APPENDIX 28
Memorandum submitted by the Forest Peoples
Programme (FPP)
The Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) would like
to thank the International Development Committee for its invitation
to comment on the Government's new White Paper on globalisation.
FPP is an NGO that works to support forest peoples in their struggle
to control the use of their lands and to develop sustainable activities
that enhance their dignity and protect their forest environment.
A major part of FPP work involves collaborative research with
local communities to assess the effectiveness of the development
policies and programmes of multilateral development banks and
other donors. FPP draws on these local evaluations in its international
advocacy effort that aims to promote improved social and environmental
performance both in the operations of international financial
institutions (IFIs) and in the projects and programmes of bilateral
aid agencies like DFID.
Our response to the White Paper sets out what
we see as its positive aspects before making a critical assessment.
Our critical evaluation raises a number of questions about the
usefulness of some parts of the White Paper as a basis for promoting
more effective UK development assistance. We hope that some of
these queries will be put to the Secretary of State when the Committee
takes evidence for its inquiry on 30 January 2001.
Positive Points: (Numbers in brackets
refer to the numbered paragraphs in the White Paper)
(i) Several commitments made in the White
Paper underline the significant advances in the Government's thinking
on key development issues in recent years. These include the pledges
to:
continue UK support and advocacy
for debt relief (300, 301, 302);
untie UK overseas aid and encourage
other countries to untie their aid programmes to developing countries
(320, 323);
promote a cross-sectoral approach
to development and improved co-ordination between the policies
and programmes of different international development agencies
and donors (81, 278, 308, 310, 331, 335, 340, 354);
support political and legal reforms
in developing countries to establish stronger social policies
to safeguard the rights and interests of poor people (51,
56, 57, 59, 96); and
assist developing countries in their
fight against corruption (64, 315).
(ii) The Forest Peoples Programme welcomes
a number of other positive elements and analyses in the White
Paper. These include:
the Government's affirmation of its
rights-based approach to development which is geared towards empowering
poor people to "realise their human rights" (70,
71, 76 and pledges page 33);
the recognition that effective poverty
reduction requires the institution of secure property and land
rights for poor people (53, 54, 91, 92, 260);
the acknowledgement that there is
a need to empower poor people by increasing their participation
in international policy-making processes and development programmes
as well as the development decisions taken by their own governments
(50, 51, 58, 59, 70, 71, 360, 361, 362);
the Government's advocacy for reforming
the international development system to make it more accountable
to civil society (338, 343);
the commitment to promote more effective
independent evaluation of development effectivenessincluding
monitoring and evaluation of development operations by NGOs and
civil society organisations (171, 318, 319);
and
the recognition that trade liberalisation
can have significant negative effects for the poorest people in
society (217).
Critical assessment and queries
(iii) Notwithstanding these progressive
elements, our overall impression of the White Paper is that it
is strong analytically in identifying the obstacles to effective
poverty reduction, but either weak or vague regarding concrete
strategies for improving development effectiveness. In summary,
we feel that the White Paper lacks clear explanations about how
globalisation must be properly regulated or "well managed"
(10, 19, 39, 90) to benefit poor and
disadvantaged groups in developing countries. Our critical assessment
in the remaining paragraphs will make observations and queries
relating to different parts of the White Paper and will also request
clarifications on government thinking on key development topics
linked to globalisation.
"The Challenge of Globalisation" (pp12-22)
(iv) The White Paper asserts that "everywhere
it is clear that openness is a necessarythough not sufficientcondition
for national prosperity"and cites East Asian countries
and China as examples of the positive impacts of economic globalisation
(31). Outside East Asia, there is much evidence to show
that openness has exacerbated poverty in individual countries
and has also widened the poverty gap globally.[24]
In contrast, there is no clear proof that the capital account
liberalisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) has lead to
economic growth and poverty reduction.[25]
Despite the lack of consensus among economists regarding the pros
and cons of globalisation, the White Paper firmly promotes the
"gradual" liberalisation of capital accounts and FDI
as necessary preconditions for effective poverty reduction (38,
154).
can the Secretary of State cite other
specific examples where openness has been beneficial to poor people
in developing countries? (Please note that this question does
not ask for examples which show that openness has been linked
to economic growth as given in Figure 5.1 as the White Paper acknowledges
that there is no systematic relation between growth and inequality
(32); and
are there any developing countries
where sequenced capital account liberalisation has already been
proven to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development?
