APPENDIX 7
Memorandum submitted by Board of Deputies
of British Jews
1. INTRODUCTION
(i) The Board of Deputies of British Jews
welcomes the opportunity to respond to the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into Iran.
(ii) Established in 1760, the Board of Deputies
of British Jews is the democratic representative body of the Jewish
community in Britain.
(iii) Since the times of Sir Moses Montefiore,
who was President of the Board for most of the period between
1840-1874, the British Jewish community has played an active role
in seeking to secure the well being of Jews throughout the world.
Today the International Division of the Board carries out this
work.
(iv) The Board of Deputies has always sought
to protect the rights of Jews and Jewish communities wherever
they may be under threat. For example, the Foreign Affairs Committee
of the Board (the forerunner to the International Division) worked
to present a coordinated response to the situation in the Soviet
Union.
(v) The Board maintains close links with
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and holds regular formal meetings
on issues of international concern to the Jewish community.
(vi) In this paper we wish to draw attention
to a number of issues of concern which we believe should be taken
into account by those who are assessing Britain's relations with
Iran. The issues we wish to raise relate to: weapons of mass destruction;
human rights; sponsorship of international terrorism; and the
particular case of the Iran 10.
2. IRAN'S
FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC POLICIES—BACKGROUND
(i) Mohammad Khatami was elected President
in February 1997 and since then has sought to implement a program
of reforms. This reform program notwithstanding, Iran has continued
to seek non-conventional weapons capability as well as long-range
ballistic missiles. It continues and has even expanded its sponsorship
of Palestinian terrorist organisations and continues to oppose
the Middle East peace process, while continuing also to act in
violation of international human rights norms.
(ii) These policies continue unabated, which
suggests either that President Khatami supports them or he is
powerless to stop them. (It should be noted that Iran's security
services, the Ministry of Intelligence and Interior and the Revolutionary
Guards remain under the control of the spiritual leader Ali Khameni.)
The implications for regional and global security are serious.
(iii) One of the first official statements
of the new supposedly reformed and pro-democracy parliament in
Tehran called for the complete destruction of the State of Israel.
The Majlis (parliament) was further quoted saying that: "The
brave resistance of Hezbollah in Lebanon was successful due to
the guidelines of Late Ayatollah Khomeini and the current spiritual
leader and we hope that all occupied lands could be freed from
the Zionist annexation and we pray to God for the destruction
of the intruding Israeli regime."
3. ACQUISITION
OF WEAPONS
OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (WMD)
(i) Iran remains one of the most active
countries seeking to acquire WMD technology and to develop an
indigenous capability to produce various types of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and their delivery systems. (US Director
of Central Intelligence Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 2 February 1999).
(ii) Russia and China continue to supply
missile-related goods and technology to Iran. In July 1999 Iran
tested the Shahab-3 missile with a range of 1,300 km and the Defence
Minister has stated publicly that a Shahab-4 missile is being
developed with a longer range and heavier payload than the Shahab-3.
(US Director of Central Intelligence, 2 February 1999).
(iii) Iran has manufactured and stockpiled
chemical weapons (CW) including blister, blood and choking agents
and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. (US Director
of Central Intelligence, 2 February 1999) Intelligence sources
in Israel and the US say that Iran is prepared to equip its agents
with chemical and biological weapons in order to carry out its
terror attacks, according to the Sunday Times. (Ma'ariv, 10 September
1999).
(iv) Iran continues to seek fissile material
and technology for weapons development and has set up an elaborate
system of military and civilian organisations to support its effort.
Various Russian entities continue to market and support a variety
of nuclear-related projects in Iran. These include the construction
of a 1000-megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran. These
projects, along with other nuclear-related purchases, will help
Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn
would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development.
(US Director of Central Intelligence, 2 February 1999).
(v) The latest "Unclassified Report
to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July
Through 31 December 1999" relating to Iran is attached at
Appendix A with further information at Appendix B.
