Select Committee on Defence Seventh Special Report


Formal meetings

3. The 2000-01 Session lasted from 6 December 2000 to 14 May 2001, a total of 83 sitting days. The Committee held 15 meetings, at 11 of which evidence was taken. Six evidence sessions were televised. Five meetings were held concurrently with other committees.

4. We took evidence from Rt Hon Geoffrey Hoon MP, Secretary of State for Defence, on two occasions, one of which[10] followed up our Report last Session on European Security and Defence;[11] from Mr John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces on one occasion, from the Rt Hon Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Minister for Defence Procurement, on one occasion and from Dr Lewis Moonie, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, on one occasion. Other witnesses included 21 officials from the MoD, including three serving members of HM Forces and seven employees of Defence Executive Agencies. These sessions included one on 1 March with the new Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce OBE.[12] A full list of witnesses is at Annex A.

Informal meetings

5. The Committee held six informal meetings or briefings during the Session.

Meeting with
7 December 2000Russian Defence Minister NATO-Russian relations
18 December 2000Officers' Pensions Society Personnel issues
22 January 2001General Manilov NATO-Russian relations
29 January 2001Romanian Defence Minister Future of NATO etc
30 March Federation of Electronics Industries Procurement and research
24 April 2001Norwegian Defence Minister UK-Norway relations etc


6. The Committee made six visits during the Session, two within the UK (at a total cost of £2,550) and two overseas (at a total estimated cost of £28,800).


7. Our two UK visits were as follows:

7-8 February 2001St Athan Defence Aviation Repair Agency inquiry
13-14 February 2001 UK


8. Our overseas visits this year again achieved our objective of visiting front-line and support units on active service (in Kosovo),[13] as well as an important visit to Ukraine and Russia to renew our contacts and learn of recent developments in those countries.

10-15 December 2000 Kiev and MoscowNATO-Russian relations/National Missile Defence
20-23 March 2001Kosovo Peace support operations

9. Individual members of the Committee also travelled in a representative capacity as follows.

12-13 February 2001 StockholmConference of EU parliamentary defence committees
13-15 February 2001 Sierra LeonePeace support operations

Members' participation rates in these activities are published in Annex C.

Membership and Staff

10. There were no changes this Session to the membership or staff of the Committee, the details of which are set out, along with details of the Committee's specialist advisers, in our last Annual Report.[14]

11. We wish to take this final opportunity to express our gratitude to our Specialist Advisers[15] who have assisted the Committee over the course of this Parliament.[16]

Inquiries and Reports

12. We published nine Reports and six Special Reports over the Sessions which are summarised below.[17] We also continued our joint inquiry with our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees into the government's annual reports on strategic export controls. There were five joint meetings and we jointly published two further Reports.[18]


13. This Report, published on 14 February, examined the proposed treaty establishing the legal basis for an Agreement between the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the European defence industry. This inquiry was part of our ongoing role in seeking to examine all significant treaties, relating to our area of responsibility, which are presented to Parliament before ratification.

14. We concluded that the effect of the Agreement should be to bring overdue improvements in the European defence markets and that its main value would be in providing a means to apply pressure to countries not following the spirit of the Agreement in relation to ensuring security of supply. We expressed some scepticism as to whether the rather imprecise provisions of the Agreement would be sufficient to advance open, competitive and well-managed collaborative research programmes, but welcomed its stipulation that competition should be the preferred method for managing collaborative research. We concluded that the UK would need to balance carefully the relative industrial and technological benefits it derives from collaborating with Europe and with the United States, and that access to US technology must remain a vital part of the UK's research strategy. We were reluctant to see duplication and overlap in the already overcrowded world of defence requirements harmonisation but, equally, believed it would be regrettable should the momentum be lost, which OCCAR[19] had now achieved in its existing role, in attempting to take on additional responsibilities.

15. We concluded that the effectiveness of the Framework Agreement relies on the political, rather than the legal, commitment of its signatories and we urged the MoD not unduly to circumscribe the UK industry in taking the Agreement forward. We recommended that the ratification of the Agreement should not be delayed.

