Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence

Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140 - 159)



Mr Rowe

  140. Can I just say that one of the things that shook us when we went to Malawi was we were impressed by the Anti-Corruption Bureau but discovered to our horror that they felt they were being blocked by the British Home Office in one of their investigations. The second point I want to make is I think it was in Malawi, things do blur a bit after a while, when we were told that the Public Accounts Committee had never met because they could not afford the fares to get together. It was certainly in one of the countries we went to, I think it was Malawi, they said they had never actually met, although they existed on paper, because the individual Members of Parliament could not afford the costs of coming to meet.
  (Mr Cockcroft) I would like to respond to that in two ways. First of all, in relation to Malawi there is some good news that you may be aware of because we referred to it in our text. Gilton Chiwaula, the Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, gave a speech at a conference we organised in London in July in which he said that there were seven cases involving British companies in which he had asked the Home Office to support his investigation and he had not even received a reply, never mind a negative one. I am glad to say that Peter Hain was present and within three days of Chiwaula's return to Malawi a representative of the British High Commission was on his doorstep asking for details of what these cases actually were. That represents some kind of progress. I think in relation to the Public Accounts Committee, I cannot comment on the Malawi one but it is quite important to make this comment in relation to corruption and aid flows, as a matter of fact in quite a number of Commonwealth countries Public Accounts Committees have been considering reports of the Auditor-General for quite a long time. If we take the case of Kenya, the Auditor-General has been reporting on major cases, including Goldenburg and the major dam project and a number of other recognised scams, and these reports have been tabled, they are in the public domain, you can get them if you go to the Auditor-General's office, and the Public Accounts Committee has debated them, but it has made singularly little difference to any donor policy. That, of course, is now changing because of everything that has happened in the last three years, but the fact of the matter is that it is not as if many of these cases are completely sub rosa, they are splendidly in the public domain. The best account of the Goldenburg scandal is that of the Auditor-General, which is in the public domain and has been there for about seven years.


  141. This Parliament has difficulties of that kind as well. What other conditions must exist in a country if anti-corruption commissioners are to be successful?
  (Mr Cockcroft) I think it is clear that there has to be some popular reaction against what is going on. Obviously in any society, and I think if we take Nigeria under Abacha that would be an example, there is a degree of cynicism which is reached which makes it highly implausible that any change is going to happen and it then becomes very difficult for anybody, whether from outside or from within, to generate forces of change. I think in all these cases there has to be some identifiable domestic force which is pushing for this outcome. That might be the church, or it might be the mosques, or it might be civil society groups, or it might be professional organisations. In a number of cases professional organisations have behaved quite courageously. As we mention in our report, the action taken by the Law Society of Kenya in actually bringing a court case against eight people associated with the Goldenburg scandal was remarkably courageous. The Law Society personnel involved might have been wiped out at any moment. One has to recognise that. Then from our own TI perspective, although the Abacha regime was, one might say, pretty close to being a hopeless case, the fact of the matter is that TI-Nigeria was founded in 1994 by some rather courageous Nigerians and is one of our strongest chapters and did develop during the mid-1990s during the period when President Obasanjo was in jail. I think one has to have those kinds of beacons of commitment before there is much which can be done.

  142. Is a free media an essential part of this?
  (Mr Cockcroft) Yes, but I think that cuts both ways. Obviously a free media is essential and the extent to which corruption is now being discussed in many of the countries that I am sure all of us have in mind is quite remarkable because it is firmly on the agenda in a way which was unthinkable ten years ago. On the other hand, in TI we have been responsible, with others, for sponsoring workshops on investigative journalism because there is a lot to be learned in terms of better practice in journalism in reporting cases. I am sure other Members are familiar with Uganda and one can see in the Ugandan press that there are a lot of very wild statements made which may not necessarily be helpful to the anti-corruption cause. They are generally helpful but it does not do any harm to, as it were, register a note of caution.

