Memorandum submitted by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office on Yugoslavia
1. On 24 September 2000, Dr Vojislav Kostunica
was elected President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
in the first round of the FRY Presidential elections. The former
regime of Slobodan Milosevic attempted to falsify this result,
and then to annul the election in its entirety. But a wave of
popular protest and strikes, which culminated in the occupation
of the Federal Parliament on the afternoon of 5 October, swept
Milosevic from office and ensured the inauguration of President
Kostunica. A democratic Federal Government was established on
4 November. After an interim period of all-party administration,
a democratic Serbian Government is now being formed following
early Serbian Parliamentary elections on 23 December.
2. These developments have transformed the
prospects of Serbia, and have a made a positive impact on the
whole Balkans region. A regime which was a chronic regional source
of instability and criminality has been replaced, against the
odds, in a democratic fashion and without bloodshed. Dialogue
between Belgrade and Pristina is now possible. Bilateral and multilateral
regional co-operation has been boosted, as the country at the
geographical centre of the Balkans begins its return to the European
family of democratic nations. There is a real chance that the
complex outstanding issues surrounding the assets and liabilities
of the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) can
at last be brought to an agreed solution.
3. There are still serious problems. The
consequences of ethnic extremism and nationalism in the former
Yugoslavia will only diminish slowly over time. But for the first
time, all governments in the Balkans region are committed explicitly
to peaceful co-operation with their neighbours and to democratic
processes. The establishment of democratic Serbian and Federal
governments in Belgrade is supplying the last piece of that jigsaw.
Serbia
4. The most dramatic consequence of the
fall of Milosevic has been the end of Serbia's international isolation.
The FRY has joined key international and regional organisations
(UN, OSCE, IMF, EBRD, Stability Pact) and is applying for membership
of others (World Bank, Council of Europe, World Trade Organisation,
Interpol). The FRY has restored or established diplomatic relations
with the US, the UK, France, Germany, Slovenia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina (but not yet with Albania). The attendance of President
Kostunica at the summit of regional leaders in Skopje on 25 October
and at the EU-Balkans Summit in Zagreb on 24 November marked the
resumption of comprehensive multilateral diplomacy in the region.
The FRY has also taken the first step along the road to a contractual
relationship with the EU, with the establishment of an EU-FRY
Taskforce which will examine the feasibility of moving towards
a Stability and Association Agreement. The determination of the
FRY Government to rebuild its external links has been matched
by real goodwill at the international level.
5. HMG supports all measures aimed at securing
the democratic transformation that has taken place in the FRY,
and wants to see the country safely embarked on a sustained programme
of democratic and economic reform. Full participation in the international
community will, however, require the FRY to meet exacting standards.
As with Croatia, we will expect the FRY to co-operate fully with
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), and to play its full part in the implementation of the
Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6. The new situation also provides an opportunity
for Serbia to confront its recent past. This will be essential
for the establishment of a new, healthy, democratic society in
the FRY. A fundamental re-appraisal of the 1990s is also a prerequisite
for developing a good working relationship with the other countries
of the former Yugoslavia, particularly Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Various initiatives are already underway in governmental
and non-governmental circles in Belgrade, for example with the
formation of special units to investigate corruption in the former
regime, and the establishment of a "Truth Commission."
The apportioning of moral and criminal responsibility for the
crimes of the former regime will be a painful process, but we
continue to believe that this process, including full co-operation
with ICTY, will help draw a line under the recent past and lay
the foundations for a more stable and just future.
7. The democratic revolution in Serbia also
brings a new opportunity for rational dialogue between the entities
of the FRY. We look forward to a Belgrade-Podgorica dialogue taking
place in a calm atmosphere, with the aim of finding mutually acceptable
solutions on status which contribute to regional stability. We
also look forward to a much more positive attitude by Belgrade
towards all aspects of the implementation of UNSCR 1244 on Kosovo
(Montenegro and Kosovo are covered in more detail below). For
Serbia, there is also an opportunity to examine the internal architecture
of the state. Positive moves have already been made in Vojvodina
and the Sandzak, with the renaissance of the Vojvodina Assembly
in Novi Sad and the appointment of a Sandzak Bosniac as Federal
Minister of National Minorities.
8. At the same time there has been a deterioration
of the security situation in the Presevo Valley area of southern
Serbia (bordering Kosovo). This has been made more complicated
by the Albanian extremists' ability to move comparatively freely
in, and launch attacks from, the 5km wide Ground Safety Zone (GSZ)
in Serbia which borders the administrative boundary with Kosovo.
