RELOCATION FOLLOWING PARAMILITARY INTIMIDATION
1. For too long in Northern Ireland, intimidation
has been used, on both sides of the community, to force residents
of particular areas, of the opposite tradition, to leave their
homes. This practice has contributed in no small measure to the
emergence of significant areas where the population is exclusively
of one tradition, and a corresponding reduction in the number
of 'mixed' areas. This has a number of unfortunate consequences.
First, it increases the scope for sectarian tension. Second, in
the present context, it creates, or enhances, the scope for private
paramilitary organisations associated with one or other tendency
to exert control over particular areas, including control of criminal
activity. It is also increasingly used, within areas of the same
tradition, to maintain control of those areas, often as cover
for criminal activity.
2. Ministers, of whatever political persuasion, have
rightly and consistently condemned paramilitary intimidation,
for which there can be no legitimate justification. Commenting
in the House recently on the practice of paramilitary organisations
of forcing people to relocate, either within Northern Ireland
or elsewhere, the Rt Hon Adam Ingram, JP, MP, Minister of State
at the Northern Ireland Office, commented:
"... The practice is
one of the blights on the face of Northern Ireland. It represents
a denial of the human rights and the civic dignity of every individual
who is subject to such practices by paramilitary groups."
"The practice should
stop immediately. Clearly, it is more easily stopped when all
members of the community stand against it ...."
We agree wholeheartedly with the sentiments expressed
by the Minister.
3. In May 2000, we decided to conduct an inquiry
into the problem, with the following terms of reference:
To examine the incidence
in Northern Ireland of the practice of paramilitary organisations
of intimidating residents into relocating within, or leaving,
the Province, and the alleged causes; the steps being taken by
Government and law enforcement agencies to eliminate this activity;
the response of the Government and public bodies to persons claiming
to have been forced from their homes through paramilitary intimidation;
and the assistance available to persons affected by such intimidation
who subsequently reside, permanently or temporarily, in Great
4. The range of government departments and public
authorities with an interest in this issue is very broad, and
includes the Northern Ireland Office, Northern Ireland Departments,
other United Kingdom Departments and, where individuals relocate
in either Scotland or Wales, relevant departments there also.
The issues are also of concern to local government and to a range
of statutory bodies. Inevitably, we have had to be selective in
our choice of witnesses.
5. We have taken oral evidence on six occasions,
and a number of other witnesses have submitted written evidence.
A list of the witnesses may be found at p. xxii and details of
the written submissions at p. xxiii. We are most grateful to all
who have contributed to this inquiry.
6. The terms of reference we adopted concentrate
specifically on those intimidated by paramilitary organisations
into relocating, either within Northern Ireland or elsewhere.
Expulsion is, however, only one of the tactics used by paramilitary
organisations in relation to their control over areas. Not surprisingly
therefore, much of the evidence has tended to reflect the rather
broader theme of paramilitary attempts to control communities
in their areas of operation, with exclusions viewed as one particular
mechanism used. Although it may be argued that, over the years,
people have felt a need to relocate for a range of reasons the
thrust of this inquiry has been on relocation at the behest of
paramilitary organisations and on the particular causes and consequences
7. Northern Ireland is not the only place in the
world where paramilitary organisations have sought to exert control
over civilian populations. We visited South Africa from 22- 25
January 2001 to gather information on how the problem had been
tackled there and to see what lessons might be learned in the
context of the situation in Northern Ireland. A list of the organisations
and individuals with whom we had discussions is given in the Annex
of this Report. We are most grateful to all concerned for their
willingness to assist us in our inquiry. We would also like to
thank Ms Ann Grant, CMG, the British High Commissioner, and her
staff, and Mr David Pearce, HM Consul, Durban, for all their assistance
in relation to the visit.
8. On this occasion, the Northern Ireland Office
memorandum also included information on the responsibilities of
the devolved administration.
