APPENDIX 1
RECENT CASES OF CORRUPTION INVOLVING UK COMPANIES
AND UK-BACKED INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
TURKWELL, KENYA
UK Company Involvement: Knight Piesold
UK Government Involvement: Export Credits
Guarantee Department
Between 1986 and 1993, Knight Piesold was "overview
consultant for detailed design and construction" for the
155 metre-high concrete Turkwell hydropower dam in Kenya—a
$300 million project. Knight Piesold documents obtained by The
Corner House state the funding for its involvement in Turkwell
came via the UK Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), which
was not publicly reported at the time.
Other companies involved in the dam included
GE Alsthom, Norconsult and Sogreah. Spie Batignolles, the French
construction company, won the construction contract which did
not go out to competitive tendering. [124]
In March 1986, an internal memorandum written
by Achim Kratz, then European Commission delegate to Kenya, was
leaked to the Financial Times. [125]
The memo stated that the contract price was "more than double
the amount Kenya's Government would have had to pay for the project
based on an international competitive tender." The memo continued,
"The Kenyan government officials who are involved in the
project are fully aware of the disadvantages of the French deal
. . . but they nevertheless accepted it because of high personal
advantages." [126]
Kenyan observers say that these "personal
advantages" included payments of millions of dollars to Kenya
President Daniel Arap Moi and to the then Energy Minister Nicholas
Biwott. [127]
When the dam was completed in February 1991, the Kenyan press
described it as "the whitest of white elephants" and
a "stinking scandal".
For two-and-a-half years after completion, the
dam operated at less than half its designed operating capacity
and when it was officially opened by President Moi in October
1993, the reservoir was less than a quarter full.
As a result of the corruption scandal surrounding
the Turkwell Gorge project, international donor aid to Kenya's
energy sector was frozen for a decade and only began to return
in late 1996. [128]
EWASO NGIRO
UK Company Involvement: Knight Piesold
UK Government Involvement: Export Credits
Guarantee Department
Since 1989, Knight Piesold has continued to
be involved in a dam project run by the state-owned Kenya Electricity
Generating Co. called the Ewaso Ngiro project — three dams,
generating 180MW of electricity and costing a total of $350 million
by the project's due completion date of 2007. In 1992, a World
Bank study team criticised a £38.1 million contract for feasibility
studies and environmental impact assessments that the company
won in 1990 for being "five times what such services would
normally cost".[129]
The World Bank's report was obtained by the
Financial Times, which reported that the UK Government's
ECGD had backed 85 per cent of Knight Piesold's fee. The reputation
of the client, then called Kenya Power and Lighting Corp, was
already tainted by allegations of corruption and other criminal
offences against Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott — including
accusations that he was one of two prime suspects in the murder
investigation of Foreign Minister Robert Ouko killed while investigating
high level corruption. Biwot was arrested, then released for lack
of evidence. The World Bank documents stated that at least £15.3
million had been paid up front to Knight Piesold, even though
the project was not due to come on-stream for another 10 years.
"The exorbitant cost of this contract together with the high
level of upfront payments . . . even before the feasibility study
has been completed, raises fundamental questions about procurement
practices and financial management," the World Bank report
said. Knight Piesold said at the time that the "fee was entirely
in line with the norm for work of this nature". Since this
scandal, Knight Piesold won further contracts for full tender
design and documentation".
The three-dam project links the Ewaso Ngiro
and Amala rivers with a 3.5 kilometre-long tunnel, reversing the
Amala's flow which will "consequently suck water from Masarua
Swamp", giving Kenya the ability to tap water from the rainy
West to the arid Rift Valley. The Masarua Swamp is a key water
resource within the famous Serengeti National Park.
The project is causing massive controversy between
Kenya and Tanzania, according to a March 1999 report from Mishael
Ondieki at The Nation newspaper in Kenya. "Tanzanians
are convinced that the formation of dams in Kenya will drain water
from Tanzania, leading to migration of animals from their country,"
Oneiki quoted one source saying. "It is predicted that the
project, if commissioned, could jeopardise the East African Cooperation
regional alliance. "Other sources told Ondieki that Tanzania,
teaming up with Uganda, wanted to stop Kenya generating power
so as not to threaten Tanzanian power finding a market.
