakdown of quarterly reports received appears as an Annex.[20]

6. The MoD appeared to have some difficulties supplying us with accurate and consistent figures on TA restructuring.[21] We were particularly concerned to ensure that the promise of a 'better trained' TA was being held to. This is why we sought statistics on the level of Man Training Days. While at first glance these appeared to have declined dramatically, we have now received the revised figures for the period 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000 and are pleased to see that the TA is currently funded for approximately 1.5 million Man Training Days per year.[22] However, our concern is that a far higher proportion of training is now at an individual level rather than at unit level. Although the relative balance between unit-level and individual training may inevitably have shifted to reflect the new roles of the TA, without unit level training the TA will not genuinely be 'more usable' and better integrated into the Army.

7. In our first report on Territorial Army restructuring, we dealt at length with the problems that the restructured territorial infantry battalions would have in providing effective training at battalion and even company level.[23] There is a double problem—on one hand without a more developed unit structure it is very difficult to deliver good quality sub-unit training of the kind needed to provide formed sub-units. On the other hand, the lack of a developed structure on the new format also makes it extremely difficult to train officers and other key personnel in infantry units, even for use as individual replacements, as they do not experience exercising within a proper unit structure. It proved difficult to disentangle from the statistics provided to us by the MoD exactly how Man Training Days were divided between individual, sub-unit and unit level training. Brigadier Holmes admitted that—

... we have not yet got the right structure in the infantry battalions ... we have put together what are called battalions but, if we remember, they were actually training organisations. The fact that they are finding it extremely difficult to train and to man as infantry battalions is a major problem ... [The infantry is] now very scattered.[24]

We welcome the acknowledgement on the floor of the House by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces that the infantry are (in his view) one area of the Reserves which have not properly settled down since the Strategic Defence Review.[25] Revisiting the infantry battalion structure must be a high priority.

8. The witnesses from the Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations (CRFCA) confirmed our impression of reduced unit-level training since restructuring. The MoD, in its written submission, believed—

... the number of Man Training Days per TA soldier allocated to collective training has remained the same following the SDR[26]

although the MoD is—

... currently unable to provide statistics comparing the number of exercises before and after SDR because [we] do not have an integrated management information system (MIS) application.[27]

If no accurate or reliable records are maintained this may give reason to doubt the assurance given by the MoD as to the accuracy of its figures.

9. We therefore welcome news of a new IT system—Cresta—which is under trial in the Royal Engineers TA. The Director of the Reserve Forces and Cadets explained that it—

... is going to allow us to set much more accurately what training standards are to be met by individuals, what resources are required to meet those, and to record very accurately what training standards are to be met by individuals, what resources are required to meet those, and to record very accurately the level of expertise across cap badges and by trades.[28]

We hope that, in future, the MoD will be able to demonstrate convincingly that both individual training and unit training levels for the TA are being maintained at appropriate levels.

10. Linked to the question of training is the level of support given to the TA in terms of full-time training staff. The MoD agreed to supply us in its quarterly reports with updates on the numbers of both regular and non-regular Permanent Staff Instructors (PSIs). The latest quarterly report states that there were 1,521 Regular and 1,296 Non Regular Permanent Staff supporting the TA, of whom 847 were Regular PSIs and 280 NRPS PSIs.[29] We had requested figures after hearing that there might be a possibility of a reduction of the number of PSIs going beyond those posts disappearing as a result of loss of units in the proposed restructuring of the TA in the SDR.[30]

11. Again, the MoD had some difficulty in supplying us with accurate figures for PSIs. The figures supplied in February 2000 included permanent staff who were not instructors.[31] We asked for a corrected figure and were told that—

... although we have a breakdown of the Regular PSIs (permanent staff instructors) for the May return, we are now unable to provide a similar degree of detail for the NRPS (non regular permanent staff instructors).[32]

The MoD has reassured us that the figures will not have changed substantially: we hope they are right. While the MoD's evidence is insufficiently detailed to show particular changes, it does appear that some specialist units may have lost permanent staff, which could affect readiness levels.

