Select Committee on International Development Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 28

Memorandum submitted by the Forest Peoples Programme (FPP)

  The Forest Peoples Programme (FPP) would like to thank the International Development Committee for its invitation to comment on the Government's new White Paper on globalisation. FPP is an NGO that works to support forest peoples in their struggle to control the use of their lands and to develop sustainable activities that enhance their dignity and protect their forest environment. A major part of FPP work involves collaborative research with local communities to assess the effectiveness of the development policies and programmes of multilateral development banks and other donors. FPP draws on these local evaluations in its international advocacy effort that aims to promote improved social and environmental performance both in the operations of international financial institutions (IFIs) and in the projects and programmes of bilateral aid agencies like DFID.

  Our response to the White Paper sets out what we see as its positive aspects before making a critical assessment. Our critical evaluation raises a number of questions about the usefulness of some parts of the White Paper as a basis for promoting more effective UK development assistance. We hope that some of these queries will be put to the Secretary of State when the Committee takes evidence for its inquiry on 30 January 2001.

  Positive Points: (Numbers in brackets refer to the numbered paragraphs in the White Paper)

  (i)  Several commitments made in the White Paper underline the significant advances in the Government's thinking on key development issues in recent years. These include the pledges to:

    —  continue UK support and advocacy for debt relief (300, 301, 302);

    —  untie UK overseas aid and encourage other countries to untie their aid programmes to developing countries (320, 323);

    —  promote a cross-sectoral approach to development and improved co-ordination between the policies and programmes of different international development agencies and donors (81, 278, 308, 310, 331, 335, 340, 354);

    —  support political and legal reforms in developing countries to establish stronger social policies to safeguard the rights and interests of poor people (51, 56, 57, 59, 96); and

    —  assist developing countries in their fight against corruption (64, 315).

  (ii)  The Forest Peoples Programme welcomes a number of other positive elements and analyses in the White Paper. These include:

    —  the Government's affirmation of its rights-based approach to development which is geared towards empowering poor people to "realise their human rights" (70, 71, 76 and pledges page 33);

    —  the recognition that effective poverty reduction requires the institution of secure property and land rights for poor people (53, 54, 91, 92, 260);

    —  the acknowledgement that there is a need to empower poor people by increasing their participation in international policy-making processes and development programmes as well as the development decisions taken by their own governments (50, 51, 58, 59, 70, 71, 360, 361, 362);

    —  the Government's advocacy for reforming the international development system to make it more accountable to civil society (338, 343);

    —  the commitment to promote more effective independent evaluation of development effectiveness—including monitoring and evaluation of development operations by NGOs and civil society organisations (171, 318, 319); and

    —  the recognition that trade liberalisation can have significant negative effects for the poorest people in society (217).

Critical assessment and queries

  (iii)  Notwithstanding these progressive elements, our overall impression of the White Paper is that it is strong analytically in identifying the obstacles to effective poverty reduction, but either weak or vague regarding concrete strategies for improving development effectiveness. In summary, we feel that the White Paper lacks clear explanations about how globalisation must be properly regulated or "well managed" (10, 19, 39, 90) to benefit poor and disadvantaged groups in developing countries. Our critical assessment in the remaining paragraphs will make observations and queries relating to different parts of the White Paper and will also request clarifications on government thinking on key development topics linked to globalisation.

"The Challenge of Globalisation" (pp12-22)

  (iv)  The White Paper asserts that "everywhere it is clear that openness is a necessary—though not sufficient—condition for national prosperity"—and cites East Asian countries and China as examples of the positive impacts of economic globalisation (31). Outside East Asia, there is much evidence to show that openness has exacerbated poverty in individual countries and has also widened the poverty gap globally.[24] In contrast, there is no clear proof that the capital account liberalisation and foreign direct investment (FDI) has lead to economic growth and poverty reduction.[25] Despite the lack of consensus among economists regarding the pros and cons of globalisation, the White Paper firmly promotes the "gradual" liberalisation of capital accounts and FDI as necessary preconditions for effective poverty reduction (38, 154).

    —  can the Secretary of State cite other specific examples where openness has been beneficial to poor people in developing countries? (Please note that this question does not ask for examples which show that openness has been linked to economic growth as given in Figure 5.1 as the White Paper acknowledges that there is no systematic relation between growth and inequality (32); and

    —  are there any developing countries where sequenced capital account liberalisation has already been proven to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development?

