APPENDIX 10
Memorandum submitted by Dr A M Ansari,
University of Durham
Despite current difficulties in Anglo-Iranian relations,
Iran remains a vitally important country for the UK. Quite apart
from its economic importance, Iran retains a strategic and political
significance which must be factored into any assessment of foreign
policy objectives. The second largest producer in OPEC, with the
fourth largest reserves of oil in the world, Iran also possesses
the second largest reserves of natural gas (after Russia). Moreover,
its strategic situation, lying as it does between the oil emporiums
of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, provide it with an even
more crucial role in terms of the security of Western oil supplies.
It is a key player in Central Asia, and currently enjoys similar
interests to the UK (and the West in general), in containing both
Saddam Hussein, and the Taleban in Afghanistan. Its ability to
project influence, and to some extent power, into both these regions
is increasingly being viewed as a valuable asset by Western governments.
Another crucial factor which is being increasingly recognised
is the process of political reform currently taking place. While
some observers are sceptical about the nature of this process,
there is little doubt that the social revolution underpinning
the political transformation taking place will not only have momentous
consequences for the political development of Iran itself, but
of the wider Islamic world. For these reasons alone, it is essential
that the UK play an active role in developing constructive relations
with Iran. In addition to these, it should be borne in mind that
the UK has enjoyed a particularly intimate relationship with Iran
over the past two hundred years, providing it with certain advantages
and constraints which need to be recognised, managed and harnessed
to good effect.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Anglo-Iranian relations extend back several
centuries, the first embassy having been dispatched in the early
seventeenth century, but diplomatic relations began in earnest
in the early nineteenth century following British involvement
in the Indian sub-continent. Not only was Iran of interest to
the UK in terms of trade, but there were important political ties
to be fostered in light of Britain's rivalry with Tsarist Russia.
Indeed from the period of the Napoleonic Wars, Iran became increasingly
embroiled in Great power politics, as first France, then Britain
sought to become the dominant European power in the country. The
great threat to Iranian power however, came from the north and
in a succession of wars, Iran lost considerable Caucasian territories
to Russia and effectively lost her status as a great power. From
around 1828 onwards, Iran effectively became a pawn in the imperial
rivalry between Russia and Great Britain, as each side sought
to manipulate politics in Tehran. Indeed, Iran arguably only managed
to maintain her independence through an ability to play each power
against the other, and because neither Russia nor Britain could
afford to see the other dominate the country. Britain therefore
played an increasingly intimate role in the politics of the country,
and the British embassy, along with that of Russia, was viewed
by many Iranians as the real source of power in the country. This
was made apparent by Britain's central role during the Constitutional
Revolution in 1906, when she initially played a vital role in
ensuring the success of the revolutionaries.
While there was undoubtedly growing resentment
at the level of British interference in the politics of the country,
this was to be tragically consolidated in the first half of the
twentieth century when British power in Iran reached its zenith,
chiefly through its control of two vital economic assets. Although
by 1907, Britain and Russia agreed to separate spheres of influence,
with Britain dominant in the south. British power in Iran was
expressed not only through an extensive network of consulates,
but through its control of the British Imperial Bank of Persia
(latterly HSBC), and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (latterly BP).
The Imperial Bank grew to dominate fiscal policy and to enjoy
a monopoly over the issue of notes, a monopoly it only reluctantly
relinquished in a gradual battle with the Iranian government in
the 1930s and 1940s, while the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which
the British government soon bought a golden share, dominated oil
production and revenues. Both these institutions, seen as extensions
of the British government, generated deep resentments among Iranians
developing a strong sense of national identity, not least because
the British exchequer made more from oil taxes than the company
paid in royalties to the Iranian government (in light of the current
furore over OPEC and oil prices, this is worth noting). Economic
dominance aside, there were more overtly political causes for
resentment.
In the aftermath of the First World War and
following the Russian Revolution, Britain sought to consolidate
its political dominance in Iran through the ratification of the
Anglo-Persian Agreement (1919), which many Iranians regarded as
an attempt to reduce the country to the status of a protectorate.
When this failed, Britain was seen as having a crucial hand in
the coup d'etat of 1921 which eventually resulted in the establishment
of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79). Despite the often awkward relationship
between British and the Pahlavis, in the eyes of many Iranian
nationalists, Britain was intimately tied to, and as such tarred
by its association with the Pahlavi autocracy. This resentment
exploded in 1951 when the nationalist government of Dr Mohammad
Mosaddeq decided to nationalise the oil industry, very much on
the same lines as the post-war Labour government had nationalised
many British industries. As Britain's largest overseas asset,
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (as it was then known) was not going
to be relinquished without a fight, and there was much concern
that British prestige in the Middle East could be irreparably
damaged if such a move were not resisted. In the end, following
an embargo of Iranian oil, the British and US governments orchestrated
a coup which overthrew the popular government of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq
and restored the Pahlavi autocracy. It was a seminal moment in
the development of the Iranian consciousness and still rankles
today. Indeed, the events of 1953, while acknowledged and regretted
by the US, have yet to be officially recognised by the British
government, despite the fundamental role they play in continued
Iranian suspicion of British motives, and they run like a deep
negative undercurrent beneath most aspects of Anglo-Iranian relations.