12. Officer recruitment is still in need of attention. At present, the training period for a new officer recruit in the TA is two and a half years. Colonel Taylor told us that

... we are well aware that it is taking far too long to get a young officer through and we think it is putting off the applicants ...[33]

RMA Sandhurst runs four commissioning courses for TA Officers per year, each course accommodating approximately 100 candidates. However, from January to October 2000 only 60% of these opportunities were taken up. Concern was expressed by our CRFCA witnesses over the lack of career paths for young officers, particularly in the infantry[34] and they believe that this is having an adverse effect on recruitment and retention of young people, although our witnesses from the MoD strongly denied that this was the case.[35] Brigadier Durcan, Deputy Inspector General, TA, said that he—

... was working, in [his] branch, on the basis that we are recruiting 60% of our requirement for officers...[36]

Retention of graduates from the Officer Training Corps (OTCs) was also identified as a problem,[37] although the RNR has been forward-thinking in setting up local satellite units for recruitment.[38] Both sets of witnesses were of the opinion that the Reserves were experiencing a temporary lack of confidence due to restructuring, as happened with the Royal Navy Reserves when it lost its minesweepers.[39]

13. In January 1999, immediately after SDR, Territorials held 53 out of 132 unit level commands—40%. We note that, within the much smaller current structure, the number of commands held by territorials has reduced to just 22 out of 77—less than 30%. A lack of such opportunities will be frustrating for trainees and will deter the brightest and best from putting in the time needed to achieve promotion. If the Reserve Forces are to continue to attract young potential officers capable of rising to the higher ranks then there is a need to reinstate the fast-track system and provide evidence that Commanding Officer positions really are available to Territorials, and on a part-time basis. This was wholeheartedly supported by Colonel Taylor who, when asked if he would wish to see a fast track, answered with "a very positive yes".[40]

14. Above all, one of the key aspirations of the TA for a long time has been to have deployed sub-units. Overall there appears to have been disappointingly little new thinking on possible roles for Reservists, given both the overstretch in the Regular forces and the broader width of potential and actual tasks facing them. We note, for example, that elements of the yeomanry are now training as tank crew. Yet given the continuing delays in trying to get the new training cycle up and running for armoured and armoured infantry brigades, there has still been no attempt to trial territorial infantry and yeomanry units for use on exercises, for example as "enemy" in Canada. At a more ambitious level, given the levels of overstretch in the Royal Armoured Corps and their recruiting problems, it is surprising that no consideration has been given to forming within the yeomanry some armoured units or sub-units to supplement their Regular counterparts. Other units, such as the Royal Signals, could also offer effective support to the Regulars if deployed as sub-units. We recommend the early deployment of formed TA sub-units, for example, to the Balkans.

Royal Naval Reserve

15. Under the proposals of the SDR the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) fared better than the Territorial Army. The establishment of the RNR was increased to 3,850. Brigadier Holmes, Director of the Reserve Forces and Cadets, told us that its strength at 1 November 2000 was 3,078.[41] We were told that at December 2000 the trained strength of the RNR was 2,574 against a trained requirement 3,887.[42] This gives a very different impression of the usability of the RNR. It takes three to five years to bring a recruit through to the trained strength.[43] Although we recognise that it is unlikely that the entire trained strength would be required to deploy simultaneously, we were pleased to have the reassurance that the recruitment drive will be maintained until overall numbers are more nearly achieved (anticipated to be in about 2004).[44] However, we expect to see this assurance supported by evidence, and we invite the MoD in its response to this Report to provide evidence of a positive trend in recruitment to the RNR which is on target to meet the requirement.

16. The RNR has 150 reserve aircrew:[45] however, only just under 10% of these (14) are fast-jet pilots of whom three are currently serving on Sea Harriers, 10 on the Hawk.[46] The Forces are able to recruit from the commercial sector and we were told that all 88 RNR pilots have previous service with the Army, Royal Marines or Royal Navy.[47] Any pilot deployed in a combat role would need some 'surge' training to counteract 'skills fade'. However, 81 of the 88 pilots have completed the minimum requisite amount of training (17 days) within the past year. The MoD is keen to emphasise that—

In reality, the average number of days' training has increased from 21 to 24 days in recent years; and the number of available training days is set to increase further with the post-SDR number of funded training days per pilot being increased from 25 to 35.[48]

We welcome the RNR's achievement in recruiting and retaining part-time pilots. We believe that it is a success that should be built on further.