  (v)  The White Paper rightly stresses that globalisation will only benefit the poor if developing country governments have the political will to establish adequate regulatory and redistributional structures to ensure equitable development (26, 41, 44, 56, 70). However, many governments still lack this necessary commitment.

    —  besides the long-term commitment to support democratic processes, the media and education so that poor people can push for social reform (36, 71), what strategies will DFID adopt where recipient governments are reluctant to put in place progressive social and environmental policies and legislation consistent with agreed international standards?

    —  does DFID have a formal way of comparing the national policy and domestic legislation of recipient countries with DFID's policies?

    —  what would be DFID's aid strategy in those cases where the policies of a recipient country are found to seriously contradict DFID's policies or contravene key international standards on human rights and sustainable development?

    —  how will DFID help ensure that developed and developing countries have "more joined-up and coherent policies" (42)?

  (vi)  The observation that remote isolated groups of the world's poor are often untouched by globalisation is potentially misleading (36). There is much evidence to show that remote rural and forest-dwelling peoples often suffer the worse negative environmental and social impacts of intensified natural resource exploitation resulting from increasing openness to international capital.[26]

"Promoting Effective Governments and Efficient Markets" (pp 23-33)

  (vii)  Secure land and property rights are rightly seen as an essential component of markets that "work for the poor" (91, 92), yet there is little information about the concrete mechanisms DFID will use to support poor people in their struggle for secure property rights.

    —  Can the Secretary of State guarantee that there will be provisions in the forthcoming Development Bill that will act on the Government's recognition that secure property rights are an essential precondition for poverty reduction and the empowerment of poor people?

    —  Does the Secretary of State envisage any DFID-funded programmes to support land reform, land regularisation and resource security initiatives with impoverished, disadvantaged and marginalised groups in developing countries?

    —  How will DFID's development assistance foster land redistribution and overcome the reluctance of some countries to implement positive reforms in the regularisation of rights to land and natural resources?

    —  Many marginalised social groups have common property regimes regulated by customary law that are not recognised by developing country governments: what steps does DFID propose to secure these common properties from fragmentation by predatory land markets?

  (viii)  "Good social policies" are promoted in the White Paper as key to managing globalisation in order to safeguard the interests of people "who may lose from rapid economic change" (95, 96). However, there is limited information about what the Government understands by "good" social policies nor how such policies will be promoted by the UK:

    —  How does DFID assess the quality of social policies operating in a particular country? Does DFID operate anything similar to the World Bank's "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment" procedures?

    —  Can the Secretary of State give examples of "good" social policies in a developing country and how these policies have prevented the adverse impacts of globalisation on the poor?

    —  How will DFID "encourage" (76) developing country partners to establish social and development policies that are consistent with existing and emerging international human rights and environmental law?

  (ix)  In applying its rights-based approach to development, DFID priorities for action will involve working on human rights issues with governments that are "committed to the realisation of poor people's rights" (see 5.14, Realising Human Rights for Poor People, DFID, October 2000). Again, this raises questions about the appropriate way to work with governments that lack commitment towards human rights:

    —  How will DFID implement its right-based policy in countries where governments are disinclined to integrate international human rights standards into domestic legislation and national development policy and practice?

    —  What safeguard mechanisms does DFID envisage in such countries to protect the rights of poor people and vulnerable social groups in DFID-assisted development operations?

    —  Will the proposed Development Bill include provisions to integrate DFID's innovative proposals to support participatory rights assessments across all UK development assistance operations?[27]

    —  What is DFID's position regarding the protection of the rights of particularly disadvantaged groups like indigenous peoples who suffer extreme poverty and often lack secure property rights?[28] Does DFID accept that such groups merit targeted and specific social policies like those operated by the World Bank, some Regional Development Banks and a number of bilateral governmental aid agencies (eg, DANIDA)?

    —  Will the UK Government develop operational guidance for UK development assistance affecting indigenous peoples as recommended by EU Resolution 13461/98?[29]

"Investing In People, Sharing Skills and Knowledge" (pp 42-47)

  (x)  FPP welcomes the Government's pledge to support the development of fair and equitable international intellectual property regimes that protect traditional knowledge and genetic resources and ensure adequate benefit sharing (147). The intention to establish a Commission (149 and Box 6) to look at these issues is also potentially positive, provided it takes account of the views and concerns of those groups holding traditional knowledge:

    —  How will the composition and working of the Commission guarantee the equitable participation of major stakeholders including indigenous peoples and peasant farmers?

