3. The 2000-01 Session lasted from 6 December 2000
to 14 May 2001, a total of 83 sitting days. The Committee held
15 meetings, at 11 of which evidence was taken. Six evidence sessions
were televised. Five meetings were held concurrently with other
4. We took evidence from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP,
Secretary of State for Defence, on two occasions, one of which
followed up our Report last Session on European Security and Defence;
from Mr John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces
on one occasion, from the Rt Hon Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean,
Minister for Defence Procurement, on one occasion and from Dr
Lewis Moonie, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, on one occasion.
Other witnesses included 21 officials from the MoD, including
three serving members of HM Forces and seven employees of Defence
Executive Agencies. These sessions included one on 1 March with
the new Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce
A full list of witnesses is at Annex A.
5. The Committee held six informal meetings or briefings
during the Session.
|7 December 2000||Russian Defence Minister
|18 December 2000||Officers' Pensions Society
|22 January 2001||General Manilov
|29 January 2001||Romanian Defence Minister
||Future of NATO etc
|30 March ||Federation of Electronics Industries
||Procurement and research
|24 April 2001||Norwegian Defence Minister
||UK-Norway relations etc
6. The Committee made six visits during the Session,
two within the UK (at a total cost of £2,550) and two overseas
(at a total estimated cost of £28,800).
7. Our two UK visits were as follows:
|7-8 February 2001||St Athan
||Defence Aviation Repair Agency inquiry
|13-14 February 2001
8. Our overseas visits this year again achieved our
objective of visiting front-line and support units on active service
as well as an important visit to Ukraine and Russia to renew our
contacts and learn of recent developments in those countries.
|10-15 December 2000
||Kiev and Moscow||NATO-Russian relations/National Missile Defence
|20-23 March 2001||Kosovo
||Peace support operations
9. Individual members of the Committee also travelled
in a representative capacity as follows.
|12-13 February 2001
||Stockholm||Conference of EU parliamentary defence committees
|13-15 February 2001
||Sierra Leone||Peace support operations
Members' participation rates in these activities
are published in Annex C.
Membership and Staff
10. There were no changes this Session to the membership
or staff of the Committee, the details of which are set out, along
with details of the Committee's specialist advisers, in our last
11. We wish to take this final opportunity to express
our gratitude to our Specialist Advisers
who have assisted the Committee over the course of this Parliament.
Inquiries and Reports
12. We published nine Reports and six Special Reports
over the Sessions which are summarised below.
We also continued our joint inquiry with our colleagues on the
Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry
Committees into the government's annual reports on strategic export
controls. There were five joint meetings and we jointly published
two further Reports.
FIRST REPORT: THE SIX NATION FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT
13. This Report, published on 14 February, examined
the proposed treaty establishing the legal basis for an Agreement
between the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden concerning
measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the
European defence industry. This inquiry was part of our ongoing
role in seeking to examine all significant treaties, relating
to our area of responsibility, which are presented to Parliament
14. We concluded that the effect of the Agreement
should be to bring overdue improvements in the European defence
markets and that its main value would be in providing a means
to apply pressure to countries not following the spirit of the
Agreement in relation to ensuring security of supply. We expressed
some scepticism as to whether the rather imprecise provisions
of the Agreement would be sufficient to advance open, competitive
and well-managed collaborative research programmes, but welcomed
its stipulation that competition should be the preferred method
for managing collaborative research. We concluded that the UK
would need to balance carefully the relative industrial and technological
benefits it derives from collaborating with Europe and with the
United States, and that access to US technology must remain a
vital part of the UK's research strategy. We were reluctant to
see duplication and overlap in the already overcrowded world of
defence requirements harmonisation but, equally, believed it would
be regrettable should the momentum be lost, which OCCAR
had now achieved in its existing role, in attempting to take on
15. We concluded that the effectiveness of the Framework
Agreement relies on the political, rather than the legal, commitment
of its signatories and we urged the MoD not unduly to circumscribe
the UK industry in taking the Agreement forward. We recommended
that the ratification of the Agreement should not be delayed.
16. The government's observations were published
on 3 April 2001 as the Third Special Report from the Committee.
The government agreed that strong collaborative research relationships
should be sustained both with the United States and partner countries
in Europe. It believed it was important for OCCAR to continue
to focus on its primary activity of providing effective management
of equipment procurement programmes. The government reported that
the UK had ratified the Agreement on 28 February and had been
the first of the six countries to deposit its instrument of ratification.