(v) The White Paper rightly stresses that
globalisation will only benefit the poor if developing country
governments have the political will to establish adequate regulatory
and redistributional structures to ensure equitable development
(26, 41, 44, 56, 70). However,
many governments still lack this necessary commitment.
besides the long-term commitment
to support democratic processes, the media and education so that
poor people can push for social reform (36, 71),
what strategies will DFID adopt where recipient governments are
reluctant to put in place progressive social and environmental
policies and legislation consistent with agreed international
standards?
does DFID have a formal way of comparing
the national policy and domestic legislation of recipient countries
with DFID's policies?
what would be DFID's aid strategy
in those cases where the policies of a recipient country are found
to seriously contradict DFID's policies or contravene key international
standards on human rights and sustainable development?
how will DFID help ensure that developed
and developing countries have "more joined-up and coherent
policies" (42)?
(vi) The observation that remote isolated
groups of the world's poor are often untouched by globalisation
is potentially misleading (36). There is much evidence
to show that remote rural and forest-dwelling peoples often suffer
the worse negative environmental and social impacts of intensified
natural resource exploitation resulting from increasing openness
to international capital.[26]
"Promoting Effective Governments and Efficient
Markets" (pp 23-33)
(vii) Secure land and property rights are
rightly seen as an essential component of markets that "work
for the poor" (91, 92), yet there is little
information about the concrete mechanisms DFID will use to support
poor people in their struggle for secure property rights.
Can the Secretary of State guarantee
that there will be provisions in the forthcoming Development Bill
that will act on the Government's recognition that secure property
rights are an essential precondition for poverty reduction and
the empowerment of poor people?
Does the Secretary of State envisage
any DFID-funded programmes to support land reform, land regularisation
and resource security initiatives with impoverished, disadvantaged
and marginalised groups in developing countries?
How will DFID's development assistance
foster land redistribution and overcome the reluctance of some
countries to implement positive reforms in the regularisation
of rights to land and natural resources?
Many marginalised social groups have
common property regimes regulated by customary law that are not
recognised by developing country governments: what steps does
DFID propose to secure these common properties from fragmentation
by predatory land markets?
(viii) "Good social policies"
are promoted in the White Paper as key to managing globalisation
in order to safeguard the interests of people "who may lose
from rapid economic change" (95, 96). However,
there is limited information about what the Government understands
by "good" social policies nor how such policies will
be promoted by the UK:
How does DFID assess the quality
of social policies operating in a particular country? Does DFID
operate anything similar to the World Bank's "Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment" procedures?
Can the Secretary of State give examples
of "good" social policies in a developing country and
how these policies have prevented the adverse impacts of globalisation
on the poor?
How will DFID "encourage"
(76) developing country partners to establish social and
development policies that are consistent with existing and emerging
international human rights and environmental law?
(ix) In applying its rights-based approach
to development, DFID priorities for action will involve working
on human rights issues with governments that are "committed
to the realisation of poor people's rights" (see 5.14, Realising
Human Rights for Poor People, DFID, October 2000). Again,
this raises questions about the appropriate way to work with governments
that lack commitment towards human rights:
How will DFID implement its right-based
policy in countries where governments are disinclined to integrate
international human rights standards into domestic legislation
and national development policy and practice?
What safeguard mechanisms does DFID
envisage in such countries to protect the rights of poor people
and vulnerable social groups in DFID-assisted development operations?
Will the proposed Development Bill
include provisions to integrate DFID's innovative proposals to
support participatory rights assessments across all UK development
assistance operations?[27]
What is DFID's position regarding
the protection of the rights of particularly disadvantaged groups
like indigenous peoples who suffer extreme poverty and often lack
secure property rights?[28]
Does DFID accept that such groups merit targeted and specific
social policies like those operated by the World Bank, some Regional
Development Banks and a number of bilateral governmental aid agencies
(eg, DANIDA)?
Will the UK Government develop operational
guidance for UK development assistance affecting indigenous peoples
as recommended by EU Resolution 13461/98?[29]
"Investing In People, Sharing Skills and
Knowledge" (pp 42-47)
(x) FPP welcomes the Government's pledge
to support the development of fair and equitable international
intellectual property regimes that protect traditional knowledge
and genetic resources and ensure adequate benefit sharing (147).
