Select Committee on Defence Seventh Special Report

  ANNEX F: Progress on Committee Recommendations and Undertakings in the Current Session

  SESSION 2000-01

  First Report: The Six-Nation Framework Agreement (HC 115) Published: 14 February 2001

  Government Reply: Third Special Report (HC 389) Published: 3 April 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.That the UK will have to continue to balance carefully the relative industrial and technological benefits it derives from collaborating with Europe and with the US. (Para 23) Accepted     
2.That access to US technology developed and matured in US research programmes must remain a vital part of the UK's research strategy. (Para 23) Accepted     
3.Anxieties within industry about transfers and protection of intellectual property will have to be allayed as work on the Framework Agreement is taken forward. (Para 27) Accepted. Industry is being consulted on harmonised contractual and legal arrangements to protect intellectual property.    
4.If OCCAR were used to take on the defence requirements harmonisation role, care would be needed to insulate its existing procurement programmes from the inevitably complex and difficult negotiations that there would be to secure common requirements for new capabilities. (Para 31) Accepted. OCCAR should, at this early stage of its development, continue to focus on managing its existing programmes.    
5.The UK must ensure that equipment requirements are not contrived to support particular national industries rather than to meet genuine military requirements. (Para 33) Accepted.     
6.As the MoD takes the work of the Framework Agreement forward, it must ensure UK industry is not unduly circumscribed. (Para 40) Accepted. Industry will continue to be consulted on the Agreement's further development.    
7.That ratification of the Framework Agreement is the essential next step, which should not be delayed. (Para 42) Accepted. The UK ratified the treaty in February 2001.   As at March 2001, Germany was also soon expected to ratify the treaty, which would allow the treaty to come into force.
  Second Report: The Strategic Defence Review: Policy for People (HC 29) Published: 23 February 2001