The Agreement would come into effect thirty days after the second
signatory had deposited its instrument, and Germany was expected
to do this shortly.
SECOND REPORT: THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW: POLICY
17. This Report, published on 23 February, was the
result of a comprehensive examination of the MoD's progress in
implementing its Policy for People, announced in the Strategic
Defence Review in July 1998, in the light of the Armed Forces
Overarching Personnel Strategy which was published in February
2000. It began by considering the context in which the Armed Forces
will have to recruit and retain sufficient men and women over
the next ten years or so. It looks at the ways in which the Armed
Forces have become less visible in society over recent decades,
and some of the consequences of this.
18. We noted that the targets for full manning of
each of the three Services are proving difficult to achieve. We
also noted that in the preceding few months outflow from each
Service had consistently exceeded intake. The small net loss which
resulted tended to understate two effectsthe greater effect
that the loss of trained personnel has on the overall trained
strength of those available for operational duties (because
new recruits take time to become usable) and the particularly
acute shortages in key specialisms, such as pilots and medical
19. Our view on recruitment was that the story is
generally a positive one. The Services' achievements in recruiting
women and members of ethnic minorities and the significant improvement
in reaching these groups of potential recruits in recent years
were noted. However, we commented on the targets for ethnic minority
recruitment which the Armed Forces have set not being met and
recommended more systematic evaluation of recruiting strategies.
Equally, we recorded our disappointment that figures for the recruitment
of women did not shown sustained growth and concluded that it
was in the Services' own interest to publicise more widely the
career opportunities they offer to women. In assessing comments
by the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff (General Sir Charles
Guthrie) on the MoD's policy on women in the frontline, we concluded
that it was not clear whether the exclusion of women was on the
grounds of physiological ability or moral distaste for women having
to do such work and concluded that if it were the latter, it was
time it was abandoned.
20. We regarded retention as a much greater problem
than recruitment. A particular issue for service men and women
and their families is the increased level of activity which all
the Services have experienced since the end of the Cold War, which
has gone side by side with a reduction in numbers by one-third.
The Report looks at the effects of these changed patterns of activity,
and the steps the MoD has taken to tackle some of them. We concluded
that if the sustained pattern of high operational tempo is to
be maintained, the Services may have to accept that they need
more people, and in the short to medium term they may have to
consider rewarding existing personnel more generously.
21. The Report examines some of the initiatives the
MoD has introduced to tackle retention problems, particularly
new training and education initiatives, housing (both for single
personnel and for those with families), and pay. On Single Living
Accommodation, we concluded that it was simply unacceptable for
the upgrade programme to take as long as ten years, and that the
worst accommodation should be improved as a matter of urgency.
We commented that a high standard of Service Families Accommodation
should be available to all those who want it and recommended that
more of the proceeds from the 1996 sell-off of the married quarters
estate should be made available to the Defence Housing Executive
for the upgrade of family accommodation.
22. The Report ends by looking at the way in which
the MoD looks after ex-service men and women. We noted, with some
impatience, the delay in completing the long-promised reviews
of Service pensions and compensation arrangements for those injured
or disabled as a result of their service.
23. Overall, we welcomed most of the measures which
have been introduced under the Policy for People but we questioned
whether these will be sufficient to enable the Armed Forces to
achieve and sustain full manning levels. We suggested that special
measures may be needed to address particularly acute shortages,
and that these may prove expensive. We believed the MoD might
have to be more imaginative in the way it recruits and uses people,
including thinking about more flexible career patterns and greater
use of part-time and volunteer personnel.
24. The government's observations were published
on 9 May as the Fourth Special Report from the Committee. The
MoD accepted that achieving SDR manning targets would be challenging
but believed them to be robust and well-founded. The Committee's
criticism that retention, particularly in the Army, was not being
tackled with sufficient urgency or imagination was rejected and
examples were provided of new recruitment and retention strategies
in all three Services. Our Report criticised the delay in publishing
the outcome of the MoD's reviews of pensions and compensation
arrangements, and these have since been published, as have the
findings of the Defence Training Review, on which the Report also
commented. The Committee's specific recommendations on funding
for Service Families Accommodation, and on health and education
provision for Services families, were rejected, as was the request
for a statement on the MoD's policy on unmarried partners.
THIRD REPORT: STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS: ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1999 AND PARLIAMENTARY PRIOR SCRUTINY
25. This Report was made jointly with the Foreign
Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees
and was published on 14 March.