The Nation said that Knight Piesold had
recently prepared a report claiming that the project was viable
and would have "little impact on the environment". However,
the report went on to state that it was unable to give conclusive
results because of insufficient data on the levels of the Ewaso
Ngiro river and Lake Natron into which the river drains. "It
is increasingly difficult to carry out Kenyan research on Lake
Natron since it is on the Tanzanian border," the newspaper
quoted the Knight Piesold report.
Knight Piesold also spoke to Tanzanian fears
about fragile flamingo nesting and breeding sites being destroyed:
"It will definitely affect the flamingo nesting areas but
will not at any point hinder them from their breeding grounds
since the lagoon there they breed will not be affected."
Tanzania has twice vetoed the project, fearing the Masarua Swamp
in the Serengeti will be drained, driving wild animals permanently
to Kenya.
The Kenyan Government is pushing the project;
its permanent secretary in the Ministry of Energy, Crispus Mutitu,
accused the media of giving the project bad publicity, adding
that the country's electricity supply would worsen if the project
was not undertaken. The Government will have to pay 30 per cent
of the total cost of the project under World Bank arrangements
— conditions that it has failed to meet on several past
projects, which have consequently stalled. 15
YACYRETA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, ARGENTINA
ITAIPU HYDROELCTRIC PROJECT, BRAZIL
UK GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT :WORLD
BANK
Both the World Bank-funded Itaipu Dam and the
Yacyreta dam on the Parana River have been beset by corruption
allegations. Brazilian journalist Paulo Schilling and Para-guayan
ex-legislator Ricardo Canese have described the building of Itaipu
as "possibly the largest fraud in the history of capitalism.
Itaipu was originally projected to cost some $3.4 billion, but
skim-offs by the military rulers of Paraguay and Brazil and their
colleagues contributed to the cost skyrocketing to around $20
billion." Meanwhile, the Yacyreta dam was famously described
by Argentinian president Carlos Menem as a "monument to corruption".
Impregilo and Dumez led a joint venture as main
contractor. Lahmeyer International was the second company in the
10-company consortium responsible for the engineering and construction
supervision, called CIDY. Harza was the lead company in CIDY.
Voith Hydro and Dom. Eng. Works manufactured 13 of the turbines
and Impsa and Cometarsa the remaining seven. Voith did the hydraulic
design for adjustable blade units, and Voith and GE Canada the
mechanical design. Siemens supplied generators (with Ansaldo,
Mitsubishi, Hitachi and Toshiba). Impregilo assembled the turbine-generators
on site (with CIE, Sade and Iglys).
The Yacyreta dam's costs soared from an original
estimate of $2.7 billion to $11.5 billion, and the still unfinished
dam is currently 10 years behind schedule. It has faced technical,
financial, social and environmental problems. Three turbines had
to be taken out of service in 1998 at a cost of $5 million in
lost production when cracks appeared. In May 1999, four turbines
failed and the binational operating company, Entidad Binacional
Yacyreta (EBY), is seeking damages from the manufacturers of $200,000
for each day the turbines are inactive.
The floodgates of Yacyreta's reservoir were
closed in 1994 before a detailed environmental and social mitigation
plan was in place. The reservoir has never been filled to its
full capacity and the dam is operating at only 60 per cent of
its installed capacity, below the project's financial break-even
point. Financing has not been found for the $857 million worth
of additional construction work required to fill the reservoir,
nor for past and future resettlement and environmental mitigation
costs.
The project was economically justified on the
assumption that Argentinian electricity demand would increase
by 8-10 per cent per year during the 1980s. In fact, demand grew
by around just 2 per cent, so that when the first turbines came
on-line in the mid-1990s, Argentina already had a surplus of generating
capacity. The World Bank Performance Audit Report says: "Based
on the foregoing, the Audit concludes that Yacyreta was not a
least-cost solution to expanded power supply and its relevance
to the country's priorities was negligible. On several occasions,
the Bank had good cause for stopping the project before the major
civil works were too advanced."
Less than 25 per cent of the 50,000 people who
would be forced to move to make way for the Yacyreta's reservoir
if fully filled have been resettled so far. The World Bank's Inspection
Panel outlines "unsanitary conditions . . . in many of the
stagnant bays created by the reservoir (which) pose health risks
to poor people living in low-lying urban areas." The panel
also found that thousands of people have lost their jobs as a
result of the dam and have received no compensation. A June 1999
internal report to the Board of the Inter-American Development
Bank points out some "serious problems in EBY's dealings
with civil society, particularly people affected by the project
and organizations that are speaking for them on the Paraguay side,
as EBY's institutional credibility has eroded."
