Supplementary memorandum submitted by
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1. During the Committee's Session of Evidence
with Mr Vaz on 27 February, as part of its inquiry into policy
on Yugoslavia, Mr Vaz undertook to provide written comments on
a number of specific issues. These comments are set out below.
A separate note will be provided on the Committee's question about
independent studies of the health effects of depleted uranium.[1]
KOSOVO: MURDER
OF REXHEP
LUCI
2. Mr Vaz undertook to comment on the case
of Mr. Rexhep Luci (UNMIK Director for Urban Development, who
was murdered on 13 September 2000) and on KFOR's role in policing
Kosovo.
3. Individual protection in Kosovo is the
responsibility of UNMIK police, who are trained for the purpose.
It is correct that the time of his murder Mr Luci did not have
any police protection. The provision of close protection by UNMIK
police is based on the threat assessment against the individual.
Where there is intelligence to suggest that there is a threat
against someone's life, UNMIK police endeavour to provide protection.
4. The role of KFOR is to provide overall
security in Kosovo, not individual protection - although in some
cases KFOR troops have been used to protect individuals or property
as the only way of deploying sufficient force to prevent ethnically-motivated
crimes. We believe that any deficiencies in policing should be
solved by strengthening police training and procedures.
KOSOVO: INTERNATIONAL
JUDGES
5. Mr Vaz undertook to comment on the delay
in appointing members of the Bar and the judiciary to international
posts in Kosovo.
6. At present there are 12 international
judges and five international prosecutors working in Kosovo. Last
March, UNMIK requested further judicial staff, and the UK responded
very quickly (over 100 suitable volunteers were identified). Of
these, UMIK appointed two British prosecutors—of whom one
is still working in Kosovo.
7. UNMIK has indicated that it remains in
favour of the appointment of more international judges and prosecutors
and is looking at whether more resources can be made available
to meet the costs. We are discussing with UNMIK and with the UN
Secretariat in New York the urgent need for additional resources
for this in the forthcoming UNMIK budget. Mr Vaz has instructed
our Mission to the United Nations in New York to raise this matter
again with the UN Secretariat.
KOSOVO: ETHNIC
SERB PARTICIPATION
8.The Committee asked for detailed information
to support the FCO's statement in our Memorandum (see page 26,
para 17) that "Kosovo Serbs.. are also now playing a full
role in the Joint Interim Administrative Structures and Kosovo
Transitional Council.."
9. The following Kosovo Serbs are participating
regularly in the Joint Interim Administrative Structures:
— Dr Rada Trajkovic, who has been an
active Member of the Interim Administration Council (IAC) since
April 2000 (the IAC consists of Dr Trajkovic and three representatives
of the Albanian community);
— Randal Nojkic, Co-Head of the Department
of Labour and Dragan Nikolic, Co-Head of the Department for Agriculture
and Rural Development (there are 20 Departments: 16 Albanians,
two Serbs, one representative each from the Turkish and Bosniak
communities);
— Oliver Ivanovic, Member of the Joint
Committee on Returns.
Dragan Velvic, Randal Nojkic, Father Sava and
Dr Rada Trajkovic are nominated Members of the Kosovo Transitional
Council (KTC). The KTC has 35 Members: five seats are reserved
for Serbs, one of which is vacant.
KOSOVO: TREPCA
COMPLEX
10. The Committee requested further information
on the Trepca industrial complex in Kosovo.
11. The future of the Trepca complex (which
includes mines and other associated industries) is being addressed
by the EU pillar of UNMIK. UNMIK's intention, with the UK supports,
is to regenerate the economy of Kosovo after decades of neglect
by attracting inward investment, and to make this recovery sustainable.
The unresolved question of ownership of Trepca and other facilities
is an obstacle, but one which UNMIK is tackling, in consultation
with Belgrade.
12. Specifically, UNMIK has commissioned
a study by independent consultants on options for future production,
including the feasibility of re-opening the vast majority of the
Trepca facilities which are now closed—either as redundant
or on environmental pollution grounds. This is due to report soon,
and UNMIK's plans will be announced shortly thereafter. Subject
to the outcome of the study, UNMIK's hope is that as much as possible
of the complex be brought back into operation. But modern production
methods may mean that far fewer people will be employed there
in the future.
MONTENEGRO: DIPLOMATIC
REPRESENTATION
13. The Committee asked about UK diplomatic
representation in Montenegro.