4. SPONSORSHIP
OF TERRORIST
ORGANISATIONS
(i) Iran remains a leading state sponsor
of terrorism. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security have institutionalised the use of terrorism
as an instrument of policy since 1979. (Ambassador Michael Sheehan,
Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, US State Department, testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2 November 1999.)
(ii) CIA Director George Tenet told the
US Congress, "Hardliners continue to view terrorism as a
legitimate tool of Iranian policy, and they still control the
institutions that implement it." Iran continues to be involved
in a range of terrorist activities. These include providing support
such as financing, equipping, offering training locations, and
offering refuge from extradition to some of the most lethal terrorist
groups in the Middle East, notably Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad. In the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, Iranian support
includes tens of millions of dollars each year. (The Sunday Telegraph
reported on 15 August 1999 that Iran had made a transfer of £3
million to Hamas.)
(iii) Evidence has led the Clinton administration
to conclude that Iran is increasing the flow of arms and money
to terrorist groups in an effort to derail the Middle East peace
process. This was discussed at length at a meeting of counter-terrorism
officials from the G8 countries and British and German officials
presented evidence similar to that presented by the US. (Washington
Post, 4 December 1999.) In November 1999, Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak told Prime Minister Blair that Iranian supported groups
were preparing a fresh offensive against the peace process giving
a general warning regarding the possibility of imminent attacks
by radical terrorists. Mr Blair was reported to have informed
British intelligence agencies that have since warned vulnerable
targets in the UK. (Sunday Times, 12 December 1999.)
(iv) Increased support and shipments of
guns and explosives for Hamas as well as evidence of a new direct
relationship. Evidence of this emerged from information and computer
data uncovered when Jordanian authorities recently raided the
offices of Hamas in Amman. (Washington Post, 4 December 1999.)
Iranian intelligence has given Hamas an estimated $5 million to
fund terrorist attacks on Israeli targets. The money, provided
in August 1999, was the first of several monthly payments which
were transferred into the bank accounts of Hamas officials in
an agreement with Hamas in return for a marked increase in terrorist
activity. (Sunday Telegraph, 15 August 1999.)
US intelligence sources have said that Iran
"operates an ongoing pipeline that gives at least millions
of dollars a year to Hamas alone." Iran also continues to
make direct payments to the families of suicide bombers, according
to US and Israeli sources. (Washington Times, 18 August 1999.)
(v) Accelerated deliveries of arms to Hezbollah
including long-range Katyusha missiles capable of reaching targets
deeper into Israel. (Hezbollah is the organisation which fought
Israeli forces in the security zone in Southern Lebanon and which
has fired hundreds of missiles into Northern Israel.) (Washington
Post, 4 December 1999.) Following the Israeli withdrawal from
Lebanon, there is still the risk of escalation and missile attacks
from closer to the newly defined international border.
(vi) Iran supports the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, responsible for a number of attacks and suicide bombings
inside Israel. In March 1999 a US District Court ruled that Iran
should pay $247 million to the family of Alisa Flatow, a US citizen
killed in a Palestinian Islamic Jihad bomb attack in Gaza, in
April 1995, because Iran provided funding to the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad that carried out the attack. (US Department of State: Patterns
of Global Terrorism 1998.) In addition, Israeli security sources
state that they have detained several Palestinian terrorists following
their return from Iran where they received training in weapons,
explosives and sabotage, with a view to carrying out terror operations
in Israel for the Islamic Jihad. (Israel Foreign Ministry.)
(vii) The US believes that Iranian officials
might have played a part in planning or facilitating the June
1996 bombing of a US military housing complex in Saudi Arabia
that killed 19 US servicemen. (Ambassador Michael Sheehan, coordinator
for counter-terrorism, US State Department, testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2 November 1999.)
Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk told
Congress that there is "information about the involvement
of some Iranian officials" in the Khobar bombing." CIA
sources say terrorists received money and passports from Iran
and that Iranian agents were casing American facilities in 1995.
