APPENDIX 9
Memorandum submitted by Zoran Kusovac
1. UK AND FCO
ROLE IN
MILOSEVIC'S
DOWNFALL
After the 1999 NATO action failed to unseat
FRY President Slobodan Milosevic, the international community
set out to achieve that goal by different means. Although the
determination and financial assistance from the USA were crucial
in providing the necessary funds and infrastructure and above
all in sending the message that most of the Western world was
united behind that goal, the role of the UK was significant, although
the public is yet not fully aware of its extent or crucial importance.
Several UK organisations combined their effort to explore ways
and means by which the common goal might best be achieved and
engaged in identifying the local players whose participation would
make it possible.
The FCO played a leading role in this despite
the fact that it had no official diplomatic presence on the ground
in Belgrade. The involvement of a number of diplomats who had
previously served in the region establishing a wide network of
contacts and acquiring first-hand experience in dealing with the
often unpredictable local forces whose alliances and allegations
often change overnight created a necessary pool of knowledge within
the FCO. This knowledge was expanded by organising a series of
events, meetings and conferences bringing together various members
from the non-Milosevic camp and exploiting possible routes to
success. The involvement of Wilton Park as a specialised FCO agency
was one of the crucial links in this process. Other governmental
agencies, of nature usually not discussed in an open document,
also acted with determination and dedication, assigning experienced
officers to a number of outposts as close as possible to Belgrade
(Budapest, Banja Luka, Pristina, Vienna) where they could maintain
regular contacts with the Serbian political actors and where their
experience was on the whole well utilised.
Several UK and foreign think-tanks and NGOs
also provided valuable input. On the whole the FCO did a much
better job in identifying the organisations and individuals which
could provide practical knowledge and suggest realistic, pragmatic
and efficient policy than did the corresponding ministries of
most other Western countries who often allowed themselves to be
guided by ideological or "humanitarian" rather than
pragmatic principles.
2. INVOLVEMENT
OF OTHER
UK AGENCIES
Public knowledge of the full extent and nature
of contacts with the officials of the Belgrade regime and members
of the opposition is likely to remain limited for some time, but
there is no doubt that the UK approach produced results. A number
of members of the former establishment are known to have sought
discreet contacts with UK officials rather than those of any other
Western country. Whether pursued or not, and to which extent,
those contacts certainly provided a valuable insight into the
degree of coherence of the regime and allowed for the co-ordination
of support to anti-Milosevic activities.
3. PITFALLS OF
FASCINATION WITH
CHANGE IN
BELGRADE
However, as soon as the main goal—the
removal of Slobodan Milosevic was achieved, the approach which
had made that goal possible became slightly counter-productive.
A number of Western governments as a whole can be said to be in
a state of near-obsession with Serbia and its new regime. While
such an outcome is understandable as it follows a period of lengthy
frustration in which no apparent inroads could be made in weakening
Milosevic's regime, it could lead to dangerous oversimplification
of the nature of remaining problems in the Balkans that will have
to be dealt with in the future.
The nature and degree of change in Belgrade
does not seem to be fully understood by a number of decision-makers
and the reason for that might lay in the lack of willingness to
study the complex and difficult nature of internal relationships
of elements of the previous regime and the often changing roles
played by many if not most of the prominent members of the present
governments of FRY and Serbia.
While it is widely known that Milosevic's regime,
in a pragmatic attempt to secure unlimited rule for a long period,
engaged in murky dealings with the political and commercial underworld
and with recorded criminals, the past relationship of a number
of members of the current regime with the former establishment
is often overlooked. The same goes for the relationships between
members of the current authorities and the nouveaux riches, businessmen
who co-operated with both the opposition and the government and
the criminal underworld. Giving the current regime the benefit
of the doubt could prove to be bordering on naivety. Rather, they
have to be judged on performance, and guidelines for the elements
on which the new regime will be judged and the timescale in which
those are to be achieved must be made clear and leave no room
for interpretation.
Over-concentration on Serbia is detrimental
to the general stability of the region. With Serbian elections
ending the interim period of formal co-habitation of Milosevic's
socialists with the DOS authorities, the international community
should again concentrate on an array of regional issues, which
include, in order of importance, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo and
Croatia. The dangers of failure to understand and implement this
would be that the international community would risk once again
finding itself in a position to trail behind the events rather
that predict and guide them.