The intention to establish a Commission (149 and Box 6)
to look at these issues is also potentially positive, provided
it takes account of the views and concerns of those groups holding
traditional knowledge:
How will the composition and working
of the Commission guarantee the equitable participation of major
stakeholders including indigenous peoples and peasant farmers?
Will the Commission consider the
issue of collective rights over indigenous knowledge?
"Harnessing Private Finance" (pp 48-64)
(xi) The White Paper observes that the IMF
should improve its efforts to assess the impacts of its programmes
on the lives of poor people (169, 171). However,
the IMF argues that the World Bank is responsible for evaluating
the potential adverse social and environmental impacts of macroeconomic
and adjustment operations, while the World Bank admits that it
still lacks effective sectoral impact assessment tools[30].
There still appears to be limited co-operation between the World
Bank and IMF on these critical issues.
How will the UK seek to build capacity
in both institutions to carry out effective sustainability assessments
of their technical advice to governments in developing countries
and their corresponding macroeconomic programmes?
How will the Government's proposed
"road maps" build in an analysis of the impacts of increased
economic openness on the poor?
How will these analyses relate to
the proposed "sustainability impact assessments" for
changes in trade policy proposed in section 5 of the White Paper
(256)?
Will the forthcoming Development
Bill contain provisions requiring the participation of all affected
stakeholders in such sustainability assessments?
(xii) Much emphasis is placed in the White
Paper on the need to promote social responsibility in the private
sector through voluntary codes of conduct for Transnational Corporations
(TNCs) and other private sector actors operating inor doing
business withdeveloping countries (201 and pledges
page 64; see also 270). Ethical business principles for
Export Credit Guarantee Agencies are also seen as the way forward
in the transition to sustainable development. This best practice
approach is promoted despite the fact that there is strong evidence
that self-regulation is not sufficient to ensure that private
sector investments respect human rights and the environment (something
that is in fact conceded elsewhere in the White Paper (272)).[31]
Much of these codes lack binding language and contain multiple
derogations that allow the private sector to avoid social responsibility.[32]
(xiii) In FPP's view, one key mechanism
for improving the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines would
be the creation of strategic partnerships with local beneficiaries
and NGOs for the participatory evaluation of codes of conduct,
third-party certification (like that operated by the Forest Stewardship
Council) and ethical investment schemes. Such local monitoring
and evaluation could help companies to verify if their operational
codes effectively address the concerns of poor people. It would
also help companies evaluate the extent to which their operations
adhere to international social and environmental standards.
Is DFID prepared support novel partnerships
with local people and NGOs to monitor the effectiveness of corporate
codes of conduct on the ground?
(xv) Even if compliance with voluntary codes
of conduct can be improved, it is clear that better social and
environmental performance in the private sector still needs to
be reinforced by national laws and effective institutions to regulate
commercial activities.
Given that such adequate legal frameworks
and regulatory mechanisms can only reasonably be expected to develop
over the long-term, what interim binding mechanisms does
DFID propose to safeguard the interests of citizens affected by
private sector operations in developing countries?
Capturing the Gains from Trade (pp 65-76).
(xvi) The White Paper makes a number of
progressive points in relation to international trade. These include
recognition that developing countries need to be more involved
in international trade negotiations (227, 233, 236,
237, 239, 240) and the support for reforming
the WTO to ensure a fully transparent and fair international trading
system (226, 227, 228, 239, 239). However, the White
Paper fails to acknowledge that the majority of developing countries
do not support a new trade Round until the imbalances of the Uruguay
Round have been addressed and reform has taken place. African
countries in particular have repeatedly stated that they do not
want to be pressured into a new trade Round.[33]
It is therefore counterproductive for DFID to argue for a new
trade Round until these issues have been properly addressed.
How can DFID justify its support
for a new trade Round while so many developing countries oppose
it until WTO reforms can ensure it becomes a fair and transparent
trading system?
Does the UK Government agree that
trade agreements (bilateral, regional and multilateral) should
be preceded by an independent sustainability impact assessment,
with the full participation of civil society?
Does the Secretary of State agree
that the outcome of sustainability impact assessments should provide
a primary basis for trade negotiations?