Barbara Follett

  143. Talking about communications in general, has there been an incident of a media campaign that has been funded by donor organisations about corruption? Mr Hasan mentioned the electronic media. I know in a very limited fashion we are also beginning to get the worldwide web and the Internet. There are new ways of getting to the public. I wondered if there had been an incident of this? I am just going to tack on my last question: do you feel that the Department for International Development is doing enough to eradicate corruption?
  (Mr Cockcroft) I think on the first point, the role which the media can play is, as we have already agreed, very important. New forms of communication are relevant but probably more relevant in Asia than Africa. Maybe Mr Hasan would like to say something about that in a moment. Internet coverage in Africa is still very small. Press campaigns have been used rather well by TI-South Africa which in a Sunday newspaper has had a supplement on corruption related issues for nearly two years now. Awareness building was a key part of the success of the Hong Kong Anti-Corruption Bureau and any history of that bureau, which was a success story from the 1970s onwards, stresses the outreach that they achieved in terms of raising public awareness. The Hong Kong story is a classic case of that and that lesson has been learned, for example, to revert for a moment to Malawi, because in the first year of operations of the Malawi Anti-Corruption Bureau the Director and his team held meetings in every district and as a result got 5,000 complaints of corruption related issues within the first year. Something of this is going on but probably not enough. It probably is something to which more attention could be paid. Before addressing your last point, I think Mr Hasan might want to add something to that.
  (Mr Hasan) I would certainly agree with what you have said in terms of communication. I think, given the fact that the electronic media is becoming more liberalised, more people working in this particular sector, there is a tremendous potential and I do not think we are really exploring it properly. We feel that media, of all different forms, can create an enabling environment, if I can use that cliche. I think that it is important when we are dealing with corruption and bad governance that it is not basically setting up new institutions and having new laws, we are actually trying to tackle people's attitudes and tackling them from a very early stage, for example school and college students as they grow up. We are really trying to reinforce certain ethical values. I think the media can play a very, very important role in that particular aspect. I would say that certainly when DFID and other donor agencies are looking into this, it is important to bear in mind the software side of development rather than just the hardware side and to look at it as an holistic approach, not just looking at one particular aspect or institution but how can that affect other institutions. I put that in my conclusion but I would say certainly institutions like the Auditor-General, setting up an Ombudsman, the separation of the judiciary, which was mentioned earlier on, repeal of certain acts which are very outdated, like the Official Secrets Act, access to information, the right to have information, these are some of the areas where I think donors, and particularly DFID, could really try to focus and encourage the civil society and an organisation like ourselves to be more effective in tackling the issue of corruption.

Mr Worthington

  144. Can I just quickly go back to a Bangladesh question again. When we went there we saw these very, very large NGOs like BRAC and Proshika who were delivering on education. We found that the Bangladesh Government was not delivering on education, they put money in but the teachers did not come out. What would you do as DFID? Would you reward success or try to clear up the mess?
  (Mr Hasan) In terms of NGOs providing services, it is important to bear in mind that they do not really become an alternative source. They can provide a way forward but it has to be the Government which has to take on the responsibility of providing the mass of the population with education, health and other basic necessities. We cannot really put the responsibility on to the shoulders of big, large NGOs, they have their limitations. Because of over-emphasis on what they can achieve they can get into a mood of complacency themselves and I think lack of accountability and transparency within the NGO movement is another very important factor. I think there are limitations. I would say that the work of NGOs needs to be seen as what can be done rather than replacing what government should be delivering to its citizens.


  145. Before we get on to the question of UK law and bribery, this seems to be the right point to ask you, Mr Cockcroft, on the issue you raised in your introduction which was that you had come to the conclusion that aid needed to be tapered in countries where corruption was not being tackled and was not reducing. I wonder whether you would like to comment about donors withdrawing aid from corrupt countries. Do you have examples of countries where donors should withdraw from government funding, in particular lending to the departments like education, like health, directly to, in fact, go to assist the government to deliver those programmes? Would you think that those programmes have to be reduced, in fact possibly stopped, if there is corruption, like in Malawi where a considerable amount of British aid is going into the education department and I understand schools are being built which have never actually appeared on the ground? What do you think we should do about that? Do you think aid in those circumstances should be withdrawn?
  (Mr Cockcroft) Could I respond to that but respond to it in the context of Mrs Follett's last question, which I also did not answer but there is at least a relationship between the two.