The Royal Auxiliary Air Force

17. Under the SDR, the Royal Auxiliary Air Force complement was increased by 270 support posts.[49] The RAF currently has 131 reserve aircrew of whom 67 serve on Full-Time Reserve Service (FTRS) terms and only 64 are part-time personnel. Of the part-time personnel (Auxiliaries) 45 are pilots with only seven of those fast-jet pilots.[50] Pilots have to be either combat ready or hold an instructor qualification.[51] Seven fast-jet pilots and two navigators are employed on the Tornado F3.[52] The Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, HQ Strike Command (Air Vice-Marshal Sudborough) acknowledged that—

... the Air Force Board Standing Committee recently agreed that we should increase the utility of auxiliaries and reserve aircrew. We have notionally taken 10% of our establishment and we are increasing ... we want to make sure that we employ people that are readily available, either to train or to act as trainers, or, indeed, in front line service.[53]

In the RAF, 45 of the 67 Full-Time Reserve Service are serving on Strike Command squadrons, Operational Conversion Units or as flying instructors within Personnel and Training Command.[54]

18. In our recent Report on wider personnel issues we noted that the RAF is now trialling reservist fast-jet pilots as well as Royal Auxiliary Air Force air crew employed in strategic lift aircraft[55] and that the RAuxAF has seven fast-jet pilots The Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, HQ Strike Command, informed us that his aircrew—

... were used actively ... during Kosovo ... for not only training but also route flying on a routine basis.[56]

We advocated in that Report a more creative approach to using reservist aircrew—

It is evident that these arrangements to use reservist aircrew point to one very productive way forward. The RAF is, in a way distinct from the other services, part of a wider world—the aviation world. The initiatives the RAF has already taken in building relations with that wider world need to be built on to develop a strategy in which they work even more closely together.[57]

We identified in particular the need to develop a career path for part-time personnel in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force[58] and in an earlier Report on the Reserves suggested the use of formed units. The Territorial Army already has a very successful helicopter regiment.

19. This argument applies with equal force to the Fleet Air Arm and the Army Air Corps, but the RAF has a more urgent need to exploit its links with civil aviation more effectively. The National Audit Office identified that—

The Royal Air Force faced critical shortages in a few airman trades and those with specialised skills such as targeteers and mission support system personnel. There were also shortages of Royal Navy trained aircrew.[59]

In our Lessons of Kosovo Report we noted that pilots were having to spend long hours in the cockpit in transit to theatre and we suspected that this might be evidence of overstretch in the RAF's capacity to deploy outside home bases.[60] The various initiatives which have been introduced to tackle the problem of pilots leaving the Forces prematurely to take up positions in civilian aviation are a positive step.[61] In order to retain staff the Forces are also offering financial incentives toward further qualifications which can be used in the commercial sector in return for an extended period of service. It is time for the Reserve Forces fully to take up the task of supporting the Regular Forces' deployments of air forces abroad. Developing a proper career path for part-time Royal Auxiliary Air Force personnel and some formed flying units would be integral parts of this, as proposed in the SDR.[62]

Medical Reservists

20. We reported in our Seventh Report of Session 1998-99 on the state of the Defence Medical Services.[63] Bearing in mind that the government's vision for the DMS is for a fully manned, trained, equipped, resourced and capable organisation with high morale, capable of providing timely and high quality medical care to the Armed Forces on operations and in peacetime,[64] we commented that—

Under the SDR, a genuine effort has been made to match medical capability to operational requirements. It is, however, clear that currently for any situation beyond a 'medium' scale of military effort—and it is not clear to us that this scale of effort is not currently exceeded—the DMS relies on reservists that simply do not exist. It is scandalous that such a situation should have been allowed to come to pass.[65]