  Government Reply: Fourth Special Report (HC 462) Published: 9 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.That the plans to open a second Army Foundation College should be realised as soon as possible. (Para 30) The Army Foundation Project is looking as a matter of urgency at what can be delivered, both in the short and longer term.    
2.That more systematic evaluation of all recruitment strategies is carried out to identify those which are most successful, with particular attention to those directed at ethnic minorities. (Para 39) The need for systematic evaluation of ethnic minority recruitment strategies has already been recognised and has increasingly influenced the construction by each Service of its annual ethnic minorities recruiting action plan. A tri-Service forum exists to facilitate the sharing of results of evaluation, together with details of initiatives, research and marketing strategies.    
3.That all three Services follow the Army's example in adopting them to assess physical fitness for any post. (Para 47) Work is in hand, on a tri-Service basis, to examine physical fitness testing.    
4.We do not believe that the MoD nor the Army are yet tackling poor retention rates with sufficient urgency and imagination to address the manning problems, and we expect to see much greater effort. (Para 61) Do not accept that retention is not being tackled with sufficient urgency and imagination. Armed Forces retention is a matter of the highest priority.    
5.If a sustained pattern of high operational tempo is to be maintained, it may be that the Services simply need more people to do the job than was envisaged in the SDR. (Para 83) While time and the world has moved on since the SDR, its principles and conclusions in relation to force levels are proving as robust and well-founded as we expected them to be.    
6.It is unfortunate that the introduction of Pay 2000 was delayed by a year, thus delaying its benefits. We hope for a successful introduction in April 2001 and expect the MoD to be able to demonstrate through the promised evaluation that the new system is having a positive effect on morale and on retention rates. (Para 87) The MoD will monitor the impact of the new pay system closely and assess the impact on retention and morale—particularly in the early years.    
7. We recommend a phased increase in the sums available under the Learning Credits scheme, up to a target of £500 per person per year. (Para 95) The standard Learning Credit scheme is already generous in comparison to most employers. The level of the award is reviewed annually.    
8.It would be better if personnel were able to take leave to which they should be entitled unless unavoidable operational commitments make this impossible. If over-commitment is preventing leave being taken on a regular basis, it is only fair that the MoD should investigate financial means of compensating those affected. (Para 102) The obligation to ensure that leave is taken wherever possible is placed on the chain of command. We do not accept that financial compensation should be offered when leave is lost as this would risk the ability of commanding officers to achieve the required levels of operational capability.    
9.We cannot emphasise too strongly our belief that generous access to free communication with families is a fundamental right which should be available to personnel on operational deployments wherever possible. The record of the MoD in this area is poor. Improvements have been made in recent years. Further improvements should be made. (Para 103) A Review of Operational Welfare was conducted in autumn 1999 and led to a fundamental reappraisal of how personnel are supported on operational deployments. The recommendations of the Review are being implemented from 1 April 2001, costing an additional £60 million over a five-year period, and will give high priority to communications with home by telephone, e-mail, post and e-blueys.    
10. In addition to ensuring that the worst Single Living Accommodation is improved as a matter of urgency the MoD needs to adopt a strategic and considered approach in assessing the long-term accommodation needs of unaccompanied Service personnel. (Para 107) The Secretary of State announced a very significant programme of expenditure on the SLA on 14 March, which will build up to new investment levels of around £200 million per year on new and upgraded SLA.    
11.That the MoD takes a more imaginative approach to terms of employment in the Services and investigates in detail the possibility of offering career breaks and guaranteeing personnel with families more stability at periods in their career when they need it. That it explores ways of making greater use of the resource the Services have in personnel who have completed their 22 years' service. (Para 110) All three Services are embracing a number of initiatives to meet the reasonable expectations of individuals and their families in combining a Service career with family responsibilities. Careful management of such initiatives is required to ensure they are not at the expense of operational capability of overstretch. The Navy is actively considering the possibility of offering career breaks and greater stability when this is needed. Examples are given of the ways in which all three Services make use of selected personnel beyond 22 year's service.    
12.That the MoD takes full account of the views of the EOC and the CRE in working towards an effective equal opportunities policy which will meet the high standards which the Services have set themselves. The MoD should demonstrate its commitment to a harassment free working environment by ensuring that there is no display of material which may either be seen as offensive to women or of a racist nature, in any public areas on any of its premises or that of its agencies. (Para 128) MoD will continue to work closely with the EOC and CRE to tackle any prejudice and import best practice from elsewhere. All three Services will continue to act decisively to remove any literature or material which might be sexist, racist or offensive to those of a different sexual orientation.    
13.That the provision of 'cyber cafés' and distance learning centres for families in every significant Service community should be adopted as a definite target. (Para 136) Naval spouses will have access to the education facilities in all 18 RN/RM learning centres. All major Army garrisons and stations have publicly funded internet facilities for families and many units have set up cyber cafes at their own expense. The RAF provides internet facilities at every RAF HIVE and learning centres with internet facilities have been set up on 10 RAF stations.    
14.That the 1991 study conducted by the Army Personnel Research Establishment be re-run, and take in the RAF. (Para 138) The majority of subject areas covered by the study are now monitored on a regular basis through the continuous attitude surveys.    
15.That more of the proceeds of the sale of the married quarters estate should go back to the Services in the form of an immediate, ring-fenced increase in the funds made available to the Defence Housing Executive specifically for the upgrade of the SFA, and that the MoD tailor its policies on the SFA to meet the specific needs of each Service. (Para 144) The split of receipts of the sale of the married quarters estate was decided by the previous government. The need for additional funding will be kept under review in the light of future contract costs and demand for accommodation from Service families.    
16.We expect to see a more active engagement by the DfEE and the Department of Health in the issues affecting Service family welfare, and we recommend that our successor committee take evidence from Ministers in those Departments on their achievement of these goals. (Para 147) Other government departments are engaged on a day-to-day basis with the problems faced by Service families and have responded positively to resolve many of these but MoD recognises that this involvement has sometimes been responsive rather than pre-emptive. The ministerial group will meet in the autumn to review the way in which other departments are engaged in addressing Service families' concern.    
17.We recommend the rapid development of key indicators of the quality of education and health provision for Service families, the rapid development of targets for improvement, and the public measurement of progress in reaching these. The government has been setting national standards for health and education for the population as a whole. These should represent a minimum for Service families. (Para 148) Specific Service family problems with regard to health and education are monitored through Service and MoD family welfare organisations, through the Families Forum and through continuous attitude surveys. MoD has no reason to believe that the systems in place for education and health are failing to identify issues of significant and therefore has no plans to introduce new monitoring systems or targets.    
18.That the MoD at least match funding increases for health and education for the general population, and seek commensurate Treasury uplift of the defence vote. (Para 149) Should arrangements fail to match those available in the UK, the MoD would address this, seeking additional funding as necessary.    
19.We expect a comprehensive statement of policy on unmarried partners in response to this Report and encourage our successor committee to give consideration to this important matter of principle at an early stage. (Para 152) MoD is keeping the issue under active consideration but an early conclusion is not anticipated.    
20.We expect the Armed Forces Pension Scheme review findings to be published before the government replies to this Report. (Para 160) The review findings were published on 16 March.    
21.That resettlement facilities are made available to spouses. (Para 163) Many of the existing arrangements are already open to spouses. Last year full resettlement support was extended to those who are medically discharged, who are unable to take it up themselves. The RAF and RAF Association are developing a 'point of contact' scheme which will be available to serving personnel and spouses seeking local employment opportunities.    
22.That the MoD make resettlement training and advice an entitlement for Service personnel which should be available for up to 12 months after discharge. (Para 163) The rules already allow for exceptions to be made for genuine operational or other Service reasons.    
  Third Report: Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 1999 and parliamentary prior scrutiny (HC 212) Published: 14 March 2001