  146. Yes, it carries on from that.
  (Mr Cockcroft) If I may just respond briefly to your question of what it is DFID should be doing in relation to anti-corruption. I think it is important to note that DFID is doing a lot and a lot of that is well thought out and quite imaginative. One has to recognise from a TI perspective, and any other perspective, that this is a very difficult thing to do because, as I have said several times, changing attitudes to corruption at the end of the day have to come from within any society rather than from without. So the business of identifying the key to change agents is very crucial. I think one should note that reform of the judiciary is something which is reasonably practical. Long-term technical support to offices, such as the Auditor-General's, is practical. In many societies where one party states have been dominant, the tradition of commercial law has almost evaporated and that does have a direct effect on foreign direct investment because investors feel when they are negotiating, say with an Attorney-General's department, that nobody in that department has any vague idea about what their needs as investors are. So support in the area of commercial law is quite significant. There is now quite a lot of growing interest in regional appeal courts, so that under the new East African Secretariat arrangements there is going to be an appeal court which will make some difference to whether or not a case gets stuck at country level. In summary, one can say that DFID is doing a good deal and much of that is commendable. Obviously it could do more. The key thing is to recognise that one needs a long-term perspective and what one is really doing is trying to support local change agents. If I may come on to your point, Chairman. Again, the statement that we made was in relation to whether or not governments themselves should be the key recipients of aid. I am aware that your question relates to increased DFID participation in the active disbursement of funds in the education sector in particular. I think from a TI perspective there are significant dangers in that. If one is taking the view that in order to spend the money effectively one has to spend it directly, this then becomes a neo-colonial type of arrangement which may be sustainable for four or five years, but probably not much more, and then the inevitable question becomes is there an exit strategy, what happens after the aid programme for education, for example, has been disbursed, can the country concerned then administer it effectively? One has to express a certain amount of doubt. This may be an approach to channelling and disbursing increased quantities of aid to a particular sector but is it really a response to the critical factors which determine the level of corruption in any one society? From a TI perspective we would rather doubt that. The conclusion then becomes still that the tapering of aid in very corrupt countries which show no interest in reform is justified but in the context, first of all, of supporting key institutions, such as those we have mentioned several times this morning, and trying to maximise the benefits which aid can achieve working through NGOs and civil society organisations.

  147. It is difficult to see exactly where you would actually taper aid in view of your answer, is it not? Let us take China. The Department for International Department is increasing hugely its aid to China, which happens to have the unfortunate distinction of being the most corrupt country in your league table. Therefore, if we should taper our aid it stands to reason, does it not, that we should taper it in China?
  (Mr Cockcroft) As a matter of fact, with the greatest of respect, I am not sure that is a very good example because the Chinese Government is now clearly extremely interested in the issue of corruption. In fact, it invited a delegation from TI to China six months ago in order to try to bring itself up to speed with international best practice and TI is having an internal debate as to the extent to which it should, as it were, be a part of this activity or whether or not the objectives of the Chinese Government may have some degree of ambiguity. Your key question is are there specific countries which should be dropped?

  148. Yes.
  (Mr Cockcroft) I think it would be very unfortunate if one used this argument to identify individual countries. The total number of countries would probably be quite small. One is reluctant to be drawn into that. I think I would rather discuss a possible mechanism which one could use in such a situation. That would be to develop a trust fund approach in which aid is made available in limited quantities to a trust fund with a board of trustees that represent both international and, maybe in the case of DFID, UK individuals but also more enlightened elements of local society. That trust fund will then be responsible for disbursing funds to individual local NGOs in that framework. I say that, and maybe the intention behind the suggestion is more important than the actual mechanism. TI's whole existence and its emphasis on national chapters is based on the view that in any society there are elements who are attempting to address the issue of corruption or are sufficiently concerned about it to make a move. When we began to formulate and think through TI in 1991 and 1992, there were inevitably many people who said this was impossible because there were very high levels of endemic corruption. In fact, TI has only been able to establish its 80 chapters, of whom at least two-thirds are in the south or in transition economies, because in each of those countries it has been possible to find people who are prepared to address the question. Our TI perspective, which is not that of an official donor—TI is not an organisation which is in the business of corroborating donor conditionality—is to identify those progressive routes within civil society and find ways in which they can work. As a result of the Annual General Meeting, which we have just held in Ottawa, it has been agreed that there will be a process through which national chapters within TI are invited to make proposals in relation to the debt relief discussion and how conditionality could best be linked into that. So this would not be, as it were, a set of ideas emanating from Western branches of TI or its Secretariat but it would reflect the views of as many chapters as possible on the ways in which conditionality could best be developed in relation to their particular country.

