HIGHWAYS AGENCY
26. In A New Deal for Trunk Roads the Government
altered the aims and objectives of the Highways Agency. Henceforth
the Agency would be expected to be a network operator charged
with giving a higher priority to road maintenance and making better
use of existing roads, and placing greater emphasis on environmental
and safety objectives,[117]
rather than simply being responsible for building and maintaining
the trunk road network. This welcome change of direction has been
coupled with changes in the Agency's practices, principally involving
a greater emphasis on environmental concerns.[118]
However, the Ten Year Plan for Transport set out total
spending of £21 billion on trunk roads over the next decade,[119]
including thirty trunk road bypasses, 360 miles of road widening,
and eighty other major schemes. A further £30 billion will
be spent on road maintenance.[120]
We trust that the proposal in the Ten Year Plan for Transport
to undertake a number of road-building and road-improvement schemes
does not signal a shift away from the direction given to the Highways
Agency in A New Deal for Trunk Roads.
27. We have already commented on the need for all
of the Executive Agencies to improve the ways in which they communicate
with the public and interested bodies. That need is particularly
acute in the case of the Highways Agency. For example, it is not
at all clear how priorities for the Agency are set, and how decisions
about whether or not to adopt particular road schemes are taken.[121]
Both English Nature and the RAC also raised concerns about their
communication with the Agency.[122]
English Nature told us that the Highways Agency's Road Users'
Committee and National Environment Committee could "become
more productive by placing greater emphasis on using them to help
the Agency develop policy and best practice":[123]
at present, English Nature claimed, meetings of the committees
are used to give updates on individual projects, with "limited
interaction with external members and little scope for influencing
the direction of these projects".[124]
The RAC told us that it wished to be consulted about plans set
out by the Highways Agency[125]
to increase the use of the hard shoulder under certain circumstances
by traffic on trunk roads.[126]
The Highways Agency has not excelled at communicating with
the public and interested parties in the past: although there
are some signs of improvement, we urge the Agency to take further
steps to become open and responsive in future.
28. We have received particularly strong representations
about the surface of the A30 near Marsh Green, Exeter, which opened
only within the last two years. Many residents have complained
that the road is extremely noisy because it is surfaced with rolled
concrete. That surface has since been abandoned for new road developments,
due to the level of noise generated by traffic using it. Indeed
the Government has set a target that all concrete roads should
be resurfaced with quieter materials within 10 years,[127]
but a recent announcement by the Highways Agency of those to be
resurfaced before April 2002 did not include this section of the
A30.[128]
Although we welcome the target for resurfacing rolled concrete
roads with quieter materials within ten years, we urge the Highways
Agency to complete the process of doing so more quickly if possible.
Resource Accounting and Budgeting
29. In its evidence the PCS argued that the introduction
of Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) at the Highways Agency
revealed "a lack of good financial management at senior levels
within the Agency".[129]
The union claimed that an external contractor appointed in 1994
to advise the Agency on introducing RAB then bid, in 1998, for
the contract to introduce RAB and, despite concerns expressed
about the propriety of the arrangement, proved successful. In
all, the PCS claimed, the contractor was paid £13 million
to introduce RAB to the Agency. The union also said that because
the original project had failed to deliver its objectives new
consultants have been employed, at a cost of a further £9
million, to complete the task,[130]
which is now known as the Strategy for Financial Management project.
It argued that much of the £22 million which has been, or
will be, spent on RAB and the Strategy for Financial Management
has been wasted.[131]
30. The Highways Agency's account of the matter differed
in some respects. It told us that in November 1994 an external
consultant had indeed been appointed by invitation from its then
Finance Director, rather than by competition, to review the Agency's
preparedness for commercial accounting. A competition was then
held in March 1995 for the role of Project Director of the Commercial
Accounting Project. The same consultant who had previously been
advising the Agency won the competition, and until March 1998
principally worked as Project Director on the Commercial Accounting
Project, but also provided advice on Private Finance Initiative
and 'institutional issues'. Between December 1994 and March 1998
the adviser was paid approximately £420,000.[132]
31. The Highways Agency confirmed that the Project
Director, in the form of CBC and Associates won the contract put
out to competition in 1998 to implement RAB at the Agency. The
Agency claimed that "in the event CBC provided the only compliant
tender".[133]
That contract ran from February 1998 until 2 November 2000, and
under it CBC and Associates was paid £8,730,000.[134]
Thus in total CBC and Associates, in one form or another, has
been paid £9,150,000 for advice and other work relating to
the introduction of RAB at the Agency. In addition, other contractors
were paid £2,668,000 between 1998 and 2001, and a further
£9 million will be paid to deliver the Agency's Strategy
for Financial Management project, a total of almost £21 million.
32. Although the Highways Agency disputed some of
the claims made by the PCS, it agreed that there had been some
difficulties. The Chief Executive of the Agency agreed that the
outside contractor originally appointed to advise the Agency was
"somebody who had previously worked with the [then] Finance
Director".[135]
He said that "what was disappointing and, in retrospect,
not managed carefully was the time it took [to implement RAB]".[136]
The Chief Executive told us that "it is not the way I would
necessarily have handled things ...There are elements of the way
in which that process was managed, both in terms of procurement
arrangements and the time it took to deliver, which ... are very
disappointing".[137]
33. The PCS told us that concerns about the propriety
of the arrangements made by the Agency with CBC and Associates
were first raised by the head of the Agency's Internal Audit Team.