The fatwa against Salman Rushdie for instance cannot be
understood, outside this historical context of resentment and
the general widespread assumption, that whatever Britain gets
up to, it must be to the detriment of Iran.
CURRENT SITUATION
At the same time, this lengthy relationship
affords Britain opportunities which other countries do not have.
For all the popular resentment at political interference, there
is a widespread admiration for the British practice of politics—while
they may not like being the object of this, Iranians can appreciate
political quality when they see it. As such, many institutions
are modelled on, or aspire to be comparable to the equivalent
British institutions (the BBC is a particular favourite, and it
is noteworthy that despite the frequent denunciations of the BBC
Persian service it remains by far the foreign radio station of
choice—this "imitative" nature of Iranian politics
should not be underestimated, there is considerable scrutiny of
the British political process, from Blair's attack on the "forces
of conservatism, to the Shayler affair)). Furthermore there are
strong cultural and business links. Britain remains the destination
of choice for Iranian students seeking an overseas education;
while many Iranians have worked in or with British companies,
and vice versa, many British executives have spent time in Iran.
Political suspicion of British Machiavellianism, is therefore
sometimes awkwardly parallelled by genuine social warmth between
British and Iranian colleagues. Sir Denis Wright, the former British
Ambassador to Iran, wrote following the diplomatic rupture in
1951-53, that Britain and Iran resembled "estranged lovers".
This is an apt description of Anglo-Iranian relations in the twentieth
century; it is only because the two have been so intimate that
they so readily express emotions of betrayal and are not surprisingly
cautious in pursuing a rapprochement. But the other side of this,
is that once a determination to rebuild relations is agreed, the
process will tend to be rapid, and for those unaware of the historical
precedent, unusually warm.
Given the nature of this historical relationship,
and the duality of the inheritance, it is important that any policy
towards Iran be handled delicately and with sensitivity. Iranians
have long memories which are regularly replenished with historical
anecdote, and issues which are viewed as ancient history here,
are very much part of the political firmament in Iran. One pertinent
example will suffice to indicate this. Last summer (1999), the
conservative dominated Iranian parliament decided in some haste
to debate a motion replacing the annual holiday commemorating
the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a religious
holiday. Coincidentally, the British embassy issued a communique
indicating Britain's willingness to invest in the Iranian oil
industry, despite US objections. As so often in the past, these
two disparate moves were seen by many reformists as part of a
grand scheme, by which British investment would be secured at
the expense of eliminating the "nationalisation" holiday.
The reformist press went into overdrive berating the Parliament
for its political stupidity, and handing a gift to the British
government. So damaging was this charge, that the parliament was
forced to reverse its decision days later. While a relatively
minor event, it was an accurate reflection of popular sentiment,
the very current relevance of historical events, and the perception
of Britain and British power. As one diplomat has pointed out,
there is some truth in this, Iran is the only country where the
British Empire still exists!
There are of course dramatic changes taking
place in Iranian society and politics, and while at present the
reformist cause seems to have suffered a setback, there should
be no doubt that the social revolution taking place is a profound
one. While its origins predates the election of Mohammad Khatami,
in 1997, the process of reform has gathered considerable momentum
since that time, and not unnaturally has evoked a serious reaction.
There is however little doubt that the process of democratisation,
which is an internal process, is gathering pace—there are
sound, social, demographic, economic, political and crucially,
ideological reasons, supporting this development. Few in Iran
are in any doubt that such a transformation in the political fabric
of the country will be easy—governments have after all on
the whole been autocratic—but neither is there any doubt
that this ambitious goal will be achieved, and my own fieldwork
in the country, leaves me in little doubt that Reformist goals
will indeed be accomplished. One aspect of this development is
a review of Iran's relations with the outside world, in particular
the West, and President Khatami has been explicit in his call
for a more mature Iranian approach which does not see the West
(Britain and the US in particular) as the font of all wickedness.