The Report renewed our call for Ministers to agree to a system
of prior parliamentary scrutiny of applications for arms export
licences. In December, the government rejected the Committees'
initial proposal made in our July 2000 Report. In this Report,
we brought forward a new set of compromise proposals designed
to meet the objections advanced by the government and others,
while preserving the principle of prior parliamentary scrutiny
of delegated powers. These included: halving the number of applications
brought before the Committee; accepting that Stage 2 notifications
should be made in confidence; and agreeing that Ministers should
be free to go ahead with the grant of a licence otherwise subject
to Stage 2 notification where there are genuine grounds for believing
a contract might otherwise be lost. We concluded that our new
proposals deserved proper scrutiny within Whitehall; but that
there were good reasons to have a system of prior parliamentary
scrutiny ready to operate as soon as committees were set up in
a new Parliament. We believed that our proposals for prior scrutiny
were the logical extension of the process begun by the government
26. We also commented on some specific issues. We
believed it would be deeply regrettable if the government failed
to present a Bill in the current Parliament, at least in draft,
giving effect to the proposals in the 1996 Scott Report.
We commended the progress made on the EU Code of Conduct and called
for the government to press EU applicant countries to conform
to the Code. We repeated our call for a common interpretation
of the EU embargo on China. We commended the government's efforts
on the issue of small arms. On Israel, we welcomed the
more cautious attitude towards granting open licences to such
destinations, announced by the Foreign Secretary in response to
concerns expressed in our earlier reports in relation to Zimbabwe,
and concluded that officials should have drawn Ministers' attention
to the possibility of military equipment being used in the occupation
of Southern Lebanon and thereby requiring an explicit policy decision.
We reasserted our opinion that a serious error of judgement was
made in late 1998 and early 1999 in granting several Military
List open licences covering Zimbabwe and concluded that the Government
Response on this point was factually inaccurate and wholly irrelevant
to our central concerns, in adducing the fact that a number of
the open licenses were to named end-users.
27. The Quadripartite Committee went on to consider
the draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill, the subject
matter of its Seventh Report (paragraphs 44-48 below).
FOURTH REPORT: THE DRAFT DEFENCE AVIATION REPAIR
AGENCY TRADING FUND ORDER 2001
28. This Report was published on 13 March and examined
the Draft Defence Aviation Repair Agency Trading Fund Order 2001.
Under the provisions of the Order (which has subsequently been
approved by Parliament), the Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA)
converted to a trading fund on 1 April 2001.
As a trading fund, DARA will be put on a more commercial footing
and will be expected to cover its costs from its trading income
(rather than from MoD grants). We examined the rationale and the
implications of that change of status and the Agency's preparations
for the change, including its rationalisation and relocation programmes.
29. We noted that trends in the aviation repair market
are converging to dictate a significantly different approach to
meeting the MoD's requirements. Competition for available work
has become more intense, in a market where a more flexible and
integrated approach to aviation maintenance is needed to win contracts.
We considered it right that the MoD, like its civil counterparts,
should be seeking (through the establishment of the trading fund)
to take advantage of these new more favourable conditions. We
warned, however, that safeguards are still needed. First, there
is still a need for assured access to repair capabilities and
a capacity for undertaking 'surge' workloads in times of crisis
(as the Kosovo campaign demonstrated), which must be protected
in DARA. Second, partnerships being developed by DARA with the
private sector must not be allowed to remove the MoD's ability
to run effective competitions for its repair requirements.
30. It had already been decided to move engine repair
work from DARA's St Athan site (near Cardiff) to Fleetlands in
Hampshire, and DARA is weighing up a proposal to move St Athan's
remaining work to new purpose-built facilities at Cardiff Airport.
Such rationalisation plans will help it compete with private industry,
but we believed this should proceed only after thorough investment
appraisal and consultation. We welcomed the MoD's assurances that
compulsory redundancies would be avoided.
31. We welcomed the focus now being given to improving
unacceptably long 'turnround times' for completing aviation repairs
in DARA's workshops, which was felt in the unavailability of front-line
aircraft, but we wished to see measures introduced to continue
monitoring turnround times when DARA became a trading fund.
32. We believed that, from the MoD viewpoint, converting
DARA to a trading fund would develop a competitive alternative
to its commercial sources of repair work, saving money for other
more pressing defence requirements. For DARA, the change of status
would challenge its previously sheltered relationship with the
MoD, but it would also bring benefits. If DARA cannot deliver,
however, the MoD might be driven to place more repair work directly
with industry, which would leave DARA to wither on the vine.