  149. I am just a bit worried whether your answer is a little bit influenced by the fact that the Department for International Development gives you large donations.
  (Mr Cockcroft) If I might say so, Chairman, I think that is a little unfair because I have made a very specific comment (in relation to the current and fairly new DFID strategy of building up and working through government departments) which is not DFID policy and, in fact, if it was taken seriously it would be in opposition to it. If I might say so, I think that does represent a willingness to challenge DFID's position.

  Chairman: I am glad you have cleared that unfair question. Can we move on. In your memorandum you talk about mending the UK law on bribery and corruption and I think Tony Colman is going to lead us on this.

Mr Colman

  150. Can I say that I am afraid I have to leave at 12.15 to speak in Westminster Hall, so I have asked Mr Andrew Rowe if he can continue on this particular line of questioning. In your introductory statement you were hard hitting in the penultimate paragraph: "The UK is currently gravely at fault to an extent which can be described as a national disgrace. We", that is the UK, "have no legislation adequate to deter overseas bribery." If I may act as the Devil's advocate, looking at your Bribe Payers' Index I see that the United States is at number ten, we are at number 13, yet the United States have had legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, obviously for the last 23 years. What evidence is there, in fact, that introducing legislation actually reduces corrupt practices? How are these United States companies getting away with it?
  (Mr Cockcroft) If I might be allowed to make a slightly lighthearted comment. That finding caused some concern in the TI-USA national chapter, not least because they had been instrumental in raising the funds to pay for the survey. I think I would rather answer that from a slightly different perspective. One can certainly see that many major US companies are extremely sensitive to the implications of the FCPA and very few major US companies like to be fined $25 million, as GE was for a bribe paid in Egypt only about three or four years ago. The compliance procedures which many companies now operate clearly do have some implications for those individual companies. To what extent this applies to US companies further down the scale and to what extent mechanisms, such as offshore tax arrangements of the kind that have recently been attacked by the EU and taken to the WTO, provide a mechanism for getting round that is an open question. Of course, as has been pointed out many times, the fact that joint ventures have been exempted from the FCPA until very recently, although that is now a hole that has been plugged, has some implications for that. I think that John Bray may have something to say about that.
  (Mr Bray) Mainly to endorse the point about US companies actually taking this really quite seriously and having detailed compliance procedures. There is a technical aspect of this, a legal aspect, which is that under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, judges are authorised to give lesser penalties to companies who can demonstrate that they have compliance programmes but have nonetheless been let down by an individual. What the lawyers say on this—I have heard them say it—is "you own the companies, you want to have your own compliance programmes, you do not want to have the Department of Justice setting it up for you because if you do it will be very tough and very painful". They do hear that message. I would agree with Laurence's point about unorthodox arrangements. The other point which is often made by competitors is the extent to which the US Government uses its influence on behalf of its own companies and this raises the question when is that practice legitimate. There are some cases where it may be regarded as bullying and not legitimate as distinct from fair representation.

  151. Your damning of the UK is quite strong at the very least. What evidence do you have to support your allegations? Again, in your evidence you say that "those bribing overseas seem to have a rather comfortable regime in the United Kingdom". What evidence do you have for that?
  (Mr Cockcroft) The evidence that whereas domestic bribery legislation was first introduced in 1896, and private to private bribery was outlawed in 1906, there appears to be no single case in which any UK company has been brought to court or charged in any way for the payment of a bribe overseas, although the UK claims in OECD circles that the existing legislation is adequate and simply needs modernisation. Our view is that modernisation is actually an inadequate phrase because the existing arrangement needs to be replaced. I think that Mr Rodmell may have something to add to that.
  (Mr Rodmell) Yes. I think the description of our position is right to be strongly put because during the whole of the negotiation of the OECD Convention the impression we had was that the UK was telling all the other delegations that our laws are perfectly adequate and it is up to the rest of you people to catch up, with the exception of the USA. In fact, TI-UK was forever pointing out to the department that was not a view shared by anyone outside the department.


