Examination of Witnesses (Questions 65
- 79)
WEDNESDAY 13 DECEMBER 2000
ASSISTANT CHIEF
CONSTABLE ALAN
MCQUILLAN
Chairman
65. I have been debating whether I should welcome
you as Assistant Chief Constable or as Mr McQuillan. You may wish
to state a preference yourself. I think it will be easier for
the record if I address you as Mr McQuillan.
(Mr McQuillan) I am quite content with
that Sir, thank you.
66. You are content with that. Thank you most
warmly for the memorandum you sent us, the written memorandum,
and also for coming to see us today. We will endeavour to make
our questions follow a logical order, but in the nature of the
shape of this horseshoe it means the questions may come from different
quarters, we will not simply go round the room. If there is any
way in which you want to gloss any answer you have given us, either
here and now or in writing afterwards, please do not hesitate
to do that; and, equally, when we have had the opportunity of
reading the transcript, it may strike us that there is some question
which we ought to have asked you which we failed to ask you, and
we will reserve the right to follow up with a question in writing
after the event. Is there anything you would like to say to us
before we start asking questions?
(Mr McQuillan) No, Sir, I am quite happy.
67. Alright. In the introduction of the memorandum,
the RUC categorises six groups who are singled out for attack
or intimidation. Are you able to offer us numbers of cases in
each of those categories known to the RUC, or reported to it,
during, say, each of the last three years? And if, on any of these
questions, it is easier for you to write to us afterwards, rather
than taking the questions now, then obviously feel free to do
so.
(Mr McQuillan) The short answer to that, Sir, is,
no, we are not able to give definitive figures in any of these
categories. There is a series of reasons for that. First of all,
the information is incomplete, and we know it is incomplete and
we know it is unreliable. There is a whole series of factors in
that. All of the information is shared across a range of different
Government agencies, so each of us has part of the picture. We
have tried here to analyse this logically and present it in that
way, but I must also say that these are not necessarily absolutely
discrete categories, in that there may be overlaps between different
areas. We are forced to categorise things in a particular way,
but, for example, we put down some of the intimidations to feuds
within Loyalist organisations; the primary motive for some of
that may be disputes over drugs, it may be personal disputes,
there can be all sorts of different motivations within these different
categories. But one of the problems that we do have is the lack
of consistent, reliable information.
68. Would you want to give us any sense of trends,
in any of those categories?
(Mr McQuillan) I think, Sir, if I deal with each of
the categories in turn. If we deal with sectarian intimidation,
this has always been, for many, many years, a feature of the situation
in Northern Ireland. As we have set out in the paper, in the early
1970s there was massive intimidation that led to huge-scale movement
in housing in Belfast, and, as a result of that, almost a modus
vivendi was reached, where different communities settled into
particular areas, with quite clear interfaces between them, in
some of the urban areas. And the problem of, therefore, intimidation
in housing movement then settled largely along those interfaces.
So the level of intimidation then dropped through the mid seventies
and eighties. I think, subjectively, we feel that intimidation
and sectarian attacks have probably increased slightly, or increased
in some areas, over the last couple of years, there have been
signs of increased friction. It has always been part of the back-drop,
but we believe that in some areas it has increased, and there
is clear evidence of that. For example, at the moment, in the
town of Larne, we have had a series of very well-publicised, sectarian
attacks from both sides of the community, on both sides of the
community, and also, for example, in the town of Coleraine, we
have had a series of attacks on Roman Catholics. But our subjective
impression is, it is going up. The issue of paramilitary feuds
predominantly affects the Loyalist organisations; there has been
a massive increase in that over the last 12 to 18 months. There
has always been a series of different tensions among the major
Loyalist paramilitary groups, and, as we have tried to set out
in the paper, there are all sorts of motivations for that; there
are personal disputes between people, there are turf wars over
racketeering, and individuals trying to extend their scope of
operations, but there has been a massive increase in that, which
has culminated in the feuding over the last 12 months, with a
number of people shot dead, in Belfast and other areas.
69. Can I just break for a moment. Do your remarks
about the turf wars on racketeering apply both to Republicans
and to Loyalists?
(Mr McQuillan) Much less so on the Republican side,
because, on the Loyalist side, we have a fragmented series of
different groups, of broadly equal strength. On the Republican
side, until the emergence of the Real IRA, there was only one
dominant group, so there was no inter-feuding on any significant
scale. We have seen Republican feuds in the past, in the mid eighties,
for example, when a number of people were murdered, but not on
the scale of the Loyalist feuds, and that is primarily because
the Provisional IRA was such a dominant force in Republican terrorism.