The union said that having done so the Head of Internal Audit
was then "removed from his post and ultimately transferred
out of the Agency".[138]
The Chief Executive of the Agency told us that "there were
discussions with him [the Head of Internal Audit] about his general
level of performance",[139]
following which he "agreed to move".[140]
The Agency told us in a supplementary note that "discussions
had been held with the Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions Internal Audit in January 1998 about the need
to upgrade the post of Head of the Agency's Internal Audit function
and for a change in leadership. This built on previous discussions
between the Head of Internal Audit and the Agency's Personnel
Director in November 1997 ... It was [eventually] agreed that
the post be upgraded, to be filled by an existing member of Department
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions staff, that the
Head of Internal Audit would seek a post outside the Agency and
that the Agency would use its best endeavours to help him".[141]
He is now employed in the central Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions.
34. We are profoundly concerned about several
aspects of the evidence we have received about the introduction
of RAB at the Highways Agency, including the way in which the
outside contractor was originally appointed to advise the Agency,
the processes through which he, and his company, were then able
to secure two further contracts with the Agency worth, in total,
more than £9 million, the total cost of implementing RAB
at the Agency, and the time taken to do so. We are not satisfied
with the explanations we have so far received about these matters
from the Agency and from the Department of the Environment, Transport
and the Regions. We recommend that the Government urgently investigate
these matters, and all aspects of the introduction of RAB at the
Highways Agency, examining their propriety, whether they comply
with relevant domestic and European legislation, and whether the
costs incurred and the time taken to implement RAB have been acceptable.
Finally we seek further reassurance that the decision to move
the Head of Internal Audit from the Agency was not influenced
by the fact that he had raised concern about the implementation
of RAB: the Government should conduct further inquiries into that
matter. We intend to return to this matter in the future.
10 Department of the Environment, Transport and
the Regions Annual Report 2000, Chapter 14, p.211, which can
be viewed at www.detr.gov.uk/annual00/index.htm. Back
11
Cash budget and staff figures (both for 2000-01) are taken from
HC Deb, 21 December 2000, col.285w. Back
12
Excluding almost £5 billion of VED collected by the DVLA,
and passed to the Consolidated Fund. Back
13
See Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
Annual Report 2000, Chapter 14, p.210, which can be viewed
at www.detr.gov.uk/annual00/index.htm. Back
14
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC (1998-99)
31. Back
15
Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers: Standards and Training,
Nineteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 515. Back
16
See, for example, Departmental Annual Report 1999 and Expenditure
Plans 1999-2002, Fifteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 440. Back
17
See Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee Press
Notice No. 51 of Session 1999-2000, 27 July 2000, which can be
viewed at www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom90/etrpnt51.htm. Back
18
See TEA01, paras.3.2.3 to 3.2.7 and Appendix F. Back
19
See TEA01, para.7.4.1, and The Maritime and Coastguard Agency,
Sixth Report, HC (1998-99) 31. Back
20
See TEA01, para.2.1.2. Back
21
See QQ.324 to 455. Back
22
See, for example, Q.16 and Q.140. Back
23
See TEA02, para.2.7 and paras.3.3 ff. Back
24
TEA01, para.1.2.1. Back
25
See, for example, Q.271 ff, Q.449, Q.462, and Q.592. Back
26
See TEA01, para.1.3.2. Back
27
See, for example, Q.663 ff, and Q.451 ff. Back
28
HC Deb, 9 March 1999, col.181. Back
29
Cars with engines smaller than 1100 cc were required to pay £100
in Vehicle Excise Duty, compared to £155 for larger-engined
cars; see TEA01, Appendix A, para.1. Back
30
See HC Deb, 21 March 2000, col.868; the reduced rate of Vehicle
Excise Duty of £100 would apply to cars at 1200 cc or below
from 1 March 2001, and in addition from that date a four-band
Vehicle Excise Duty regime for newly-purchased cars would be introduced,
which aimed to reward the most environmentally friendly vehicles. Back
31
See Q.329. Back
32
See Clause 18 of the Vehicle (Crime) Bill. Back
33
See Q.325. Back
34
See Q.331. Back
35
See Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers: Standards and Training,
Nineteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 515, para.28 ff. Back
36
See Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers, Nineteenth Report,