On 6 March 2001, Mr Denis Haughey MLA, Minister in the Office
of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) commented:
"Government wishes to
meet the real identified needs of victims strategically, so that
we do not leave gaps in provision. 'Programme for Government'
confirms the commitment to putting in place a cross-departmental
strategy and detailing precisely how government will tackle the
important areas of victims. This will result in the adoption of
a service-wide, systematic approach to making life better for
those who have suffered.
We are also committed to improving services offered
to victims by April 2002, a challenge which requires the active
support of all departments and all public bodies ...."
We welcome this general commitment made on behalf
of the Northern Ireland Executive. The needs of victims of paramilitary
intimidation should be a key element in formulating strategy and
delivering services and the voices of the victims should be heard.
II. THE PROBLEM
9. In this section we seek to analyse the scope and
nature of the problem of, and arising from, forced relocation
as a result of paramilitary intimidation, and the causes. We also
seek to quantify the scale of the problem, and the consequences.
We note, though, that actual expulsions represent only part of
the Maranatha Community drew attention also to the insidious impact
of threats of expulsion, which were frequently enough to secure
the desired end.
10. The evidence suggested that some expulsions were
intended to be permanent, while others might be intended to be
only for a period.
They also varied in terms of the extent of movement involved:
this varied from a few streets, to leaving Northern Ireland.
11. Maranatha described
the cause as a "fundamental part of the consolidation of
control by the paramilitaries over specific areas, rural and urban
.... People are systematically intimidated and coerced into accepting
that the paramilitary presence is the de facto authority,
which must be obeyed." It saw the roots of the problem as
involving a range of factors, including the settling of personal
scores. The RUC drew attention to two major contributory causes.
The first is the extent to which public sector housing in working
class areas in the main urban conurbations had increasingly become
segregated along political/religious lines since the inter-community
rioting of the late 1960's/early 1970's. The second is the incidence,
particularly on the loyalist side, of paramilitary feuds. There
are a number of motivations for these, including extending an
organisation's power base, the control of criminal activity and
personal disputes between senior figures in the various organisations.
Professor Kennedy expressed a number of broadly similar concerns.
12. Maranatha had noticed some degree of correlation
between the incidence of expulsions and political developments.
However, hopes that the Good Friday Agreement and the prisoner
release programme might lead to a sustained reduction have unfortunately
Scope and nature
13. Marantha commented that the geographical spread
of expulsions appeared to be growing. It commented:
"... where at one time
expulsions could have been identified as appertaining to a specific
geographical area, i.e. the estates within specific towns or cities,
the reality now is that the activity has spread into rural areas
and into areas where you would never even contemplate that."
14. The RUC saw the problem as rather more localised.
Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan commented
"the vast majority of this problem is concentrated into a
relatively few areas, in comparison with the totality of Northern
Ireland. ... There are a number of areas, both Loyalist and Republican,
where this goes on, for example, parts of Belfast, parts of South
Down, along the border, Dungannon, and parts of [Co.]Londonderry,
including Londonderry. Those are the areas where it has been most
prevalent." He continued:
"In terms of actual exclusions from Northern Ireland, it
is not my perception that we are seeing people excluded from new
15. The RUC commented that the problem of housing
intimidation had to be seen in the context of the overall pattern
of paramilitary intimidation. RUC identified six principal categories
of victims of such intimidation:
- victims of sectarian intimidation
- victims of paramilitary feuds
- members of the security forces, prison officers
and public officials
- alleged criminals
- those who have had disputes with paramilitaries
- victims of racial intimidation.
It also pointed out, though, that in some cases,
incidents might relate to more than one category, but it lacked
consistent, reliable information.
Professor Kennedy categorised those likely to be driven out of
their communities in broadly similar terms. Maranatha commented
that there were a wide range of reasons why people were expelled,
and the reason given is not always the real one. It maintained,
though, that many of those it assisted had not had any involvement
with paramilitary organisations
16. Professor Kennedy described the typical victim
as "young, working class and male".
