FIRST SPECIAL REPORT
GOVERNMENT REPLY TO THE FOURTH REPORT FROM
THE HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, SESSION 1999-2000
BLANTYRE HOUSE PRISON
The Home Affairs Committee has agreed to the following
Special Report:—
We have received the following response from the
Home Office to our Fourth Report, Session 1999-2000, on Blantyre
House Prison.[9]
Introduction ( Recommendations 1, 2, 15)
1. We were completely unconvinced that the
search was a proportionate response to the intelligence which
had been used to justify it (paragraph 37).
2. We do not believe that the reasons given
to us in public justify the exceptional search or the way in which
it was carried out. Nor do we find the evidence given in private
persuasive (paragraph 37).
15. We conclude that (a) the absence of a
resettlement policy, (b) the ambiguity about the security status
of Blantyre House, and (c) the obvious tension between the former
Governor and the Area Manager all reveal serious weaknesses in
the management of the Prison Service. This is compounded by the
inability to investigate properly what went wrong. The situation
should never have been allowed to deteriorate to the point at
which the Director General thought the only option open to him
on 5 May was to remove the Governor and conduct a full search
of the prison (paragraph 94).
1. The Government notes the Committee's criticisms
of the search carried out at Blantyre House prison on the night
of 5/6 May 2000. It accepts that, unintentionally, the search
and the simultaneous move of the then governor of the prison has
led the HAC, and others, to doubt the Government's commitment
to resettlement and that of senior managers in the Prison Service
to the regime at Blantyre House. It does not, however, believe
that that doubt is deserved. The Government regrets the damage
caused during the search of the prison, and has accepted the need
for further work on the security classification of resettlement
prisons and an overarching policy framework on resettlement.
2. The Committee and the Government are agreed
on the importance of ensuring that Blantyre House continues to
perform well as a resettlement prison. The Government regrets
that the Committee did not accept the Director General's explanation
of the reasons for the search of the prison, and remains firmly
supportive of the Director General in carrying out his responsibilities.
3. This memorandum is the Government's response
to the Committee's recommendations. The Government believes that
this response should dispel any doubt over its central commitment
to resettlement, and its capacity to respond to learning points
related to the conduct of the search. While it welcomes the way
in which the Committee has used Blantyre House as a vehicle for
discussion of wider issues, including security and resettlement,
it is also concerned that potentially wide-ranging decisions on
major, and complicated, policy issues should be put in a wider
context. This memorandum therefore reports on wider resettlement
issues.
Use of intelligence (3)
3. We recommend that there should be an immediate
review at senior Prison Service level of the manner in which the
intelligence produced by the Prison Service's own Chaucer group
and used to justify the search of Blantyre House was collected
and assessed and what steps might be taken to confirm the reliability
of such intelligence (paragraph 38).
4. As recommended by the Committee, the Director
General has commissioned from the Director of Security a review
of the manner in which the Chaucer group collects and assesses
intelligence. This review was conducted by a small team that included
a police officer. Emerging findings from that review have identified
improvements that could be made to intelligence handling procedures,
mainly relating to the technical training of staff and the collation
and analysis of intelligence. The review found that those procedural
improvements might have strengthened the credibility of intelligence
produced by the Chaucer team, but did not find that the intelligence,
on which the search of Blantyre House was based, was unreliable.
The Director General is meeting with the Chief Constable of Kent
at the end of January for further discussions and will report
separately to the Committee.
5. The Prison Service is aware of the importance
of dealing consistently and effectively with the minority of staff
who are found to have acted corruptly. The Attorney General has
recently given approval to charge three prison officers at Elmley
prison under the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act. The three
officers had been suspended from duty pending the outcome of a
joint police/Chaucer team investigation into allegations that
they received rewards for arranging favourable treatment for a
prisoner.
6. The Director General has made plain his view
that he expects staff to act with complete integrity. He has,
for instance, made it plain that he will not tolerate violence
by staff against prisoners. A wide-ranging review on staff corruption/security
issues is in its final stages. This work commenced in June 2000
and final recommendations will be presented to the Prison Service
Management Board at the end of January 2001.
7. The Chaucer model of area-based intelligence
collation and analysis was one of several models which was examined
as part of the review, and, even if the proposed model of a national
capacity for dealing with intelligence relating to staff corruption
is accepted, and implemented, it is recommended that there will
continue to be a need for a regional coordination capacity. The
learning points from Chaucer's experience, which has pioneered
much of the Service's thinking on these issues, will be fed into
the Chaucer team itself, and into the developing intelligence
strategy.