21. The SDR placed a significant requirement on the TA to recruit large numbers of medical personnel. The Reserves were to provide 11 Field Hospitals in the event of a large scale war-fighting operation. The operational manning levels for RFA Argus, in its hospital ship role, is also likely to depend on RNR volunteers. We have previously expressed concern that the MoD had been over-ambitious in expecting to recruit 2,000 extra volunteer personnel[66] and currently shortages of medical reservists are still being experienced. The Deputy Inspector General, TA, Brigadier Andrew Durcan, admitted that—

... there are a number of areas that traditionally find it difficult to recruit, but the ones that we are most concerned about, unsurprisingly, are medical and signals.[67]

The Chairman of the Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations, Colonel Mike Taylor, was in agreement—

... the thing that is at the root of the medical recruiting problem of course is .... that as a result of SDR that the TA was given vastly enhanced establishments to fill which were a significant increase over what had been in place before.[68]

Brigadier Durcan indicated that the medical establishment overall is at 73% of its posted strength but that this disguised "quite worrying deficiencies in medical specialists".[69] Figures given in an answer to a recent Parliamentary Question highlighted shortfalls in the trained strength of nurses within the Defence Medical Services, which included 61% for Accident and Emergency, 63% for intensive/coronary care, 93% for ophthalmic nurses, and 68% for nurses with specialism in burns and plastics. The answer noted that the recruitment of trained nurses remains difficult[70] and that the MoD aims to achieve 50% of the requirement by September 2001 and 100% by April 2006.[71] It is clear that, three years on from the SDR, that the policy of placing such a responsibility on the Reservists to provide medical services is not yet working. Brigadier Holmes was explicit—

The SDR imposed on the TA a medical burden which it was in no position to bear.[72]

22. Our Report on the Defence Medical Services noted the importance of forging relations between the DMS and NHS.[73] Although this is now progressing,[74] medical personnel are still not signing up at the rate which the SDR requires. The CRFCA has been active in trying to recruit more medical personnel through promoting further liaison between the MoD and the Department of Health.[75] Brigadier Holmes told us that over the last year there had been—

... a net gain [in] what I might call inelegantly serious medics. These are not cooks and drivers. These are serious medical personnel ...".[76]

But severe shortages still remain. This is an area of continuing concern.

  

23. We were pleased to hear that 'very considerable progress' had been made in creating an effective relationship between the MoD and the NHS to supply NHS employees to support the Defence Medical Services. NHS representatives have been recruited to sit on the Defence Medical Services Board and given the opportunity to visit the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre (RTMC) at Chilwell and to learn more about the Forces.[77] But the NHS is itself suffering from overstretch, and has both funding and recruitment problems.

24. We have previously recommended that the MoD should give more thought to how the requirements of the medical Reserve can be better tailored to the specific needs of NHS personnel.[78] The Director of the Reserve Forces and Cadets told us that—

... we do emphasise the personal and professional advantages that come from military training ... the opportunity to go off on an operation and to practise accident and emergency medicine in a place like Pristina.[79]

The MoD can provide exclusive experience for NHS personnel in specialist areas such as emergency surgery, burns, trauma, etc. The potential benefits to the NHS of generating more medical reservists should be more aggressively marketed by the MoD, now that more NHS senior management figures are on the Defence Medical Services Board. In order to attract further medical staff an incentive scheme tailored toward the NHS should be introduced in order to recruit more volunteer staff. Giving a larger voice to senior part-time officers in the Territorial Army, RNR and Royal Auxiliary Air Force should also help to inject some reality into plans largely devised by regular military staff.[80]

Regular Reservists

25. When Regulars leave the Forces they are under a statutory obligation to be available for call-up for a period of up to 22 years from when they joined up.[81] Maintaining contact with these ex-Regular reservists is essential. We note below that up to 9,250 Regular Reservists had been earmarked for mobilisation for any land invasion of Kosovo in the summer of 1999.[82] We were told that although the trade and skills requirement of the Regular Reservists was in the process of being refined in preparation for the generation of that force, no specific individuals had been earmarked to deploy before it was called off.[83] The Ministry of Defence also told us that —

