APPENDIX 2 (continued)
Supplementary note by the Immigration
and Nationality Directorate, Home Office
Recommendations
The service should consider the scope for
small scale computerisation at individual ports to improve the
use of intelligence information, for example by speedier access
to relevant information and more detailed analysis of patterns
and trends of offending. (2.10)
In assessing the information technology needs
of the Desk the Service should consider the need to take professional
advice so as to make the most effective use of the information,
having regard to cost and the resources available. (2.33)
This recommendation has been overtaken by organisational
changes. The IND Intelligence Section is now a separate unit.
An intelligence database has now been ordered and is due to be
installed imminently. The IS Intelligence and Investigation Unit
database has been subsumed by the Warnings Index System and by
the CRISIS system. The latter provides a management information
system for enforcement offices. Most IND information technology
requirements are now outsourced.
Recommendation
In developing the role of the Intelligence
Desk the Service should ensure that:
— ports are regularly consulted
and provided with information relevant to their current needs;
— the Desk builds fully upon the
local initiatives at some ports and promotes good practice;
— the Desk promotes full exchange
of information between enforcement work and the arrivals control,
this might include for example alerting officers on the control
to the methods used by offenders to enter the country. (2.32)
Progress
Points one and three are standard practice.
The IND Intelligence Section is now a separate unit, which coordinates
intelligence work for the Service. The IS is currently undertaking
a scoping study to introduce a standardised system for intelligence
gathering which will be based on the NCIS model. This should establish
a co-ordinated and accountable system of intelligence gathering
and usage at ports and enforcement offices.
Recommendation
The Service should improve allocation of
detention spaces by:
— Introducing a clear grading system
to prioritise cases;
— Improving the system for monitoring
accommodation use and detainee movements, possibly through computerisation;
— Extending co-ordination arrangements
to the whole country;
— Establishing a central point for
authorising and controlling the use of police and prison accommodation.
(paragraph 5.10)
Progress
Efficient use of detention is a prime objective.
It has been decided that cases for detention are to be prioritised
in accordance with the feasibility of removing the detainee from
the United Kingdom. To facilitate this a review of all existing
detained cases was commenced in May 2000 to enable the blockages
to removal to be more readily identified.
The monitoring and co-ordination of detainee
movements has been improved. In 1999 the in-country escorting
contract was expanded to include all movements in Scotland and
Northern Ireland and a new overseas escorting service contract
was awarded.
An interim computerised system has been installed
to deliver management information for monitoring accommodation
and detainee movements across the country. It is in the process
of being developed to include all of the information currently
held manually and will be enhanced to ensure that it can deal
with the rapid expansion of the detention estate, a greatly increased
through-flow of detainees and bail coordination. This new enhanced
system will be known as DELMIS and will be operated by Detainee
Escorting and Population Management Unit (DEPMU) which has responsibility
for authorising, controlling and the allocation of immigration
and prison accommodation.
485 overnight places are available in six Immigration
Service detention centres (Annex B) with a further 520 places
in Haslar Holding Centre, Lindholme Detention Centre and HMPs
Rochester and Gateside in units managed by the Prison Service
but used entirely for immigration detainees.
The Immigration Service is working towards the
Government's commitment that, as resources allow, detainees should
not routinely be held in prisons. The priority is to reduce the
incidence of detainees held in small numbers in local prisons.
A building adjacent to the main HMP Lindholme has recently been
converted to an immigration detention centre to obviate the need
for placing detainees in Northern England in prisons. It opened
in July 2000 and has a capacity of 112. The use of prisons in
Scotland and Northern Ireland continues as no alternative accommodation
is currently available however detainees in Scotland are now accommodated
in a discrete 60 bed unit at HMP Gateside and a review of the
future provision of detention facilities in Northern Ireland is
underway.
Prisoners who have received sentences of 12
months or longer or who have been placed in Category A prisons,
and who are to be detained under the Immigration Act after completing
their sentence, remain in the care of the Prison Service.
Oakington Reception Centre, a short term non-secure
establishment managed by a private contractor opened in March
2000 and has a capacity of 400.