  Government Reply: Not received by dissolution of 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.It would be deeply regrettable were at least a draft Bill to give effect to the 1996 Scott Report not presented for proper parliamentary scrutiny during this Parliament. (Para 7)  See Seventh Report, Session 2000-01, HC 445 Draft Bill published on 12 April 2001 as Cm 5091  
3.That the Government continue to press for greater transparency during discussions on the EU Code of conduct. (Para 11)      
4.That, in all future bilateral discussions with applicant countries, the Government makes a specific point of pressing the need to conform to the EU Code of Conduct. (Para 14)      
5.The inclusion in the next Annual Report of a note on progress in establishing the revised export control system under the Six-Nation Framework Agreement. (Para 17)      
6.Once the UN Conference has run its course, action must be taken to achieve more public identification of those arms producing and exporting countries which are holding up the emergence of an international consensus on the key issues. (Para 19)      
7.That further consideration be given to a stricter interpretation of the arms embargo on China than that currently operated by the UK. (Para 33)      
8.That vigorous efforts to procure a common interpretation, at the very least among the member states of the EU, of "limited" arms embargoes would engender a greater atmosphere of mutual confidence. (Para 35)      
9.That a thorough evaluation of the outcome of the licence for the Jamaican police be undertaken so that the practice can be extended to other countries where the UK quite properly feels obliged to refuse a licence. (Para 41)      
10.That there should be a rethink of the target of 30 working days for settling appeals against refusals and renewed efforts to meet an achievable but challenging target and that a procedure be established through which companies would at least have the chance to answer the departments' doubts or concerns. (Para 48)      
11.That, with regard to prior Parliamentary scrutiny, on an experimental basis the following categories should be excluded from Stage 1 notification of —(i) licence applications for exports to NATO countries and other close allies, on the bassi of a list of criteria to be agreed between the Committee and Ministers; (ii) licence applications for dual-use goods, subject to the right to identify in the light of experience specific countries or specific categories of goods where prior scrutiny would be required; and (iii) licence applications not circulated to other departments. (Para 53)  See Seventh Report, Session 2000-01, HC 445.   
12.That Ministers should be free to go ahead with the grant of a license otherwise subject to Stage 2 notification, not only as a result of national security and operational considerations in crises or conflicts as set out in our July 2000 Report, but also where there are genuine and well-founded grounds for believing that a contract may otherwise be lost. (Para 59)      
13.Cannot agree that all "individual casework decisions" by Ministers can be automatically exempt from prior scrutiny. (Para 70)      
14.That a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny should be ready to operate as soon as committees are set up in a new Parliament. (Para 72)      
  Fourth Report: The Draft Defence Aviation Repair Agency Trading Fund Order 2001 (HC 261) Published: 13 March 2001