    —  Will the Commission consider the issue of collective rights over indigenous knowledge?

"Harnessing Private Finance" (pp 48-64)

  (xi)  The White Paper observes that the IMF should improve its efforts to assess the impacts of its programmes on the lives of poor people (169, 171). However, the IMF argues that the World Bank is responsible for evaluating the potential adverse social and environmental impacts of macroeconomic and adjustment operations, while the World Bank admits that it still lacks effective sectoral impact assessment tools[30]. There still appears to be limited co-operation between the World Bank and IMF on these critical issues.

    —  How will the UK seek to build capacity in both institutions to carry out effective sustainability assessments of their technical advice to governments in developing countries and their corresponding macroeconomic programmes?

    —  How will the Government's proposed "road maps" build in an analysis of the impacts of increased economic openness on the poor?

    —  How will these analyses relate to the proposed "sustainability impact assessments" for changes in trade policy proposed in section 5 of the White Paper (256)?

    —  Will the forthcoming Development Bill contain provisions requiring the participation of all affected stakeholders in such sustainability assessments?

  (xii)  Much emphasis is placed in the White Paper on the need to promote social responsibility in the private sector through voluntary codes of conduct for Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and other private sector actors operating in—or doing business with—developing countries (201 and pledges page 64; see also 270). Ethical business principles for Export Credit Guarantee Agencies are also seen as the way forward in the transition to sustainable development. This best practice approach is promoted despite the fact that there is strong evidence that self-regulation is not sufficient to ensure that private sector investments respect human rights and the environment (something that is in fact conceded elsewhere in the White Paper (272)).[31] Much of these codes lack binding language and contain multiple derogations that allow the private sector to avoid social responsibility.[32]

  (xiii)  In FPP's view, one key mechanism for improving the effectiveness of voluntary guidelines would be the creation of strategic partnerships with local beneficiaries and NGOs for the participatory evaluation of codes of conduct, third-party certification (like that operated by the Forest Stewardship Council) and ethical investment schemes. Such local monitoring and evaluation could help companies to verify if their operational codes effectively address the concerns of poor people. It would also help companies evaluate the extent to which their operations adhere to international social and environmental standards.

    —  Is DFID prepared support novel partnerships with local people and NGOs to monitor the effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct on the ground?

  (xv)  Even if compliance with voluntary codes of conduct can be improved, it is clear that better social and environmental performance in the private sector still needs to be reinforced by national laws and effective institutions to regulate commercial activities.

    —  Given that such adequate legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms can only reasonably be expected to develop over the long-term, what interim binding mechanisms does DFID propose to safeguard the interests of citizens affected by private sector operations in developing countries?

Capturing the Gains from Trade (pp 65-76).

  (xvi)  The White Paper makes a number of progressive points in relation to international trade. These include recognition that developing countries need to be more involved in international trade negotiations (227, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240) and the support for reforming the WTO to ensure a fully transparent and fair international trading system (226, 227, 228, 239, 239). However, the White Paper fails to acknowledge that the majority of developing countries do not support a new trade Round until the imbalances of the Uruguay Round have been addressed and reform has taken place. African countries in particular have repeatedly stated that they do not want to be pressured into a new trade Round.[33] It is therefore counterproductive for DFID to argue for a new trade Round until these issues have been properly addressed.

    —  How can DFID justify its support for a new trade Round while so many developing countries oppose it until WTO reforms can ensure it becomes a fair and transparent trading system?

    —  Does the UK Government agree that trade agreements (bilateral, regional and multilateral) should be preceded by an independent sustainability impact assessment, with the full participation of civil society?

    —  Does the Secretary of State agree that the outcome of sustainability impact assessments should provide a primary basis for trade negotiations?