HC (1998-99) 515, evidence p.39. Back
37
See Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers, Nineteenth Report,
HC (1998-99) 515, para.33. Back
38
TEA07, para.7. Back
39
See TEA01, p.37. Back
40
See TEA01, paras.3.2.3 ff, and Q.203. Back
41
Q.203. Back
42
See Q.303. Back
43
See TEA07, para.7. Back
44
Q.304. Back
45
Q.307. Back
46
See TEA07, para.4. Back
47
Q.3. Back
48
See TEA07, para.4. Back
49
Q.9. Back
50
See Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers: Standards and Training,
Nineteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 515, para.42. Back
51
Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers: Standards and Training,
Nineteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 515, para.41. Back
52
See Q.206. Back
53
See Q.204. Back
54
See Q.234 and Q.238. Back
55
See Q.205. Back
56
See TEA01, para.3.1.16. Back
57
See TEA01, Appendix C, and Q.206. Back
58
See Q.208. Back
59
See Q.206; see also TEA01, para.3.2.2. Back
60
See Q.5. Back
61
See Q.211. Back
62
See QQ.11 ff. Back
63
See Q.239. Back
64
See Q.211. Back
65
TEA05, Appendix 1, p.1. Back
66
See Q.256. Back
67
See Q.254. The Chief Executive told us that the number of Supervising
Examiners who oversee the examiners had increased from 35 to 40,
but that the number of Supervising Examiners overseeing Approved
Driving Instructors had fallen from 50 to 41. Back
68
See Q.258. Back
69
TEA05, Appendix 2, p.2. Back
70
See TEA07, para.12. Back
71
TEA07, para.14. Back
72
TEA06, para.15.4. Back
73
See QQ.310 ff. Back
74
TEA01, para.3.3.9. Back
75
TEA01, para.3.3.7. Back
76
See TEA01, para.3.8.5. Back
77
See HC Deb, 14 January 1999, cols.242w ff. Back
78
See Q.248. Back
79
See TEA03, para.4.0. Back
80
See Q.253. Back
81
Q.34; see also TEA07, para.9. Back
82
See TEA06, para.8.5. Back
83
TEA01, para.3.8.6. Back
84
Q.28; see also Q.38. Back
85
See QQ.29 ff. Back
86
Q.38. Back
87
TEA03, para.2.4. Back
88
See TEA03, para.2.5. Back
89
See Q.40. Back
90
See Q.298. Back
91
European Commission Directive 2000/56/EC. Back
92
European Council Directive 91/439/EEC, as amended by Council Directives
96/47/EC and 97/26/EC. Back
93
See the Consultation Paper on European Community Changes to
the Driving Test, issued by the Driving Standards Agency,
January 2001, which can be seen at www.drivingtests.co.uk/dsa/consult/euro_dt_changes.htm. Back
94
See Young and Newly-Qualified Drivers: Standards and Training,
Nineteenth Report, HC (1998-99) 515, para.19. Back
95
See TEA01, para.3.6.7. Back
96
See Q.315. Back
97
Q.20. Back
98
See The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC
(1998-99) 31. Back
99
See The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC
(1998-99) 31, para.46. Back
100
See The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC
(1998-99) 31, para.56. Back
101
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency: Annual Report and Accounts
1999-2000, 20 July 2000, p.4. Back
102
Q.592. Back
103
Q.592. Back
104
TEA01, para.7.5.8. Back
105
See Q.611 and Q.614. Back
106
Q.104. Back
107
TEA05, Appendix 4. Back
108
See QQ.107 ff. Back
109
Q.598. Back
110
See Q.104 and Q.608. Back
111
See Q.608. Back
112
See The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC
(1998-99) 31, para.20. Back
113
See The Government's Response to the Sixth Report by the Environment,
Transport and Regional Affairs Select Committee: The Maritime
and Coastguard Agency, Cm 4433 (www.shipping.detr.gov.uk/response/mca/index.htm). Back
114
See Q.592, and TEA01, para.7.4.6. Back
115
See TEA01, para.7.4.7. Back
116
See The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Sixth Report, HC
(1998-99) 31, paras.39 ff. Back
117
A New Deal for Trunk Roads, Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions, July 1998, p.7, which can be seen at
www.detr.gov.uk/itwp/trunkroads/index.htm. Back
118
See QQ.459 ff. Back
119
See Transport 2010: The Ten Year Plan, Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, July 2000, p.54, which
can be seen at www.detr.gov.uk/trans2010/index.htm. Back
120
See Transport 2010: The Ten Year Plan, p.98. Back
121
See Q.465 to Q.482. Back
122
See TEA02, para.2.7, and TEA08, paras.5 and 15. Back
123
TEA02, para.2.7. Back
124
TEA02, para.2.7. Back
125
In Transport 2010: The Ten-Year Plan Stakeholder Document,
Highways Agency, which can be seen on the Internet at www.highways.gov.uk/info/10_yearpl/stake_cd/index.htm. Back
126
TEA08, para.7. Back
127
See Transport 2010: The Ten Year Plan, para.6.32. Back
128
See Consultation begins on quieter road surface programme,
Highways Agency Press Notice, 29 December 2000. Back
129
TEA05, Appendix 3. Back
130
See TEA05, Appendix 3. Back
131
See Q.134. Back
132
See TEA01B, paras.2.1 to 2.4. Back
133
TEA01B, para.2.5. Back
134
See TEA01B, para.2.6. Back
135
Q.495. Back
136
Q.490. Back
137
Q.510. Back
138
See TEA05, Appendix 3. Back
139
Q.525. Back
140
Q.523. Back
141
TEA01B, para.2.11. Back