The Itaipu dam, meanwhile, has drowned a large
area of Atlantic forest, the fastest disappearing forest in Brazil.
Many of the 42,000 people displaced by the dam moved to resettlement
schemes in Amazonia, with disastrous effects for themselves and
for the indigenous peoples and forest of the region. The reservoir
has caused the local spread of bilharzia, a debilitating water-borne
disease, previously unknown in the area.
PAITON 1 AND PAITON II, INDONESIA[130]
UK COMPANY
INVOLVEMENT: POWERGEN
PLC, BARCLAYS
BANK
Finance for the massive Paiton 1 and Paiton
2 coal-fired power complex in Java, Indonesia, has been guaranteed
by a number of ECAs, including JEXIM, US Ex-Im, OPIC and Hermes.
The UK's Barclays Bank was one of eight banks which syndicated
the loan for the Paiton 1 project and the West Merchant Bank is
reported to be heavily involved in financing Paiton 2, with Prudential
Assurance providing debt cover for the project. PowerGen, the
UK energy utility, has a 35 per cent share in Paiton 2.
The bid to build and run the Paiton 1 project
was won by Mission Energy-General Electric, a joint venture which
had the backing of President Clinton, former Vice-President Dan
Quayle, and such Washington insiders as Ron Brown, Robert Rubin,
Warren Christopher and Henry Kissinger.
In December 1998, the Wall Street Journal
reported a series of corruption scandals associated with Paiton
1. Members and friends of the Suharto clan, among them Hashim
Djodjohadikusomo, a relative of Suharto, as well as Agus Kartasasmita,
a brother of the Energy Minister and later Minister for Economic
Affairs, had been attributed a 15 per cent stake without payment.
[131]
Djodjohadikusomo and Kartasasmita were also awarded the order
to supply coal for the plant, despite their company having no
previous experience in the coal business. The contract was awarded
without public tendering. The Indonesian National Audit Commission
has been estimated that such corrupt contracts increased the cost
of Paiton 1 by $600 to $1000 million.
As Peter Bosshard notes, these costs were shifted
to the Government by charging PLN, the state electricity board,
an extremely high price for the electricity it purchased from
the Paiton plant. The final electricity tariff was set at 8.6
cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity, 32 per cent higher than
comparable tariffs in Indonesia and 60 per cent higher than in
the Philippines. "It was a presidential decision", commented
Negah Sudja, a former head of research at PLN, in the Asian
Wall Street Journal, "Everybody knew it was nepotism,
but we couldn't do anything about it." The President of PLN,
Djiteng Marsudi, was more explicit: "The power companies
dictated terms to us because they had Indonesia's first family
behind them. Resisting them was like suicide."
Ex-Im officials were told by government officials
and by PLN staff that they did not want and could not afford the
plant, but that they were powerless to challenge the project as
it had the backing of the President.
The economic collapse in S.E Asia and the crash
of the Indonesian rupiah meant that PNL could no longer meet its
obligations under the power purchasing contracts, which had to
be paid in dollars. Initially, the Ministry of Mines stepped in
but by March 1998, it had run out of funds. The contract was renegotiated
but the tariff was not disclosed
With the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the new
Government announced that it would check all power purchasing
agreements for corruption and nepotism. Where this could be proven,
the contract would be considered null and void. PLN is focusing
its attention on five power plants, including those at Paiton.
In October 1999, PLN filed a suit against the
companies that operate Paiton 1 in a move to void the power purchasing
agreement. However, PLN was advised by Indonesia's new president,
Addurraham Wahid, not to proceed—and the head of its negotiating
team, along with the head of the company, were dismissed.
Indonesia's Attorney-General, however, is confident
of a prosecution eventually. "We are in possession of unambiguous
evidence for corruption. So far, however, we have been forced
by political pressure to suspend our investigations until an interim
agreement has been been concluded. Once we will be able to proceed
with the investigations, it will become clear which companies
have been paying bribes." [132]
Pressure from western governments on PLN to
conclude a settlement has been intense. In July 1999, a delegation
of the export credit agencies from Switzerland, Germany, the USA
and Japan warned ministers that a renegotiation of the power purchasing
contracts would have a detrimental impact on inward investment.