14. The British Embassy in Belgrade is responsible
for relations with the Government of the Republic of Montenegro,
as part of its coverage of the FRY. We have always maintained
contact with the Montenegrin authorities through regular visits
by London—or regionally—based UK diplomats. Contacts
between the UK and Montenegrin authorities have become easier
and more frequent since the arrival of the new British Ambassador
(Mr Crawford) in Belgrade on 19 January. Mr Crawford has since
made two trips to Montenegro (26 January and 20 February), during
which he called on a wide range of Government and Opposition politicians
- including President Djukanovic, Prime Minister Vujanovic, Foreign
Minister Lukovac, Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament Marovic
and President of the SNP Predrag Bulatovic. Mr Crawford will continue
to visit Montenegro on a regular baiss. The former Head of the
British Office in Pristina (Mr Slinn) has been attached to the
Embassy in Belgrade on a temporary basis, and will also be building
political contacts with Montenegro as part of his portfolio. Alan
Charlton (Director, South East Europe) will visit Podgorica on
6 March.
15. We believe that frequent contact at
this level is for now an adequate basis for a dialogue with Montenegro.
We will continue to keep the situation under review.
MONTENEGRO: RIGHT
TO SECEDE
16. The Committee asked whether the UK considered
that Montenegro has a constitutional right to secede from Yugoslavia.
17. This is of course a question of Yugoslav
and Montenegrin law. The question is complex because two Constitutions
are involved: the Federal and the Montenegrin. In a number of
areas these Constitutions appear to be incompatible, and the interpretations
of their provisions by political parties and legal authorities
differ substantially. Some politicians and experts argue that
the Federal and Montenegrin constitutions establish Montenegro
as a sovereign state, which either implicitly or explicitly has
the right to secede from or to dissolve the FRY; others draw the
opposite conclusion.
18. It should be noted that the Constitution
of the FRY (dating from 1992) is different from the Constitution
of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),
which was in force at the time of the disputes in 1990-91 over
the nature of the sovereignty of Slovenia, Croatia and the other
four Republics.
19. In normal circumstances any dispute
about the provisions of the Federal Constitution or the compatibility
of the Federal and Montenegrin Constitutions would best be resolved
by the Federal Constitutional Court. However, this body was politicised
by the Milosevic regime, and—particularly since the changes
to the Federal Constitution forced through the Federal Parliament
by Milosevic on 6 July 2000—the Government of Montenegro
has challenged the basic legitimacy of Federal institutions. A
political impasse has been reached.
20. It cannot be for the UK to determine
the interpretation of the Federal and Montenegrin Constitutions.
The international community will of course be willing to help
with expert advice, should the parties request that. We believe
however that the only way to ensure a peaceful and sustainable
outcome to discussions over the future status of the FRY and of
Montenegro is for the parties themselves to engage in an open
and constructive dialogue. We should be deeply concerned if the
nature of the process or the outcome of the status negotiations
seemed likely to damage the stability of either Republic or the
the wider region.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
TO THE
BALKANS
21. Mr. Vaz undertook to provide a detailed
breakdown of international assistance to the region. I attach
tables which show assistance to South Eastern Europe over the
period 1991-2000 from: the European Community, member states of
the EU, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development.
THE EU CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH-EAST EUROPE
1991-99 EU ASSISTANCE (MILLIONS OF EUROS)
| Country | European
Community
| Member
States |
EIB | EU Total
| EBRD | Grand Total
|
| Albania | 882.30
| 712.80 | 46.00
| 1,641.10 | 68.00
| 1,709.10 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2,066.26
| 507.90 | 0.00
| 2,574.16 | 70.00
| 2,644.16 |
| Croatia | 348.79
| 1,165.90 | 0.00
| 1,514.69 | 511.00
| 2,025.69 |
Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia | 673.45
| 712.40 | 0.00
| 1,385.85 | 0.00
| 1,385.85 |
| FYROM | 422.00
| 178.20 | 60.00
| 660.20 | 143.00
| 803.20 |
| Regional Cooperation | 117.96
| 0.00 | 0.00
| 117.96 | 0.00
| 117.96 |
| Romania | 1,813.20
| 3,069.40 | 1,134.50
| 6,017.10 | 1,283
| 7,300.10 |
| Bulgaria | 1,480.50
| 754.80 | 751.00
| 2,986.30 | 296.00
| 3,282.30 |
| TOTAL | 7,863.91
| 7,101.40 | 1,991.50
| 16,956.81 | 2,371.00
| 19,327.81 |
THE EU CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH-EAST EUROPE 2000 BUDGET ALLOCATIONS
(MILLIONS OF EUROS)
| Beneficiary country | Allocation
|
| Albania | 35.00
|
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 100.00
|
| Croatia | 18.50
|
| Macedonia | 20.00
|
| Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: |
|
| Kosovo | 360.00
|
| Montenegro | 20.00
|
| Serbia | 4.40 (+E200 million announced at Biarritz)
|
| Regional Cooperation | 23.00
|
| TOTAL | 776.50
|
Source: European Commission website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external
relations.
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