Indeed, it is important to recognise that Khatami's development
of detente with the West is not fundamentally driven by economic
needs (though this is important) but is also regarded as an important
cultural obstacle to overcome. To that extent the compromise reached
on the Salman Rushdie affair was a vital bridge to cross. While
some in Britain were appalled that the fatwa was not "lifted",
and ambassadorial relations were nonetheless restored, this somewhat
missed the point. While many people in Iran did not agree with
the fatwa, they were less than enthusiastic about being seen to
"submit" (yet again) to British power. This rather reckless
act of rebelliousness, which was delicately and effectively brought
to a conclusion by the FCO and their counterparts in the Iranian
Foreign Ministry, thus ensured that nobody lost face, and that
Iranians could genuinely feel satisfied at having stood up to
Britain. While it did not eliminate suspicions it did calm the
lingering wound, and encourage some more cynical Iranians that
a new more mutually respectful relationship with Britain might
be possible. In this case Britain can be said to have sacrificed
short term political expediency in return for long term gain,
and considerable advances in Anglo-Iranian relations have been
made since 1998. Indeed, many are now arguing that Britain will
regain her dominant position in the country within a few years.
Nevertheless some serious suspicions remain,
which only emphasise the importance of prudence and sensitivity
in handling the development of constructive relations. In fact,
they indicate that Britain must be proactive in the process. Thus
despite considerable progress, I was struck by the fact that many
reformists, especially students, still considered that Britain
played an important role in the political life of the country,
but more damagingly, that Britain as an inherently conservative
and traditional country, was full square behind the "conservative"
and "reactionary" forces in Iran. My protestations that
Britain would in fact be sympathetic to democratic forces were
greeted with polite dismissal, and "evidence" to the
contrary was summarily provided. Thus, students pointed out, it
was Britain who orchestrated the coup against Mosaddeq and the
restoration of autocracy, and Britain has always had a congenial
relationship with the clerical classes. While simplifications
of the past, they nevertheless contain more than a kernel of truth.
At the same time, suspicions are widespread among all political
groups with respect to British (mainly parliamentary) open support
for opposition groups, in particular the Mujahideen-e Khalq Organisation
(MKO), and what is effectively its political wing, the National
Council of Resistance. The fact that the MKO are headquartered
in Iraq, does not render it either popular or effective in Iran
(despite their assertions to the contrary) and many wonder, with
some justification, why the organisation is tolerated in the UK
despite having been designated a terrorist organisation by the
US state department. Indeed there is a contradiction to be tackled
here: the juxtaposition of full diplomatic relations with a foreign
government, and apparent official support for an organisation
that seeks the violent overthrow of this government. These perceptions
need to be addressed, if Britain's public standing in the country
is to improve. How exactly this is achieved is a matter for policy
makers, although one route is through broader cultural and educational
links.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
AND POINTS
FOR DISCUSSION
Summarising this rather condensed precis, the
following points regarding British foreign policy towards Iran
need to be borne in mind:
— British foreign policy towards Iran
does not occur in a vacuum, but rather is located within a profound
historical relationship in which Iran has normally been the weaker
partner. This must be recognised and understood when developing
foreign policy. Iranians have long memories and history did not
begin in 1979;
— Britain cannot afford to ignore Iran,
whose role in south west Asian security and stability, remains
vital;
— great strides have been made in cultivating
a more constructive relationship, but suspicions remain, principally
around the two areas noted above, which need to be addressed and
overcome; although these need to be approached gradually and incrementally.
Britain must show concern about human rights without appearing
to preach, but neither must it remain aloof and appear to condone
illegal actions. Such behaviour will only reinforce opinions concerning
Britain's "conservative" leanings;
— Iran is currently undergoing a social
revolution with important political ramifications. This needs
to be better understood and appreciated by a broader swathe of
decision-makers, especially outside the FCO;
— there is a strong "nationalist"
resurgence in the politics of Iran, epitomised by the current
rehabilitation of Dr Mosaddeq. This too, must be recognised and
the tendency to view all things in Iran through an "Islamic"
prism, avoided;
— furthermore, this is an internal
process for which the periodic interventions of exiled opposition
groups (calling for revolution from LA, for instance), do nothing
but harm. Open support for these groups, (fundraising for instance)
likewise sends the wrong message. They do not have the widespread
support they claim, and their proclamations to this effect only
endanger the lives of many student reformers;
— while there is room for improvement
and the development of a more proactive policy (it would certainly
be better to have more Persian speakers in the diplomatic service),
relations have on the whole been developing constructively over
the past two years, and Britain has regained much lost ground.
Much of the credit for this must go to the FCO and in particular
the embassy staff in Tehran who have handled affairs with considerable
sensitivity and skill. In light of the impending return of US
(corporate) interests, this development, as far as British interests
are concerned, would seem more vital than ever.
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