A refusal to "pay would impair Indonesia and our ability
to work with you in the future." In late 1999, the government
gave into pressure and withdrew the legal action against the Paiton
operators.
LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT, LESOTHO
UK Company Involvement: Balfour Beatty,
Kier International, Stirling International, Kvaerner Boving and
ABB Generation's UK
UK Government Involvement: Export Credits
Guarantee Department, World Bank, European Investment Bank, Commonwealth
Development Corporation
Nineteen companies and individuals are currently
on trial in Lesotho, charged with paying millions of dollars in
bribes to obtain contracts on the Lesotho Highlands Water Project,
a massive water diversion scheme intended to bring water from
Lesotho to South Africa. Four British firms—Balfour Beatty,
Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, Kier International and Sterling
International Civil Engineering—are implicated.
British taxpayers have underwritten loans to
UK contractors involved in the project—including those implicated
in bribery—to the tune of £66 million. [133]
Gibb, Balfour Beatty and their partners received EU grants. The
EU along with the World Bank are so determined that this criminal
trial should be a watershed for international trade that they
have offered to pay for Lesotho's prosecution.
According to Swiss bank records, which form
the basis of the prosecution's case, the Lesotho Highlands Project
Contractors consortium of which Balfour Beatty is a part allegedly
paid £585,000 in March 1991 via an intermediary into a Swiss
bank account controlled by the Lesothan official in charge of
the project. Only one month earlier a building contract was signed,
worth £135 million pounds. In March 1994 the consortium allegedly
paid a further £200,000 to the official's account. Two weeks
later, they signed the contract to build another dam, worth forty
one million pounds. Altogether, this consortium alone allegedly
handed over a million pounds in bribes.
From its outset, the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project was founded on rule breaking—not least rules enshrined
in the World Bank's Charter that forbid the Bank from meddling
in the internal political affairs of a member country. The project
was first conceived during the Apartheid era when South Africa
was subject to international sanctions. To avoid the difficulties
of international financiers openly aiding the then-apartheid regime,
the project's financial advisers—Chartered WestLB—set
up a London-based trust fund through which payments could be laundered.
It was an arrangement which, to say the least, was of borderline
legality — yet it was sanctioned at the highest international
level, not least through the Executive Directors of the World
Bank (who collectively represent the bulk of the world's governments).
Funding for the project has come from the World
Bank; the European Investment Bank; the German, British and French
bilateral aid agencies; the UK Commonwealth Development Corporation;
commercial banks including Banque Nationale de Paris, Dresdner
and Hill Samuel; and a number of export credit agencies (including
Germany's Hermes, France's COFACE, Italy's SACE, South Afrikaans's
SACCE and Britain's ECGD). The ECGD's support amounted to £66
million and went in loan guarantees for five UK companies, four
of which are now being prosecuted. Not one of the financing agencies,
however, appears ever to have vetted the corruption records of
the companies bidding for contracts.
Although the Bank has instigated an internal
investigation into the current corruption, the investigators—Arnold
and Porter, a prestigious Washington-based law firm—have
reportedly been subject to restrictions. For example, Non-governmental
organisations have told by Bank officials that the firm has been
denied complete access to World Bank files and is only allowed
to copy files which it could have obtained via third parties.
This is denied by the Bank. Once completed, the investigation
will not be made public.
Meanwhile, demands by NGOs that any conviction
in the Lesotho courts should result in the companies being debarred
from World Bank contracts, as required under World Bank rules,
are being steadfastly resisted. Convictions in the court, the
Bank has stated, will have no bearing on the Bank's future dealings
with any of the companies.
Instead, the Bank is insistent that it will
only disbar companies if its own internal investigations show
that a company has been involved in corruption involving a project
component specifically financed by the World Bank. Surprisingly,
at the Bank's AGM 2000 in Prague, President Wolfensohn publicly
announced that the Bank will wait for the results of the trial.
Nevertheless it is not clear how the Bank will act in case companies
will be convicted under the Lesotho law and not found guilty under
the Bank's internal investigation.
In any case, President Wolfensohn made it clear
that the Bank will only disbar companies if investigations show
that a company has been involved in corruption involving a project
component specifically financed by the World Bank. Since
the Bank only made a small contribution to the multimillion dollar
financing scheme, this would mean that few—if any—companies
are affected.