The use of police cells is now controlled centrally
by the Detention Co-ordinator for persons detained on arrival
at Heathrow and Gatwick. All ports are instructed that the use
of police cells must normally be restricted to cases where the
passenger has a serious criminal record, terrorist connections,
a history of absconding from less secure accommodation, or needs
close supervision, for example where there is a suicide risk or
a risk to others. Such individuals are made subject of a Special
Needs form and approval for placement in police accommodation
must be obtained from an Immigration Inspector. Enforcement cases
apprehended in country may normally be detained in police cells
for a maximum of 48 hours when the Detention Co-ordinator will
assess them for allocation into long-term detention. Police accommodation
is only used with the prior agreement of the Police and for the
shortest period possible to effect transfer into appropriate long-term
accommodation or removal from the United Kingdom.
Comment
The Immigration Service is pursuing a strategy
to provide a network of detention centres across England. The
centres will be managed under contract with the private sector
whose service standards and performance will be closely monitored.
It is planned to increase the detention estate by up to 1,800
places by spring 2001. There are plans to re-develop and increase
the capacity of the Harmondsworth site and we are looking to provide
more coverage in the Northern Home Counties and in the South East.
Recommendations
In order to guide the allocation of resources
the Service should consider setting minimum standards for the
facilities they provide in further examination areas and detention
centres. (4.26 and 5.17)
The Service should consider, together with
the relevant port authorities, the case for expanding the capacity
of some further examination areas and improving interview accommodation
where possible. (4.26)
The Service should consider developing minimum
standards for the care of detainees and monitoring the service
provided by immigration staff and contractors at all detention
centres against these standards. (5.17)
Taking due account of the sensitivity required
and the potential problems involved, the Service should consider
whether it might be useful to undertake a survey of the views
of further examination and detention passengers to ensure that
their needs and concerns are recognised and taken into account.
(4.27)
Progress
A first draft of Detention Centre Rules, which
set minimum standards for detention centres, has been produced.
This was circulated widely for comment in June 1999.
Comprehensive contract monitoring schedules
against which the performance of the private sector is measured
are in place at all detention facilities and in the in-country
and overseas escorting contracts. Facilities at detention centres
have been upgraded. Annex C sets out the current situation.
Best Practice guidelines for the facilities
in FEAs and interview rooms have been circulated and are updated
as appropriate. A steering group is currently working to produce
national standards for holding rooms.
The update of 1996 provides details of an assessment
of the merits of a survey of further examination and detention
passengers which has been completed. No further work has been
done on this, as other work in the field of detention has been
ongoing. There have been significant changes in this field since
the National Audit Office report. Detention Management Services,
a new section headed by an Assistant Director was established
in 1998 to oversee detention procedures and practice. At the same
time a new unit, the Detention Operational Management Unit, was
set up whose principal functions are the provision of detention
facilities; the delivery of service standards and operational
requirements, management of Immigration Service detention contracts;
liaison with the Prison Service and advice on detention custody
and practice. In addition there has been rationalisation of the
Immigration Service use of prison accommodation and a programme
to increase the capacity of spaces available in the detention
estate.
Comment
There are currently numerous avenues for detainees
to express any views and concerns they might have. As part of
the reception process, detainees are advised of the formal grievance
and complaints procedures in place. In addition, they can speak
to the Immigration and Contractor's staff on site, members of
the Visiting Committee and can contact a representative from their
Embassy or High Commission. Detainees are, from time to time,
invited to market test catering or comment on such matters as
provision of sports equipment and library items.
Most importantly, the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999 introduces, for the first time, a framework of regulation
for detention centres which will formalise regimes across the
estate. Statutory rules will regulate the rights and responsibilities
of both detained persons and those who manage detention centres.
A first draft of Detention Centre Rules has been produced and
circulated with the target date for introduction as Autumn 2000.
All custody officers who work in detention centres are required
to be accredited by the same date. The Immigration Service is
working with the Custodial Care National Training Organisation
to formulate the occupational standard and an NVQ programme.
Recommendation
The Service should consider whether there
is a need to improve procedures for keeping detainees at all centres
informed of the progress of their case, in particular:
— whether staff conducting surgeries
need to be better briefed about the position of detainees' cases;
and
— whether there is a need to seek
confirmation that each detainee has received and understood a
progress report. (5.20)
Progress
An induction programme is now in place at each
location including interviews with Immigration Service staff.
Detainees are provided with written reasons for detention and
receive a monthly written update on the position of their case
(on forms IS91R and IS151F). Detainees may ask to speak with an
Immigration Officer to discuss their case. Interpreters are available
if necessary.
SECTION TWO
Responses to questions from the Committee in
a letter dated 2 August 2000
What plans does IND have to increase the proportion
of freight vehicles searched at Channel ports?