8. Subject to further consideration of the overall
costs of accepting the recommendations, proposals are: a 'professional
standards' statement; improved recruitment and selection checks;
integrity testing; a culture intolerant of corruption; independent/specialist
staff advice and support; improved management procedures; a national
Intelligence and Investigation Unit; and consistent and strong
case resolution.
The conduct of the search (4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
4. We endorse the substantial criticism of
the search made in the Prison Service's own internal report. We
do not accept that there were insuperable difficulties in finding
the keys and reject the claim that it was necessary to use force
to enter the chapel and health care centre, which are separate
from the prisoner accommodation (paragraph 39).
5. Neither the Prison Service's internal report
nor the evidence we have heard in public and private provide convincing
explanations for the damage caused in the search (paragraph 40).
6. On the basis of all the evidence we have
heard, we conclude that the search was a failure aggravated by
the unnecessary damage caused. It was an exceptional operation
in Prison Service terms and it was neither planned nor carried
out with an appropriate degree of care (paragraph 41).
7. Some of the items found were significant—especially
mobile phones linked to criminals. But it is odd that the search
should be justified after the event by the discovery of items
not specifically sought in the course of the search. There was
a complete mismatch between the objectives of the search, the
methods used, and the items sought (paragraph 42).
8. This was not a normal search and it should
be judged by a different standard. We believe the items found
fell well below the level of contraband which would justify an
exceptional search of this nature (paragraph 43).
9. We are dissatisfied at the attempts to
mislead the Committee and public over the significance of what
was found (paragraph 44).
9. The Committee endorses the substantial criticism
of the search made in the Prison Service's own internal report.
That inquiry makes a number of recommendations, including the
need for contingency plans, the importance of the attendance of
the Board of Visitors at any non-routine event and practical planning
issues related to the search. A full review of the security manual
is being undertaken during 2001 and the section which gives guidance
on searches is being given a high priority. It remains the case
that non-routine searches of the kind carried out at Blantyre
House are expected to be relatively rare occasions. The Service
has, nevertheless, accepted the point that the learning points
from the Blantyre House search need to be absorbed into routine
guidance.
10. Separately, all prisons will be required
to have in place a standing plan for a full lock down search of
both prison and grounds. This is part of normal contingency planning,
and many governors will already have such a plan as a matter of
good practice. Copies of these plans will in future be lodged
at area offices. Area managers who foresee a need for a non-routine
search will be advised to seek advice from Security Directorate
on a case-by-case basis.
11. The Committee has said that it is dissatisfied
at what it described as "attempts to mislead the Committee
and public". The Government does not believe that this is
a fair assessment. The results of the search do not stand alone
as justification for the search. It took time, both to assess
each item and to conduct the inquiry into the management of Blantyre
House, which provided the basis for improvements to the way in
which security is managed at Blantyre House. The objectives for
the search were broad, and included taking a snap-shot of security
and control measures at the prison. The Committee's criticism
is based on public comments, in the first four weeks after the
search, when it was not yet possible to assess the full significance
of every item seized in the search.
12. The Director General accepts that a large
number of items seized turned out subsequently to be relatively
insignificant. But there were some significant finds. The Director
General has provided to the Committee, for completeness, a list
of all items seized during the search. The selective quotation
used by the HAC to support its conclusion: "In fact the Prison
Service's own internal inquiry concluded "there were no significant
finds"" is a misrepresentation. The full quotation is:
"Other than cannabis, ecstasy tablets, hard-core pornography
and various financial papers, there were no significant finds."
13. The HAC report states that planning for the
search of Blantyre House began on 18 April, on the basis of which
the Committee has suggested that the Home Secretary's letter of
20 April confirming that Blantyre House would continue as a resettlement
prison, might have been "less than complete". As was
made plain in the evidence put to the Committee, authorisation
for the search was given by the Director General on 28 April.
No planning was undertaken before that date. The allegation made
against the Home Secretary in paragraph 96 of the HAC report is
without foundation.
Move of the governor/ relationship between the
area manager and the governor (10, 11)
10. We have not heard any convincing evidence
as to why it was necessary to remove the Governor, without notice,
on the day of the search. If it was necessary to move him at all,
this could have been done weeks before. Alternatively he could
have been suspended from duty during the period of the search
(paragraph 49).
11. We conclude that the relationship between
the Area Manager and the Governor had deteriorated to such an
extent that the Prison Service should have addressed it much earlier
by moving one of them or altering the chain of command or both
(paragraph 79).