4. SERBIA
For all practical purposes Serbia should now
be considered as a country with two paragraphllel governments.
The federal authorities under President Vojislav Kostunica exercise
practical control over the territory of Serbia excluding Kosovo.
Their competencies over Montenegro are but nominal, despite the
efforts to introduce some sort of direct representation of the
federal authorities there by opening the "federal government
offices" in Montenegro. Such offices are not entirely in
the spirit of the existing federal constitution and they are most
unlikely to succeed in imposing a degree of federal government's
control on Montenegro.
The authority of the new Serbian government
under Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic stretches over exactly the
same territory as that of the federal one: the territory of Serbia
excluding Kosovo. This in itself would be a potential recipe for
a clash of competencies; taking into consideration the different
natures and political agendas of the two current leaders, Kostunica
at federal and Djindjic at Serbian level, such a conflict can
be safely predicted.
It should be noted that both Kostunica and Djindjic
are practically operating far above and beyond the competencies
that their formal positions grant them: while the Serbian constitution
gives sweeping powers to the president, it puts the prime minister
in a position of clear subordination to the president. On the
federal level the position is quire the opposite: the federal
president is constitutionally a figurehead, while prime minister
enjoys almost unlimited competencies. This paragraphdox is the
results of both constitutions having been tailored to Milosevic
and his system. Furthermore, the post of President of Serbia is
now occupied by the last remnant of Milosevic's nomenklatura,
Milan Milutinovic, who was a figurehead even under Milosevic.
In a similar way, Zoran Zizic, the Federal Prime Minister, is
completely by-passed and the federal executive is lead by President
Kostunica and Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus. Both latter
are representatives of Serbia while Zizic, formally representing
Montenegro, has no political credibility due to the fact that
he was one of the leading officials of the Milosevic regime and
a convinced pro-Milosevic campaigner in his home republic and
was only appointed in a thinly disguised attempt to claim that
the federal state actually extends beyond Serbia.
5. FEDERAL PRESIDENT
VOJISLAV KOSTUNICA
The most remarkable feature of Vojislav Kostunica
is his persistence in his political position since the beginning
of the 1990s. This slightly old-fashioned conservatism based on
"traditional values" (which had long lapsed from Serbian
political practice into coveted memory of the disempowered urban
elites) secured Kostunica's party a modest but fairly constant
following, although few observers ever believed that his party
would ever be able to dominate Serbian politics save as a member
of a non-Milosevic opposition.
Elevating Kostunica to the position of the joint
candidate was only achieved after other leaders, most notably
Zoran Djindjic and Vuk Draskovic, had burned their fingers and
spoiled their chances by infighting, over-ambition and co-operation
with Milosevic. The USA took an extremely pragmatic stand on the
urgency for the opposition to act in unison and they hardly had
any reservations about Kostunica becoming the front runner, despite
repeated warnings from a number of independent sources. The UK
position was less pronounced and in retrospect it can be said
that the extreme pragmatic approach of the USA imposed Kostunica
onto the rest of the Serbian opposition.
Of the two clichés invariably attached
to Kostunica, that of being a "moderate Serbian nationalist"
and a "legalist" only the former is true. His self-proclaimed
intention to act strictly within legal limits has already been
derogated by his actions in assuming much wider powers than foreseen
by the constitution and in his attitude to Montenegro. In this
light, his claims that Milosevic cannot be extradited to the Hague
on legal and constitutional grounds should not be accepted.
Kostunica is a genuine Serb nationalist who
never sincerely embraced the idea of Serbia being limited to its
present borders. His genuine belief is that the Serb-controlled
part of Bosnia, Republika Srpska, should be joined to Serbia,
at least practically through the weakening of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina
and establishment of "special relations" with Serbia
if not outright annexed or incorporated. Next on his priority
list is the incorporation of Montenegro into Serbia, annulling
its status as a constituent state and making it barely a province
within Serbia. This would be detrimental to the stability of the
region as a whole. In trying to achieve this goal, Kostunica is
trying to rally the support of France, Russia and Greece.