Tackling Global Environmental Problems (pp 77-83)

  (xvii)  The White Paper rightly advocates the need to better integrate environmental concerns into World Bank operations and Poverty Reduction Strategies (265, 278). However, the World Bank's draft Environment Strategy falls seriously short of a comprehensive programme for improving the mainstreaming of environmental issues.[34] For example, the strategy lacks any analysis of the institutional constraints within the Bank that impede the mainstreaming of environmental concerns into its operations. Nor does it deal adequately with the need for improved co-ordination between different World Bank institutions and departments.[35]

  (xviii)  The UK Government judges that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has proved to be an effective instrument for tackling global environmental challenges (279). The Government pledges to press for a 50 per cent increase in GEF funding from 2002 until 2006. However, the White Paper fails to review how effective the GEF has been in fostering poverty reduction and implementing international environmental agreements. Such an assessment seems essential before a huge increase in funding can be justified.

  (ixx)  For example, the Paper the fails to revisit past debates about whether the GEF is facilitating the mainstreaming of environmental issues in development or is in fact impeding it notably by applying its incremental cost criterion.[36] There is disturbing evidence to show that GEF projects continue to disregard the rights of local people and continue to leave affected communities worse off after conservation and development investments.[37] The continuing negative impacts of GEF projects are to some extent rooted in wider systemic social policy compliance failures and institutional tensions within the World Bank Group.[38] Moreover, GEF projects that are not administered by the World Bank are subject to no clear social policies or guidelines.


    —  What is the UK Government view on the best way to achieve improved social and environmental performance in the World Bank Group?

    —  How will DFID support the World Bank in its current efforts to improve compliance with its social and environmental safeguards across it whole portfolio?

    —  Will DFID undertake an independent review of the effectiveness of the GEF in implementing pro-poor policies and projects that respect human rights prior to lobbying for an increased GEF budget?

    —  How will the Government's proposal for more GEF resources result in a positive impact on those communities who depend on globally important habitats and diversity for their livelihoods, health and well-being?

  (xx)  A major strength of the White Paper is its emphasis on the need for "effective regulatory mechanisms" for development in "environmentally sensitive sectors such as agriculture, minerals, forestry, fisheries and tourism" (267). However, once again, this raises the question of appropriate development assistance strategies for those countries where these regulatory mechanisms are not yet in place:

    —  Will the UK Government's government "road maps" to economic openness advise against intensifying natural resource-based export-led development in countries without adequate regulatory capacity to enforce appropriate social and environmental standards?

Using Development Assistance More Effectively (pp 84-98)

  (xxi)  The commitment to increase the UK development assistance budget to 0.33 per cent of GDP by 2003-04 in an effort to approach the 0.7 per cent UN target (286) is potentially positive. However, a bigger budget will only have a positive impact on poverty if it is disbursed with effective benefit sharing mechanisms to ensure that development assistance reaches the poor.

    —  How will the UK Government ensure that larger aid budgets will reach the poor they intend to help?

    —  What provisions in the forthcoming Development Bill are designed to ensure that an increased UK development assistance budget brings about more efficient poverty reduction?

    —  Does DFID plan to forge partnerships with the local people and NGOs to monitor the effectiveness of its aid operations in order to help identify obstacles to efficient and equitable benefit sharing, the effective realisation of human rights and improved environmental performance?

  (xxii)  It is disconcerting that instead of proposing novel benefit sharing initiatives, the White Paper pledges to channel more aid through state agencies in recipient countries where they have "a strong commitment to poverty reduction and good policies in place" (292, 314, 315; see also pledges page 98). Poor and marginalised peoples have long argued that conventional development aid fails to bring about positive impacts for local people because it is channelled through governments or large city-based agencies or external NGOs who soak up funds for administration or embezzle them through corruption. The first query here is similar therefore to that raised in (vii) above:

    —  On what criteria will DFID judge that a government is eligible for more direct UK development assistance? How is a government's "commitment" to poverty reduction to be assessed?

    —  Will the Development Bill accommodate support for innovative funding strategies that channel support direct to poor people and their community institutions?

    —  Will DFID efforts to enable local procurement (324) facilitate contracts with local beneficiaries themselves (rather than outside (albeit "local") contractors). How will such efforts ensure that DFID adopts pro-poor procurement guidelines?

  (xxiii)  Much more positive is the assertion that there is a need for greater transparency in the operation of all development programmes (318) and that this can be furthered by implementation reviews carried by developing countries and civil society. Here too the White Paper lacks details about how this goal is to be achieved. There are some potential models that could be drawn on to improve transparency and accountability of development agency operation eg, cross-sectoral executive committees to oversee development projects or programmes. Such committees feature an equitable composition of civil society, beneficiary, government, donor and private sector members with equal executive power.