  Government Reply: Fifth Special Report (HC 514) Published: 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.There is still a need for assured access to repair capabilities and a capacity for surge workloads in times of crisis (as the Kosovo campaign demonstrated). That continuing requirement must be protected in DARA and partnerships with private sector repair firms and original equipment manufacturers must not be allowed to remove the MoD's ability to run effective competitions for its repair and overhaul requirements. (Para 44) Accepted.     
2.DARA's rationalisation plans should proceed only after thorough investment appraisal and consultation with those affected by any changes. They should not be driven by an overriding aim of reducing the Agency's capabilities. (Para 45) Accepted.     
3.The MoD should introduce alternative measures to monitor DARA's ability to control the Agency's progress in improving turnaround times. (Para 46) Accepted.     
4.The Agency should become a trading fund on 1 April 2001, as planned. It should continue to have that status for the foreseeable future. (Para 48) Trading Fund status will provide the right commercial environment ... to build a successful new enterprise.   DARA became a trading fund on 1 April 2001.
  Fifth Report: The Draft Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Trading Fund Order 2001 (HC 289) Published:13 March 2001

  Government Reply: Sixth Special Report (HC 515) Published: 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.That the MoD will seek to secure the full sale receipt for the MoD and the reimbursement from the Treasury of the MoD's costs of implementing the public-private partnership. (Para 8) The MoD will receive £250 million in 2001-02 in anticipation of the sale.The expected costs of the preparation for the sale will lie where they fall — £8.5m on the MoD; £15.5m on the DSTL trading fund; and £53m on New-DERA.    
2.That the outstanding issues and uncertainties relating to the PPP will have been resolved before March/April 2001 and the decisions set out in the reply to this Report. (Para 9) The policy on disallowing 'manufacturing' is defined; drafting of the definitions remains.

Identifying strategic assets will be completed by 1 July 2001.

Responsibilities on New-DERA's share ownership does not need to be finalised until the sale takes place.

DERA's existing staff will be divided equitably to ensure both New-DERA and DSTL to ensure that both have their necessary capabilities.

  Sixth Report: The Strategic Defence Review: The Reserves (HC 412) Published:10 April 2001

  Government Reply: Not received by dissolution of 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.That revisiting the infantry battalion structure must be a high priority. (Para 7)      
2.That, in future, the MoD will be able to demonstrate convincingly that both individual training and unit training levels for the TA are being maintained at appropriate levels. (Para 9)      
3.That there is an early deployment of formed TA sub-units, for example, to the Balkans. (Para 14)      
4.That in its response to this Report, the MoD provide evidence of a positive trend in recruitment to the RNR which is on target to meet the requirement. (Para 15)      
5.That the RNR's success in recruiting and retaining part-time pilots should be built on further. (Para 16)      
6.That it is time for the Reserve Forces fully to take up the task of supporting the Regular Forces' deployments of air forces abroad and that developing a proper career path for part-time Royal Auxiliary Air Force personnel and some formed flying units would be integral parts of this, as proposed in the SDR. (Para 19)      
7.That the potential benefits to the NHS of generating more medical reservists should be more aggressively marketed by the MoD, and that an incentive scheme tailored toward the NHS should be introduced in order to recruit more volunteer staff, and that a larger voice should be given to senior part-time officers in the Territorial Army, RNR and Royal Auxiliary Air Force to inject some reality into plans largely devised by regular military staff. (Para 24)      
8.That there is insufficient evidence to assure us of the accuracy of central records of the Regular Reservists at present. The MoD cannot afford to treat this resource carelessly. (Para 25)      
9.That the MoD has to decide whether to enforce the current procedures relating to Regular Reservists—including prosecution—where necessary, or admit that current procedures have failed, in which case reform of the system, including the legislation, should be made a high priority. (Para 26)      
10.That the MoD build on its good relationship with the RFCAs in order to find solutions for areas which are still experiencing post-restructuring problems. The first call on money saved from running costs arising from the restructuring should be for re-investment in the RFCA infrastructure. (Para 32)      
11.It is essential, for the future of the Forces, that accommodation issues relating to the Cadets are quickly and effectively resolved. (Para 35)      
12.That the MoD continue to ring-fence funding to ensure that all cadets units are properly housed and their accommodation is brought up to standard. In the response to this Report the date on which work will be complete should be given. (Para 36)      
13.That the MoD must continue to monitor the effect of 'overfishing' the volunteer Reserves carefully. A report on their current assessment of the scale of this problem should be included in its response to this Report. (Para 41)      
14.We applaud the frankness with which our MoD witnesses owned up to the lessons of Kosovo for the use of the TA. We trust our successors will take time to check the MoD's good intentions have been put into practice. (Para 48)      
  Seventh Report: The Draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation Bill (HC 445) Published: 9 May 2001