The choice of France as the preferred Western
partner reflects Kostunica's vision of national-romantic grandeur:
he is genuinely fascinated with the figure and role of General
de Gaulle as somebody who "restored national pride, re-instated
the idea of (sometimes stubborn) nationalist pride and stood up
to Anglo-American domination". Although he will publicly
praise British commitment to traditional values, Kostunica is
not at ease with British pragmatism, but even much less so with
the American version of it. The choice of Russia is dictated more
by the need to balance the Western influence, which Kostunica
fears, rather than any shared values or interests, while in the
case of Greece Kostunica values the symbiotic relationship between
the state and the Orthodox Church.
The real reason for Kostunica's refusal to allow
Milosevic's trial in the Hague should be fully understood. Kostunica
represents the less unreasonable Serb nationalist faction which
realises that Milosevic's project of Serbian expansion failed
not only due to mangled execution but also because its desire
for a greater Serbia was pragmatic, rather than genuine. This
faction, which has been boosted with Kostunica's election, believes
that the goal remains to be achieved in future.
Should Milosevic be tried by the ICTY, the criminal
nature of the whole Greater Serbian project and all of its participants,
genuine or pragmatic, would be dissected and exposed before the
eyes of the world and the Serbs would no longer have any excuse
to deny knowledge of the atrocities committed. However, a trial
in Belgrade would obfuscate the issue of the very nature of the
Greater Serbian project, concentrating instead on his guilt for
the economic and political miseries in Serbia and common crime.
Kostunica's agenda is to try Milosevic in Serbia to prove that
Serbs were victims of Milosevic, therefore themselves innocent,
rather than allow for a Hague trial which would expose others
as victims of the Greater Serbian project in which a huge number
of Serbs participated quite willingly. A trial in Belgrade would
prevent the process of changes in Serbia which roughly corresponds
to the post-1945 de-Nazification of Germany to ever happen.
Kostunica has an extremely limited grasp of
economic issues and his influence on choosing strategic partners
for future investments in Serbia does not correspond to his general
political influence. Yet, he would be ready to try to exclude
from economic partnership those nations whom he perceives as not
politically benevolent to his ideas.
6. MONTENEGRO
The issue of Montenegro and the related issues
of the future status of Kosovo will remain the stumbling blocks
for the international community's approach to FRY—whichever
way they are resolved.
It should be understood that stability in the
regions to a large degree depends on the perceptions of the Yugoslav
successor states and to a somewhat lesser degree of other regional
neighbours, rather than on somewhat globalistic views of the international
community. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina all see themselves
as past victims of Serbian expansionism, rather than just of Milosevic's
regime and for them the change of government in Belgrade does
not in itself guarantee long-term regional stability. They do
admit that the possibility of a new war starting out from Serbia
has been significantly reduced, but that in itself is not sufficient
to guarantee long-term stability.
Post-Yugoslav successor states in general do
not shun regional economic co-operation and integration, but they
deeply fear any attempts at political revival of any regional
integration that would resemble Yugoslavia. The very idea of Yugoslavia
effectively freezes any substantial attempts at co-operation,
and the negative emotional charge of the name is such that as
long as it lingers on regional co-operation will be something
enforced by the international community and refused by its would-be
participants.
The necessary condition for the re-activation
of regional co-operation at any level more sophisticated than
simple bilateral trade is the complete dismantling of former Yugoslavia.
To achieve this Montenegro must be allowed to pursue full independence,
without tying it to the international community's fears of the
implication of such a development for the status of Kosovo.
Political ideas in Montenegro have evolved a
long way since the creation of FRY in 1992 and a majority of the
population now supports independence. What is more significant,
the age structure of those in favour of independent Montenegro
is in striking contrast with those who favour the union, with
the young generation by and large supporting full independence.
The often raised question of viability of Montenegro is somewhat
of an obfuscation: in its current economic state it is as non-viable
as Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo who all depend on foreign
aid. However, the ultimate resolution of political issue would
allow the population of the region to concentrate on economic
rather than political issues, which is the only way in which self-sufficiency
can be guaranteed.