16. The government's observations were published on 3 April 2001 as the Third Special Report from the Committee. The government agreed that strong collaborative research relationships should be sustained both with the United States and partner countries in Europe. It believed it was important for OCCAR to continue to focus on its primary activity of providing effective management of equipment procurement programmes. The government reported that the UK had ratified the Agreement on 28 February and had been the first of the six countries to deposit its instrument of ratification. The Agreement would come into effect thirty days after the second signatory had deposited its instrument, and Germany was expected to do this shortly.


17. This Report, published on 23 February, was the result of a comprehensive examination of the MoD's progress in implementing its Policy for People, announced in the Strategic Defence Review in July 1998, in the light of the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy which was published in February 2000. It began by considering the context in which the Armed Forces will have to recruit and retain sufficient men and women over the next ten years or so. It looks at the ways in which the Armed Forces have become less visible in society over recent decades, and some of the consequences of this.

18. We noted that the targets for full manning of each of the three Services are proving difficult to achieve. We also noted that in the preceding few months outflow from each Service had consistently exceeded intake. The small net loss which resulted tended to understate two effects—the greater effect that the loss of trained personnel has on the overall trained strength of those available for operational duties (because new recruits take time to become usable) and the particularly acute shortages in key specialisms, such as pilots and medical personnel.

19. Our view on recruitment was that the story is generally a positive one. The Services' achievements in recruiting women and members of ethnic minorities and the significant improvement in reaching these groups of potential recruits in recent years were noted. However, we commented on the targets for ethnic minority recruitment which the Armed Forces have set not being met and recommended more systematic evaluation of recruiting strategies. Equally, we recorded our disappointment that figures for the recruitment of women did not shown sustained growth and concluded that it was in the Services' own interest to publicise more widely the career opportunities they offer to women. In assessing comments by the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff (General Sir Charles Guthrie) on the MoD's policy on women in the frontline, we concluded that it was not clear whether the exclusion of women was on the grounds of physiological ability or moral distaste for women having to do such work and concluded that if it were the latter, it was time it was abandoned.

20. We regarded retention as a much greater problem than recruitment. A particular issue for service men and women and their families is the increased level of activity which all the Services have experienced since the end of the Cold War, which has gone side by side with a reduction in numbers by one-third. The Report looks at the effects of these changed patterns of activity, and the steps the MoD has taken to tackle some of them. We concluded that if the sustained pattern of high operational tempo is to be maintained, the Services may have to accept that they need more people, and in the short to medium term they may have to consider rewarding existing personnel more generously.

21. The Report examines some of the initiatives the MoD has introduced to tackle retention problems, particularly new training and education initiatives, housing (both for single personnel and for those with families), and pay. On Single Living Accommodation, we concluded that it was simply unacceptable for the upgrade programme to take as long as ten years, and that the worst accommodation should be improved as a matter of urgency. We commented that a high standard of Service Families Accommodation should be available to all those who want it and recommended that more of the proceeds from the 1996 sell-off of the married quarters estate should be made available to the Defence Housing Executive for the upgrade of family accommodation.

22. The Report ends by looking at the way in which the MoD looks after ex-service men and women. We noted, with some impatience, the delay in completing the long-promised reviews of Service pensions and compensation arrangements for those injured or disabled as a result of their service.

23. Overall, we welcomed most of the measures which have been introduced under the Policy for People but we questioned whether these will be sufficient to enable the Armed Forces to achieve and sustain full manning levels. We suggested that special measures may be needed to address particularly acute shortages, and that these may prove expensive. We believed the MoD might have to be more imaginative in the way it recruits and uses people, including thinking about more flexible career patterns and greater use of part-time and volunteer personnel.

24. The government's observations were published on 9 May as the Fourth Special Report from the Committee. The MoD accepted that achieving SDR manning targets would be challenging but believed them to be robust and well-founded. The Committee's criticism that retention, particularly in the Army, was not being tackled with sufficient urgency or imagination was rejected and examples were provided of new recruitment and retention strategies in all three Services. Our Report criticised the delay in publishing the outcome of the MoD's reviews of pensions and compensation arrangements, and these have since been published, as have the findings of the Defence Training Review, on which the Report also commented. The Committee's specific recommendations on funding for Service Families Accommodation, and on health and education provision for Services families, were rejected, as was the request for a statement on the MoD's policy on unmarried partners.