Maranatha, however, had seen a change in the nature of expulsions
from Northern Ireland since 1994: there was now an increasing
tendency to expel whole families, rather than individuals. It
also pointed out that some of those expelled have already been
punished following conviction by a court of law.
The bulk of expulsions appear to be intra-community.
They may be for a determinate period, or for 'life'.
17. There was general agreement on the part of the
witnesses that the scale of the problem was difficult to define,
but that present statistics were likely to understate the problem.
Maranatha indicated that the practice was prevalent in both traditions
at about the same level.
In evidence to us on 5 April 2000,
the Secretary of State drew attention to data from NIACRO's Base
2 project, which relate solely to people who approached Base 2
to discuss their plight. NIACRO provided more comprehensive figures
as part of its evidence
and the Table below shows the numbers presented to Base 2 who
|Relocated outside Northern Ireland||55
|Relocated within Northern Ireland||76
18. Maranatha maintained that "many expulsions
and punishment beatings go unannounced and unreported. This is
often because the victim has been warned that there will be further
punishment to himself or herself or their family if the offence
is reported to the police or even recorded in the press."
It estimated the number of expulsions to Great Britain at around
four per month, although there are also other family members who
follow subsequently, and some cases which only come to light retrospectively.
19. The RUC could not offer a breakdown of cases
across the categories mentioned earlier.
It pointed out that statistical information is spread across a
number of different Government agencies and that the data may
overlap. It also commented
"we know that many victims do not report incidents to Police
and do not wish them to be reported to Police for a variety of
motives." Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan commented that,
in contrast with the position on the overall scale of intimidation,
the RUC would have "a good idea of those intimidations where
people are forced to move home",
not least because the paramilitary organisation concerned tends
to seek, for its own purposes, public recognition of its actions.
Information is generally available from the RUC on cases where
it has had to clarify to the Housing Executive that intimidation
has taken place,
but Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan pointed out that there
are others the RUC does not find out about, for a variety of reasons.
20. The Northern Ireland Office agreed that there
and had no figure for individuals,
nor could it produce figures for the numbers relocating within
It did, however, provide us with Housing Executive figures for
the last three financial years for relocation of households through
intimidation and these are reproduced below:
In addition, very substantial numbers of people moved
as a result of the loyalist feud in Belfast last year.
21. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission,
surprisingly, has not been approached by anyone claiming to be
a recent victim of exclusion or attempted exclusion.
22. As a precursor to improving the response to
the problem of relocation following paramilitary intimidation,
there needs to be a significantly more accurate definition of
the extent of the problem, and the pattern of relocation. It is
clear from the evidence that there is at present no reliable overall
information on this, although organisations providing assistance
may have a good insight into these matters within their own sphere
of activity. What needs to be done, though, is to bring these
together and consolidate them. The new computerised database being
developed by the RUC may well have an important part to play in
There is also a need to seek to fill the gaps in the information
pattern, given the general agreement that there is under-reporting
in the official statistics.
23. Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan told us
that the RUC never advises people to relocate, either within Northern
Ireland or outside, as a result of paramilitary threats. If asked
about the level of protection the force can offer, he added "...
we would feel forced to give them an honest answer .... the reality
is that we cannot protect people 24 hours a day, seven days a
week; so we would provide advice to them on what options were
open to them, and it would then be a matter for them to decide
what to do."
24. Professor Kennedy gave examples of where the
trauma of exclusion, or potential exclusion had led to people
volunteering for physical punishment instead.
25. Maranatha drew attention to the trauma felt by
many of those expelled, often at very short notice.
Although not frequently needed, a new identity could cause particular
26. Those forced out of Northern Ireland often face
a number of practical difficulties, such as finding a doctor,
suitable housing accommodation,
and schools for their children.