(Newsweek, 15 October 1999.)
"We have information that links Iranian
officials to the Khobar bombing incident," said Michael Sheehan,
the State Department's co-ordinator for counter-terrorism. "The
FBI has that information, the intelligence community has that
information," said Sheehan. (NBC Nightly News, 2 December
1999.)
Allegations are mounting that the Khobar bombing
was directed by Iran, US officials say. New information obtained
by US law enforcement alleges that meetings took place between
the suspected bombers and two officers of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard. The former head of counter-terrorism for the CIA stated:
"The FBI has concluded that the Khobar bombing was supported
and possibly ordered by the Iranian intelligence service."
(USA Today, 2 November 1999.)
(viii) Signs that Iran is encouraging the
growth of alliances between terrorist groups that have traditionally
shunned one another have underscored these developments. For example,
there is clear evidence that Hamas and Hezbollah are training
in Lebanon under Iranian supervision. (Washington Post, 4 December
1999.)
(ix) There is evidence that Iran, according
to a minister in Ehud Barak's government, has taken a strategic
decision to use terrorism to bring about the failure of the peace
process. Barak's government has acknowledged that acts of terrorism
pose the greatest danger to the prospective peace.
According to Israeli security sources, "Iran
has sent terrorists who look like Europeans to the [Palestinian]
territories in order to carry out attacks aimed at torpedoing
the peace process." Israel's army Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz
warned of "specific information about planned attacks, based
on intelligence information." (Agency France Presse, 13 October
1999.)
According to the head of Palestinian Preventative
Security Service Jibril Rajoub, "Iran is supporting and aiding
Islamic militants in an attempt to spoil the peace process."
He further said that leaders from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah
recently went to Iran, and were encouraged by Iran to "liberate
Jerusalem."
The Arabic press began reporting in September
1999, that official Iranian envoys were urging Hezbollah Secretary-General
Nassrallah to join the joint effort to undermine the peace process.
According to these reports, Iran is willing to furnish Hezbollah
with operational assistance by means of Iranian embassies in a
number of countries. (Yedioth Achronot, 15 October 1999.)
(x) Hardliners in the Iranian government
have begun funding radical Palestinian groups which want to mount
a new intifada uprising aimed at wrecking the chances of a peace
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Iranian delegation
led by Ali Akbar Velayati, the former Iranian foreign minister
who now serves as an adviser to Ali Khameni, met with radical
Palestinian leaders in Damascus and, according to Middle East
sources, distributed £2 million. The largest portion of the
£2 million went to Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, whose members were
at one time suspected of building the device that brought down
the Pan Am jet over Lockerbie in Scotland. (Sunday Times, 6 August
2000.)
(xi) While the Iranian Government stated
it would take no action to implement the Fatwa issued against
the author Salman Rushdie, the fatwa has not been revoked and
the Iranian Government has not required the 15 Khordad Foundation
to withdraw its reward for any person carrying the fatwa out.
In fact, the Foundation increased the reward to $2.8 million.
(US Department of State: Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998.)
(xii) Members of the Committee will find
much useful information in Ely Karmon, Why Tehran Starts and Stops
Terrorism, Middle East Quarterly, December 1998.
5. IRANIAN ANTISEMITISM
AND HOLOCAUST
DENIAL
(i) In addition to regular public attacks
on Israel, the Iranian government controlled media has taken up
the cause of Holocaust denial. Radio Iran has become a prominent
forum for Holocaust deniers from all over the world. Holocaust
deniers interviewed by Tehran hosts on this network include Ahmed
Rami, Ernst Zundel, Roger Garaudy, David Irving, Ingrid Rimald[1]
and Frederick Toben. Radio Iran is broadcast on short wave to
many countries worldwide and may be accessed via the Internet.
(Archiv-Notzien, February 2000; Zundelsite, March 1999, February
2000; Journal of Historical Review, July/August 2000.)