Tackling Global Environmental Problems (pp 77-83)
(xvii) The White Paper rightly advocates
the need to better integrate environmental concerns into World
Bank operations and Poverty Reduction Strategies (265,
278). However, the World Bank's draft Environment Strategy
falls seriously short of a comprehensive programme for improving
the mainstreaming of environmental issues.[34]
For example, the strategy lacks any analysis of the institutional
constraints within the Bank that impede the mainstreaming
of environmental concerns into its operations. Nor does it deal
adequately with the need for improved co-ordination between different
World Bank institutions and departments.[35]
(xviii) The UK Government judges that the
Global Environment Facility (GEF) has proved to be an effective
instrument for tackling global environmental challenges (279).
The Government pledges to press for a 50 per cent increase in
GEF funding from 2002 until 2006. However, the White Paper fails
to review how effective the GEF has been in fostering poverty
reduction and implementing international environmental agreements.
Such an assessment seems essential before a huge increase in funding
can be justified.
(ixx) For example, the Paper the fails to
revisit past debates about whether the GEF is facilitating the
mainstreaming of environmental issues in development or is in
fact impeding it notably by applying its incremental cost criterion.[36]
There is disturbing evidence to show that GEF projects continue
to disregard the rights of local people and continue to leave
affected communities worse off after conservation and development
investments.[37]
The continuing negative impacts of GEF projects are to some extent
rooted in wider systemic social policy compliance failures and
institutional tensions within the World Bank Group.[38]
Moreover, GEF projects that are not administered by the World
Bank are subject to no clear social policies or guidelines.
What is the UK Government view on
the best way to achieve improved social and environmental performance
in the World Bank Group?
How will DFID support the World Bank
in its current efforts to improve compliance with its social and
environmental safeguards across it whole portfolio?
Will DFID undertake an independent
review of the effectiveness of the GEF in implementing pro-poor
policies and projects that respect human rights prior to lobbying
for an increased GEF budget?
How will the Government's proposal
for more GEF resources result in a positive impact on those communities
who depend on globally important habitats and diversity for their
livelihoods, health and well-being?
(xx) A major strength of the White Paper
is its emphasis on the need for "effective regulatory mechanisms"
for development in "environmentally sensitive sectors such
as agriculture, minerals, forestry, fisheries and tourism"
(267). However, once again, this raises the question of
appropriate development assistance strategies for those countries
where these regulatory mechanisms are not yet in place:
Will the UK Government's government
"road maps" to economic openness advise against intensifying
natural resource-based export-led development in countries without
adequate regulatory capacity to enforce appropriate social and
environmental standards?
Using Development Assistance More Effectively
(pp 84-98)
(xxi) The commitment to increase the UK
development assistance budget to 0.33 per cent of GDP by 2003-04
in an effort to approach the 0.7 per cent UN target (286)
is potentially positive. However, a bigger budget will only have
a positive impact on poverty if it is disbursed with effective
benefit sharing mechanisms to ensure that development assistance
reaches the poor.
How will the UK Government ensure
that larger aid budgets will reach the poor they intend to help?
What provisions in the forthcoming
Development Bill are designed to ensure that an increased UK development
assistance budget brings about more efficient poverty reduction?
Does DFID plan to forge partnerships
with the local people and NGOs to monitor the effectiveness of
its aid operations in order to help identify obstacles to efficient
and equitable benefit sharing, the effective realisation of human
rights and improved environmental performance?
(xxii) It is disconcerting that instead
of proposing novel benefit sharing initiatives, the White Paper
pledges to channel more aid through state agencies in recipient
countries where they have "a strong commitment to poverty
reduction and good policies in place" (292, 314,
315; see also pledges page 98). Poor and marginalised peoples
have long argued that conventional development aid fails to bring
about positive impacts for local people because it is channelled
through governments or large city-based agencies or external NGOs
who soak up funds for administration or embezzle them through
corruption. The first query here is similar therefore to that
raised in (vii) above:
On what criteria will DFID judge
that a government is eligible for more direct UK development assistance?
How is a government's "commitment" to poverty reduction
to be assessed?
Will the Development Bill accommodate
support for innovative funding strategies that channel support
direct to poor people and their community institutions?
Will DFID efforts to enable local
procurement (324) facilitate contracts with local beneficiaries
themselves (rather than outside (albeit "local") contractors).
How will such efforts ensure that DFID adopts pro-poor
procurement guidelines?
(xxiii) Much more positive is the assertion
that there is a need for greater transparency in the operation
of all development programmes (318) and that this can be
furthered by implementation reviews carried by developing countries
and civil society. Here too the White Paper lacks details about
how this goal is to be achieved. There are some potential models
that could be drawn on to improve transparency and accountability
of development agency operation eg, cross-sectoral executive committees
to oversee development projects or programmes. Such committees
feature an equitable composition of civil society, beneficiary,
government, donor and private sector members with equal executive
power.