27. The problem of relocation within Northern Ireland
of those forced from their homes by paramilitary intimidation
raises a number of difficult questions. The Housing Executive
has responsibility for re-housing those made homeless by intimidation
and has the ASH
to assist in providing accommodation and assisting former owner-occupiers
respectively. It is important, though, that its operation does
not have perverse consequences. For example, concern has been
expressed, in the Northern Ireland Assembly, that when paramilitaries
force unconvicted drug dealers from their homes, as a result of
the intimidation they go to the top of Housing Executive lists
for re-housing. We are pleased to note that the Minister recognises
the unacceptability of this situation, and welcome the fact that
he proposes to bring forward legislation in the Assembly to deal
with this problem.
28. Another potential difficulty which must be avoided
is re-housing those displaced from their homes in a way which
unnecessarily reinforces existing housing patterns. At all costs,
it is important to ensure that, in re-housing those displaced,
the objective of the paramilitaries in many cases, of creating
areas homogeneous in their allegiance, is not assisted. In this
context, we note the concerns expressed by Assistant Chief Constable
McQuillan about the role of the RUC in advising the Housing Executive.
Housing homogeneity appears to be a particular aim of the loyalist
paramilitaries as in the case of the loyalist feud in parts of
Belfast last year. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
has drawn attention to the fact that there may often be a discrimination
dimension to intimidation.
We note that the section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 imposes
on public authorities a broad duty to "have regard to the
desirability of promoting good relations between persons of different
religious belief, political opinion or racial group." We
recommend that the Housing Executive issues a statement indicating
how it takes account of these important new duties when deciding
how and where to re-house victims of paramilitary intimidation.
III. THE RESPONSE
29. Maranatha saw publicity as a key element in tackling
expulsions. This factor, in its experience, could have a marked
influence on the level of activity. Mr Andrew Robinson commented
"... I can think of one specific area where there were 30
to 40 names on a list for expulsion and whenever this was highlighted
and addressed all that activity was curtailed. ... Once it was
highlighted and dealt with and indicated that it would go into
a greater public arena if this happened the organisation stepped
back. ..." Professor Kennedy quoted a specific example where
publicity had resulted in the lifting of a threat,
and also commented on the beneficial impact of human rights organisations
taking an interest in paramilitary intimidation.
Enhancing the effectiveness of the rule of law
30. One of the constraints identified by Maranatha
was the unwillingness of some people, in both Catholic and Protestant
areas, to approach the police openly.
It added that creating a state of fear was a key element used
by paramilitaries in extending their control, and a sense of loss
of empowerment on the part of the community ensues. It commented
"... If communities could be empowered to take responsibility
for their areas again then perhaps you would see what we would
understand as effective policing, effective administration of
the law and order taking place. That is a feeling that people
have, that they do not have the ability to take back control of
their own communities. This is across the board. I have been in
Loyalist areas, I have been in Republican areas where individuals
feel disempowered and are accepting, or have had to become accepting,
of the principle that if anything happens you do not go to a statutory
body but you have to go to those who are representative of the
paramilitary groups. ..."
31. On the question of whether the Patten reforms
of the police would, through the creation of district police partnerships,
enhance public confidence in the police, Maranatha was not certain,
and considered that this would depend on whether or not the community
had confidence in the appointees.
It agreed, though, that an increase in confidence would lead to
a weakening of the paramilitaries.
Northern Ireland Office witnesses saw these reforms as an important
32. Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan was adamant
that there are no 'no go' areas for policing in Northern Ireland,
but there remain certain areas where special precautions must
be taken. In terms of policing estates, he said "... the
overall paramilitary control, in certain areas, or the strength
of paramilitarism, in some areas, ... clearly has an impact upon
policing, in that people are afraid to speak out, people are afraid
to be seen going to the police, but that situation has persisted
for many years, and certainly our impression is that it is getting
better in many areas. For example, in West Belfast, or parts of
West Belfast, the last three or four years, we have seen the number
of calls, routine calls, to the police for assistance virtually
double. So, in that sense, we believe people in those areas do
want to get back to a normal society, they are voting with their
feet, and they want honest policing, and they are prepared to
33. The RUC saw the problem of tackling paramilitary
intimidation as a long term one and that the first component was
"to try to reassure those people who are being intimidated;
to provide what support we can provide to them; to ensure that
we do everything possible to investigate those crimes, to catch
the people responsible and to bring them before the courts as
a deterrent ..."