The current recruitment drive will result in
the provision of additional staff to most ports of entry. At the
Channel Ports, one of the considerations in deciding the size
of the necessary increase in complements has been an enhancement
of our freight search capability. For example, in Dover, where
freight searching is carried out by a dedicated unit, the South
East Ports Surveillance Team (SEPST) will be increased by 53 posts.
This will enable us to roster round-the-clock search teams and
provide the flexibility to deploy more staff at pre-selected times
to search a greater proportion of arriving freight vehicles. At
Coquelles, we are allocating an additional 16 posts which will
considerably improve upon our current search capability. That
capability will continue to be augmented by random but reasonably
comprehensive security checks by Eurotunnel, which often detect
potential clandestines. It is important to emphasise that our
strategy is not simply to increase the volume of searches but
to improve our information and intelligence to profile and target
the most likely transporters of clandestine entrants.
Due to operational problems associated with searching
various types of freight, is fresh produce cargo less likely to
be subject to routine or profiled examination?
No. We are conscious that vehicles which carry
fresh produce are as likely to carry clandestines as those carrying
other loads. Such vehicles fit a profile for examination and on
occasions have been specifically targeted for search.
What arrangements exist at present locally and
nationally for the discussion of issues between port authorities
and all agencies operating at ports?
At local level the Border Agencies Working Group
encourages the establishment of tripartite interagency groups
comprising representatives from IS, Police and Customs and Excise
in order to coordinate approaches to port operators to discuss
a wide variety of issues including changes in practices and procedures
and accommodation requirements.
At national level the Border Agencies Working
Group itself meets regularly at least six times a year. At these
meetings attended by representatives from Customs, Police, Immigration
Service and National Criminal Intelligence Service priorities
for local action are decided. Annually a high level Steering Group
takes stock of the year's activity and outlines a work programme
for the following year.
How does the Government seek to co-ordinate the
development of controls at UK ports of entry to ensure proper
partnership with port authorities and with carriers?
The Government co-ordinates the development
of controls at UK ports of entry through the Border Agencies Working
Group and the high level Steering Group.
Has agreement been reached following consultation
with port authorities, regarding provision of facilities to the
Immigration Service free of charge? If so, what is the likely
cost to the operators?
Ministerial agreement has been given to a review
of the timetable for implementation of the facilities and charging
provisions contained within the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act.
This will provide the opportunity for some of the proposals put
forward by Industry in response to the Consultation Paper to be
considered and for the new flexibility control arrangements to
be implemented and their impact assessed. Ministers have still
to decide a revised implementation date. It is unlikely however,
to be before April 2002.
This was discussed at a meeting with the industry
consultation group on 13 July. It was agreed at that meeting that
the consultation process at a port level would now commence at
a small cross section of ports with a view to identifying common
key issues and reporting back to the consultation group in early
2001. Consultation with the remaining port authorities would then
follow.
An initial programme of meetings with the port
operators for Heathrow Airport, Manchester Airport, Dover Eastern
Docks and Hull is now underway and will look at existing accommodation
holdings, scope for rationalisation and identification of benefits
for both sides. The aim of this partnership approach is to reach
a position that is mutually acceptable. At this stage it is too
early to assess the likely cost to the operator.
Have negotiations been conducted with a view to
sharing facilities, where practicable, with the other control
agencies?
This work is being taken forward through the
Border Agencies Working Group. Representatives of each control
agency (Special Branch, Customs & Excise and the Immigration
Service) have been individually tasked with identifying opportunities
for sharing at each port. The Immigration Service will co-ordinate
and take forward the responses to promote better use of facilities.
Which other EU Member States require the authorities
at their ports to bear a proportion of the cost of physical controls
at ports of entry?
The UK Immigration Service is not aware that
such arrangements apply in other EU Member States.
What plans does the Government have to extend
CCTV operations at UK ports and airports? What costs are port
operators likely to incur as a result?
The Immigration Service is working closely with
the other border control agencies (police, Customs and Excise)
to define a standard for CCTV usage at all UK ports of arrival.
This Joint Control Agencies group is currently looking, in partnership
with BAA, at how CCTV might be implemented at the three major
South-East airports (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted).
The objective is to see if a combined user requirement
can be agreed that will not only meet the needs of the control
authorities but also those of the port operator. The expected
benefits are a more effective (immigration/police/Customs and
anti-terrorist) control; more secure air/sea ports; safer air/sea
ports; simplified infrastructures; greater flexibility in the
use of airports; more transparent mechanisms for ensuring that
service standards are being met and lower overall costs.