Regular reservists (particularly those in trades where there are shortages) receive at least one invitation, through the Annual Reporting Letter and Certificate, each year to volunteer for a tour of duty with the Regular Army [currently in the Balkans].[84]

However, we were also told by Brigadier Durcan that—

... we have rather lost the art of maintaining contact with (Regular Reservists) following the end of the Cold War.[85]

One problem is, apparently, that the introduction of Data Protection legislation has hindered accurate maintenance of such records. We were told that a new initiative had been introduced of a recorded delivery reminder letter, sent to those who fail to respond to their initial Annual Reporting Letter within a reasonable time.[86] We will be interested to learn whether this improves the accuracy of up-to-date record keeping. The MoD's memorandum states that although—

... the majority of Regular Reservists decline to volunteer the fact that their invitations are not returned as undeliverable tends to confirm contact has been maintained.[87]

This is an unacceptable approach. We do not have the evidence to assure us of the accuracy of central records of the Regular Reservists at present. The MoD cannot afford to treat this resource carelessly.

26. The Ministry of Defence admitted, in subsequent written evidence, that—

No reservist has been prosecuted for failing to provide information required by RFA [Reserve Forces Act 19]96 and the supporting regulations. It is common knowledge within the Reservist community that nothing will happen to them if they fail to comply with the regulations.[88]

If failure to prosecute those who ignore their obligations as Regular Reservists is common knowledge both within the MoD and the Reservist community it is obvious that the procedures are discredited. The MoD has to grasp the nettle and decide whether to enforce the current procedures—including prosecution—where necessary, or admit that current procedures have failed, in which case reform of the system, including the legislation, should be made a high priority. In the meantime, it must be recognised that the Territorial Army and the other Volunteer Reserve services provide the bulk of individual reinforcements, as well as being required to be available for fulfilling requirements for formed units and sub-units.

Restructuring the TAVRAs/RFCAs

27. During our previous inquiry into the Territorial Army restructuring we learned that a working group was to be set up to review the future of the Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRAs).[89] Following the review the Minister for the Armed Forces announced, on 21 April 1999, that he had—

... accepted the joint recommendation of the Commander in Chief Land Command and Chairman of the Council of TAVRAs, to set in hand new arrangements to ensure that the areas of responsibility of TAVRAs in England are aligned to those of Government office regions.[90]

28. Part XI of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 provided for the Associations' boundary changes. As a result of these changes the Eastern Wessex Association was wound up and its members absorbed into either the expanded Wessex or South East Associations.[91] According to the Ministry of Defence the regulations did not allow for an amalgamation of two Associations but the 'seeming expansion of one Association at the expense of the other'.[92] However, the MoD was keen to point out that in practice the responsibilities of each Association were amalgamated and this was not a take-over by one Association to the detriment of the other.[93]

29. On 23 March 2000, regulations were laid before Parliament to alter the title of the TAVRAs to the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations and to amend the operating regulations of the Associations.[94] On 7 September 2000 the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (Reserve Associations) Order 2000 to give effect to the boundary changes was laid before Parliament.[95] The Council of the Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations (CRFCA) told us that their new title reflects their role more accurately, supporting all three services alongside the Cadet movement. Last year, they invited the Chairman of the Sea Cadet Association and the Commandant of Air Cadets to join the Executive Committee of the Council; both accepted.[96]

30. Our witnesses from the Associations felt that the 1978 regulations under which they were operating were out of date and "had not kept pace with the introduction of delegated budgets".[97] On 23 April 1999 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between HQ LAND and the Council of the RFCAs defining the duties of the Associations within the context of the Reserve Forces Act 1996. The following December a financial memorandum was signed by the Command Secretary and Chairman of the Council of the RFCAs setting out rules for the payment of Grants in Aid by HQ LAND to the RFCAs. This gave guidance for budgetary arrangements following the TA restructuring. It also made provision for the Chairman of the Council of RFCAs, Colonel Taylor, to be a member of the Land Command Board. Commenting on this change he told us that—