The Base 2 project
34. The Base 2 project, operated by NIACRO,
aims to seek to remove the threat to individuals fearing action
against them by paramilitaries. It seeks to operate confidentially,
in accordance with principles of non-violence and human rights,
Maintenance in the community is a preferred option. Initially,
it was funded entirely by private donations but it subsequently
received government funding for a period.
With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, government and
Probation Service funding was withdrawn, as it could be construed
as implicitly endorsing continued paramilitary violence.
NIACRO has always made clear that it does not condone such violence.
The figures provided by NIACRO suggest that only a small proportion
of threats are, in the end, actually lifted.
35. NIACRO seeks to verify the threat of paramilitary
sanctions against an individual through third parties. It has
found these to be effective and this method of operation is helpful
in a variety of ways.
The Ulster Democratic Party told us
that it worked with Base 2 to seek to verify or otherwise claims
of loyalist paramilitary threat against individuals or families
and, where such a threat exists, to seek to have that threat removed.
36. The Base 2 figures provide a useful breakdown,
which reveals that a significant proportion of those approaching
NIACRO for assistance because they perceive themselves to be under
threat of paramilitary action are not apparently under any such
We recommend that a study be made of the reasons why this is
so, and of the basis for their perception.
37. NIACRO told us that it has arranged for an independent
review of Base 2 services by Professor Harry Mika of the University
We understand that this is nearly complete and we look forward
to seeing a copy in due course.
38. Relatively little specific evidence was given
on bodies co-ordinating assistance to persons forced out of their
homes. Within Northern Ireland, the bulk of the responsibilities
are transferred matters. The Northern Ireland Office
mentioned the Displaced Families Inter-Agency Group as having
a co-ordinating function within the Province. Both Marantha
and the NIO
implied that there was little, if any, co-ordination of assistance
to persons displaced to Great Britain. Professor Kennedy also
argued for greater co-ordination of support to those forced to
39. In the light of the evidence we have received,
we consider that there is a case for a more formal system of co-ordination
in Great Britain of assistance to those forced to move there from
Northern Ireland. An Anti-Intimidation Unit, as proposed by New
might have a part to play in this. We also invite the Northern
Ireland Executive to review the scope and effectiveness of the
co-ordinating arrangements in Northern Ireland.
40. Improved co-ordination, though, is not, in
our view, sufficient. There is also a need for greater advertising
of the assistance available, so vulnerable people, forced from
their homes, know where and who to turn to. A substantial number
turn to NIACRO and its Base 2 services and we commend what this
project has achieved to date. However, these are, deliberately,
the subject of only limited publicity.
We recommend that the Government and the Northern Ireland Executive,
in their respective areas of operation, take steps to ensure that
information on the support services available to those forced
from their homes is made widely available to bodies likely to
come into contact with such people, and that these bodies are
encouraged to be pro-active in passing it on.
41. Maranatha commented that a very high proportion
of those expelled would prefer to return home, but in its experience
very few of those expelled are able to get back.
42. Maranatha indicated that expulsions tended to
be graded in their seriousness. It has been able to negotiate
the return of some of those excluded for short periods, but "nearly
all the expulsions which are related to strengthening the grip
of the paramilitaries are long-term and, they hope, for life."
Maranatha also commented that "we do know that some of those
who have been told to clear out for good, when they have come
back two or three years later have been assaulted and have had
to run for their lives."
It was nonetheless possible, in some such cases, to negotiate
short visits on compassionate grounds.
43. NIACRO is now receiving funding from the Belfast
Regeneration Office to fund a re-entry programme.
It sees this work as a major priority which "will require
delicate local negotiations together with substantial change in
the practice of statutory agencies, to facilitate reintegration."
This programme has been running since April 2000.
44. We welcome the development by NIACRO of its
programme to support re-entry of persons previously excluded.