33. We agreed that the Agency should become a trading
fund on 1 April 2001, as planned, and should continue to have
that status for the foreseeable future, but we believed that privatisation
should not be on the agenda.
34. The Government's response to our Report, to be
published as the Fifth Special Report from the Committee, accepted
all of our conclusions and recommendations, except to remain silent
on the possibility of privatisation of the Agency in the long
FIFTH REPORT: THE DRAFT DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
LABORATORY TRADING FUND ORDER 2001
35. This Report was published on 13 March and examined
the Draft Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Trading Fund
Order 2001. This was the fourth time in this Parliament that we
had examined the government's proposals for a public-private partnership
for the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), which are
inextricably linked to the trading fund Order.
The Order, if approved, would, on 1 July 2001, set up the Defence
Science and Technology Laboratory, the part of DERA which will
remain in the public sector after the public-private partnership,
as a trading fund. At the same time, 'New-DERA', the three-quarters
of DERA to be privatised, will be established as a 'public limited
company' (initially wholly government owned, but intended to be
floated on the stock exchange later this year). The intention
of the Report was primarily to put the evidence we had received,
including oral evidence from the Minister, in the public domain,
before the House began its consideration of the draft Order.
36. We were disappointed that the evidence showed
that areas of uncertainty we had previously identified remained
unresolved. Our initial assessment of the recently announced proposals
for the Defence Diversification Agency raised further doubts about
the viability of an organisation which will apparently be divided
three ways. Our more general misgivings about many aspects of
the part-privatisation of DERA had also not been dispelled. Indeed,
we believed there was now a new issue about the financial implications
of New-DERA's sale. Previously announced plans were that the Treasury
would get the proceeds, except for £250 million for the MoD.
It seems now that the MoD may also have to pay some of the cost
of implementing the public-private partnership, wiping out the
benefit of the sale. We charged the Minister with seeking to secure
the full sale receipt for the MoD, and the reimbursement from
the Treasury of the MoD's implementation costs, which may be as
much as £80 million. We emphasised that we expected that,
by the time that the MoD came to re-assess the viability of the
prospective New-DERA, these outstanding issues and uncertainties
should have been resolved.
37. We concluded that if the government was resolutely
set on the misguided change of status for DERA, a delay in approving
the trading fund Order would only serve to undermine the prospects
for a successful flotation and to further damage DERA's already
brittle staff morale, neither of which we wished to see. However,
because the Order takes forward the partial privatisation of DERA,
we could not lend it positive support. We concluded that we would
still prefer that the proposed public-private partnership for
the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency be abandoned.
38. The Government's response to our Report will
be published as the Sixth Special Report from the Committee. The
Government confirmed that £250 million would be added to
the MoD's budget in 2001-02 whether or not the sale of New-DERA
took place in the same time frame, but that the costs of dividing
DERA and preparing for the privatisation would lie where they
fellwithin the MoD, within the new trading fund, and within
New-DERA respectively. The Government response was not able to
fill in all of the gaps and uncertainties identified in the Committee's
Report, but the public-private partnership is to go ahead as planned.
SIXTH REPORT: THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW: THE RESERVE
39. This Report, published on 10 April 2001, examined
the progress since the SDR in the restructuring of the Reserve
40. In response to our recommendation in our previous
Report on TA restructuring,
the MoD has provided us with quarterly updates on the progress
of the TA restructuring. Phase 2 of the restructuring (and downsizing)
process was completed in April 2000 and membership of the TA at
1 October 2000 was 40,382. As the SDR had promised better training
for this reduced force, we were concerned that although the number
of man training days for the TA has remained consistent, disproportionately
training was now given at individual level rather than at unit
level. We remain unconvinced that the structure of the infantry
battalions is satisfactory. We also recommended the reintroduction
of a fast-track entry system for officers in order to attract
and retain more Reservists. With regard to medical reservists,
we recommended that the MoD should introduce an incentive scheme
tailored towards the NHS in order to attract more recruits.
41. The Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve
Associations had been transformed into Reserve Forces and Cadets
Associations (RFCA) and we examined the new arrangements and regulations
governing their activities which had been set in place. We concluded
that the new arrangements seemed to be working well, and that
the new title more accurately reflected their role supporting
all three services alongside the Cadet movement.