The relationships currently ... between the Associations and the Chain of Command are as good as they have ever been and we are working much more closely than perhaps was the case shall we say two or three years ago.[98]

31. Restructuring has enabled the creation of 13 RFCAs whose membership totals 1,830. Each Association has both reservist and civilian members (with the exception of regular officers commanding units). At present 340 staff are employed to support the 13 RFCAs.[99] Each Association has the duty to appoint a General Purposes and Finance Committee to direct the performance of duties and powers of the Association.[100] Staff savings have been made in all RFCAs and the written submission from the RFCA estimates that £890,000 will be saved per annum in running costs due to reorganisation.[101]

32. We welcome the reorganisation of the TAVRAs into the RFCAs and are pleased to hear that it was undertaken in a positive climate. We recommend that the MoD build on this good relationship in order to find solutions for areas which are still experiencing post-restructuring problems. The first call on money saved from running costs arising from the restructuring should be for re-investment in the RFCA infrastructure.

The Associations' Estate

33. The Associations are responsible for the management of the TA Estate (although they do not own it). The restructuring proposed under the SDR involved a reduction in the establishment of the TA and consequently a rationalisation of its estate. This reduction has led to the sale of 87 TA centres, raising approximately £102m. 342 TA Centres have been retained for use by the TA and 27 for Cadet Forces, from a pre-SDR figure of 455 Centres.[102] The Committee heard from the TAVRAs during its previous inquiry that some of the decisions to sell certain sites, in their opinion, showed poor judgment on the part of the MoD.[103] We were therefore pleased to hear that the MoD, on receiving representations, did reverse several of its initial decisions to sell.[104] However our witnesses were still of the opinion that—

... the logic was there purely in terms of what we can sell ...the decisions were not necessarily taken on TA Reserve issues but how property could be capitalised. [105]

34. As a result of these sales, not only is the footprint of the TA less evident across the country, but a significant amount of work is still to be done, particularly on rehousing displaced units.[106] We were told that—

Some units that have been re-roled and in theory rehoused but the housing is not going to be financed for another three years in some cases.[107]

It is unacceptable for units of the new and improved TA to be left homeless or in temporary or inadequate accommodation for years. Such a situation is also unacceptable for the Cadet Units.

35. The RFCA told us that the funding for estate management available at present allows for only statutory (A1) and some mandatory (A2) tasks and that this "restriction will lead inevitably to deterioration of the Reserves and Cadets estate".[108] The Cadets are a valuable recruiting ground for the Regular Forces. Figures for 1999-2000 provided by the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) show that 20.2% of young soldiers and apprentices to the regular army came from the Army Cadet Force and 18.95% of soldiers to the TA.[109] As the UK, unlike many other nations, does not have conscription, such percentages show that the Cadets are significant for future recruitment. Temporary or outdated accommodation does not give the right impression to youngsters. Over time this could have a knock-on effect with young people discouraged from seriously considering the Forces as a career. It is essential, for the future of the Forces, that accommodation issues relating to the Cadets are quickly and effectively resolved.

36. The SDR guaranteed that Cadets would not be made homeless under the sell-off proposals. The CRFCA, however, told us that 54 displaced cadet detachments still required re-housing. A financial provision of £12m from the proceeds of estate disposals has been provided solely for this. [110] We recommend that the MoD continue to ring-fence this funding to ensure that all cadets units are properly housed and their accommodation is brought up to standard. In the response to this Report we expect to be given the date on which work will be complete.