We also welcome the assurances we were given that this did not
involve coming to an agreement with paramilitaries on particular
cases, although Maranatha had experience of other cases where
payments had been made.
We would be very concerned about any actions, however laudable
their motivation, which in effect gave express or implied recognition
to illegal actions of paramilitaries, or appeared to legitimise
their purported contribution to law enforcement.
Developing restorative justice
45. There is no legal framework at present in Northern
Ireland for restorative justice schemes. The RUC is strongly supportive
in principle of the development of effective restorative justice
schemes which are part of the overall criminal justice system
of Northern Ireland, have legitimacy, are done through legitimate
channels and offer appropriate protection for all concerned, including
victims and alleged offenders. It has already been involved in
setting up some schemes, working in partnership with various agencies,
and is keen to expand these.
Assistant Chief Constable McQuillan commented
"... There are, in a number of areas, or there have been
set up in a number of areas, what are euphemistically called 'restorative
justice schemes'; some of them established by individuals with
very good intent and good bona fides, who are interested
in this area and believe it is a way forward, and others where
there may be a paramilitary element in them...."
He added "... Additionally, there are suggestions
that there have been almost kangaroo courts held. In our experience
quite frankly, the kangaroo courts do not happen, individuals
are quite simply contacted and told that "it has been decided
that you have done something; you are to be punished for it"
and they are given the option of reporting and having the punishment
carried out, or, alternatively, they are simply taken out of their
home one night, or men have raided their home, and just beaten
up, or shot. There is no attempt whatsoever to put any sort of
gloss on the attack."
46. NIACRO also supported community restorative justice
programmes and could see a role for itself in either providing
or contributing to a partnership relationship with other bodies
in respect of such programmes. It also recognised that there was
an issue concerning programmes controlled by, or within, the community.
NIACRO would support these if they adhered to principles of non-violence
and human rights and they had "very, very transparent quality
standards and protocols."
47. Northern Ireland Office witnesses also had concerns
about possible difficulties with some community based restorative
It considered, though, that restorative justice might prove a
quicker route to resolving some cases, which might reduce community
antagonism towards the offender, thus lessening the likelihood
of paramilitary involvement.
48. We utterly condemn any activity by groups
on either side of the community that is aimed at intimidating
people into leaving the Province, or into relocating within the
Province. The evidence we have received demonstrates beyond peradventure
the misery caused by such illegal activity. There can be no justification
for such conduct in a civilised society committed to the defence
of internationally agreed human rights standards.
49. We welcome the steps being taken to seek to
eliminate this practice. We wholeheartedly commend the excellent
work being done by voluntary bodies, such as the Maranatha Community,
to assist those forced to relocate to Great Britain. We also commend
the work of NIACRO in relation to those under threat of punishment
beatings. We note that there are working links
between these two bodies, and with other voluntary sector groups.
We believe that these should be encouraged.
50. We welcome also the clear commitment by the
RUC to tackling this problem. It described the position thus:
"There is no doubt
that intimidation in general and especially those cases where
individuals are forced to flee their homes is a significant problem
and one we treat very seriously. It is also a difficult problem
to detect and prevent unless there is real support from the wider
community in the areas in question."
We agree that this problem will only be overcome
when the community as a whole rallies behind the forces of law
and order. We hope that the forthcoming changes in the police
force in Northern Ireland will create a climate conducive to this,
and enable the progress made to date by the RUC to be built on.
51. Our evidence also shows some of the difficulties
faced in tackling the problem. It is vital, though, that it is
not simply ignored. As Professor Kennedy commented:
"Turning a Nelsonian
blind eye to the problem of paramilitary domination of certain
areas, including the practice of exiling, is a gross betrayal
of some of the most vulnerable, powerless and disadvantaged members
of our society."
He also said:
"We need to break
the silence, at all levels of society here. There has to be a
fundamental debate about the gravity of the problems posed by
paramilitary organisation in this society, in relation to children,
individual adults, families and communities. The governments in
Belfast, Dublin and London have a major responsibility here. So
also do the media and community groups."