42. There had been two further Call-out Orders since
our last Report, one for Reservists to serve in Sierra Leone and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the second to renew
permission for the use of Reservist troops in supporting the operations
of NATO in former Yugoslavia and monitoring of no-fly zones in
northern and southern Iraq.
Administration of both Call-outs had worked well, but we expressed
concern that rates of volunteering had fallen and there was danger
of 'overfishing' the volunteer reserves as we had noted in a previous
We recommended that the MoD monitor this trend.
43. We had heard during our inquiry into the lessons
of Kosovo that the Chief of the Defence Staff came very close
to a large scale mobilisation of Reserves.
Our MoD witnesses were frank in their admission that the prospect
of compulsory mass mobilisation had come as a shock. It was clear
from the evidence that a great deal of further work needs to be
done in order for such a large operation to run smoothly. We recommended
that our successors should monitor the implementation of the lessons
of Kosovo for TA mobilisation, and the results of the forthcoming
SEVENTH REPORT: THE DRAFT EXPORT CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
44. This joint Report from the 'Quadripartite' Committeethe
second this Sessionwas published on 9 May 2001. It examined
the government's draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill,
which had been published for consultation on 12 April.
45. The Bill, when introduced, will replace the 1939
Act which has provided the statutory basis for strategic export
(and import) controls for more than 60 years. Its use came to
public prominence in the course of the Iraqi 'Supergun' affair
ten years ago, and its replacement by new legislation was recommended
in Lord Scott's report on his inquiry into that debacle in 1996.
The principle innovation is the setting out, in a Schedule to
the Bill, of the 'purposes' for which export control orders may
be made. The Bill also provides for control of 'intangible' exports
(such as the electronic transfer of technological data), and for
control of trafficking and brokering of arms.
46. The Committees took evidence on 25 April from
a range of witnesses representing NGOs with an interest in the
field, defence manufacturers, academic institutions which conduct
research in the area, Lord Scott and Ms Presiley Baxendale QC
and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
47. We welcomed the draft Bill and the consultation
process. We expressed some reservations over the powers to make
secondary legislation, particularly in relation to extending the
list of purposes and for imposing temporary controls outside the
purposes, but welcomed the undertaking to consult on secondary
legislation. We regretted the retention of the provisions of the
1939 Act relating to import controls. We had some detailed
concerns relating to: intangible exports, particularly in relation
to WMD technologies; the appeals procedure against refusals of
licences; the decision not to place administrative arrangements
for granting export licences on a statutory basis; and the exemption
of government-to-government exports from the ambit of the Bill.
We also expressed some doubts about whether the enforcement provisions,
particularly in relation to end-user requirements in licences,
were sufficient. We look forward to seeing the extent to which
these concerns have been addressed when the Bill itself is published,
which we very much hope will be early in the next Session.
48. We took the opportunity to examine some of the
witnesses on the questions of prior parliamentary scrutiny which
we raised in our Third Report of this Session.
We were pleased to learn that the provisions of the draft Bill
were not seen as offering any impediment to establishing such
arrangements on a non-statutory basis, and were heartened by the
positive tone of the Secretary of State's responses on this matter.
49. This Report, published on 9 May, was the second
in what is intended to be a regular annual series examining the
key documents in the cycle of MoD reports to Parliament. These
are: the Expenditure Plans and Estimates, the Performance Report,
the Investment Strategy, the Defence Statistics and the Resource
Accounts. We also examined a number of additional documents outside
the strict definition of this cycle, relating to defence policy.
50. We welcomed modest improvements in the quantity
and quality of the information provided in these documents. However,
we regretted the disconnection which their format makes between
the examination of policy and the discussion of resources and
performance. We recommended further recasting of the Expenditure
Plans to address this problem.
51. We noted some key issues in relation to the investment
strategy, particularly the future balance between expenditure
on personnel and on equipment; the expansion of the PFI programme;
and the programme of surplus estate disposals. We noted proposed
changes in the method of reporting performance, expressing the
hope that it would expose more of the relationship to the Department's
own internal planning system. We expressed particular concern
over the slippage in achieving full operational capability of
the Joint Rapid Reaction Forceone of the MoD's key performance
52. We continued to press for the Resource Accounts
to expose more detail in their output performance analyses, and
to demonstrate that resource accounting and budgeting was more
than just an accounting exercise and was enabling the more efficient
application of resources. On the defence budget, we welcomed the
modest increases announced in Spending Review 2000, but noted
that these were insufficient to eliminate pressure on the budget.