Additionally, the Border Agencies have a Memorandum
of Understanding to expand co-operation that includes the sharing
of CCTV equipment. Allowing access to other Border Agencies CCTV
systems avoids duplication of coverage, saves on cost and enables
greater coverage of port areas.
Ideally, the Immigration Service would want
CCTV on every entrance to the controlled zones (air bridges, coaching
stands, gates, gangways, car ramps, train platforms and embarkation
gates). This would have the potential to dramatically increase
our ability to match inadequately documented passengers to services;
improve our ability to identify carriers liable to charge under
Section 40 of the Immigration & Asylum Act 1999; and help
them prevent recurrences; improve our intelligence on whence inadequately
documented arrivals come; improve our ability to disrupt these
flows at source and reduce the need for physical surveillance
of arrivals.
CCTV in the Arrivals Halls and covering car
lanes would have the potential to enable us to measure queuing
times accurately, verifiably and transparently with minimum staff
resource intervention to ensure that published service standards
were being met.
CCTV in the areas between the entry points to
the Controlled Zones and the Arrivals Halls/Car lanes would have
the potential to allow us to carry out surveillance for intelligence
purposes and for proactive surveillance operations aimed at identifying
racketeers and facilitators and disrupting their activities/bringing
prosecutions.
CCTV beyond those areas—eg check in desks/meeters
and greeters areas etc would have the potential to further improve
our ability to carry out surveillance for intelligence purposes
and for proactive surveillance operations aimed at identifying
racketeers and facilitators and disrupting their activities/bringing
prosecutions.
The costs to port operators cannot yet be clearly
defined. Much will depend on the layout of the particular ports
and their complexity and the scope for unifying the CCTV systems
with the operator's own systems. Set against any costs would be
any Security-factor funding that might be allowed for off-setting
to carriers; the reduced costs of a more simplified infrastructure
(eg a single CCTV network instead of many) and the benefits that
operators may gain by the more flexible use of the port (eg shared
departure lounges for domestic and international passengers).
The emphasis from the Immigration Service perspective
will be on achieving CCTV systems that are cost effective and
bring benefit not just to the control authorities but also to
port operators.
Can you list those Government agencies which have
regular contact with the port authorities?
The following is not an exhaustive list but
comprises Government agencies who have statutory rights of entry
to airports under the DETR agreed security programme.
DETR Aviation Security Branch
The Police
HM Customs and Excise
UK Immigration Service
Fire and Civil Defence Authority
Animal Quarantine Service
Ministry of Agriculture Plant Health and Seeds
Inspectorate
Ministry of Agriculture State Veterinary Service
Local Authority—Public Protection Service
Local Authority—Health Control Unit—PMIs
Local Authority—Community Health Service
Laboratory of the Government Chemist
CAA—Accident Investigation Branch
CAA—Flight Operations Branch
Local Water Authority
Health and Safety Executive
What arrangements exist for Customs to share profiling
information with the Immigration Service?
In what circumstances can the Immigration Service
gain access to the Customs OASIS database and Ferry Information
Service?
What plans do you have to share passenger information
supplied by carriers? Will this involve the loan of computer systems
and equipment by carriers to the Immigration Service?
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 establishes "statutory
gateways" which enable Customs and Excise, among other named
agencies, to provide information to the Secretary of State for
specific immigration purposes. These purposes are defined in Section
20 of the new legislation. However, the gateways only allow information
to be shared for specified purposes, which broadly equate with
each agency's statutory functions. This does not allow, for example,
Customs to ask the Immigration Service to acquire certain information
on its behalf from carriers in order to by-pass perceived weaknesses
in Customs' own information gathering powers. Rather, it allows
the Immigration Service to share only that information which the
Immigration Service has lawfully collected for its own purposes
in the first instance. Customs will have routine access to "core"
passenger information (as set out at Part 1 of the Schedule to
the Passenger Information Order) to the extent that it has been
collected from carriers by the Immigration Service. The Immigration
Service has begun a detailed study to examine a range of data
sharing issues, designed to move the Service towards a more targeted
and intelligence led approach to the operation of the control.
This will include looking at the way Customs use profiles; the
way they analyse data and the manner by which carriers might provide
the Immigration Service with passenger information.
On occasions when one border agency subjects travellers
and/or vehicles to a thorough examination, what arrangements exist
to invite other border agencies to attend and thus avoid subsequent
duplication of examination procedures?