  Government Reply: Not received by dissolution of 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.That every effort is made to ensure that a draft consultative version of the relevant secondary legislation is published before the House is asked to give the Bill a Second Reading (Para ?).      
2.That the Government commit itself to laying before Parliament import Orders made under the Act as they have with export Orders, and to consult urgently on clauses to be included in the Bill to repeal what remains of the 1939 Act (Paras 15 and ?).      
3.That Orders under the Act should first be exposed in draft and in confidence to the Quadripartite Committee and, if then made and laid, the Government should undertake to use their best endeavours to find time for a debate if the Committee so recommended (Para 31).      
4.We welcome the positive tone of the Secretary of State's answers on prior parliamentary scrutiny. We were pleased to have the Secretary of State's assurance that the proposals for parliamentary prior scrutiny we had made in our March 2001 report could indeed be introduced without primary legislation. We continue to recommend strongly that they should be so introduced (Paras 32 and ?).      
5.Although we see no harm in putting the Annual Report on a statutory basis, it would be regrettable if it were to oblige FCO to charge for copies; if it had any unintended consequences for its availability; or if it were to lead to any further delays in publication.      
6.That consideration be given to a specific reference within the Schedule to internal conflicts within the country of destination and that Ministers consider the addition of further purposes for which exports may be controlled, including the avoidance of damage to health or the environment; but where they judge it inappropriate to add such powers, they should set out the existing control powers relied upon to fulfil such purposes (Paras 39 and ?).      
7.That the period of time during which Orders made under Clause 3(2) may remain in effect without parliamentary approval should be 28 calendar days (Para ?).      
8.That consideration be given to putting on the face of the Bill the assurances given in the explanatory paragraphs accompanying the draft Bill and in evidence to us, that licensing decisions should have due regard to the general purposes for which controls can be imposed, as set out in the Schedule to the Bill (Paras 48 to ?).      
9.That consideration be given to the desirability of ending the blanket exemption from controls of Government and its agencies as exporters of licensable goods and technology (Para ?).      
10.That a one-off review of all outstanding licence applications of over 18 months be undertaken with the provision to the Quadripartite Committee of the resultant list, together with an explanation for the delays; and that serious thought should be given to a form of mechanism to trigger a decision where the delay has become excessive (Para ?).      
11.That there would be advantage in putting the face of the Bill (Para ?).      
12.In view of the evidence we have received, the Secretary of State may wish to revisit his Human Rights Act certificate, particularly to the extent that it is intended to cover secondary legislation to be made under powers to be conferred on Ministers under the Bill (Para ?).      
13.The incorporation in the Bill of the safeguards for bona fide academic activity set out in the commentary on the draft Bill and in evidence from the Secretary of State. We see no case for complete exemption of academic activity from export controls (Paras 74 and ?).      
14.That steps be taken to ensure that measures in UK legislation reflect the experience of other nations also seeking to deal with the challenge of use of the internet as a means of transmitting controlled technology (Para ?).      
15.Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issues relating to proposed controls on the passage of technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction, it is also particularly important that there be wide and detailed consultation in drawing up the secondary legislation. Non-proliferation is arguably the most important single issue in strategic export control (Para 77).      
16.That, in deciding on the details of the regime for intangible transfers of technology, the burdens on business are minimised, including through sensible adaptation of the existing regime for tangible transfers (Para 82).      
17.That a clearer exposition be given in response to this Report of the current situation on technical assistance controls, so that the House will be in a better situation to assess the proposals now being made (Para ?).      
18.Whilst recognising the practical difficulties in policing activities outside the United Kingdom, there are compelling arguments in favour of extending controls on brokering and trafficking to activities outside the country and recommend that controls be introduced on the activities of UK citizens and companies wherever they take place (Para ?).      
19.That the Bill as presented should allow for the possibility of subsequent introduction of controls on the actual transport of controlled goods, and on those arranging for such transport, by an appropriate extension of the scope of "trade controls" as defined in Clause 5 (Para ?).      
20.That some statutory powers may be necessary to control licensed production overseas, and that the Bill provide for such powers to be taken in the future under secondary legislation, to be used only if a non-statutory regime is shown to have failed (Para ?).      
21.That there is a good case for some public assurances that post-export end-use monitoring is carried out thoroughly and systematically, and for an explicit commitment to recognise the importance of that task when, for example, assessing the staffing requirements of overseas posts, including defence staff (Para ?).      
22.That we welcome the clear assurance from the Secretary of State that he has sufficient legal powers to revoke a licence where there has been a breach of end-use conditions (Para ?).      
23.That we would welcome assurance that the Bill's provisions for secondary legislation on the system of administrative controls are broad enough to be able to cover the introduction of a more systematic form of end-user certification (paragraph ?).      
24.That clarification be provided to the House on the identity of the enforcement agency for transfer and other controls to be introduced by the Bill, and some explanation of the practical significance of the legal provisions to be made (Paras 115 and ?).      
  Eighth Report: The MoD's Annual Reporting Cycle 2000-01 (HC 144) Published: 9 May 2001