In this context we were pleased to hear the information that the
MoD was examining the effects of the implementation of its efficiency
programme. We hope our successors will continue to monitor it.
53. We also welcomed the publication of the two policy
documents Defence Policy 2001 and The Future Strategic
Context for Defence. We examined at some length the difficult
questions they raised for the future, in shaping the UK's defence
policy to a changing strategic context. We believe there would
be value in combining this kind of policy analysis more directly
with the discussions about resources and performance set out in
the documents that form the annual reporting cycle.
NINTH REPORT: MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROJECTS
54. This Report was the third, and most recent, examining
the progress of a selection of major equipment projects (paragraph
65). Our first report
in the series examined the then recent collapse of the collaborative
Common New Generation Frigate and its replacement by a national
Type-45 destroyer programme. Our second inquiry
focused on the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile for the
Eurofighter and strategic air-lift, the competitions for which
had then just been decided, and the Bowman communication system
whose competition was on the brink of having to be relaunched.
55. Our latest inquiry covered the Future Aircraft
Carrier, at a critical point in assessment design studies; the
recent selection of the UK/US Joint Strike Fighter to operate
from the new carriers; the technical problems encountered with
the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile intended for the Eurofighter
an other aircraft; the MoD's intervention in the contracts for
the construction of the Roll-on Roll-off ships; and enhancements
to the UK's precision-guided bombing capability in the light of
the lessons drawn from the Kosovo conflict.
56. An aim of this series of equipment procurement
inquiries has been to inform the annual Defence Equipment debate.
The next debate will fall in the next Parliament. To make the
evidence gathered from our latest inquiry available for that debate,
we published it with our Ninth Report on 9 May. Given its timing,
we were not able to complete our inquiry, which we urged our successors
to develop further in the new Parliament.
as HC (2000-01) 390-i Back
Report, Session 1999-2000, European Security and Defence,
HC 264 Back
as HC(2000-01) 298-i Back
also Appendices to this Report, pp 6 to 8 Back
14 HC 177,
Session 2000-01, op cit, paragraphs 9-13. The Committee's
Secretary from 1 January was Miss Fiona Mearns Back
15 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Michael Alcock, Lt General Sir Peter Beale, Professor
Michael Clarke, Mr Humphrey Crum-Ewing, Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold,
Dr Jonathan Eyal, Professor Keith Hartley, Dr Beatrice Heuser,
Dr Irina Isakova, Andrew Keeling, Professor David Kirkpatrick,
Professor Colin McInnes, Dr Andrew Rathmell, Ms Jane Sharp, Major-General
Peter Sheppard, Mr James Sherr, Air Marshal Sir John Walker and
Lt General Sir Christopher Wallace Back
cost of Advisers' fees and expenses will be published in the Sessional
17 A full
list of Defence Committee Reports is published at Annex D Back
Third Report and Seventh Report below Back
Organisation Conjointe de Co-operation en matières d'Armaments Back
members of the Defence Committee were delegated to be the principal
participants in the Quadripartite Committee: Mr Cohen, Mr George
and Mr Viggers. Mr Brazier, Mr Cann and Mrs Moffatt also participated. Back
draft Bill was published on 29 March 2001 as Cm 5091 Back
draft Order was debated in the Sixth Standing Committee on Delegated
Legislation on 19 March 2001 Back
Order was approved by the House on 20 March 2001and the conversion
to trading fund status duly took place on 1 April 2001 (HC Deb,
2 April 2001, cc 20-21w) Back
Sixth Report, Session 1997-98, The Defence Evaluation and Research
Agency, HC 621; Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, Defence
Research, HC 616; Ninth Report, Session 1999-2000, The
Future of DERA, HC 462 Back
Order was debated in the Eighth Standing Committee on Delegated
Legislation on 22 March 2001 Back
draft Order was approved by the House on 26 March 2001 Back
Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial
Army Restructuring, HC 70 Back
28 A further
Call-out Order was made on 5 April 2001 Back
Report, Session 1998-99, The Reserves Call-out Order 1999 and
Progress of Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 860, para 14 Back
Report, Session 1999-2000, Lessons of Kosovo, HC 347, Q35 Back
the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade
and Industry Committees Back
Report, Session 1998-99, Major Procurement Projects Survey:
The Common New Generation Frigate, HC 544 Back
Report, Session 1999-2000, Major Procurement Projects,
HC 528 Back