Does the Government have proposals
for new and effective mechanisms for improving the transparency
and accountability of development programmes?
How will the commitment to push for
independent evaluations of development effectiveness (319)
be incorporated into the forthcoming Development Bill?
Will the proposed Bill facilitate
UK Government financial and technical support for local participatory
monitoring and evaluation across all DFID development operations?
(xxiv) The White Paper pledges to support
the "full participation" of civil society in the implementation
and monitoring of Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs) (311):
How will DFID evaluate the level
of civil society participation in PRSPs formulation?
What are the benchmarks or minimum
standards for multistakeholder participation in PRSP processes?
How will DFID support bottom-up monitoring
and reporting initiatives involving grassroots communities to
assess the sustainability of PRSPs?
(xxv) The need to "encourage"
the World Bank and IMF to reform their "own structures and
methods" so they facilitate the PRSP process is highlighted
in the White Paper (311):
What specific structural and procedural
World Bank and IMF reforms does DFID view as essential for the
successful implementation of PRSPs? How can the UK Government
promote these necessary reforms?
As a major shareholder, will the
UK Government encourage the World Bank to adopt a rights-based
approach to development?
How will the Government ensure that
social and environmental safeguard policies are extended effectively
to the Bank's adjustment and programmatic lending?
Strengthening the International System (pp 99-105)
(xxvi) In the final section of the White
Paper the Government pledges to "work with others to build
a stronger, more open and accountable international system, in
which poor people and countries have a more effective voice"
(338). The question raised in (xxiii above) can be rephrased:
Can the Secretary of Sate suggest
any novel and progressive accountability mechanisms that the international
system could adopt to improve transparency?
Will the Government's proposed Development
Bill promote the development and adoption of such mechanisms so
that citizens and project beneficiaries can hold the World Bank
and other international development agencies accountable for their
operations?
(xxvii) It is paradoxical that whilst the
Government identifies the need for a stronger international system,
there is evidence that a major international development institution
like the World Bank is seeking to make their social and environmental
operational policies less mandatory and more adaptable to country
circumstances in accordance with the principles of Comprehensive
Development Framework.[39]
There is growing evidence that the current "conversion"
of the Bank's operational policies is making policies so flexible
and amenable to "country ownership" that staff or borrowers
can never be accused of having contravened them and therefore
never held to account for problems and failures in implementation.[40]
In short, strong policies consistent with international standards
are being eroded in the name of flexibility, practicality and
cost-effectiveness.
Does the Secretary of State acknowledge
that there is tension generated by the CDF focus on decentralisation
and accommodation of country priorities on the one hand, and the
international system's obligation to apply common sustainable
development standards across all its operations on the other?
As a key stakeholder in the World
Bank, can the Secretary of State guarantee that the UK Government
will make every effort to ensure that Bank's safeguards policies
are not weakened under its current policy conversion programme,
particularly the Involuntary Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples,
Forests and Information Disclosure policies that are still undergoing
revision?
In accordance with its rights-based
approach, will the UK Government also push the international system
to adopt binding operational policies that are consistent with
international human rights and environmental law?
(xxviii) One key strategy for improving
the accountability of the international system would be the establishment
of civil society monitoring and reporting on the quality of compliance
with agreed international standards for sustainable development
(Agenda 21, UNCED, CBD, RAMSAR, Forest Principles etc.).
Will the forthcoming Development
Bill enable such participatory monitoring of the international
system in line with the general pledge that the UK will push for
independent evaluation of development effectiveness (see 171,
318, 319)?
(ixxx) The White Paper pledges to strengthen
the capacity of global civil society to demand the changes necessary
to the international system to deliver effective poverty reduction
(360). Again, there is a lack of concrete proposals for
how this is to be achieved. One positive step would be to improve
the participation of civil society in the policy and programme
debates on sustainable development within the UN family. At present,
accreditation rules make it difficult for many civil society groups
to participate in UN dialogues.
Will the UK Government press for
more agile and participatory accreditation rules in the UN to
enable better civil society participation?