(ii) In an editorial, Iran's English-language
Tehran Times newspaper praised the stance taken by David Irving,
the disgraced Holocaust denier. The full text of the Tehran Times
editorial of 11 April 2000 is attached at Appendix B.
6. VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
(i) The Amnesty International 1999 Annual
Report cites institutional violations of basic human rights including
freedom of religion, freedom of expression, the right to life
and prohibitions on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.
Amnesty reports that in 1999 hundreds of political prisoners were
held, some without charge and that judicial punishment of flogging
and stoning was carried out as well as scores of executions—some
without trials. In addition, the UN special representative on
the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to be denied access to
the country.
(ii) Amnesty has reported that a large number
of Islamic scholars and grand Ayatollahs were detained or held
under house arrest for making statements or publishing articles
critical of the regime. At least 20 members of the Bahai religious
minority were under continued detention without charge with six
facing the death sentence.
(iii) Amnesty has also condemned the death
sentences passed against four people arrested in connection with
the student demonstrations in Iran in July 1999 and called for
the immediate halt of trials held in secrecy. According to Amnesty,
"Torture is widespread in Iran" and detainees may have
been tortured to extract confession. (Amnesty International: Public
Statement, 16 September 1999—Iran: Time for judicial reform
and an end to secret trials.)
(iv) Human Rights Watch reported the death
of Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, a member of Iran's small Jewish community
who was hanged in prison without being charged with a criminal
offence or any form of legal proceeding.
(v) The US State Department Human Rights
report 1998 outlined the absence of inhuman punishments. It also
noted that human rights monitors allege that many of those executed
for criminal offences such as narcotics charges are actually political
dissidents.
(vi) Many religious minorities suffer discrimination
and interference from Government authorities. The Government interferes
with the administration of their schools and harasses their adherents.
Although Christian and Jewish communities are regularly harassed
and are denied the opportunities in jobs and education that other
Iranian citizens enjoy, the Bahai community has been the target
of a specific campaign of abuse. The UN special representative
reported the existence in 1993 of a Government policy directive
that instructed government agencies to block the progress and
development of the Bahai community, expel Bahai students from
universities, restrict their employment and deny them "positions
of influence", especially in education. (US State Department,
Human Rights Report 1998.)
(vii) For a more detailed analysis of human
rights and minority treatment in Iran, as well as the following
case of the trial of the Iranian Jews, please refer to the Appendix
C.
7. TRIALS OF
JEWS IN
IRAN
(i) 13 Jews were held in Iran on charges
of espionage on behalf of Israel and the United States. The 13
Jews were arrested in March 1999. Their arrest was only made public
in June 1999 and they were in detention throughout the period
leading to their trial (three were released on bail in January
2000).
The charges were clearly false. Both Israel
and the United States have stated categorically, at the highest
levels, that the individuals involved have never been engaged
in espionage on their behalf. The spurious nature of the charges
and their possible anti-semitic basis are borne out by the professions
of the accused—Hebrew teachers, Jewish community leaders,
circumcisers, ritual slaughterers, a Jewish cemetery attendant
and a 16-year-old boy.
(ii) The accused did not receive a fair
trial. The proceedings were closed to the public. The Iranian
definition of espionage is not the same as that in the West. Under
Iranian law, any contact whatsoever with Israel is defined as
espionage, the maximum penalty for which is the death penalty.
The accused were not allowed to appoint their own lawyers, while
their state-appointed lawyers had complained of obstruction. While
the institutional hardships placed on the Jewish community in
Iran, as well as other minorities such as Christians and Bahais,
are well documented by leading human rights organisations such
as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, few voices were raised in defence
of these incarcerated Jews, particularly within Iran itself. Furthermore,
Jewish leaders stated that the trial had led to attacks on Jewish
businesses including one case of arson. Concern regarding the
fate of the 13 Jews was acute in light of previous experience:
two Jews were executed in 1997 on espionage charges and in 1998
a 60-year-old man was executed on vague charges of being a Zionist
agent. Since 1979, 15 Jewish leaders have been executed under
similar circumstances.