25. This Report was made jointly with the Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees and was published on 14 March.[20] The Report renewed our call for Ministers to agree to a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny of applications for arms export licences. In December, the government rejected the Committees' initial proposal made in our July 2000 Report. In this Report, we brought forward a new set of compromise proposals designed to meet the objections advanced by the government and others, while preserving the principle of prior parliamentary scrutiny of delegated powers. These included: halving the number of applications brought before the Committee; accepting that Stage 2 notifications should be made in confidence; and agreeing that Ministers should be free to go ahead with the grant of a licence otherwise subject to Stage 2 notification where there are genuine grounds for believing a contract might otherwise be lost. We concluded that our new proposals deserved proper scrutiny within Whitehall; but that there were good reasons to have a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny ready to operate as soon as committees were set up in a new Parliament. We believed that our proposals for prior scrutiny were the logical extension of the process begun by the government in 1997.

26. We also commented on some specific issues. We believed it would be deeply regrettable if the government failed to present a Bill in the current Parliament, at least in draft, giving effect to the proposals in the 1996 Scott Report.[21] We commended the progress made on the EU Code of Conduct and called for the government to press EU applicant countries to conform to the Code. We repeated our call for a common interpretation of the EU embargo on China. We commended the government's efforts on the issue of small arms. On Israel, we welcomed the more cautious attitude towards granting open licences to such destinations, announced by the Foreign Secretary in response to concerns expressed in our earlier reports in relation to Zimbabwe, and concluded that officials should have drawn Ministers' attention to the possibility of military equipment being used in the occupation of Southern Lebanon and thereby requiring an explicit policy decision. We reasserted our opinion that a serious error of judgement was made in late 1998 and early 1999 in granting several Military List open licences covering Zimbabwe and concluded that the Government Response on this point was factually inaccurate and wholly irrelevant to our central concerns, in adducing the fact that a number of the open licenses were to named end-users.

27. The Quadripartite Committee went on to consider the draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill, the subject matter of its Seventh Report (paragraphs 44-48 below).


28. This Report was published on 13 March and examined the Draft Defence Aviation Repair Agency Trading Fund Order 2001. Under the provisions of the Order (which has subsequently been approved by Parliament), the Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA) converted to a trading fund on 1 April 2001.[22] As a trading fund, DARA will be put on a more commercial footing and will be expected to cover its costs from its trading income (rather than from MoD grants). We examined the rationale and the implications of that change of status and the Agency's preparations for the change, including its rationalisation and relocation programmes.

29. We noted that trends in the aviation repair market are converging to dictate a significantly different approach to meeting the MoD's requirements. Competition for available work has become more intense, in a market where a more flexible and integrated approach to aviation maintenance is needed to win contracts. We considered it right that the MoD, like its civil counterparts, should be seeking (through the establishment of the trading fund) to take advantage of these new more favourable conditions. We warned, however, that safeguards are still needed. First, there is still a need for assured access to repair capabilities and a capacity for undertaking 'surge' workloads in times of crisis (as the Kosovo campaign demonstrated), which must be protected in DARA. Second, partnerships being developed by DARA with the private sector must not be allowed to remove the MoD's ability to run effective competitions for its repair requirements.

30. It had already been decided to move engine repair work from DARA's St Athan site (near Cardiff) to Fleetlands in Hampshire, and DARA is weighing up a proposal to move St Athan's remaining work to new purpose-built facilities at Cardiff Airport. Such rationalisation plans will help it compete with private industry, but we believed this should proceed only after thorough investment appraisal and consultation. We welcomed the MoD's assurances that compulsory redundancies would be avoided.

31. We welcomed the focus now being given to improving unacceptably long 'turnround times' for completing aviation repairs in DARA's workshops, which was felt in the unavailability of front-line aircraft, but we wished to see measures introduced to continue monitoring turnround times when DARA became a trading fund.

32. We believed that, from the MoD viewpoint, converting DARA to a trading fund would develop a competitive alternative to its commercial sources of repair work, saving money for other more pressing defence requirements. For DARA, the change of status would challenge its previously sheltered relationship with the MoD, but it would also bring benefits. If DARA cannot deliver, however, the MoD might be driven to place more repair work directly with industry, which would leave DARA to wither on the vine.