  152. This department being the Home Office?
  (Mr Rodmell) The Home Office department. Also reflected in the DTI who were very much involved in the delegations to the OECD. In fact, it is all based on some kind of internal opinion, which is referred to as such in the published material of OECD. It has never been made available, so no-one can look at it and test it. I am not a lawyer with any expertise in the criminal law area but I have spoken to a number of lawyers, including our honourary solicitors and so on, and spoken to counsel, and I have not found anyone who actually agrees with that view. I think it was probably less than honest to try to convince our OECD partners that, in fact, our laws were in good shape. When it came to the peer review of phase one of the evaluation of each country's performance and the degree to which their laws complied with the Convention, we had to fail, there was no way we could do anything else. The report on the UK is extremely critical. If I may just correct one impression that was given at the hearing a fortnight ago. If the Home Office's current proposals, which for the most part we very much welcome, were to be put into legislation, somebody said—I am not sure whether it was Mr Ceri Smith or Lorna Harris—that would put right all the points of the OECD requirements. That is simply not the case. There are a number of points which I have referred to in the paper, which is attached to the submission to this Committee, which make it clear there are other issues to be addressed. For example, the requirement for the consent of the Attorney-General to a prosecution for an offence of corruption is to be preserved apparently, notwithstanding the fact that the Law Commission recommended it should go. It seems to me a completely unnecessary hurdle. I do not want to get into one particular issue but there are other issues where not the whole of the OECD requirements are being met.

Mr Colman

  153. In relation to that peer review, we asked the officials that we saw on 31 October to provide us with information on other countries that had also been criticised. I think it would be useful if you could, through your chapter organisation, provide a commentary on what they have done.[6] If I may go on to what happened on 31 October at our evidence session at which the Treasury, the Home Office, DFID and DTI were present. The Treasury witness questioned the view of Transparency International that bribery was tax deductible in the UK. I have to say as somebody who was there on the basis of giving evidence he, in fact, felt this was not an area he was an expert in. Although he said he would clarify it in writing, I have just checked with the Clerk and there has been no such clarification as yet as to what the situation is. What is the position according to TI? Is there any estimate of how much corrupt money is offset in this way against tax liabilities in the UK by UK companies?

(Mr Rodmell) I am sure the second part is going to be impossible to answer but let me just deal with the first one. The Treasury advice issued to Inspectors of Taxes, which is public information, says quite clearly that if a bribe payment is made offshore and everything takes place offshore, it is paid, agreed, everything is offshore, there is nothing whatever that tax inspectors in this country can do about it, and its economic effect is it is a deductible expense in the UK. It is true that Parliament has tackled the issue. There was a Finance Bill amendment, I think it is now section 577(a) of the Taxes Act, which says that a payment that constitutes a criminal offence is not deductible, but because we do not have legislation which says to bribe a foreign public official is a criminal offence it remains deductible. In my discussions with the Treasury I have to say that one thing I find disturbing is that there is more interest in getting a large revenue take than in examining the criminality of a particular payment. In other words, they will admit that they come across extravagant commissions and they may be disallowed as payments without consideration, but they are not disallowed because they are criminal. Moreover, the whole tax investigation operates under very strict, I suppose rightly, conditions of confidentiality. I think when crime is detected, and the Home Office do believe it even now to be a crime, even though they have not got the new legislation, these gateway provisions ought to be looked at very seriously to allow information to be passed to the authorities. Why we say there is a comfortable regime here is because there is quite a lot of information in the public domain that would suggest the bribing of foreign public officials at least: press articles, cases in other courts, World Bank blacklists and so on. I am not aware of any follow-up which ever results in prosecution. That is reflected in other areas, like money laundering which is a huge factor in corruption. The ease of money laundering is what pushes up the rate of extortion. Vast sums are money laundered through London because, as you heard through Mr Ceri Smith, London is the final rinse, it is the ultimate cleaning of the money, it comes out legitimate from London. I would question what was said there because he said that we were the victims of our own success in London because we have such a wonderful regime. I would suggest to you, Chairman, that the Committee might be interested to find out why it is that there are 15,000 reports a year of suspicious transactions and hardly any prosecutions at all.


  154. We are so successful because we do not have any legislation.
  (Mr Rodmell) We do not have legislation on the corruption side, but on the money laundering side we do not either have the enforcement or the will.

  Chairman: That would make us look successful, would it not?