Members of security forces, prison officers and public officials,
Sir, we do have some reliable figures for those because they are
Government employees, and we have presented those in graphical
form. The picture there is that post the start of the Drumcree
period, around 1996, the numbers of intimidations went up very
significantly, and then over the last couple of years they have
started to steady and come down. Almost all of those were Loyalist
intimidation of police officers, prison officers and, for example,
members of the Royal Irish Regiment, who were living in broadly
Unionist areas of Northern Ireland; and that is the reason for
the change in pattern. There is also, within that, a steady background
pattern of people forced to relocate because, for example, they
are police officers, and we have become aware that Republican
terrorists have also begun to target them and have identified,
for example, their home address and are attempting to find out
details of their movements. That is a steady pattern that is running
in the background, and has for a number of years; the Loyalist
up and down movement is superimposed upon it. Alleged criminals,
Sir, again, we feel, and the figures in terms of punishment beatings,
I think, tend to show, that since the ceasefires there has been
an upward trend, certainly initially, in relation to punishment
attacks, so-called punishment attacks; those are basically the
paramilitary organisations on both sides trying to establish their
sense of control of what they regard as their territory, and intimidate
any opposition in the relevant communities. The other two final
categories that we have listed are disputes with paramilitaries
and victims of racial intimidation. The issue of disputes with
paramilitaries is very small; frankly, very few people are prepared
to stand up against these organisations. There are some people
who are; there are some increasing signs that perhaps local criminals,
in, for example, Loyalist areas, are prepared to not accept the
Loyalist paramilitaries' control over crime, in the way that perhaps
they used to like to do. But that is roughly level; but it is
very small. And also then there is the issue of the victims of
racial intimidation. This is an issue that we have only really
begun to keep statistics on recently. It is a growing problem,
but it is difficult to see to what extent the problem is growing
because we have got better information, and therefore we are exposing
more of it. We have had a real drive on to try to ensure that
all instances of racial intimidation are treated very seriously,
and that people from racial minority communities obtain a proper
service from the police. That, we think, has led to better reporting,
and therefore people being more willing to come forward. I am
sorry, Sir, that is a very whistle-stop tour.
70. Thank you very much indeed. My recollection
is that the Secretary of State, in response to a question from
myself, I think, in fact, in a written submission after the oral
examination we were conducting, did give us figures of those whom
he believed to have been sent into exile over a period of time.
In terms of the categories we are looking at, either globally
or in terms of the individual six categories, would the RUC have
figures of those forced from their homes?
(Mr McQuillan) No, Sir, we do not, for a series of
reasons. I am not aware of the Secretary of State's response to
your question, or how the figures were compiled in that; we could
cross-check that and come back to the Committee, if you wish.
Again, I would suggest that we can provide figures for those that
we know of.
71. Yes, of course, at all times, I am allowing
for the fact that there is no way you can include the people you
do not know of.
(Mr McQuillan) We do not, specifically, as an organisation,
keep figures for people forced from their homes, because we do
not necessarily know that that has happened, and therefore we
do not keep statistics of that type. There are two main sources
of statistics though. We have figures for the number of people
who are dealt with under the SPED scheme, and those are owner-occupiers;
we can rely on those. What we do not have, are what the Housing
Executive may be able to give, are some figures for those forced
out of Housing Executive accommodation. There are, however, a
number of other social landlords and private landlords, and we
have no idea how many people are forced out of their home there,
unless it has been reported to us. There is the further issue,
Sir, that, very often, the people who are excluded in this way
tend to be young people, who may well be living with their parents,
and we know of cases where the young people have been forced into
exile but the parents are permitted and continue to reside in
the family home. So the entire picture is extremely difficult
to quantify.
72. But in that latter case would you, in fact,
keep a numerical record of it, or is it just simply anecdotal
information which you have?
(Mr McQuillan) If it has been reported to us as a
crime, we would have a record of it, otherwise we might have some
intelligence in relation to it, but we have no reliable statistical
database.
73. The answers you have given us already underline
what you said in the memorandum about the difficulties relating
to information. Is there any current endeavour to improve the
quality of that information?
(Mr McQuillan) Within the RUC, the answer is yes.