33. We agreed that the Agency should become a trading fund on 1 April 2001, as planned, and should continue to have that status for the foreseeable future, but we believed that privatisation should not be on the agenda.[23]

34. The Government's response to our Report, to be published as the Fifth Special Report from the Committee, accepted all of our conclusions and recommendations, except to remain silent on the possibility of privatisation of the Agency in the long term.


35. This Report was published on 13 March and examined the Draft Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Trading Fund Order 2001. This was the fourth time in this Parliament that we had examined the government's proposals for a public-private partnership for the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), which are inextricably linked to the trading fund Order.[24] The Order, if approved, would, on 1 July 2001, set up the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the part of DERA which will remain in the public sector after the public-private partnership, as a trading fund. At the same time, 'New-DERA', the three-quarters of DERA to be privatised, will be established as a 'public limited company' (initially wholly government owned, but intended to be floated on the stock exchange later this year). The intention of the Report was primarily to put the evidence we had received, including oral evidence from the Minister, in the public domain, before the House began its consideration of the draft Order.[25]

36. We were disappointed that the evidence showed that areas of uncertainty we had previously identified remained unresolved. Our initial assessment of the recently announced proposals for the Defence Diversification Agency raised further doubts about the viability of an organisation which will apparently be divided three ways. Our more general misgivings about many aspects of the part-privatisation of DERA had also not been dispelled. Indeed, we believed there was now a new issue about the financial implications of New-DERA's sale. Previously announced plans were that the Treasury would get the proceeds, except for £250 million for the MoD. It seems now that the MoD may also have to pay some of the cost of implementing the public-private partnership, wiping out the benefit of the sale. We charged the Minister with seeking to secure the full sale receipt for the MoD, and the reimbursement from the Treasury of the MoD's implementation costs, which may be as much as £80 million. We emphasised that we expected that, by the time that the MoD came to re-assess the viability of the prospective New-DERA, these outstanding issues and uncertainties should have been resolved.

37. We concluded that if the government was resolutely set on the misguided change of status for DERA, a delay in approving the trading fund Order would only serve to undermine the prospects for a successful flotation and to further damage DERA's already brittle staff morale, neither of which we wished to see. However, because the Order takes forward the partial privatisation of DERA, we could not lend it positive support. We concluded that we would still prefer that the proposed public-private partnership for the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency be abandoned.[26]

38. The Government's response to our Report will be published as the Sixth Special Report from the Committee. The Government confirmed that £250 million would be added to the MoD's budget in 2001-02 whether or not the sale of New-DERA took place in the same time frame, but that the costs of dividing DERA and preparing for the privatisation would lie where they fell—within the MoD, within the new trading fund, and within New-DERA respectively. The Government response was not able to fill in all of the gaps and uncertainties identified in the Committee's Report, but the public-private partnership is to go ahead as planned.


39. This Report, published on 10 April 2001, examined the progress since the SDR in the restructuring of the Reserve Forces.

40. In response to our recommendation in our previous Report on TA restructuring,[27] the MoD has provided us with quarterly updates on the progress of the TA restructuring. Phase 2 of the restructuring (and downsizing) process was completed in April 2000 and membership of the TA at 1 October 2000 was 40,382. As the SDR had promised better training for this reduced force, we were concerned that although the number of man training days for the TA has remained consistent, disproportionately training was now given at individual level rather than at unit level. We remain unconvinced that the structure of the infantry battalions is satisfactory. We also recommended the reintroduction of a fast-track entry system for officers in order to attract and retain more Reservists. With regard to medical reservists, we recommended that the MoD should introduce an incentive scheme tailored towards the NHS in order to attract more recruits.

41. The Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations had been transformed into Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations (RFCA) and we examined the new arrangements and regulations governing their activities which had been set in place. We concluded that the new arrangements seemed to be working well, and that the new title more accurately reflected their role supporting all three services alongside the Cadet movement.

42. There had been two further Call-out Orders since our last Report, one for Reservists to serve in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the second to renew permission for the use of Reservist troops in supporting the operations of NATO in former Yugoslavia and monitoring of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.[28] Administration of both Call-outs had worked well, but we expressed concern that rates of volunteering had fallen and there was danger of 'overfishing' the volunteer reserves as we had noted in a previous Report.[29] We recommended that the MoD monitor this trend.