We agree, and hope that this Report might provide
a focus for such a debate. Greater publicity for the activities
of paramilitaries in terms of human rights abuses, driven by closer
attention being given to the problem by organisations and groups
concerned with human rights in the Province, could clearly play
a significant part in this process.
52. While it is undoubtedly the case that not
all those subject to intimidation are paragons of virtue, arbitrarily
and summarily cast out of the community in which they live, to
the concern and dismay of their neighbours
(a claim frequently made by apologists for paramilitary 'law enforcers'),
this is not the point. It is a fundamental tenet of human rights
law that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing .... by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law", to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty according to law and to specific rights in relation
to their defence.
However serious the allegations against them, everyone is entitled
to these protections: the summary 'justice' of the paramilitaries
is a contempt of these rights.
53. The problem is inextricably bound up with
the legacy of thirty years of terrorism and a recent Royal Ulster
Constabulary report provides evidence that a majority of the organised
criminal gangs operating in the Province have current or historic
links to republican or loyalist paramilitaries. The single greatest
contribution to tackling the problem of paramilitary exclusions
will be enhanced public confidence in the rule of law. By itself,
though, this is unlikely to be enough. The influence of the paramilitaries
will have to be weakened generally. The new Organised Crime Task
Force, and the promised crackdown on organised crime, will have
an important part to play in this. Measures to tackle the economic
deprivation that appears to have provided the paramilitaries with
fertile recruiting grounds may also be relevant.
54. As Mr Ingram observed in the Parliamentary
Answer quoted earlier in this Report,
paramilitary intimidation is more easily stopped when all members
of the community stand together. Another key element is that the
police are in a position, which they are not at present, to produce
in court sufficient credible evidence in relation to identifiable
individuals to secure convictions. To improve the current position,
Professor Kennedy called
for "a campaign of support for the police, where most of
the political parties, with the likely exception of the paramilitary
political parties, accepted their responsibilities to support
just and fair policing." We support this call.
55. We are convinced that there is a need for
a greater degree of focus and co-ordination on the very real problems
faced by those forced from their homes by paramilitary intimidation.
At present there appears to be no clear public policy on how to
handle this difficult human problem, which is one of long standing.
In this context, it is perhaps noteworthy that a 1991 report from
the British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body
drew attention, amongst other matters, to:
- the importance of assistance to young people
coming from Northern Ireland as a result of paramilitary activity
receiving further study and support;
- the problems of acceptance and assimilation
which may be faced in Great Britain by members of the Unionist
community, who regard themselves as 'British' rather than 'Irish';
- the need to improve information for those
coming to major British cities from Northern Ireland.
56. The cross-departmental strategy being developed
by the Executive should improve focus and co-ordination in respect
of those relocating within the Province. However, a mechanism
is undoubtedly also needed to help improve arrangements in Great
At present, no one agency in Great Britain has responsibility
for policy on this issue. We recommend that the Government take
steps to establish a focal point with responsibility for co-ordinating
both the development of policy in this area and the activities
of government departments and agencies, local government and other
bodies, including statutory bodies and voluntary associations.
Such a focal point could also bring together representatives of
all the bodies and groups concerned, with a view to seeking to
draw up guidelines aimed at ensuring that victims of paramilitary
intimidation forced to come from Northern Ireland to Great Britain
receive appropriate assistance and support.