Both current proposals for the re-definition
of federal relations are insincere, designed to buy lobbying time.
If implemented, both the Montenegrin and Serbian models of the
joint state would create unwieldy structures with built-in inefficiency,
not unlike that of current Bosnia-Herzegovina. Support for Montenegrin
independence, achieved by legal and peaceful means, would be welcomed
by the more pragmatic segments of the Serb society, as it would
also allow Serbia to finally shape itself as an independent state
rather than the protector of wider interest of Serb minorities
in the region or the driving force of an increasingly unpopular
federal state.
The UK policy towards Montenegro, like that
of most European countries, has been clumsy. Having embraced Montenegro
and President Milo Djukanovic as the only way of achieving an
inroads into FRY, Montenegro was suddenly abandoned the moment
Western diplomats could freely travel to Belgrade. This has been
quite unwise, as it left the government high and dry in a crucial
political moment. The USA acted less hastily and maintained a
political presence in Montenegro, which once again secured it
the position of exclusive influence, while Europe forfeited such
as opportunity.
The natural EU main partner for Montenegro would
be Italy, with whom it shares the access to the Adriatic and a
history of economic and political co-operation. However, during
Milosevic's era Italy aligned itself with Belgrade, hoping to
achieve a privileged economic position there, not unlike that
of Greece. Following Milosevic's removal Italy opted to continue
to support Belgrade, often without much subtlety, judging the
future Serbian markets to be far more valuable than those of tiny
Montenegro. Therefore, the country remains in search for a strategic
European partner, being fully aware that its own size and distance
make hopes of substantial USA involvement somewhat unrealistic.
7. KOSOVO
Following the deployment of KFOR and UNMIK and
the rise of importance of the task of removing Milosevic, Kosovo
slightly slipped from the agenda. It is (quite rightly) perceived
as a hot potato.
The current level of international involvement
in Kosovo cannot guarantee anything but continued political, economic
and security agony. The unresolved status of Kosovo continues
to block all attempts at resolving some of the fundamental safety
concerns; however lack of resolve to tackle that issue head-on
and on its own merit guarantees the continuation of the current
instability.
The international administration in Kosovo is
inefficient in its civilian part, while most of the military tasks
of KFOR have been achieved. The remaining security problems are
rather a result of KFOR being tasked with non-military duties,
largely due to the failure of UNMIK to fully exercise its foreseen
duties. The good performance of the UK military contingent is
well known, however for whatever reasons the UK is far less prominent
in the civilian side of the international mission to Kosovo. In
the run-up to the nomination of the successor to largely inefficient
UN Civilian Administrator Bernard Kouchner of France, Paddy Ashdown
was often mentioned as a potential candidate. With past military
experience and recent regional experience he could have been a
good candidate, but in the process the post went to regionally
untried Hans Hakkerup of Denmark.
Expecting to nominally tie Kosovo in any way
with Serbia and/or FRY in future is completely unrealistic, including
the proposal to create a three-member federation of Serbia, Kosovo
and Montenegro. Such a state would require extremely complex mechanisms
to ensure its functioning in all fields, from economy, to internal
security and from education to transport, and adaptable models
do not exist anywhere in the world. Furthermore, such a political
concoction would be outright rejected by the majority of its population,
both on the Serbian and the Albanian side. While Kosovar Albanians
are genuinely equivocal in demanding independence, not all Serbs
advocate Kosovo as a part of Serbia/FRY at all costs, even if
very few would yet dare say it openly. However, the idea is slowly
filtering through the more reasonable and non-nationalist intellectual,
academic and NGO circles.
The independence of Kosovo would be the ultimate
change of borders of former Socialist Yugoslavia and would be
fully justified on pragmatic, if less so on legalistic arguments.
It would not foment the desire to create a Greater Albania nor
separatist tendencies among ethnic Albanians in Montenegro or
Macedonia. All those groups have their separate histories, economic
and political agendas. Yet the independence of Kosovo—even
if it would be wise to envisage a protracted interim period of
international administration until viable and functional local
structures are put in place—would allow all elements of
the former Yugoslavia to plan and carry out their separate developments
and mutual co-operation.
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