    —  Does the Government have proposals for new and effective mechanisms for improving the transparency and accountability of development programmes?

    —  How will the commitment to push for independent evaluations of development effectiveness (319) be incorporated into the forthcoming Development Bill?

    —  Will the proposed Bill facilitate UK Government financial and technical support for local participatory monitoring and evaluation across all DFID development operations?

  (xxiv)  The White Paper pledges to support the "full participation" of civil society in the implementation and monitoring of Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSPs) (311):

    —  How will DFID evaluate the level of civil society participation in PRSPs formulation?

    —  What are the benchmarks or minimum standards for multistakeholder participation in PRSP processes?

    —  How will DFID support bottom-up monitoring and reporting initiatives involving grassroots communities to assess the sustainability of PRSPs?

  (xxv)  The need to "encourage" the World Bank and IMF to reform their "own structures and methods" so they facilitate the PRSP process is highlighted in the White Paper (311):

    —  What specific structural and procedural World Bank and IMF reforms does DFID view as essential for the successful implementation of PRSPs? How can the UK Government promote these necessary reforms?

    —  As a major shareholder, will the UK Government encourage the World Bank to adopt a rights-based approach to development?

    —  How will the Government ensure that social and environmental safeguard policies are extended effectively to the Bank's adjustment and programmatic lending?

Strengthening the International System (pp 99-105)

  (xxvi)  In the final section of the White Paper the Government pledges to "work with others to build a stronger, more open and accountable international system, in which poor people and countries have a more effective voice" (338). The question raised in (xxiii above) can be rephrased:

    —  Can the Secretary of Sate suggest any novel and progressive accountability mechanisms that the international system could adopt to improve transparency?

    —  Will the Government's proposed Development Bill promote the development and adoption of such mechanisms so that citizens and project beneficiaries can hold the World Bank and other international development agencies accountable for their operations?

  (xxvii)  It is paradoxical that whilst the Government identifies the need for a stronger international system, there is evidence that a major international development institution like the World Bank is seeking to make their social and environmental operational policies less mandatory and more adaptable to country circumstances in accordance with the principles of Comprehensive Development Framework.[39] There is growing evidence that the current "conversion" of the Bank's operational policies is making policies so flexible and amenable to "country ownership" that staff or borrowers can never be accused of having contravened them and therefore never held to account for problems and failures in implementation.[40] In short, strong policies consistent with international standards are being eroded in the name of flexibility, practicality and cost-effectiveness.

    —  Does the Secretary of State acknowledge that there is tension generated by the CDF focus on decentralisation and accommodation of country priorities on the one hand, and the international system's obligation to apply common sustainable development standards across all its operations on the other?

    —  As a key stakeholder in the World Bank, can the Secretary of State guarantee that the UK Government will make every effort to ensure that Bank's safeguards policies are not weakened under its current policy conversion programme, particularly the Involuntary Resettlement, Indigenous Peoples, Forests and Information Disclosure policies that are still undergoing revision?

    —  In accordance with its rights-based approach, will the UK Government also push the international system to adopt binding operational policies that are consistent with international human rights and environmental law?

  (xxviii)  One key strategy for improving the accountability of the international system would be the establishment of civil society monitoring and reporting on the quality of compliance with agreed international standards for sustainable development (Agenda 21, UNCED, CBD, RAMSAR, Forest Principles etc.).

    —  Will the forthcoming Development Bill enable such participatory monitoring of the international system in line with the general pledge that the UK will push for independent evaluation of development effectiveness (see 171, 318, 319)?

  (ixxx)  The White Paper pledges to strengthen the capacity of global civil society to demand the changes necessary to the international system to deliver effective poverty reduction (360). Again, there is a lack of concrete proposals for how this is to be achieved. One positive step would be to improve the participation of civil society in the policy and programme debates on sustainable development within the UN family. At present, accreditation rules make it difficult for many civil society groups to participate in UN dialogues.

    —  Will the UK Government press for more agile and participatory accreditation rules in the UN to enable better civil society participation?