That position is based on the narrowest legal
interpretation of the Bank's guidelines and a singularly selective
view of the Bank's involvement in the project. Not only did the
Bank finance the design of the project: it was also responsible
for setting up and coordinating the financing programme. Indeed,
in a confidential 1991 World Bank project document, the Bank explicitly
states;
"In the early stages of project preparation,
the Government of Lesotho explicitly requested that the Bank be
the lead agency in the rising of the massive amounts of funds
required for implementing the project and in helping to guide
the complicated and sensitive negotiations between Lesotho and
the Republic of South Africa. That the proposed project has reached
its current stage is clear evidence of the Bank having successfully
fulfilled this role to date."
WESTERN GHATS FORESTRY PROJECT
UK Government involvement: Department
for International Development
See attached Extract from Comptroller and
Auditor General of India's Report. (Not printed. Available at
ttpillaginic.in/reports/karnataka/rep 99/Kar civil3 99 chapter3.pdf)
BUJAGALI, UGANDA
UK COMPANY
INVOLVEMENT: AES ELECTRIC
LTD
UK Government involvement: Credit being
considered by Export Credits Guarantee Department, World Bank.
The proposal to dam Bujagali Falls is currently
before the World Bank, with a decision expected to be reached
within six months. If approved the 250MW hydropower scheme will
inundate one of Uganda's prime tourist destinations located on
the Victoria Nile, a river already modified by the existence of
two other large dams—the Owen Falls dam and the Owen Falls
Extension. At a total cost of US$520m it is reported to be the
largest private investment in East Africa.
The project is a joint venture between the UK's
AES Electric Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of the US AES Corporation,
and the Ugandan company Madhvani International. AES Nile Independent
Power, with offices in both Kampala and London, is the company
established to oversee the project.
Formal approval for the project by the both
the Ugandan Government and the World Bank was rejected on numerous
occasions; however the Ugandan Parliament finally agreed construction
in 1999. World Bank concerns over the deal centred on the cost—more
than 15 per cent of Uganda's GDP—together with certain aspects
of the Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA). Consequently, in 1999,
the World Bank instigated a 12 month suspension on signing of
the PPA in order for the contract, under which there would be
a 30 year power purchase deal with the Ugandan Electricity Board
(UEB), to meet it's required guidelines.
Within Uganda criticisms of the project came
from government ministers, NGOs and the media. Following allegations
of corruption in Uganda Confidential, a letter from three members
of parliament, Absalom Ongom, chair of the Parliamentary Committee
on Works, James Mwanda, chair of the Committee on Commissions,
Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, and Wandera Ogalo,
chair of the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, was
sent to the then Minister for Energy and Mines, Richard Kaijuka,
calling for his resignation. It was alleged that Kaijuka had demanded
"a bribe of US$500,000 from Nile Independent officials out
of which [he] received US240,000 with the balance to be paid .
. . after the signing the agreement between Uganda Electricity
Board and Nile Independent Power". Kaijuka was subsequently
dismissed and replaced by Syda Bumba.
Between 1998 and 2000, police investigations
revealed massive embezzlement of AES Nile Power funds, culminating
in the arrest of three staff, including the company administrator.
The company is reported to have lost over Sh600m through fraudulent
practices.
The project has also been criticised for the
lack of transparency in the allocation process. As it was not
put out for international competitive tendering it is not known
how AES procured the contract to build Bujagali.
Madhvani is also being investigated by the World
Bank over allegations of corruption and faces possible debarment
from World Bank projects. [134]
PERGAU, MALAYSIA
UK COMPANY
INVOLVEMENT:BALFOUR
BEATTY
UK GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT:OVERSEAS
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
The Pergau dam, built on the Malaysian-Thai
border with £234 million of British overseas aid, has become
a byword for patronage politics and the illegal use of aid money.
The contracts for the dam were awarded jointly to Balfour Beatty
— a company with close links to the British Conservative
Party — and Cementation International, a company which employed
the son of the then Conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
as an adviser. Balfour Beatty, a major donor to the then-ruling
Conservative Party, won civil works contracts for the dam —
without competitive bidding. The works included a 75-metre high
zoned earthfill dam, power tunnels and shafts, an underground
power cavern and a 24 km water transfer tunnel, together with
a pumping station.
