EMERGENCY AID: THE KOSOVO CRISIS
The Department's contribution to the international
response
5. Figure 1, which shows the rapid build-up and return
of Kosovo refugees, indicates the scale of the humanitarian crisis
in the region. As people left Kosovo in large numbers, the immediate
priority was to provide shelter for refugees, relieve suffering
and save lives. The Department's aid effort during the refugee
crisis included: assisting in the establishment of refugee camps
for 40,000 people in Macedonia; providing humanitarian supplies
of food (about 4 million person days), tents, blankets and health
kits (for 210,000 people for 3 months); organising over 60 airlifts
of humanitarian supplies; and operating field offices in Albania
and Macedonia to manage operations in the region, make local aid
interventions and assist in the co-ordination of the international
aid effort. Because substantial numbers of refugees lived with
host families in Albania and Macedonia, part of the aid effort
involved support, such as food and health services, for those
communities.[4]
Figure 1: The build up of refugees from
Kosovo
The number of refugees built up quickly,
and dispersed quickly after KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999.
Most refugees were accommodated in Albania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
Excludes refugees who left the region. By 9 June
the Yugoslav government reported 60,000 refugees in Serbia, although
this was not confirmed by the United Nations. Figures for displacement
within Kosovo are not available.
Source: C&AG's report, Figure 2
6. A month after KFOR (the NATO peace implementation
force in Kosovo) entered Kosovo the United Nations estimated that
through spontaneous and organised repatriation, a total of 650,000
Kosovo refugees had returned to the province. The international
aid effort then moved from refugee support to efforts within Kosovo
to assist the refugees who returned, concentrating initially on
work which could be done quickly to provide shelter, restore water
and electricity and to encourage economic activity.[5]
7. The Department's field office in Pristina, Kosovo,
was established just four days after the NATO air campaign was
suspended and two days after KFOR troops entered the province.
The Department played an active role in establishing the international
presence in Kosovo. They provided communications and other office
equipment to the UN Mission in Kosovo during their first week
in Pristina. The focus of the Department's aid effort in Kosovo
was on emergency rehabilitation and recovery. British military
units, funded by the Department, carried out immediate repairs
to a power station, water pumping stations and health clinics
so that essential services could start functioning.[6]
8. Representatives of key international agencies
involved in co-ordinating the aid effort told the National Audit
Office that the Department's support had been appropriate and
well targeted to cover demands. For instance, air handling and
convoy teams provided by the Department had filled gaps in the
capacity of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
organisation, and the Department's support had focussed on areas—mines,
the health sector, water supply and electricity distribution—in
which other donors had been less active. They also commented positively
about the contribution of the Department's field offices. In particular,
they had been on the ground promptly, they had helped co-ordinate
the aid effort, and they had been able to start projects quickly
because they had been able to act on their own initiative without
referring back to headquarters.[7]
9. We asked the Department what lessons they had
learned from the operation. They thought that this crisis had
shown that an immediate response needed preparedness in terms
of call-down contracts, experience of working closely with the
military and rapid decision-making. The scale was such that at
first international organisations found themselves less able to
respond flexibly and quickly than a bilateral agency is sometimes
able to do. The Department said that they found it easier to deploy
capacity to the field than the international organisations because
they had contracts in place, experienced people available and
a history of delegated decision-making, backed up by robust systems.
A division of labour was emerging whereby two or three major donors
could respond quickly, and others would help sustain the longer
term response.[8]
10. As regards co-ordination, the international system
had been unable to provide authoritative centralised assessments
of, for example, the numbers of refugees and where they were.
Without this information the response had been fragmented and
co-ordination had depended on who had the capacity on the ground.
The Department wanted the international arrangements to be clearer,
and they were now putting effort into their dialogue with the
United Nations to set up information exchange systems. Within
the UK, the Department told us that they were working closely
with their colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign
Office to bring together some collective capacity for responding,
particularly to post-conflict situations.[9]
11. We asked whether the European Union was organised
to carry out relief operations. The Department noted that the
European Commission was the world's largest humanitarian contributor
but because of its procedures it could take time for it to mobilise
grants. There was a reasonable prospect of good co-ordination
and co-operation among European Union members, but joint humanitarian
action would probably slow things up. The Department had also
put a lot of effort into strengthening the UN Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, and in Europe looked to the EC Humanitarian
Office and the new EU Crisis Management Committee to provide co-ordinating
mechanisms.[10]
Conclusions
12. The Department were at the forefront of the international
response to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and neighbouring
countries. Through the Crown Agents they were on the ground quickly,
and made an immediate impact. They were active in providing support
to the refugees in Macedonia and Albania; they were instrumental
in co-ordinating the international response; and they provided
practical support to the UN as it sought to establish itself in
Kosovo. They also provided funds and practical support for a wide
range of humanitarian relief projects in the region, including
those run by the British Military. We commend all those involved
for their efforts.
13. The international response to the crisis was
fragmented and co-ordination depended on who had the capacity
on the ground. There was a lack of clarity about the relative
roles and responsibilities of the international organisations
involved and their response was slow. The Department will need
to press the United Nations to set up the required information
exchange systems and to strengthen the UN Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs.
4 C&AG's Report, para 1.11 and Figure 4 Back
5 C&AG's
Report, paras 1.10, 1.14 Back
6 ibid,
paras 1.15, 2.4, 2.6 Back
7 C&AG's
Report, paras 2.15-2.16 Back
8 Evidence,
Qs 68, 121-122 Back
9 Evidence,
Qs 115-116, 118, 123 Back
10 Evidence,
Qs 122-125 Back
| 