43. We had heard during our inquiry into the lessons of Kosovo that the Chief of the Defence Staff came very close to a large scale mobilisation of Reserves.[30] Our MoD witnesses were frank in their admission that the prospect of compulsory mass mobilisation had come as a shock. It was clear from the evidence that a great deal of further work needs to be done in order for such a large operation to run smoothly. We recommended that our successors should monitor the implementation of the lessons of Kosovo for TA mobilisation, and the results of the forthcoming mobilisation exercise.


44. This joint Report from the 'Quadripartite' Committee[31]—the second this Session—was published on 9 May 2001. It examined the government's draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill, which had been published for consultation on 12 April.[32]

45. The Bill, when introduced, will replace the 1939 Act which has provided the statutory basis for strategic export (and import) controls for more than 60 years. Its use came to public prominence in the course of the Iraqi 'Supergun' affair ten years ago, and its replacement by new legislation was recommended in Lord Scott's report on his inquiry into that debacle in 1996. The principle innovation is the setting out, in a Schedule to the Bill, of the 'purposes' for which export control orders may be made. The Bill also provides for control of 'intangible' exports (such as the electronic transfer of technological data), and for control of trafficking and brokering of arms.

46. The Committees took evidence on 25 April from a range of witnesses representing NGOs with an interest in the field, defence manufacturers, academic institutions which conduct research in the area, Lord Scott and Ms Presiley Baxendale QC and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.

47. We welcomed the draft Bill and the consultation process. We expressed some reservations over the powers to make secondary legislation, particularly in relation to extending the list of purposes and for imposing temporary controls outside the purposes, but welcomed the undertaking to consult on secondary legislation. We regretted the retention of the provisions of the 1939 Act relating to import controls. We had some detailed concerns relating to: intangible exports, particularly in relation to WMD technologies; the appeals procedure against refusals of licences; the decision not to place administrative arrangements for granting export licences on a statutory basis; and the exemption of government-to-government exports from the ambit of the Bill. We also expressed some doubts about whether the enforcement provisions, particularly in relation to end-user requirements in licences, were sufficient. We look forward to seeing the extent to which these concerns have been addressed when the Bill itself is published, which we very much hope will be early in the next Session.

48. We took the opportunity to examine some of the witnesses on the questions of prior parliamentary scrutiny which we raised in our Third Report of this Session.[33] We were pleased to learn that the provisions of the draft Bill were not seen as offering any impediment to establishing such arrangements on a non-statutory basis, and were heartened by the positive tone of the Secretary of State's responses on this matter.


49. This Report, published on 9 May, was the second in what is intended to be a regular annual series examining the key documents in the cycle of MoD reports to Parliament. These are: the Expenditure Plans and Estimates, the Performance Report, the Investment Strategy, the Defence Statistics and the Resource Accounts. We also examined a number of additional documents outside the strict definition of this cycle, relating to defence policy.

50. We welcomed modest improvements in the quantity and quality of the information provided in these documents. However, we regretted the disconnection which their format makes between the examination of policy and the discussion of resources and performance. We recommended further recasting of the Expenditure Plans to address this problem.

51. We noted some key issues in relation to the investment strategy, particularly the future balance between expenditure on personnel and on equipment; the expansion of the PFI programme; and the programme of surplus estate disposals. We noted proposed changes in the method of reporting performance, expressing the hope that it would expose more of the relationship to the Department's own internal planning system. We expressed particular concern over the slippage in achieving full operational capability of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force—one of the MoD's key performance targets.

52. We continued to press for the Resource Accounts to expose more detail in their output performance analyses, and to demonstrate that resource accounting and budgeting was more than just an accounting exercise and was enabling the more efficient application of resources. On the defence budget, we welcomed the modest increases announced in Spending Review 2000, but noted that these were insufficient to eliminate pressure on the budget. In this context we were pleased to hear the information that the MoD was examining the effects of the implementation of its efficiency programme. We hope our successors will continue to monitor it.