We are endeavouring to develop a new computerised database, which
will allow us to better track, for example, all records in relation
to hate crime. In terms of the wider public sector in Northern
Ireland, I am unaware of any specific effort focused in this area,
but we are in discussions, following the Criminal Justice Review,
with the Northern Ireland Office, and the Community Safety Centre
in Northern Ireland, to try to develop a Northern Ireland Crime
and Disorder Strategy, a Community Safety Strategy; that Community
Safety Strategy is due to be produced in draft form early next
year. We also have responsibilities for monitoring, under the
provisions of Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act, and I think
that is going to force Government Departments to start to produce
statistical information, reliably, on a consistent basis. So the
short answer is, there is some work going on at Government level
that we are aware of, but it has not been focused specifically
on just this issue, it is focused upon the whole area of statistics
that we provide, including the criminal justice system.
74. Let me use a couple of analogies, before
I ask my next question. Customs and Excise, in calculating what
proportion of drugs entering the United Kingdom they have been
able to seize, have obviously had to use certain proxy statistics,
in order to calculate how much is actually coming in that they
have not seized, for obvious reasons, and it comes under the same
category as the examples you have been giving. Also, and I will
not identify a particular country but there are countries in southern
Europe where, in order to draw up national income statistics,
you have to make certain assumptions about the scale of the black
economy in those particular countries, and I can think of at least
one country where it is large enough to be a significant element
in the figures. Do you have internally a process of estimating
how much paramilitary intimidation, particularly in the context
of leaving home, is going on which is not reported to you?
(Mr McQuillan) No, Sir, we do not. We would rely upon
individual, local assessments, because predominantly this is organised
or created on a local basis, and therefore we would rely upon
local commanders to try to maintain contact with other public
agencies in their area, and, through that, those contacts give
them a feeling for the amount of this that is happening.
75. So you would have a feeling, based at a
local level, but you would not have a global figure, because there
would be certain areas where you did not actually have a feeling?
(Mr McQuillan) We do not aggregate the figures, because
it is very difficult to aggregate feelings. The local commander,
for example, in the area that covers the Shankill Road, in Belfast,
would have a very good relationship with the local Housing Executive,
other major landlords and would have a good feeling for what was
happening within the community and to what extent there was intimidation
of people, people were being forced to move; he will certainly
be getting information on that from intelligence. At the centre
of the organisation, we would have a general impression of what
was going on, or if there was a pattern emerging, because of the
clear chain of command, but we would not be able to quantify it.
Chairman: Before I call on Mr Hunter, arising
out of the evidence we have had so far, does anybody want to come
in? Mr Beggs.
Mr Beggs
76. Thank you, Mr Chairman. Is it not a fact
that, for someone to be moved by the Housing Executive, it is
necessary for the RUC to provide the Housing Executive with a
certificate or a statement that intimidation has taken place,
or worse?
(Mr McQuillan) Generally, yes, it is.
77. So that there ought to be, in each local
station, some record, and it would be possible then to compile
a total?
(Mr McQuillan) Yes, Sir, it will be possible to compile
a list of those in those areas and the number of cases that the
Housing Executive have referred to us, but, as I have tried to
explain, we believe that is only a part of the problem. There
are those that we simply do not know about, because they do not
tell the Housing Executive, they just vanish. In some cases; they
may be living with parents or relatives and the parents or relatives
remain there, so we will not always know. Probably, particularly
where they leave Northern Ireland, and if they leave Northern
Ireland and go to the mainland or go to the Irish Republic, unless
the housing authority there would write to us we would not necessarily
know what had happened.
Mr Clarke
78. I just wanted to focus in on this undetected
and unreported intimidation, and I quite understand that you are
unable to give a figure, but would you be able to go as far as
accepting that there are probably more unreported than reported
instances of intimidation; that is not very precise, I know, but
just to give the Committee a feeling?
(Mr McQuillan) I think that, in terms of intimidation,
pure intimidation that does not force people to move home, I would
say that there is a huge amount of intimidation that is never
reported and that we have no real idea of.
79. And exclusions?
(Mr McQuillan) In terms of exclusions, I would say,
we will generally find out that it has happened, because the paramilitary
organisations concerned wish to ensure that it gets publicity,
because that is part of their motivation, that they want to show
publicly that they have done this; so we would have a good idea
of that. We would have a good idea of those intimidations where
people are forced to move home; we have no idea about the overall
scale of intimidation.
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