Britain's aid agency, the Overseas Development
Administration (ODA), opposed the funding of Pergau. However,
Thatcher made an oral offer to fund the dam during a visit to
Malaysia in 1989, conditional on a full economic appraisal. In
1990, an ODA review of Malaysia's power sector identified a number
of alternative projects and concluded that Pergau would not be
an economic proposition until the year 2005 at the earliest. Nonetheless,
the government agreed to fund the project in February 1991. At
the time, Alan Clark, the UK Defence Procurement Minister, argued
that withdrawal of support for Pergau "would have an adverse
impact on UK relations with Malaysia in general and defence sales
in particular."
Documentary evidence subsequently revealed that
the aid package was linked in writing to a reciprocal arms deal
whereby the Malaysian government agreed to buy over £1,000
million worth of British military equipment in return for the
UK funding Pergau. A judicial review brought by a British NGO,
the World Development Movement, against the Foreign Office led
to a High Court ruling that aid for Pergau was in violation of
the 1966 Overseas Aid Act, which forbids British aid money being
used for the purchase of arms. Conservative ministers in parliament
had consistently denied the link between aid for the dam and arms.
Subsequently, the "revolving door"
between Whitehall and the City, which has long ensured a place
for ex-Ministers and top civil servants in the boardrooms of corporate
Britain, saw Sir Charles Powell, Thatcher's foreign affairs adviser
until 1990, become a director of Trafalgar House, which owns Cementation.
Both Lord Prior, a former minister under Thatcher, and Lord King,
ennobled by Thatcher, have also been linked to the affair. 17
In July 2000, Gregory Palast of The Observer
interviewed barrister Jeremy Carver, an advisor to Transparency
International. "I went to a DTI reception. I was introduced
to someone who identified himself as the chairman of a company
and we were talking about corruption. He announced with enormous
pride that he personally had handed over the cheque to the government
minister for the Pergau Dam `bribe' in Malaysia." The corporate
honcho, the chairman of Balfour Beatty, was not confessing, but
boasting about the payment which he may have considered not a
bribe but just the cost of doing business Malaysian-style. Carver
noted that the then Tory Trade Minister, learning of the pay-off,
publicly congratulated Balfour Beatty on its "patriotic competitiveness."
[135]
124 Geary, K, Grainger, M, Lang, C, Hildyard, N,
Dams Incorporated: The Record of Twelve European Dam Building
Companies, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, Stockholm,
February 2000, p. 89. See also: Ozanne, J, "Mr Biwott the
businessman: A look at the former Kenyan minister's road to riches",
Financial Times, 27 November 1991. Back
125
McCully, P, Silenced Rivers-The Ecology and Politics of Large
Dams, Zed Books, London and New York, 1996, p. 261. Back
126
Ozanne, J, "Mr Biwott the businessman: A look at the former
Kenyan minister's road to riches", Financial Times,
27 November 1991. Back
127
McCully, P, Silenced Rivers-The Ecology and Politics of Large
Dams, Zed Books, London and New York, 1996, p. 262. Back
128
Goldman, A and Wrong, "M, Survey-East African Community:
Future looks brighter", Financial Times, 5 November
1996, p. 4. Back
129
This section is drawn from: Geary, K, Grainger, M, Lang, C, Hildyard,
N, Dams Incorporated: The Record of Twelve European Dam Building
Companies, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, Stockholm,
February 2000. Back
130
Information on Paiton derived from Bosshard, P (in collaboration
with Altemeier, I), Publicly Guaranteed Corruption: Corrupt
Power Plant Projects and the Responsibility of Switzerland,
Berne Declaration, October 2000. Back
131
Bosshard, P (in collaboration with Altemeier, I), Publicly
Guaranteed Corruption: Corrupt Power Plant Projects and the Responsibility
of Switzerland, Berne Declaration, October 2000. Back
132
Bosshard, P (in collaboration with Altemeier, I), Publicly
Guaranteed Corruption: Corrupt Power Plant Projects and the Responsibility
of Switzerland, Berne Declaration, October 2000. Back
133
Channel 4 News. Back
134
Tumisiime, J, "Madhvani in trouble with the World Bank",
The Monitor, 12 August 2000. Back
135
Palast, G, "War on Corruption? Not quite, Minister",
The Observer, 9 July 2000, Business, p. 5. Back
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