Thomas F W Griffiths

Forest Peoples Programme

January 2001



24   eg, Stichele, M V (1998) Gender, Trade and the WTO Centre for Employment Research, Manchester; Hale A (Ed)(1999) Trade Myths and Gender Reality Global Publications Foundation, ICDA, Uppsala and Brussels; Texas Center for Policy Studies (2000) Assessment of the Environmental Effects of NAFTA on the Forest Sector in Mexico Texas Center for Policy Studies, paper presented to North American Symposium on Understanding the Linkages between Trade and the Environment; Selected reading: article on globalization and inequality see www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/abstracts/milanov.htm Back

25   Rodrick D (1998) "Who needs Capital-Account Convertibility?" pp.55-65 in Should the IMF pursue capital account convertibility? Essays in International Finance, No.207, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. Back

26   See, for example, Reed, D (Ed)(1996) Structural Adjustment, the environment and sustainable development Earthscan Publications, London; Colchester, M (1997) Fragile Frontier-loggers, miners and forest peoples. Latin America Bureau and World Rainforest Movement, London; Kaimowitz D et al (1998) "Considering the Impact of structural adjustment policies on forests in Bolivia, Cameroon and Indonesia" Unasylva 49(1998); Rice, T, Ozinga S, Marijnissen C and Gregory M (2000) Trade Liberalisation and its impacts on Forests Fern, Moreton-in-Marsh, November 2000. Back

27   See 6.6, Realising Human Rights for Poor People, DFID, October 2000. Back

28   See, for example, Psacharopoulos, G and Patrinos H (Eds)(1994) Indigenous people and poverty in Latin America: an empirical analysis World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, The World Bank, Washington, DC; Dixon, J et al (Eds)(1995), Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples Routledge, London; See especially section B.6 in DFID (1998) Country Strategy Paper: Brazil DFID, London, December 1998 and Section B.2 in DFID (1999) Country Strategy Paper: Peru DFID, London, December 1998. Back

29   Resolution 13461/98 Indigenous peoples within the framework of the development cooperation of the community of member states 30 November 1998, 2141th Council Meeting, Brussels. Back

30   See paragraph 4.3, page 17 in OED (2000) Phase I Interim Report: promoting environmental sustainability in development-an evaluation of World Bank performance World Bank, Washington, DC September 2000. Back

31   See WRM (1998) High Stakes: the need to control transnational logging companies-a Malaysian case study World Rainforest Movement and Forests Monitor, August 1998; see also FPP (2000) Undermining the Forests: the need to control transnational mining companies: a Canadian case study-Forest Peoples Programme, Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links and World Rainforest Movement, January 2000. Back

32   See, for example, Corner House (2000) Comments on ECGD Business Principles Sturminster Newton, November 2000. Back

33   For example, in a recent meeting in Libreville, Gabon, November 13-15, 2000. For details, see Tandon Y (2000) "Seattle Repeated at Libreville" pp.2-6 in Third World Economics Issue No.247, 16-31 December 2. Back

34   World Bank (2000) Toward an Environment Strategy for the World Bank Group: a progress report and discussion draft World Bank, April 2000, Washington, DC. Back

35   Forest Peoples Programmes comments on the Draft World Bank Environment Strategy, 20 December 2000. Back

36   See p.50-51: Colchester, M (1995) Salvaging Nature: indigenous peoples, protected areas and biodiversity conservation UNRISD Gland. Back

37   See, for example, Inspection Panel (1998) Report and Recommendation on Request for Inspection: India Ecodevelopment Project-Rajiv Ghandi (Nagarahole) National Park IDA and IBRD, Washington D.C.; Ramu P K, Raju JP, Channappa D, CORD and DEED (2000) Brutal atrocities unleashed at tribals during dislocation process at Nagarhole National Park by Forest Department Press Release, July 31 2000; Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) Indigenous Peoples, Forests and the World Bank-a workshop report Forest Peoples Programme, briefing papers-www.forestpeoples.org. Back

38   Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) op. cit. Back

39   See Box 13 in Griffiths T and Colchester M (2000) op. cit. Back

40   See p 3: Bank Information Center (1999) The World Bank's Policy Framework: the "safeguard" policies, compliance and Independent Inspection Panel Toolkit for Activists Issue 3, BIC, Washington, DC; CIEL (2000)Resettlement: the World Bank's assault on the poor CIEL Brief, May 2000. Back


 
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