To what extent are the daily border agencies'
operations at the SE ports co-ordinated?
The arrangements will vary from port to port but
the general, and important, point to make is that there exists
a high degree of co-operation between the border control agencies.
Each agency will normally notify the others if it has a specific
target. Unless there are reasons for another agency to conduct
its own search, the agency with a specific interest will be awarded
primacy. For example, the Immigration Service will often refrain
from searching vehicles which are to be subjected to a detailed
Customs check, safe in the knowledge that we shall be notified
if any clandestines are found. Random searches by one agency will
occasionally reveal cargo of interest to another. At an operational
level, officers are well aware of the range of colleagues' interests
and business is conducted in a spirit of mutual co-operation.
Are there plans for a joint border agencies' intelligence
unit for SE ports?
Yes. In fact at Dover, a Joint Intelligence
Cell (JIC) already exists and currently comprises officers of
Kent Police, Customs and the Benefits Agency. The Immigration
Service now has the staff resources to join and arrangements to
do so are in train.
How does the Border Agencies Working Group ensure
that closer co-operation is made effective on the ground?
Two-three visits each year are undertaken by
the BAWG to ports in order to examine the extent to which the
agencies are cooperating "on the ground". Glasgow airport
and Stranraer were visited on 3-4 July. In 1999 Dover and Portsmouth
were visited.
ICP NEWS—the Immigration, Customs and
Police border agencies newsletter is published three times per
year in order to advertise the benefits of closer working amongst
the border agencies. Staff of all three agencies are invited to
contribute articles for publication.
Periodical surveys are carried out to establish
to what extent co-operation on the ground is taking place eg training
exchanges, attachments, setting up joint intelligence cells etc.
Influencing local attitudes where relationships
are poor is just as important as spreading best practice nationally.
What is the present flow of passenger vehicle
traffic through controls at Portsmouth port? What is the full
capacity of these controls?
In the month of July 2000, immigration officers
at Portsmouth dealt with 52,049 arriving vehicles (includes cars,
coaches, camper vans and motorcycles) which represented about
50 per cent of potential capacity.
How frequent are tailbacks caused at Portsmouth
by checks being undertaken by the various control agencies?
Passenger vehicle traffic almost invariably
flows through the controls (UKIS, Customs, and, if present, Hampshire
Police Ports Unit) steadily at about walking pace (the vehicle
speed limit within the Port Restricted Zone area is 5 mph). Very
occasional exceptions would be short-term, targeted checking exercises
undertaken by Customs, and/or the Police Ports Unit which can
cause temporary tailbacks. If the volume of vehicles is high,
passengers who require more in depth examination by the Immigration
Service or who simply have to fill in a landing card, can generate
short delays. However staff are aware of the need to deal expeditiously
with all passengers and are under instruction to put to one side
vehicles containing passengers requiring further examination,
in order to minimise the interruption to the flow.
There is one other, geographical, cause of occasional
tailbacks; if the traffic lights at the exit from the Restricted
Zone immediately after the control area are at red, preventing
access to the public roads system, a tailback through the controls
can result.
Are the physical layout of control arrangements
at Portsmouth and the scheduling of ferry arrival and departure
times factors in the cause of tailbacks occurring on occasions,
impeding the off-loading procedures?
There are three "pinch" points each
day (0600-0800; 1200-1400 and 2015-2200) when four services are
scheduled to arrive, off-load and then load for departure from/to
variously Cherbourg, Caen and Le Havre. The physical layout of
the Port Restricted Zone area is such that passenger and freight
vehicles and coaches carrying foot passengers between the ferries
and the Passenger Terminal have to cross each other's routes from/to
three different linkspans. The part played by ferry company marshals
(P&O European and Brittany Ferries) is crucial in keeping
inevitable interruptions to arriving and departing vehicle flows
to a minimum.
Do any countries from which ferries depart on
sailings to the UK (eg France, Spain, the Netherlands, Germany,
the Scandinavian countries) require outward bound searches to
be carried out on vehicles?
We know of no continental feeder port which
requires the search of outbound vehicles except Coquelles where
Eurotunnel undertake security checks in accordance with their
obligations under Channel Tunnel regulations. However, random
searches, either by officials or private contractors are carried
out, with varying degrees of intensity, at a number of ports in
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain.
How many other countries operate carrier liability
legislation?