14. The Director General has explained that he
brought forward the move of the then Governor of Blantyre House
once a decision was made to search the prison. The then governor
had been in post for four years, and a move would have been entirely
reasonable. The Director General accepts, with the benefit of
hindsight, that the immediate posting of a new governor to start
on the same day of such a search was undesirable.
Security status of Blantyre House (13, 14, 20)
13. We conclude that the confusion in the
Prison Service about the status of Blantyre House was dangerous
and should have been addressed earlier. It is unacceptable that
an organisation so keen on categorisation should have allowed
one of its prisons to remain for so long in an ambivalent status
(paragraph 92).
14. Resettlement should be part of the plan
from the start for even the most dangerous prisoners, currently
described as Category A. We agree with Sir David Ramsbotham that
completion of the overhaul of the current categorisation system
is urgently needed. We welcome the Prison Service's own review
of security standards at the prison (paragraph 93).
20. We conclude that Blantyre House should
be classified as a resettlement prison for long-term prisoners
with an intermediate security status (between Categories C and
D) which reflects current layout and facilities - pending reorganisation
of security categories more generally, including selection criteria
for individual prisoners which reflect the actual security status
of a prison (paragraph 107).
15. The Government accepts the Committee's recommendation
that resettlement prisons should have a new security status. The
Service has recently introduced a "semi-open" security
classification for the women's estate which will accommodate prisoners
who present a low risk but who cannot be fully trusted in open
conditions.
16. The Service has reassessed the security needs
of the three resettlement prisons, and has decided to reclassify
Blantyre House, Kirklevington Grange and Latchmere House as "semi-open".
This will allow medium/long term prisoners to come into a semi-secure
environment and, subject to subsequent risk assessments, to be
allocated into work placements within the community. Morton Hall
will be the first prison to take women on this basis, and is scheduled
to start in May 2001. New guidance on categorisation and allocation
to "semi-open" conditions will be prepared and these
changes introduced as quickly as possible. Further work on this
is necessary, as guidance needs to be provided for all prisons
within the adult male estate, as well as the three resettlement
prisons. The Government believes that this will provide greater
clarity and consistency over the security standards expected of
resettlement prisons.
17. Sir David Ramsbotham referred, in his oral
evidence to the Committee, to the Service's review of the current
security categorisation system. The original recommendation for
review was made by General Learmont, and led to wide-ranging consultation
and analysis. The review of categorisation was completed in 2000.
Guidance (Prison Service Order 0900) was issued to the Service
in July 2000, which helps the Service place prisoners in conditions
of security commensurate with the risks they pose. It also introduced
an override facility which can be used in cases where there are
concerns about control of a particular prisoner. Evaluation of
the effect of this order on the prison population will be commissioned
during 2001. The Government does not believe that, given this
recent review, and the decisions taken regarding the security
classification of the women's estate and now of the three resettlement
prisons, that a further review of categorisation is necessary.
Conduct of internal investigations and role of
HMCIP (17, 18)
17. We recommend that when something goes
seriously wrong in the Prison Service, the investigation should
be conducted independently by the Chief Inspector of Prisons.
18. We recommend that the new inspection arrangements
for the work of prisons should apply to the overall management
of the Prison Service.
18. The Home Secretary has powers, under Section
5A of The Prison Act 1952 as inserted by Section 57 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1982, to ask the Chief Inspector of Prisons to make
special inquiry into any particular matters which gives rise for
concern in connection with conditions within prisons and the treatment
of prisoners, and he is prepared to use them where it would be
right to do so. For example, Sir David Ramsbotham was commissioned
to conduct a thematic review of suicide and self harm in prisons,
which led to the publication in May 1999 of the report "Suicide
is Everyone's Concern." In 1991 the then Inspector, Judge
Stephen Tumin, led an inquiry into the circumstances of the escape
of two IRA prisoners from Brixton prison. Ministers will use these
powers of direction if they believe that circumstances warrant
it.
19. Ministers regard it as part of the Chief
Inspector of Prison's statutory remit to examine and report on
the impact within prisons of management decisions taken within
Prison Service headquarters, and to track his findings back through
to Prison Service headquarters and the relevant aspects of headquarters'
operations. His findings might concern individual management decisions
or an evaluation of the impact of centrally-driven programmes
and their administration from headquarters.