57. One of the functions of this Report is to
highlight the plight of victims of paramilitary intimidation,
particularly those forced to leave their homes, and the need for
a more supportive response to this largely hidden legacy of the
Troubles. In view of the seriousness of the problem of paramilitary
intimidation in Northern Ireland, we recommend that this Report,
and the relevant Government responses, be further considered by
Report, 28 February 2001, Vol. 363, Col. 890-1. See also the
evidence given by the Secretary of State on 5 April 2000 (HC 409-i
(1999-2000) at Q 2 and Ev. p. 14. Back
3 Ev. p.
67, 70. Back
Press Release, 6 March 2001. Back
to subsequently in this Report as 'Maranatha'. Back
6 Q 27. Back
7 Q 20. Back
for example, the Base 2 statistics at Appendix 8, p. 98. See
also Q20. Back
9 Ev. p.
p. 3. Back
p. 19-20. Back
p. 53, 54. Back
13 Q 14. Back
14 Q 23.
See also Q 26 and Appendix 8, p. 100. Back
15 Q 87. Back
16 Q 88.
See also Q 90. Back
p. 18. Back
18 Q 67. Back
19 Q 21. Back
20 Q 22.
See also Q 37, 38. Back
p. 54. Back
p. 2. Back
23 Q 21.
See also Ev. p. 53. Back
24 Q 20. Back
25 Q 19. Back
409-i (1999-2000), p. 14. Back
p. Appendix 8, p. 98. Back
p. 1. Back
29 Q 6-12. Back
30 Q 67,
p. 18, 22. See also Q 71-72, 76. Back
32 Q 78-79. Back
33 Q 76. Back
34 Q 77. Back
35 Q 284.
See also Q 277. Back
36 Q 281. Back
37 Q 282. Back
p. 66 and Q 172. Back
Ev. p. 54 and 67. Back
6, p. 90. Back
41 Q 73. Back
42 Q 82. Back
p. 54. Back
44 Q 12-13,
16, 22. Back
45 Q 50. Back
46 Q 17. Back
47 Q 32. Back
48 Q 42-46. Back
p. 70. Back
Acquisition of Satisfactory Houses Scheme. Back
for Purchase of Evacuated Dwellings. Back
a summary of the purpose of these schemes, see Ev. p. 70. Back
Report, Northern Ireland Assembly, 26 February 2001, Vol. 9, p.
315. See also Appendix 4, p. 85. Back
54 Q 80. Back
6, p. 91. Back
56 Q 27. Back
p. 54. Q 253. Back
58 Q 265. Back
59 Q 25. Back
60 Q 26.
See also Q 28, 34 and 297. Back
61 Q 27. Back
62 Q 53. Back
63 Q 276. Back
64 Q 86.
See also Q 117-118 and Q 126-127. Back
65 Q 84. Back
Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of
67 Q 143.
See also Q 157. Back
p. 38. Back
p. 38. See also Appendix 7, p. 92. Back
70 Q 176.
See also Q 310. Back
71 Q 158.
See also Q 232-233. Back
1, p. 83. Back
8, p. 98. Back
p. 39 and Q 173. See also Q 183-184. This report is now expected
to be completed in April 2001. Back
p. 70. Back
p. 3. See also Q 46. Back
77 Q 290-293. Back
p. 54. Back
details of the functions of such a Unit, as proposed by New Dialogue,
see Appendix 10, p. 101. Back
p. 38-39. Back
81 Q 31-32. Back
82 Q 20. Back
83 Q 30. Back
84 Q 192,
199 to 202. Back
p. 39. See also Q 240. Back
p. 39. Q163-169. Back
87 Q 32.
NIACRO has had no such case within the context of Base 2 (Q 177). Back
88 Q 132. Back
89 Q 119.
See also Q 133. Back
90 Q 224-226. Back
91 Q 276. Back
92 Q 311. Back
93 Q 51.
See also Q 211-212. Back
p. 23. See also Q 92. Back
95 Q 93.
See also Q 107, 137. Back
p. 55. Back
p. 58. Back
for example, the concerns expressed in the Northern Ireland Assembly
relating to alleged drugs dealers forced by paramilitaries from
their homes. Official Report, Northern Ireland Assembly, 26 February
2001, Vol. 9, p. 315. Back
6, European Convention on Human Rights. Back
Q 258. Back
p. 58. Back
from the British-Irish Inter-Parliamentary Body, Committee C on
Economic and Social Affairs, The Irish in Britain, No. 5, April
Q 47. Back