Although definitive figures are not available,
the following 50 countries are known to impose liability on carriers
who bring inadequately documented passengers into their jurisdiction:
Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium,
Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Italy, Korea, Liberia, Macau, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Oman, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, the United States of America,
Venezuela, the Yemen Republic.
Are airlines encouraged to assess or profile passengers
prior to departure and, if so, is this a formal or informal arrangement?
Under legislation carriers are only expected
to check that a passport or travel document presented by a passenger
is valid and acceptable for entry into the UK, that the passenger
is the rightful holder and that, where required, the passenger
holds a valid visa. Where a passenger presents a false passport,
the carrier is liable to a charge only if the falsity is reasonably
apparent—that is, if it is of a standard which a trained
representative of the carrying company, examining it carefully
but briefly and without the use of technological aids, could reasonably
be expected to detect. The same standard of reasonable apparence
also applies to impostors, ie those passengers unlawfully travelling
on another person's passport.
Airlines are not generally required to assess
passengers' reasons for travelling to the UK or predict their
intentions on arrival in the UK. However, in the case of visa
nationals seeking to benefit from the visa waiver concession,
carriers need to satisfy themselves (as far as possible) that
the passenger meets all of the requirements of that concession,
including having a genuine intention to transit as claimed. The
training offered to airlines by the UK immigration service stresses
the importance of brief but careful examination of travel documents
and also highlights the link between many inadequately documented
passengers (IDAs), and a variety of common factors including illogical
routings, lack of check-in baggage on long haul flights and late
arrival at check-in. Consideration of these factors, and their
own experience of passengers holding false documents or a document
not rightfully theirs, has led airline staff to a heightened awareness
of the type of passenger whose documents they might wish to examine
more closely.
Will profiling by carriers be a condition for
pre-clearance agreements?
Pre-clearance arrangements will enable the Immigration
Service to give or refuse leave to enter prior to a passenger
boarding a ship or aircraft for the United Kingdom. Such arrangements
require bi-lateral agreements between the United Kingdom and the
Government of the country where the pre-clearance operation is
located. These arrangements are separate from the responsibilities
that Carriers have to identify inadequately documented passengers.
What plans are there to review the Direct Airside
Transit Visa policy in relation to the exemptions to the DATV
requirement?
It is important to ensure that all visa requirements
continue to be workable and justifiable in relation to their costs
and consequences. These matters are kept under regular review.
Further to the information provided in annexes
A and B of appendix 37 of your initial memorandum, could you provide
details, by calendar year of
— The number of charges made upon
airline carriers under the provisions of the Immigration (Carriers
Liability) Act 1987 since their implementation;
— The total value of these charges;
— The number of charges which were
subsequently appealed against;
— The number of such appeals which
were upheld;
— The value of the charges in respect
of which appeals were upheld.
Since the inception of the Immigration (Carriers'
Liability) Act 1987, separate records of demands served only on
air carriers (as opposed to all carriers) have not been kept.
Table A attached indicates the total number
of charges demanded (by calendar year) of all carriers, their
value and the value of charge demands which were subsequently
waived. It also contains details of the approximate cumulative
number of charges demanded of air carriers only as at 31 December
1999, their value and the value of the demands subsequently waived.[11]
It should be noted that charge demands may be
waived at the port of arrival or at Immigration Service HQ. Moreover
because carriers can dispute charges either by formal written
representation or, more rarely, through discussion and negotiation,
it is not possible to detail accurately the total number of charges
"appealed" against. Table A sets out the value of all
demands waived in respect of all carriers annually from 1987.
It also contains the cumulative value of all demands waived in
respect of air carriers as at 31 December 1999.[12]
There are many reasons for waiving charge demands.
Charges may be waived at ports of arrival following representations
on the basis of new evidence received after demand notices have
been served. They may also, for example, be waived at Immigration
Service Headquarters as a result of secondary representations
or following the grant by IND of full refugee status to passengers
in respect of whom demands have been served.