This GSZ was established by the KFOR/FRY Military-Technical Agreement
in order to provide a buffer zone between the Yugoslav Army (VJ)
and KFOR, and neither the VJ and Serbian paramilitary police,
nor KFOR, operate in it. However, the situation has been stabilised
with the help of a new constructive relationship between KFOR
and the FRY authorities. The Belgrade authorities have refused
to respond to provocations with violence and, with international
support, are making a genuine attempt to engage the leadership
of the local Albanian community in a political dialogue. The problem
of extremist groups in and around what is now the GSZ goes back
some years, and it is unlikely to be solved immediately. But a
democratic government in Belgrade ought to be able to meet the
legitimate political needs of local communities, and hence to
remove any residual excuses for illegal actions by extremists.
Meanwhile the ECMM is playing an active monitoring role.
Montenegro
9. For Montenegro, the first consequence
of the establishment of a democratic Federal Government in Belgrade
was the lifting of a major threat to Montenegro's security. Having
lost operational control of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and of other
state security and intelligence organisations, Milosevic was no
longer in a position to threaten Montenegro with unrest or armed
conflict. President Kostunica was quick to convene a meeting of
the Supreme Defence Council, allowing President Djukanovic to
exercise his Constitutional right to take part in top-level discussions
on defence and security issues. The leadership of the Yugoslav
military in Montenegro has now been changed. Although there are
continuing Montenegrin concerns about the composition and activities
of the seventh Battalion (Military Police) of the VJ's Second
Army, there is now little likelihood of Federal forces clashing
seriously with the Montenegrin police.
10. Kostunica's decision to bring the Montenegrin
SNP (hitherto generally pro-Milosevic) into his coalition was
forced upon him by coalition mathematics—Djukanovic's coalition
parties had all boycotted the elections, leaving the SNP with
almost all the Montenegro seats. It nonetheless caused some further
strain between Djukanovic and Kostunica. Kostunica has discussed
holding a further round of FRY Parliamentary elections in 2001,
on a free and fair basis. Subject to the outcome of talks between
Serbia and Montenegro on their future relationship, this could
provide an opportunity for Montenegrin representation in FRY institutions
to be normalised.
11. The change in Belgrade has also helped
to strengthen Parliamentary democracy in Montengro itself. Real
internal political tensions remain, but even before the fall of
Milosevic the SNP in Montenegro had demonstrated its willingness
to abide by norms of democratic behaviour (particularly in its
acceptance of OSCE monitoring of the local elections in June 2000).
As the influence of the pro-Milosevic circle in the SNP wanes,
Montenegro will be able to move towards a political system based
on high democratic standards and mutual respect. HMG will continue
to support democratic reforms in Montenegro, in co-ordination
with other bilateral donors, the EU and international organisations
such as ODIHR/OSCE.
12. Montenegro and Serbia now have to resolve
the future of their institutional relationship. In the last years
of Milosevic, Montenegro was excluded systematically from genuine
participation in Federal institutions, and was driven increasingly
to adopt its own autonomous powers—for example on customs,
banking, monetary policy and foreign policy. The Montenegrin Government
refused to recognise the decisions of Federal institutions, and
did not accept the changes to the Federal Constitution rushed
through by Milosevic in July 2000. Now, however, the Serbian and
Montenegrin Governments are agreed that formal negotiations beginning
early in 2001 will aim to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement
for a joint state. It is crucial that this arrangement be arrived
at in an open and democratic manner, and that it enjoys a political
consensus wide enough to close off any danger of subsequent unrest
or instability. The aim should be a sustainable outcome which
is compatible with the priority of regional stability. HMG believes
that a single international personality will allow Montenegro
and Serbia to exercise autonomous powers at the appropriate levels,
without damaging consequences for the region.
Kosovo
13. The changes in Belgrade so far have
had only a limited direct effect within Kosovo, which is likely
to remain under international administration oversight in accordance
with UNSCR 1244 for some time to come. However, they hold out
the prospect of progress in the medium term. There have already
been substantial contacts between Belgrade and the UN Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on infrastructure issues
such as power supply. There have also been extensive contacts
between Belgrade and KFOR (and NATO) on security issues, in particular
the situation in the Presevo Valley, building on the pre-existing
links through KFOR's Joint Implementation Commission, attended
by Serbian and Yugoslav representatives.
14. The FRY Government's priorities in relation
to Kosovo appear to be the return of refugees and the security
of Serbs and other minorities within Kosovo. We support these
objectives, but the realities of the situation mean that refugee
returns will have to be achieved step by step. UNMIK and KFOR
regard the security of returnees and those living within Kosovo
as a priority issue. Undertakings such as Operation TROJAN in
the UK sector (which covers a large number of projects aimed at
improving the security and welfare of the Serb community) will
continue.
15. The fate of those Kosovo Albanians who
were detained by Milosevic's forces after the Kosovo conflict
remains a serious concern. The release in November of Dr Flora
Brovina, the well-known human rights activist, was a welcome step.