Effectiveness of Blantyre House (19, 21)
19. On the basis of this experience, we are
also inclined to believe that resettlement prisons should be managed
centrally, as are both high security and women's prisons (paragraph
106).
21. Blantyre House will need a clear policy
framework, significant resources and a commitment of senior management
to rebuild the spirit of trust necessary to return to its role
as an effective resettlement prison (prison 108).
20. The Committee also recommended central management
for the three resettlement prisons. The Director General has recently
announced changes in the future management structure for the under
18 estate, which will in future be managed on a functional basis
above governor level through an area manager for juveniles. Neither
that decision, nor the discrete management of high security and
women's prisons, is intended to affect the importance of line
management, via area managers, as the guiding principle on which
the bulk of the prison estate is managed. This approach was endorsed
by Lord Laming, in the findings of his report on the Prison Service.
21. The Government does not believe that that
the three, relatively small and geographically distanced, resettlement
prisons should also be managed centrally. As the Committee has
pointed out, resettlement is part of the Service's core business,
and most prisoners rejoin the community from multi-functional
prisons, particularly local prisons or direct from Category C
and D training prisons. The success of that resettlement rests
heavily on the effectiveness of close links with the local community
(which Blantyre House has developed so effectively).
22. The Government believes, that along with
the proposed redesignation of a Director of Resettlement (see
paragraph 29 below), that the right balance of clarity of line
management is retained. In addition, the area manager for Wales
has lead responsibility for representing the interests of open
prisons across the estate and for promulgating good practice and
facilitating discussion on key issues.
23. The Committee has noted the importance of
a clear policy framework, significant resources and a commitment
of senior management to enable Blantyre House to work effectively
as a resettlement prison. The prison is working to the existing
business plan and targets agreed for 2000/2001. From 2001, along
with all other prisons, Blantyre House will be working to a Service
Delivery Agreement (SDA). The Blantyre House SDA will seek to
enhance and develop the rehabilitative work of the prison.
24. The governor has completed a re-profiling
exercise of the prison. The area manager has approved the following
significant additional resources for Blantyre House:
- 40% increase in probation cover;
- 50% of an AO;
- 2 OSGs;
- 1 detached duty Principal Officer (discussing
possible permanent post).
25. In addition the Governor has found resources
locally to provide:
- 1 Officer;
- 50% of an AO;
- Upgrade of a typist to Personal Secretary.
26. The Governor of Kirklevington has been working
with the governor of Blantyre House and his management team on
a consultancy basis to share best practice. A program of management
and staff exchanges with Kirklevington has now started. Meanwhile
Blantyre House continues to carry out and plan community events;
OAP Christmas party (December), art and craft exhibition at Cranbrook
library in conjunction with Kent Art & Libraries (January)
and the annual pantomime (March).
27. The management team has tightened several
areas of security which were necessary to restore balance. They,
and the area manager, remain totally committed to providing a
positive regime for prisoners and meeting their resettlement needs.
They are also committed to the Blantyre House ethos that encourages
prisoners to be self motivated and take responsibility for themselves.
Resettlement (12, 22, 23)
12. We therefore have a situation in which
almost all the prison population will leave prison at some stage;
most of them will have some form of resettlement need; prison
Governors see their main role as rehabilitating prisoners; but
the Prison Service has no policy or guidance on resettlement (paragraph
89).
22. We believe the Prison Service must take
a longer term view of its duty to protect the public and devise
targets which measure rates of reoffending (paragraph 14).
23. We recommend that the Prison Service publishes
urgently a policy on resettlement and reports to the House in
one year's time on what has been achieved. We also want it to
consider the appropriateness of appointing a Director of Resettlement
with specific responsibility for three resettlement prisons and
resettlement programmes in all other prisons (paragraph 119).
28. The Government is in full accord with the
Committee's view of the importance of resettlement. It also agrees
with the Committee's view that resettlement should be part of
the plan from the start for all prisoners. However, the Government
does not accept the Committee's view that there is: "...no
policy or guidance on resettlement." It has accepted that
there is a lack of a national policy framework, and had
reported to the HAC on this work. The Committee's recommendation
that the Prison Service should report in one year's time on what
has been achieved in the resettlement field is welcome, and a
report will be submitted to the Committee and placed in the library
of the House of Commons.