  Government Reply: Not received by dissolution of 14 May 2001

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.We recommend that the Expenditure Plans report is completely recast as a forward-looking document, disclosing as much as is practical about the aims and objectives of the MoD over the succeeding 12 to 36 months. (Para 13)      
2.That our successors to examine the performance of the Defence Estates agency in some detail. (Para 24)      
3.That there should be a move away from deciding cash limits first, on a purely historical basis, and designing defence policy around those limits. (Para 29)      
4.That our successors will be vigilant to detect any future slippage in the target date for the JRRF. (Para 33)      
5.Future MoD Performance Reports will be structured to reflect the Balanced Scorecard. This will be a welcome development if it ties together the Department's internal and external reporting systems, and provided that judgements—whether a particular objective is labelled 'red', 'amber' or 'green'—are applied consistently between the two. The judgements must also demonstrate that the MoD's self-assessment is rigorous and self-critical, not self-serving or complacent. (Para 37)      
6.The results of MoD 'benchmarking' of agencies' performance targets against outside organisations should be disclosed and Parliament should be given a clearer view of the performance required of agencies as a group, and any improvements over time. (Para 42)      
7.That our successors will continue to monitor the progress of RAB at key stages of the reporting cycle, and that they will ensure that, next year, the MoD will indeed 'be right'. (Para 47)      
8.The meaningful costing of defence outputs should be a pivotal part of the accountability improvements made possible by Resource Accounting and Budgeting and such data should be available sooner than the disappointingly drawn out timetable currently envisaged. (Para 50)      
9.That the response to this Report should include an explanation of the long-term strategy of the MoD for conducting such reviews, their likely timing, and the extent to which they will be open to external inputs. (Para 56)      
10.The lack of sufficiently capable headquarters on the part of our European allies is a serious matter for concern, given the increasing importance of the regional conflict prevention and crisis management defence mission, which is an issue which will have to be addressed in the context of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy. (Para 66)      
11.That our successors will conduct an early inquiry into weapons of mass destruction. (Para 71)      
12.That there would be value in combining something like the policy essay of Defence Policy 2001, and indeed elements of the broader picture painted in The Future Strategic Context for Defence, with the Expenditure Plans, and recasting the format of that document to link resources allocated to key policy areas more clearly. (Para 78)      
13.That there would be merit in a White Paper, once a Parliament at least, which carries the signature of at least the Secretaries of State for Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development, and that of the Prime Minister, showing how the 'joined up' policies of conflict prevention, crisis management and the maintenance of peace and security are operating, and are co-ordinated, across the whole of government activity. (Para 79)      
14.That future Performance Reports should provide sufficient detail to demonstrate conclusively and fully the timescale, cost and performance benefits obtained from smart procurement. (Para 83)      
15.That there may be a fine line between acquiring better equipment through incremental acquisition and settling for 'worse' equipment by reducing its prospective potency, range or other capabilities and this is an issue that will remain at the heart of our annual examination of major procurement projects. (Para 91)      
16.To monitor closely the financial, as well as the security, implications of the Conflict Prevention budget. (Para 97)      
17.That the change in direction (though modest) in the MoD's budget settlements is welcome. (Para 101)      
18.That it is vital that the MoD is able to demonstrate more convincingly that the perpetual demand for increased efficiency is not being achieved by covert cuts in capability. (Para 107)      
  Ninth Report: Major Procurement Projects (HC 463) Published: 14 May 2001

  Government Reply: No response required

 Recommendations and undertakings Government Response Committee Response/Follow-up Further Government
1.The Report published the written and oral evidence to make it available to our successors. N/A     

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