The number and total value of all demands waived
at the port of arrival in the year 1999 (usually in response to
representations) was 785 demands with a total value of £1,570,000.[13]
Details of formal secondary representations
dealt with at Immigration Service HQ are as follows:
All Carriers
| |
Representations Received
| Representations Upheld
|
| | Number
| Value | Number
| Value |
| 1997 | 472
| £944,000 | 206
| £412,000 |
| 1998 | 267
| £534,000 | 95
| £190,000 |
| 1999 | 298
| £596,000 | 133
| £266,000 |
| 2000 (1st half) | 135
| £270,000 | 32
| £64,000 |
Air Carriers
| | Representations Received
| Representations Upheld
|
| | Number
| Value | Number
| Value |
| 1997 | 452
| £904,000 | 205
| £410,000 |
| 1998 | 263
| £526,000 | 92
| £184,000 |
| 1999 | 289
| £578,000 | 128
| £256,000 |
| 2000 (1st half) | 121
| £242,000 | 28
| £56,000 |
The Committee will wish to note that, regrettably, an error
occurred in the details given in Annex B to Appendix 37 to the
initial memorandum. The computerised presentation of demands waived
changed from 1 April 1999. As a result of a consequential clerical
error the wrong figure was quoted for the cumulative total of
charges waived as at 31 December 1998. This, in turn, led to wrong
figures being quoted for the amounts waived during 1998, 1999
and 1999-2000. Attached as Table B are the correct figures.
Could you provide details of the ISPD current complement figures?
On 1 July 2000 there were 2,567 staff in post in ISPD. This
figure is due to increase to 3,050 by 31 March 2001. Table C shows
actual numbers of staff in post from 1995.
Are there plans to give an element of transparency to the civil
penalty objection system?
The procedure for objecting to a penalty notice is laid down
in Section 32 of the Immigration and Asylum Act. It requires that
any person served with a penalty notice who wishes to object to
his liability under it must submit a notice in writing to that
effect. The Secretary of State is required to consider such an
allegation and determine whether or not any penalty to which it
relates is payable. In practice, notices of objection are considered
on behalf of the Secretary of State by the Inspector at the Civil
Penalty Central Administration Unit. Where the penalty is upheld,
the person who submitted the notice of objection receives a letter
fully explaining the reasons for the decision. If the penalty
then remains unpaid, payment may only be enforced via court proceedings
during which a responsible person would have the opportunity to
be heard by the court and to adduce evidence to show why the penalty
should not stand.
There are no plans to change the objection procedures.
At which ports are the provisions of the Immigration and Asylum
Act 1999 enabling imposition of the civil penalty now being enforced?
Since 3 July 2000, the civil penalty provisions applying
to vehicles have been enforced at all ports of entry.
Could you provide details as of 31 July, of
— The number of civil penalty notices issued;
— The number of penalties paid, and the amount received;
— The number of successful appeals against civil
penalty notices;
— The number of civil proceedings instigated
as a result of refusal to pay.
As at 31 July: 294 penalty notices had been served.
Fifteen penalties totalling £86,000.00 had been paid
in full and agreement reached for an additional four penalties
totalling £86,000.00 to be paid by instalment.
Notices of objection in nine cases had been successful.
Twenty-four cases had been referred by the Treasury Solicitor
to solicitor agents for enforcement action although court proceedings
had yet to be filed at court or served on the persons concerned
in any of these.
How have your plans to counter displacement activity resulting
from tighter controls involved the other border agencies?
The Immigration Service works closely with Police and Customs
on initiatives such as Coastwatch where members of the public
are encouraged to telephone a hot line provided by Customs if
they see suspicious activity that may be of interest to all the
control agencies.
Is the provision of AFIS progressing as stated in Appendix
31 of your memorandum?
Progress on the Immigration & Asylum Fingerprint (IAF)
Project continues on schedule and remains within budget. Phase
1A was implemented by the end of June and now includes an interim
matching solution pending the full matching service which will
be part of Phase 1B due for implementation in December.
How extensive is the Warnings Index network? Does it include
West Coast ports?
The Warnings Index (WI) computer system is installed at every
port where UK Immigration Officers are based. Terminals are also
installed for use by HM Customs in Lower Thames Street, London
EC3 and by NCIS in Spring Gardens, London SE11. Immigration Officers
take portable WI computers to those places where there is occasional
attendance. Portable WI computers are also used by Immigration
Officers in the Channel Islands. The WI system is not installed
at those ports on the West Coast of the UK which deal solely with
traffic from the Isle of Man and from Ireland. Some police officers
who operate controls at the West Coast ports, Immigration Officers
in the Irish Republic and staff operating the immigration control
in the Isle of Man are registered users of the WI system and may
make checks of the system by telephoning the Warnings Index Control
Unit.
To what extent is the Warnings Index used for Customs and Police
(including NCIS) purposes?