Resettlement Directorate
29. The Director General has decided to reflect
the central importance of resettlement programmes and policies
by redesignating the Regimes Directorate as the Resettlement Directorate,
to be headed by the present Director of Regimes (a member of the
Prison Service Management Board) who will be redesignated as Director
of Resettlement. The new arrangements will build on the work of
the Regimes Directorate which brought together the newly established
Custody to Work Unit, prison education and industries, the What
Works In Prison Unit and other services under the Director of
Regimes' command to develop programmes which help prisoners resettle
into the community. The redesignation of the Director's role underlines
the importance of achieving effective resettlement not just through
the resettlement prisons, but much more generally across the prison
estate.
Resettlement programmes and policies
30. In addition to the work done at the three
resettlement prisons, in open prisons generally and in some units
in closed prisons, there is a range of resettlement provision
across the prison estate which is directed at addressing offending
behaviour and helping prisoners re-integrate back into the community.
Such provision reflects Prison Service policies at national level
and is delivered locally, taking account of the differing needs
of various categories of prisons and prisoners, operational priorities
and local circumstances.
31. This existing provision is being augmented
by a wide range of resettlementrelated programmes and projects
to identify and promote effective practice, particularly in getting
prisoners into employment and accommodation on release. Examples
include:
- the resettlement pathfinders under the Government's
Crime Reduction Programme at seven establishments, which are exploring
effective resettlement work with short-term prisoners, in partnership
with the Probation service and voluntary sector organisations;
- the Welfare to Work pilots at 12 establishments
which aim to increase the job skills and employability of younger
adult prisoners and help ensure that they get maximum benefit
from the New Deal for Young People on release. Over 6,300 young
offenders have started the Welfare to Work programme and some
4,700 have successfully completed it;
- housing advice and mentoring pilots going ahead
at six establishments in partnership with the Rough Sleepers Unit;
- the Headstart programme which has been successfully
run at Thorn Cross is being extended to two more prisons. The
programme helps prisoners to achieve job aspirations through individually-tailored
interventions, including building close links with the individual's
home community prior to release.
32. There are many other employment and accommodation
schemes based on locally developed partnerships between prisons
and other agencies, especially the voluntary sector. The experience
of all these initiatives and programmes is being fed into the
development and implementation of a new custody to work strategy
for the Prison Service to deliver improved employment and accommodation
outcomes for released prisoners, reflecting the research which
suggests that a significant impact on reoffending rates can be
achieved by helping offenders to find secure housing and stable
jobs on release.
33. Beyond the provision and policies already
in place, the Prison Service has also for some time been developing
national standards for the resettlement estate covering eligibility,
selection, security, control and regime based on existing sentence
planning, throughcare and evidence of effectiveness. That work
preceded the search of Blantyre House. The Resettlement Standard
published in November 2000 will ensure that all prisoners will
have the opportunity to maintain and develop appropriate community
ties and prepare for their release.
34. Provision will be made in collaboration with
probation services and other agencies (including the voluntary
sector), and will be targeted on the basis of an assessment of
risks and needs, directed towards reducing the risk of re-offending
and risk of harm. Under the Standard, prisons are required to
have a resettlement policy committee which is representative of
all key functions and service providers, with senior managers
being responsible for ensuring the delivery of resettlement services.
Implementation of the Standard will be audited and a resettlement
KPI is being developed for introduction in April 2002 which will
set targets for improving the number of prisoners with a job and
accommodation on release. A Prison Service Order on Resettlement,
which provides more detail than the Standard, including the common
standards for the resettlement estate, is likely to be published
in April 2001.
35. The Custody to Work Unit, reporting to the
new Director of Resettlement, will be taking the lead on further
developing resettlement policy and practice, drawing together,
among other things, the continuing major investment made by the
Prison Service in education for employment focused on basic skills
(an additional £18 million in SR 2000) and delivering the
Home Secretary's target of doubling the number of prisoners getting
jobs on release over the next three years (an additional £21
million in SR2000). The Unit will also be responsible for the
implementation of the Resettlement Standard (working closely with
the What Works In Prison Unit), building on work done by officials
across departments on the continuing barriers faced by offenders
seeking access to employment and housing, and liaising with the
Social Exclusion Unit on the latter's current study into the re-integration
of ex-prisoners.
36. The What Works In Prison Unit has been set
up separately to ensure that Prison Service programmes and regimes
are based firmly on evidence of effectiveness and "What Works"
research. A needs assessment system, OASys, is being developed
jointly with the Probation Service and is currently being piloted
as one way of helping to ensure that the available programmes
which will aid the resettlement of offenders are targeted on the
right prisoners.