Thomas F W Griffiths
Forest Peoples Programme
January 2001
24 eg, Stichele, M V (1998) Gender, Trade and the
WTO Centre for Employment Research, Manchester; Hale A (Ed)(1999)
Trade Myths and Gender Reality Global Publications Foundation,
ICDA, Uppsala and Brussels; Texas Center for Policy Studies (2000)
Assessment of the Environmental Effects of NAFTA on the Forest
Sector in Mexico Texas Center for Policy Studies, paper presented
to North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between
Trade and the Environment; Selected reading: article on globalization
and inequality see www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/abstracts/milanov.htm Back
25
Rodrick D (1998) "Who needs Capital-Account Convertibility?"
pp.55-65 in Should the IMF pursue capital account convertibility?
Essays in International Finance, No.207, International Finance
Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. Back
26
See, for example, Reed, D (Ed)(1996) Structural Adjustment,
the environment and sustainable development Earthscan Publications,
London; Colchester, M (1997) Fragile Frontier-loggers, miners
and forest peoples. Latin America Bureau and World Rainforest
Movement, London; Kaimowitz D et al (1998) "Considering
the Impact of structural adjustment policies on forests in Bolivia,
Cameroon and Indonesia" Unasylva 49(1998); Rice,
T, Ozinga S, Marijnissen C and Gregory M (2000) Trade
Liberalisation and its impacts on Forests Fern, Moreton-in-Marsh,
November 2000. Back
27
See 6.6, Realising Human Rights for Poor People, DFID,
October 2000. Back
28
See, for example, Psacharopoulos, G and Patrinos H (Eds)(1994)
Indigenous people and poverty in Latin America: an empirical
analysis World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, The World
Bank, Washington, DC; Dixon, J et al (Eds)(1995), Social
Welfare with Indigenous Peoples Routledge, London; See especially
section B.6 in DFID (1998) Country Strategy Paper: Brazil
DFID, London, December 1998 and Section B.2 in DFID
(1999) Country Strategy Paper: Peru DFID, London, December
1998. Back
29
Resolution 13461/98 Indigenous peoples within the framework
of the development cooperation of the community of member states
30 November 1998, 2141th Council Meeting, Brussels. Back
30
See paragraph 4.3, page 17 in OED (2000) Phase I Interim
Report: promoting environmental sustainability in development-an
evaluation of World Bank performance World Bank, Washington,
DC September 2000. Back
31
See WRM (1998) High Stakes: the need to control transnational
logging companies-a Malaysian case study World Rainforest
Movement and Forests Monitor, August 1998; see also FPP (2000)
Undermining the Forests: the need to control transnational
mining companies: a Canadian case study-Forest Peoples Programme,
Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links and World Rainforest Movement,
January 2000. Back
32
See, for example, Corner House (2000) Comments on ECGD Business
Principles Sturminster Newton, November 2000. Back
33
For example, in a recent meeting in Libreville, Gabon, November
13-15, 2000. For details, see Tandon Y (2000) "Seattle Repeated
at Libreville" pp.2-6 in Third World Economics
Issue No.247, 16-31 December 2. Back
34
World Bank (2000) Toward an Environment Strategy for the World
Bank Group: a progress report and discussion draft World Bank,
April 2000, Washington, DC. Back
35
Forest Peoples Programmes comments on the Draft World Bank Environment
Strategy, 20 December 2000. Back
36
See p.50-51: Colchester, M (1995) Salvaging Nature: indigenous
peoples, protected areas and biodiversity conservation UNRISD
Gland. Back
37
See, for example, Inspection Panel (1998) Report and Recommendation
on Request for Inspection: India Ecodevelopment Project-Rajiv
Ghandi (Nagarahole) National Park IDA and IBRD, Washington
D.C.; Ramu P K, Raju JP, Channappa D, CORD and DEED (2000) Brutal
atrocities unleashed at tribals during dislocation process at
Nagarhole National Park by Forest Department Press Release,
July 31 2000; Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) Indigenous
Peoples, Forests and the World Bank-a workshop report Forest
Peoples Programme, briefing papers-www.forestpeoples.org. Back
38
Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) op. cit. Back
39
See Box 13 in Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) op.
cit. Back
40
See p 3: Bank Information Center (1999) The World Bank's Policy
Framework: the "safeguard" policies, compliance and
Independent Inspection Panel Toolkit for Activists Issue 3,
BIC, Washington, DC; CIEL (2000)Resettlement: the World Bank's
assault on the poor CIEL Brief, May 2000. Back
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