53. We also welcomed the publication of the two policy documents Defence Policy 2001 and The Future Strategic Context for Defence. We examined at some length the difficult questions they raised for the future, in shaping the UK's defence policy to a changing strategic context. We believe there would be value in combining this kind of policy analysis more directly with the discussions about resources and performance set out in the documents that form the annual reporting cycle.


54. This Report was the third, and most recent, examining the progress of a selection of major equipment projects (paragraph 65). Our first report[34] in the series examined the then recent collapse of the collaborative Common New Generation Frigate and its replacement by a national Type-45 destroyer programme. Our second inquiry[35] focused on the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile for the Eurofighter and strategic air-lift, the competitions for which had then just been decided, and the Bowman communication system whose competition was on the brink of having to be relaunched.

55. Our latest inquiry covered the Future Aircraft Carrier, at a critical point in assessment design studies; the recent selection of the UK/US Joint Strike Fighter to operate from the new carriers; the technical problems encountered with the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile intended for the Eurofighter an other aircraft; the MoD's intervention in the contracts for the construction of the Roll-on Roll-off ships; and enhancements to the UK's precision-guided bombing capability in the light of the lessons drawn from the Kosovo conflict.

56. An aim of this series of equipment procurement inquiries has been to inform the annual Defence Equipment debate. The next debate will fall in the next Parliament. To make the evidence gathered from our latest inquiry available for that debate, we published it with our Ninth Report on 9 May. Given its timing, we were not able to complete our inquiry, which we urged our successors to develop further in the new Parliament.

10  Published as HC (2000-01) 390-i Back

11  Eighth Report, Session 1999-2000, European Security and Defence, HC 264 Back

12  Published as HC(2000-01) 298-i Back

13  See also Appendices to this Report, pp 6 to 8 Back

14  HC 177, Session 2000-01, op cit, paragraphs 9-13. The Committee's Secretary from 1 January was Miss Fiona Mearns Back

15  Air Vice-Marshal Sir Michael Alcock, Lt General Sir Peter Beale, Professor Michael Clarke, Mr Humphrey Crum-Ewing, Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, Dr Jonathan Eyal, Professor Keith Hartley, Dr Beatrice Heuser, Dr Irina Isakova, Andrew Keeling, Professor David Kirkpatrick, Professor Colin McInnes, Dr Andrew Rathmell, Ms Jane Sharp, Major-General Peter Sheppard, Mr James Sherr, Air Marshal Sir John Walker and Lt General Sir Christopher Wallace Back

16  The cost of Advisers' fees and expenses will be published in the Sessional Returns Back

17  A full list of Defence Committee Reports is published at Annex D Back

18  See Third Report and Seventh Report below Back

19  The Organisation Conjointe de Co-operation en matières d'Armaments Back

20  Three members of the Defence Committee were delegated to be the principal participants in the Quadripartite Committee: Mr Cohen, Mr George and Mr Viggers. Mr Brazier, Mr Cann and Mrs Moffatt also participated. Back

21  The draft Bill was published on 29 March 2001 as Cm 5091 Back

22  The draft Order was debated in the Sixth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation on 19 March 2001 Back

23  The Order was approved by the House on 20 March 2001and the conversion to trading fund status duly took place on 1 April 2001 (HC Deb, 2 April 2001, cc 20-21w) Back

24  See Sixth Report, Session 1997-98, The Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, HC 621; Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, Defence Research, HC 616; Ninth Report, Session 1999-2000, The Future of DERA, HC 462 Back

25  The Order was debated in the Eighth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation on 22 March 2001 Back

26  The draft Order was approved by the House on 26 March 2001 Back

27  First Report, Session 1998-99, The Strategic Defence Review: Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 70 Back

28  A further Call-out Order was made on 5 April 2001 Back

29  Sixth Report, Session 1998-99, The Reserves Call-out Order 1999 and Progress of Territorial Army Restructuring, HC 860, para 14 Back

30  Fourteenth Report, Session 1999-2000, Lessons of Kosovo, HC 347, Q35 Back

31  Comprising the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committees Back

32  Cm 5091 Back

33  See above Back

34  Eighth Report, Session 1998-99, Major Procurement Projects Survey: The Common New Generation Frigate, HC 544 Back

35  Tenth Report, Session 1999-2000, Major Procurement Projects, HC 528 Back

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