BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
IN KOSOVO
141. The first stage of ensuring that Kosovo's government
is subject to democratic control occurred on 28 October 2000 with
the elections to municipal councils. According to the FCO, "the
high turnout is an indication of the desire of Kosovo's people
to support democracy in Kosovo. The high level of support for
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Dr Rugova, appears
to suggest strong support for moderation as the way forward for
Kosovo."[294]
While the victory of the moderates is to be welcomed, we heard
during our visit that the councils tended to adopt a "winner
take all" approach, with all posts going to the party winning
a majority, even if the majority was only 51 per cent. This is
of course normal practice in a number of political systems, but
carries particular risks in an area with no tradition of democracy,
and which so recently was involved in war. There is also a risk
that failure in the elections will make radical Kosovo Albanian
elements feel that they do not have a vested interest in developing
the institutions of self-government, but rather have a vested
interest in radicalising the population by provoking the Serbs
into a reaction, and in building up their military strength in
order to gain influence in what they hope will soon be an independent
Kosovo. Keeping the more radical elements involved in the political
structures is clearly one of the challenges facing the international
administration in Kosovo. Recent events in Mitrovica and the Presevo
valley can to some extent be seen in the light of these elections,
as well as the arrival of the new administration in Belgrade (which
threatened the extremists by raising the possibility of an accommodation
with Belgrade).
142. There is considerable scope for devolving further
power from the Special Representative to local structures. Mr
Haekkerup, the new head of UNMIK, has said that his highest priority
for Kosovo, along with guaranteeing security, was to create a
legal framework for the creation of a Kosovo assembly and a provisional
self-government.[295]
Dr Karin von Hippel, who worked with UNMIK for a year, told us
that the process of creating the framework "is quite secretive
and I do not think it should be secretive."[296]
It is perhaps understandable that the UN administration does not
want to ask locals how much control they want: it is difficult
to ask a question when you know that you will not like the answer.
Nonetheless, consulting as widely as possible will help to ensure
that the new institutions to be established in Kosovo are as legitimate
as possible in the eyes of the local population. We recommend
that the Government encourage UNMIK to consult as widely and as
transparently as possible on the future of Kosovo's democratic
institutions.
143. It is likely that any such consultation will
result in confirmation that Kosovo Albanians have a widespread
expectation of independence in the near future, and that any assembly
should have extensive powers. The former head of UNMIK, Bernard
Kouchner, told the UN Security Council that "while Kosovo
Albanians welcomed the regime change in Belgrade, it would not
change their desire for independence."[297]
In the long term, it will be difficult for UNMIK to block these
aspirations, but it will not be possible to devolve ultimate control,
in particular over security issues, without a clear and sustained
reduction in the threat against the Serb population of Kosovo.
One problem with establishing conditions for the devolution of
power is that the moderates may have little influence over the
more radical elements, and therefore may be unable to produce
an improvement in the security environment even if they desire
it. It may be that the radicals have already lost hope of gaining
their objectives peacefullyall the more reason for improving
the international administration's capacity to tackle illegal
behaviour. Regardless of what impact establishing conditions for
the devolution of power would have, there is little alternative.
The international community would be mistaken to go very far in
devolving power without clear signs that violence is under control
in Kosovo. Certainly, the possibility of a constituent assembly
and independence should be ruled out until the other elements
of UNSCR 1244 have been achievedin particular a "safe
environment for all people in Kosovo."[298]
Kosovo conclusion
144. The advent of the new administration in Belgrade
has changed the climate in Kosovo as in other parts of the Balkans.
At the most basic level, the changes in Belgrade have reduced
the threat of a Serb invasion of Kosovo. However, fears among
Kosovo Albanians that the international community will "betray"
Kosovo now that Milosevic has gone may have been behind the recent
upsurge in violence, both within Kosovo, and, as we discuss below,
in the Presevo valley and on the border with Macedonia.
145. It may be possible to scale down the mission
in Kosovo over time, by devolving more responsibility to local
structures, but it is difficult to see the mission ending in the
near future, because it will not be possible to lift the international
security guarantee on the safety of the Serbian population. This
leaves the international community in its current rather uncomfortable
and expensive position of holding the line between Serbs and Albanians
in Kosovo. As Alan Charlton of the FCO told us, the mission is
going to be "a long, long haul."[299]
146. We conclude that, while there are unsatisfactory
elements to the existing situation in Kosovo, immediate independence
would be destabilising and reintegration with Serbia would be
unlikely in any meaningful timescale. There is considerable scope
within UNSCR 1244 for developing a political process aimed at
resolving Kosovo's future, as well as developing "provisional
democratic self-governing institutions." We recommend that
the Government work with its international partners to ensure
that the Kosovo Albanians are aware that the further development
of those institutions will depend upon a sustained reduction in
violence within Kosovo and across its borders. We believe that
there should be a different level and intensity of dialogue with
the Kosovo Albanians. Such a dialogue should seek to promote much
more rapidly the assumption of control over the province through
democratic institutions, and continuing aid and support for reconstruction
and economic development, in return for cast iron guarantees that
the Kosovo Albanians will uphold impartially internal law and
order, security for the Serb minorities and the prevention of
cross border violence into neighbouring Macedonia and Serbia.
We further conclude that the mission in Kosovo is unlikely to
be completed for several years. The British Government should
be doing its utmost to persuade all those countries contributing
to the peace process in Kosovo, including Russia and the United
States, to make a commitment of both civilian and military personnel
to Kosovo of sufficient length so that the progress achieved to
date is built upon and not reversed.
262 Q205. Back
263
Q154. Back
264
Q206. Back
265
See para. 110. Back
266
See para. 136. Back
267
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1173000/1173648.stm Back
268
www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/03/4SEE/see140301.html. Back
269
Ev. p.41. Back
270
Q73. Back
271
Q68. Back
272
Q71. Back
273
Q125. Back
274
The role of these bodies is set out in UNMIK regulation 2000/1,
available on: www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg01.html.
See also Kosovo report, paras 226-228. Back
275
Ev. p.31. Back
276
Ev. p.60. Back
277
www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/NewsRoom?OpenFrameSet Back
278
Q66. Back
279
Q66. Back
280
See paras. 51ff. Back
281
Kosovo report, para 199. Back
282
The Guardian, 31 January 2001. Back
283
Ev. p.40. Back
284
Available from the House of Commons Library. Back
285
Ev. p.41. Back
286
Kosovo report, para 237. Back
287
See para. 73. Back
288
Q210. Back
289
Q228. Back
290
Q85. Back
291
Kosovo Report, Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned,
Oxford 2000, www.kosovocommission.org. The report was produced
by a commission chaired by Justice Richard Goldstone and co-chaired
by Mr Carl Tham. Back
292
Q81. Back
293
UNSCR 1244, 11 (e). Available at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm. Back
294
Ev. p.33. Back
295
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm#Anchor9. Back
296
Q65. Back
297
Security Council press release SC 6953, 16 November 2000. Back
298
UNSCR 1244, Annex 2.4. Available at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm. Back
299
Q125. Back