We have made clear in Belgrade that we hope this can be followed
soon by the release of the remaining prisoners imprisoned in similar
circumstances. This would be a key confidence-building measure.
Similarly, we recognise that there is concern in Serbia about
the fate of Serbs missing in Kosovo. This concern also should
be addressed: we hope that Kosovo Albanian representatives will
engage in the process of resolving this issue.
16. The future status of Kosovo, which is
left open by UNSCR 1244, is a matter of importance, but will need
to be addressed in the longer term, once a degree of confidence
has been re-established between Pristina and Belgrade. In the
meantime, UNMIK is taking forward preparations for the establishment
of provisional institutions for self-government, such as Kosovo
Assembly, and elections to these bodies, as required under paragraph
11(c) of UNSCR 1244. As these bodies will be provisional by definition,
their establishment will be without prejudice to the future status
of Kosovo. Initial preparations for these elections are underway,
but it is likely to take some time for them to be fully and properly
prepared, and no date for elections has yet been fixed.
17. The fall of Milosevic appears to have
led to greater willingness on the part of Kosovo's Serb community
to co-operate with UNMIK and KFOR. Serbs are now participating
(by appointment) in the new Kosovo municipal authorities, put
in place following the elections on 28 October. Despite the non-participation
of the majority of Kosovo Serbs in these elections, there now
appears to be real enthusiasm for participation in municipal government,
and for elections to be re-run in Serb areas in the near future.
Kosovo Serbs (along with other minorities) are also now playing
a full role in the Joint Interim Administrative Structures and
Kosovo Transitional Council, the interim structures put in place
by UNMIK to involve the local population in the government of
Kosovo. Kosovo Serbs are co-heads (alongside international appointees)
of two JIAS departments.
18. The biggest challenges for the international
community in creating a functioning society in Kosovo are organised
crime and the effective administration of law and order. Ethnically
and politically motivated violence is still a problem, but now
constitutes a small proportion of overall crime in Kosovo. The
establishment of the Criminal Intelligence Unit, due to be operational
in February 2001, to which the UK has made the most significant
contribution, is a crucial step in addressing this problem. We
are working in close co-operation with UNMIK to strengthen further
the judicial system in Kosovo, including through the nomination
of candidates for posts as international judges and prosecutors.
The locally-staffed Kosovo Police Service is gaining strength,
experience and effectiveness, working in close co-operation with
UNMIK Police and KFOR, and already includes a significant proportion
of recruits from the ethnic minorities, particularly Kosovo Serbs,
among its numbers.
19. The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was
established as civilian organisation in 1999. The KPC has carried
out a significant number of useful duties in the civil sector,
including reconstruction and humanitarian relief, and is being
trained to be more effective in such roles in the future. The
activities of the KPC are closely monitored by UNMIK and KFOR,
and the numbers of incidents of non-compliance by KPC members
is low. It is an important part of the international community's
strategy to engage with the former members of the KLA (who constitute
a large proportion of the KPC's membership) and help them make
a positive contribution to Kosovo through the work of the KPC.
The positive direction of the KPC is underlined by the fact that
it has recently admitted its first Serb members (the agreed target
is ten per cent non-Albanian membership). We welcome UNMIK's intention
to establish an UNMIK-appointed international KPC "administrator"
to organise the KPC more effectively, focus its work, attract
additional funding and engage it in worthwhile projects. The UK
has put forward a candidate for this post.
Conclusion
20. If Milosevic had still been in power
at the end of November, an empty chair at the Zagreb Summit would
have symbolised the incompleteness of the new regional spirit
of co-operation. As it is, the new administration of President
Kostunica has already made significant steps along the road of
re-establishing the FRY as a democratic partner in the Balkans.
The countries of the region can now build prosperity and move
closer to the European Union, without the fear of a further Milosevic-inspired
conflagration.
21. Over the last years, the electorates
of the Balkans have begun to reject nationalist extremism and
corruption in favour of democratic co-existence. The events of
September and October in Belgrade marked the end of the rule of
perhaps the worst and most cynical extremist in the Balkans, the
man who unleashed nationalism as a political force in the Yugoslavia
of the late 1980s. Serbia lost a decade—hundreds of thousands
lost their lives. Now at last, Serbia, Yugoslavia and the region
are emerging to a brighter future. Basic to that is the European
agenda—a contract that if the South East European countries
can co-operate politically and work on democratic and economic
reform together, then the EU and international institutions will
play their part in offering a destination in the community of
Western European nations.
22. But there will be many difficult issues
to be tackled on the way, political, social and economic. With
its partners and allies, the United Kingdom will continue to work
closely with the authorities in Belgrade and Podgorica, with the
UN Mission in Pristina and with neighbouring countries to create
the best possible chances that this opportunity for stability,
regional co-operation and prosperity is seized.
10th January 2001
|