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13  HC Deb, 17 November 1998, c749 Back

14  Ev p 26 Back

15  First Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 70, para 47 Back

16  Sixth Report, Session 1998-99, The Reserves Call-out Order 1999 and Progress of Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 860, Ev p 2 Back

17  ibid, para 19 Back

18  Ev p 30 Back

19  Ev p 30 Back

20  p xxiii Back

21  Q 22 Back

22  Ev p 26 Back

23  First Report, Session 1998-99, op cit, paras 9 to11 Back

24  Q 99 Back

25  HC Deb, 3 July 2000, c17 Back

26  Ev p 26 Back

27  Ev p 26  Back

28  Q 40 Back

29  Ev p 30 Back

30  First Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 70, QQ124-127 Back

31  Ev p 27 Back

32  Ev p 27 Back

33  Q 105 Back

34  QQ 104, 112-114 Back

35  QQ 25 and 26 Back

36  Q 8 Back

37  Q 113 Back

38  Q 105 Back

39  Q 8 Back

40  Q 114 Back

41  Q 9 Back

42  Second Report, Session 2000-01, The Strategic Defence Review: Policy for People, HC 29, para 17 Back

43  Q 12 Back

44  Ev p 24 Back

45  We note that the new CO of the Air Branch is part-time Back

46  One of the fourteen has not trained for one year Back

47  Ev p 26 Back

48  Ev p 26 Back

49  Cm 3999, Supporting Essays, p 7-18 Back

50  Ev p 26 Back

51  Ev p 26 Back

52  The MoD told us that the ratio of Auxiliary pilots to navigators is 7:2 for the F3 and 31:9 for all aircraft types. Back

53  Q 29 Back

54  Ev p 26 Back

55  Eighth Report, Session 1997-98, The Strategic Defence Review, HC 138, para 262 Back

56  Q 27 Back

57  Second Report, Session 2000-02, The Strategic Defence Review: Policy for People, HC 29, para 69 Back

58   ibid  Back

59  Report from the National Audit Office, Session 1999-2000, Kosovo: The Financial Management of Military Operations, HC 530 Back

60  Fourteenth Report, Session 1999-2000, Lessons of Kosovo, HC 347, para 133 Back

61  Second Report, Session 2000-02, The Strategic Defence Review: Policy for People, HC 29, para 66 Back

62  Cm 3999, Supporting Essays p 7-3 Back

63  Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services, HC 447 Back

64  Defence Medical Services: A Strategy for the Future, Ministry of Defence, December 1998 Back

65  Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services, HC 447, para 88 Back

66  First Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 70, para 28 Back

67  Q 13 Back

68  Q 104 Back

69  Q 13 Back

70  HC Deb, 29 January 2001, c63w Back

71  Ev p 25 Back

72  Q 81 Back

73   Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services, HC 447, para 90 Back

74  Q 85 Back

75  Q 85 Back

76  Q 83 Back

77  Q 80 Back

78  Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services, HC 447, para 87 Back

79  Q 89 Back

80  At a hearing in on 5 July 1999 with the Surgeon General and his Chief of Staff, the Committee were somewhat surprised to find that none of the witnesses appeared to know who any of the senior volunteer reservists of the medical elements of the RNR, TA and Royal Auxiliary Air Force were. Instead, a reliance was being developed on so-called full-time Reservists, brought in from the regular forces. Seventh Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Defence Medical Services, HC 447, Q 316 Back

81  Army Form B 271W (11/99) Back

82  Ev p 28 Back

83  Ev p 28 Back

84  Ev p 29 Back

85  Q 63 Back

86  Ev p 28 Back

87  Ev p 29 Back

88  Ev p 28 Back

89  First Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army, HC 70, para 38 Back

90  HC Deb, 21 April 1999, c565w Back

91  S.I., 2000, No.2379 Back

92  Ev p 35 Back

93  Ev p 35 Back

94  The Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Regulations 2000 Back

95  S.I., 2000, No. 2379 Back

96  Ev p 13 Back

97  Ev p 13 Back

98  Q 93 Back

99  Ev p 13 Back

100  RFCA Regulations, para 1.6 Back

101  Ev p 13 Back

102  HC Deb, 16 January 2001, c147w Back

103  Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army, HC 70, Q 51 Back

104  Q 138 Back

105  Q 138 Back

106  Q 97 Back

107  Q 97 Back

108  Ev p 30 Back

109  Ev p 31 Back

110  Ev p 14 Back

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Prepared 10 April 2001