Targets which measure reoffending
37. The Prison Service is committed to reducing
the rates of re-offending by prisoners on release. Following the
Home Affairs Committee's 1997 Report, the Prison Service reviewed
the possibility for setting a target on reducing reoffending.
Because data on re-offending rates rely on self-reporting by offenders,
it considers that reconviction rates remain a better target measure.
38. A target has therefore been set jointly for
the Prison and Probation Services jointly, through the Home Office
Public Service Agreement published on 3 November 2000, to reduce
by 2004 the rate of reconvictions of all offenders punished by
imprisonment or by community supervision by 5% compared to the
predicted rate. Because the reconviction data do not become available
until more than two years after the offender's release, the Key
Performance Indicators for the Prison Service (the management
tool for delivering this target) are based on delivering the annual
outputs (educational qualifications, accredited offending behaviour
programmes, and drug work) which evidence shows will reduce the
level of reconvictions.
39. Targets for individual prisons are likewise
set on the basis of delivering programmes in accordance with the
evidence on "what works". Reconviction rate targets
have not been set for individual prisons, because most prisoners
move between prisons during sentence and it would therefore not
be possible to attribute subsequent reconviction rates to the
impact of a particular prison and because there would be considerable
difficulties in taking into account differences in age, previous
record and current offence, all of which influence subsequent
reconviction rates.
Conclusion (16, 24)
16. We note that Mr Narey has chosen to take
full responsibility for these events, but we do not believe he
is entirely to blame. The factors that led to the crisis on 5
May started before he became Director General in 1999. We accept
Sir David Ramsbotham's assessment that this is not the way Martin
Narey wants the Prison Service to go. The burden of salvaging
Blantyre House and devising a resettlement policy now rests heavily
on him (paragraph 97).
24. It is hard to escape the conclusion that
what took place at Blantyre House was a self inflicted injury
by the Prison Service. Management drifted into an avoidable situation.
The only way out may have seemed to be to remove the Governor
and search the prison. That was done in ways that have alienated
everyone connected with the prison. Now the Prison Service needs
to prove its commitment to resettlement across the whole Prison
Service by devising and articulating a clear policy. The status
of Blantyre House must be clarified and a real effort made to
revive the ethos of trust there. Capable Governors and staff need
to be reassured that they work for a competent employer. Then
perhaps something positive can grow from the serious error of
judgement (paragraph 120).
40. The Director General is personally monitoring
the implementation of the action plan from the investigation into
the general management of Blantyre House and is supporting the
governor and area manager in ensuring consolidation of change
through regular meetings and briefings. He will visit the prison
again in January to assess progress, and in the interim has authorised
the area manager to exclude Blantyre House from the requirements
to make efficiency savings during the financial year 2001/2002.
This, together with the additional resources authorised by the
area manager, represents a substantial proportionate increase
in resources for the prison.
41. The Government has accepted, or is already
carrying out, many of the recommendations made by the Committee
on resettlement. It has accepted a range of recommendations arising
from the experience of the search of Blantyre House carried out
on 5/6 May 2000. The Service has, overall, in the last few years,
made real inroads, as a result of additional resources, into key
areas that will aid resettlement and reduce reoffending. The Government
is focussing on basic skills, on offending behaviour programmes
and making progress on the availability of drug treatment for
prisoners.
42. Tangible progress can now be demonstrated:
- since the introduction of a literacy and numeracy
key performance indicator last April, over 5,200 full qualifications
at basic skills level 2 and over 26,000 other qualifications,
making many of these prisoners employable for the first time,
on release.
- a reduction in the proportion of positive drug
test results from 24.4% in 1996-97, to 14.2% last year and to
12.3% (2000/2001, to date).
- a transformation in the provision of drug treatment.
CARAT (Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice and Throughcare)
services are in place in every prison, benefiting over 37,000
prisoners this year. 51 drug treatment programmes are now up and
running, for prisoners requiring them.
- roll out of independently accredited programmes
for offending behaviour—4,600 such programmes last year,
as compared with 3,000 twelve months earlier, and rising to nearly
9,000 by 2003-4. Data is now emerging confirming the research
evidence that these programmes will reduce reconvictions by about
a third.
43. Utilising the additional investment provided
by the Spending Review (£ 157m, including £ 88m for
the drug strategy), the Service is building substantially on this
progress. New targets for getting prisoners into jobs and housing
will be included. The Service welcomes the opportunity to demonstrate
to the Committee, in a year's time, what has been achieved in
the resettlement field.
Paul Boateng
Home Office
15 January 2001
9 HC(1999-2000)904. Back
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