Ann Clwyd

  155. Does it not undermine our whole credibility, the fact that we have not introduced legislation? We have signed up to all the international conventions, as far as I can see, yet we take no action. Somewhere in your evidence you talk about the arms industry and the construction industry being particularly keen to bribe to get overseas contracts. We are the second largest arms exporters. Are we protecting our own defence industry? Could that be one of the reasons why we have not introduced the necessary legislation?
  (Mr Rodmell) It is difficult to speculate, is it not? I do wonder why it is that the UK has become so soft on corruption when countries that we would more readily associate as engaging in corrupt activities, some not very far from us in Europe, for example, have actually taken the necessary steps. It is a relatively simple matter, we are only looking at one offence and the necessary extra-territoriality. I am not an expert but I am advised that it is a matter of two or three sections in a short Bill that we proposed that we thought we would save the Minister for Trade some degree of embarrassment going to the inter-ministerial meeting in June by being able to say something was in hand, you know. Nothing is in hand. It ought to be non-controversial.


  156. Is this next June or last June?
  (Mr Rodmell) No, last June, the inter-ministerial meeting at which was published the critique of the UK's performance under the OECD Convention.

  157. A short Bill might be more attractive to the Government at this point in the electoral cycle.
  (Mr Rodmell) Indeed. I think it is all wrapped up at the moment in the minds of the Home Office and the DTI that it has to be dealt with with corruption but it is actually just a financial crime. We have accepted the international obligation to make it a crime, we should get on and do it. If there is a Bill coming earlier, for example the Financial Crimes Bill might make it earlier, it would fit very neatly in there. There are various ways of doing it.

Ann Clwyd

  158. You did say that it is difficult to speculate, but would you just like to speculate as to why it has been blocked?
  (Mr Rodmell) I do not know why it is. I would not like to think that it is because we are protecting certain industries and so on. I have to say that in talking, as I do, and I think TI-UK generally has a very good relationship with the departments, we get a lot of co-operation and help from them, otherwise with the limited resources we have we could not keep up to date on the issues, so I do appreciate a lot of what departments do. When we talk to ministers, and for example when we read what the Home Secretary says in the foreword of the White Paper, he recognises corruption as a deadly virus but we will deal with it when parliamentary time allows. If it is a deadly virus it does not wait for parliamentary time, especially when the parliamentary programme is in disarray towards the end of the—

  Chairman: Never believe that excuse.

Mr Rowe

  159. Really this is almost confirming what you were saying. When we had the Treasury and DFID and DTI in front of us I did ask myself the question about the fact that money laundering is never proceeded against and Ms Harris replied: "Money laundering is criminally actionable in the United Kingdom. The point I was making was that normally what is actually prosecuted by the authorities is the predicated offence. Very often the person who committed the predicated offence is the launderer as well. The prosecution will then decide not to prosecute the same person for the laundering." This seems to me—
  (Mr Rodmell) Can I just comment on that? I think that is a misconception of what money laundering offences are all about, particularly in London which is the major financial centre of the world. It is necessary under present legislation to prove that there is a predicate offence, be it drug trafficking, be it corruption and so on, but what one is tackling with money laundering is the knowing handling of the proceeds of crime. It has been commented that quite a lot of firms of lawyers, accountants and others would not even recognise payments if they saw them coming through the accounts but banks, for goodness sake, if they apply rudimentary rules of knowing their customer, understanding where the money is coming from, should recognise when payments are really the laundering of funds.

6   Note by witness: Having looked into this, it would be very difficult to give a throughly objective view without first undertaking a comparative study of all the published Phase I evaluations. So far as I am aware, this work has not been undertaken by the OECD secretariat and TI(UK) does not itself have the necessary resources to do this. The best I have been able to do is speak with Professor Mark Pieth, Chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. He tells me that as the UK has been found not to have implemented the Convention, the UK has to be grouped with Turkey, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Professor Pieth fears that, in consequence of its failure to implement the Convention, one or more other states may well move to exclude the UK from participation in the evaluation of other states in Part II of this process which will be commencing this year. This would not of course preclude the UK from being itself evaluated, but the UK would be seen to be in an inferior capacity, relative to other signatory states. TI(UK) would suggest that this is a particularly unsatisfactory situation for a G7 state. Back

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