Annex 21
FROM IND INTELLIGENCE SECTION (INDIS)
"THE NATURE
AND SCALE
OF THE
CHALLENGE TO
UNITED KINGDOM
BORDER CONTROLS
AND THE
VARIOUS WAYS
IN WHICH
IT MAY
DEVELOP IN
FUTURE"
From the intelligence perspective
In recent times, rapid population growth, environmental
degradation, disparities in economic development and ethnic and
political conflict have led to large-scale population movements
throughout the developing world. Accurate figures for illegal
immigrants worldwide are difficult to find but the International
Labour Organisation (ILO) suggests that the figure could be as
high as 30 million and that more than 100 states are now subject
to major inward/outward movements. The World Bank estimates that
the population in the low-income economies will grow from 1.4
billion in 1995 to 2.2 billion in 2025. Although trade and investment
may improve the situation in some source countries, most will
not see any significant equalisation of living standards for the
foreseeable future.
Racketeers were quick to spot the market opportunity
and moved in with alarming speed. Recent studies, most notably
the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna,
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the CIREFI
European Union Working Group have concluded that "almost
all illegal entrants make use of unlawful assistance from facilitators".
The gangs have transferred the knowledge, facilities and networks
used for smuggling drugs and other commodities to a highly profitable
new endeavour. Many actively recruit potential immigrants in source
countries, provide escorts and safe houses en route and are increasingly
providing support on arrival such as legal advice to lodge asylum
applications. Opportunist illegal entry is becoming rarer. The
trade is now firmly in the hands of organised crime.
Organised crime
The International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) estimates the profits being made by criminal gangs controlling
the illegal migrant flows to the West as $12 billion annually.
Sources in the United States put the figure at $30 billion. Sums
range from £2,000 to be smuggled from Romania to £16-20,000
from China. Nearly 20,000 people were detected seeking to enter
the United Kingdom clandestinely in 1999; an increase from just
10,000 the year before. Detections of clandestine entrants are
at record levels. What proportion of the whole they represent
is by the nature of the offence unknown. Many illegal entrants
are absorbed by their own communities and find irregular employment
there. Others assume false identities and find work, ostensibly
lawfully. Sections of some industries are now underpinned by illegal
labour; the clothing industry, the building trade, agriculture
and the hotel, domestic and catering industries all depend on
illegal workers.
The Civil Penalty (Immigration and Asylum Act)
and extending the Airline Liaison Officer network will make life
more difficult for the organisers. The Civil Penalty has made
drivers more vigilant and will certainly bite on opportunists
and the smaller, less sophisticated groups. The larger groups
may seek alternative methods of entry. The success of Airline
Liaison Officers has contributed to the resurgence of clandestine
entry but it is not the primary factor. Traffickers have realised
that larger profits are to be made by transporting greater numbers
overland or by sea where fewer barriers are placed in their path.
EU DIMENSION
The United Kingdom border is inextricably linked
to those of our European neighbours, some of whom continue to
issue work permits for low paid work which the indigenous population
is unwilling to undertake. Other have run amnesty programmes.
Many of those benefiting may choose to come to the United Kingdom
if employment prospects are better. Security of the external EU
frontier will depend on the ability of the EU-accession countries
to control their borders efficiently. Their law enforcement agencies
will need help.
CONCLUSION
Illegal immigration was once an opportunistic
endeavour, small numbers entering clandestinely or by using forged
documentation or deception. But since organised crime entered
the market place, greed has taken over. Traditional methods of
entry at airports are becoming too small-scale, generating insufficient
profits for the risk involved. Improved security and the relatively
containable environment of airports has led the traffickers into
overland routes where larger-scale movements of people is possible.
Groups of 50+ are not uncommon. Documentation is not always necessary.
Border posts are simply avoided. The United Kingdom remains an
attractive destination and its advantages, true or exaggerated
are easily communicated through local media or via resident family
members. Significantly, it is no longer subject only to the pull
factors created by family and tradition. As minority communities
grow the culture shock of moving country will diminish. For as
long as the gangs seek ever greater profits, illegal immigration
will remain a significant threat
FROM THE NATIONAL FORGERY SECTION
"THE NATURE
AND SCALE
OF THE
CHALLENGE TO
UNITED KINGDOM
BORDER CONTROLS
AND THE
VARIOUS WAYS
IN WHICH
IT MAY
DEVELOP IN
FUTURE"
Fraudulent use of travel documents has long
been recognised by the UK as a serious threat to the integrity
of the immigration control. In the early 1970s the Immigration
Service (IS) formed the National Forgery Section (NFS) as a part
of the IS Intelligence Unit to act as a centre of expertise in
examination of suspect documents and false document detection
as well as a centre for gathering and disseminating information
on all aspects of travel documents and their abuse. The NFS supports
forgery detection capabilities at ports of entry by:
(i) conducting a national training programme
for false document detection (at basic, intermediate and expert
levels);
(ii) by ensuring that ports are provided
with up-to-date forgery detection equipment capable of checking
for document abuse, including abuse of the latest and most sophisticated
security safeguards in travel documents;
(iii) by providing ports with rapid, up to
date information about travel documents and latest instances of
travel document abuse and fraud methods in illustrated formats
(by both paper and electronic means).
The nature and scale of the challenge to UK
border controls presented by travel document abuse is persistent.
Appendix 24 provides forgery detection statistics for ports of
entry for the years 1995 to 1999. It is important to note that
the majority of false document detections in each of the years
shown related to EEA documents. Travel document abuse has long
been used by persons who do not qualify for entry to the UK under
the Immigration Rules but are nevertheless determined to enter
by deception using false documents. The type of documents used
by fraudsters is usually targeted at aspects of the immigration
control where it is perceived that examination of travel documents
and their holders will be least rigorous, and by using documents
that are either easy to forge or counterfeit or to obtain by fraudulent
means. Statistics also demonstrate, however, that all forms of
travel documents (including visas and stamps) from all countries
are subject to extensive fraud. High standards of security features
in travel documents, as well as security of their storage and
issuing processes, are, therefore, as vital as the need for expertise
at the control point in detecting document abuse.
Despite increased preventative measures, such
as new visa requirements and an effective network of Airline Liaision
Officers, the challenge to the UK border controls of travel document
fraud is severe and set to continue. It is essential, that document
fraud detection capability is maintained by having highly trained
officers supplied with the most up to date forgery detection and
document reading equipment capable of machine reading internationally
agreed document formats and the latest security features. It is
also vital that officers have immediate access at the controls
to intelligence data about different types of travel documents
and fraud methods. This will enable the UK control to maintain
its deterrent effect for forgers and those using fraudulent documents
whilst at the same time allowing rapid verification and clearance
of the vast majority of bona fide travellers.
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