The WI is one of a number of operational tools available
to HM Customs and Excise. It is in regular use by HM Customs and
has a valuable role to play as part of their strategy in maintaining
a UK Customs Control. The WI is also an integral part of Police
National Strategy on border controls. It is regularly used by
Police Officers for the prevention and detection of serious crime;
to uphold national security and for the prevention of terrorism.
Its existence is an important factor in facilitating co-operation
between all the Border Control Agencies.
The Terrorism Act 2000 seeks to include Customs and Immigration
Officers as examining officers, what plans are there to allow
Police to act as examining officers under Immigration legislation?
There are no plans to extend the powers of Police Officers
beyond those already contained in the Immigration Act 1971 and
subsequent legislation.
Using existing powers, what objections would there be to Customs
officers operating the EEA arrivals controls? Subject to a power
to examine what objections would there be to Police operating
the EEA arrivals controls?
It is only immigration officers who have specific statutory
power to examine arriving EEA passengers in order to determine
whether they are entitled to exercise free movement rights and,
if so, whether they should be excluded from the United Kingdom
on public policy, public security or public health grounds. We
do not see how Customs or the police could become involved in
this process without significant re-training and on the part of
the police primary legislation would be required. This is not
practicable in the foreseeable future.
The primary threat to the integrity of frontier controls
by persons using the EEA channel at major ports is one of forgery,
whereby non-EEA nationals use EEA documentation in order to enter
the United Kingdom unlawfully. From 1 October 1999 to the end
of June this year 4,225 forgeries were detected at ports of which
61 per cent were EEA documents. In order to counter this threat
the Immigration Service has developed significant expertise in
forgery detection that is not shared by the other control agencies
whose primary objectives are very different.
Additionally, using a police or Customs officer on one element
of the primary immigration control would reduce the ability for
Immigration Service managers to redeploy resources rapidly to
counter competing pressures on the control. For example, at Waterloo
International Terminal the immigration officers deployed to deal
with EEA passengers are quickly re-deployed to deal with non-EEA
passengers once the EEA queue is reduced. This facilitates the
speedy passage of the majority of people who may be considered
to constitute a low risk to the immigration control.
Customs officers are deployed flexibly according to perceived
risk and there could be no guarantee that they would be available
for immigration control purposes at any given time.
In what circumstances would the Immigration Service seek to
operate embarkation controls?
The Immigration Service would co-operate with the Police
in reinstituting traditional embarkation controls in an emergency,
for example to identify a named terrorist. In a national emergency
there is also provision under section 3(7) of the Immigration
Act 1971.
SECTION THREE
Responses to questions emanating from the oral evidence session
with IND officials on 13 June 2000 or the visits to IS ports.
The national figure of illegal entrants detected in May 2000.
(Q3 of the oral evidence session refers)
2,180 people were identified and treated as offenders in
May 2000. This compares with 2,092 in April 2000 and 1,260 in
May 1999. (It should be noted that not all such offenders are
clandestine entrants.)
The final figures for funding for the current financial year.
(Q34 of the oral evidence session refers)
The ISPD allocation is £116 million.
Do we grant exceptional leave on the basis of difficulties
with documentation? (Q117 of the oral evidence session refers)
We do not have a policy of granting exceptional leave where
we cannot obtain a document.
Are asylum seekers in France allowed to work? (Q124 of the
oral evidence session refers)
As a general principle asylum seekers in France have not
been allowed access to the Labour market since 1991. There is
discretion to grant access to individual asylum seekers who possess
specific skills of which there is a shortage in the French labour
market. This discretion is very seldom exercised.
Enclosed Space Detection Devices (Query raised following the
Committee's visit to Status Park)
The National Forgery Section is actively considering and
evaluating any form of enclosed space detection device promoted
by manufacturers, including AVIAN (Advanced Vehicle Interrogation
and Notification). Evaluation of the suitability of AVIAN will
be taking place in the near future.
11
Whilst the cumulative and annual figures given now and previously
include all carriers and all amounts incurred, waived and paid,
the detailed balance reports for many earlier years listed only
carriers with outstanding debts. It was not possible, therefore,
to distinguish the amounts incurred and waived in respect of air
carriers only. The present computerised accounting system now
allows this to be done. Back
12
It should be borne in mind that charges waived in any calendar
year cannot be compared directly with charges demanded in that
same year. Charges waived in any one year will include charges
originally demanded in earlier years. Back
13
The computerised accounting system in use in previous years is
not capable of distinguishing between demands waived at ports
and elsewhere. Back
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