(iii) It has already been noted that Iran
supports and directs a number of extremist terror groups opposed
to the Middle East Peace Process. The activities of these pose
a genuine threat to the entire peace process. Recent US and European
intelligence assessments concluded that Iran was stepping up and
expanding its efforts to encourage more terror by these groups
because of the renewed momentum in the peace efforts. It would
seem clear that the arrest of and trial of the 13 Jews is a continuation
of this hostile policy towards Israel through the Iranian Jewish
community.
(iv) Sentences were handed down on Saturday,
1 July 2000 in the trial of 13 Jews in Iran accused of espionage.
Ten of the defendants were given sentences of four to 13 years
while three were acquitted. All of the sentences were subject
to appeal.
(v) The international community has consistently
condemned the entire episode. The 13 Jews were held for months
without charge, denied the right to appoint their own lawyers
and denied access to their government-appointed lawyers. Before
the trial began eight defendants "confessed" and pleaded
guilty. These "confessions" were paraded on television
in a blatant publicity stunt, which hinted at the dubious nature
of the entire trial. In the light of the lack of proper legal
counsel and their extended incarceration, many observers are convinced
that these "confessions" were made under duress.
(vi) On 21 September 2000 the Shiraz Court
of Appeal announced the appeal verdict of the Iran 10. Contrary
to press reports, the prison sentences of the ten were not reduced.
Instead, the court overturned the lower court's ruling on how
the prison sentences would be served. The lower court ruled that
the sentences of each prisoner were to run consecutively. The
Appeal Court verdict accepted the lower court's ruling on the
sentences, but makes their prison sentences run concurrently.
In addition, the Appeals Court upheld the lower court's convictions
of the 10 on the charges of co-operating with a foreign government,
ie, Israel. The Iran 10 will therefore remain imprisoned for terms
ranging from between two to nine years.
Despite claims by Iranian officials that Iran's
judicial branch was "independent", in early September,
the judiciary announced a delay, reportedly to provide a reprieve
to President Khatami during the trip to the United Nations where
he was attempting to portray Iran's regime as one that respects
the rights of its citizens.
(vii) The verdicts raise many questions
as to the appropriate Western response. Western governments must
surely give thought as to whether they can rightly carry on with
business as usual, given the clear violations of the human rights
of these innocent Jews. The situation calls for a clear and robust
response.
8. BRITISH RELATIONS
WITH IRAN—POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
(i) The British Government currently pursues
a policy of "constructive engagement", the aim of which
is to support the "reformists" within President Khatami's
regime. Unfortunately, this policy has not had the desired effects.
The key organs of the Iranian state are firmly in the hands of
the "conservatives" who control Iranian foreign policy,
security and the judiciary amongst others. Indeed, at the time
of writing, a large number of moderate press and media publications
have been forcibly closed down in an attempt to curtail the public
drive for reform.
(ii) It must be remembered that the so-called
"moderates" take a similar approach in their dealings
with Israel as the hardliners. There is a general consensus that
Israel is a racist expansionist state that should be destroyed.
(iii) Evidence exists that suggests that
when the West adopts a firmer approach to dealing with Iran, the
Iranian regime is prepared to curb some of its more excessive
behaviour. It has been argued that the outcome of the trial of
the 13 Iranian Jews was positively affected by international pressure
which prevented death sentences being passed.
(iv) The current contacts with Iran are
most likely being driven primarily by economic interests. The
financial and trade incentives being offered have no place in
an "ethical" foreign policy and merely reward the Iranian
regime for its support for terrorism and abuse of human rights.
(v) We believe that the fate of the Iran
10 must be a test case for Britain's relations with Iran. The
British Government must seriously consider whether it can continue
with diplomatic relations if the 10 continue to be imprisoned.
1 It was confirmed in 2012 that this reference should be to Ingrid Rimland. Back
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