| (a) | We recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office urgently examines whether the Government is committing sufficient resources to the region and states its conclusions and future plans in its response to this Report (paragraph 14).
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| (b) | We recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office takes the earliest possible steps to open discussions within the EU on how in practical terms the far from hypothetical problem of the accession of Cyprus while it is still politically divided should be overcome (paragraph 16).
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| (c) | We continue to conclude that Turkey should not have a veto over the accession of Cyprus, and recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office intensifies its efforts to secure EU-wide agreement to this position (paragraph 18).
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| (d) | We recommend that the Government clarifies whether it considers the number of Council votes and European Parliament seats for the applicant countries to have been settled finally or not (paragraph 22).
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| (e) | We recommend that the Department in its Response to this Report clarifies whether it considers that any single NATO member will have a veto over the provision of NATO assets and capabilities for an EU-led military operation (paragraph 26).
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| (f) | The Treaty of Nice has proved to be much more substantial than the United Kingdom Government and others initially envisaged. The 2004 IGC looks certain to be very much more substantial still, going to the very heart of the balance between the EU's governmental and parliamentary institutions and those of the member states. We conclude it is of the utmost importance that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Government, keep this Committee, its successor Committee, and the House as a whole closely informed about all aspects of its policy towards the next IGC so that there can be greater understanding of the implications of the next IGC than there has been of some of those in the past (paragraph 34).
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