House of Commons - Public Accounts

Select Committee on Public Accounts Fifteenth Report

FIFTEENTH REPORT

The Committee of Public Accounts has agreed to the following Report:—

STRATEGIC RAIL AUTHORITY: ACTION TO IMPROVE PASSENGER

RAIL SERVICES

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Between February 1996 and March 1997 passenger rail services in Great Britain were franchised to 25 private sector train operating companies under franchise agreements negotiated by the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF). The agreements set out the services to be provided in return for subsidies, some £1 billion from OPRAF and £0.3 billion from local Passenger Transport Executives in 1999-2000. The agreements and the Railways Act 1993 also gave OPRAF powers to take action in the event of poor performance or non-compliance with franchise terms.[1]

2. OPRAF was replaced in February 2001 by a new Strategic Rail Authority with increased powers to improve rail services. From July 1999, pending the passage of legislation, the Authority operated in shadow form, using the powers of OPRAF and of the British Railways Board, which it subsumed. In 1999, the Authority began a process to replace the existing franchise agreements by inviting some train operating companies to rebid voluntarily for their franchise in competition with other bidders.[2]

3. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General,[3] we examined OPRAF's and the Authority's actions to improve passenger rail services. Since our examination, in March 2001, the Authority has also published its Strategic Agenda.[4]

Having regard to this agenda, there are three main points to make on the basis of our examination.

The Authority needs to move with greater urgency in bringing about improvements in services. The Authority's Strategic Agenda sets out its view of how rail services might be improved over the longer term. Although the Authority has an objective of 15 out of 16 trains being on time, it considers that on some lines this could take as long as 20 years to achieve. The Authority should set demanding and measurable objectives for improvement to increase the pace of change.

The Authority needs more effective levers to obtain better value for the public money going into the industry and continuous improvement in rail services. The Authority plans to spend some £28 billion of public money on the railway over the next ten years, almost half of the total investment in the railways over that period. Existing franchises have not so far provided the Authority with the leverage necessary to deliver a good service for passengers and the Authority must look to the new franchises to deliver a better service in the future. To secure better services and to give value for the public funds received, it is important that the franchise replacement programme is not delayed, and that it achieves the Authority's aim of doubling bonus and penalty rates, bringing punctuality within its enforcement powers, and providing for clawback should train operators earn excess profits.

The Authority should take a broader view of passenger interests. The Authority's Strategic Agenda now recognises that to the public, performance has come to mean something more than the train turning up on time. Much of the Authority's oversight is nevertheless focussed on punctuality and reliability. These are important issues for passengers, but their experience of rail travel is affected by other factors such as cleanliness, overcrowding, seat reservations, late running trains failing to make scheduled stops, and difficulties in obtaining redress for poor quality service. The Authority should target improvements in the full range of service factors which impact on passenger satisfaction levels.

4. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

The Authority's strategic oversight of the rail industry

(ii) "Transport 2010", the Government's ten year plan published in July 2000, increases planned spending on the railways to a total of £60 billion over the following ten years. Nearly half of this amount, some £28 billion, will be funded by the taxpayer through the Authority, including a grant of £4.7 billion direct from the Authority to Railtrack (paragraph 20).

(iii) The Authority intends to publish in the Autumn a Strategic Plan setting out its plans for using this money to improve the railway, but the only specific target we were given was an "aspirational" target that at least 15 out of 16 trains (93.75 per cent) would be on time, compared to around 90 per cent in the two years to March 2000. The Authority considers that some companies may need as long as 20 years to achieve this target, although it has secured commitments to earlier improvements in the two franchises that have been re-let to date. The Authority should set more demanding timescales for improvement, and interim targets for progress towards the 15 out of 16 target where it cannot immediately be achieved (paragraph 21).

Passenger services

(v) Complaints by passengers to train operating companies increased to more than one million in 1998-1999, and complaints to the regional Rail Passengers Committees increased by 127 per cent between 1994-95 and 1998-99. The Authority should establish why the number of complaints is rising, and the implications for the terms of new franchises being negotiated (paragraph 34).

(vi) It is not always straightforward for passengers to obtain compensation. For example, passengers without season tickets may have difficulty proving that they travelled because their tickets have been collected at the end of the journey by station staff or a ticket machine. While proper protection is needed against fraud, the Authority and the train operating companies should clarify compensation arrangements, for example by publicising details of the type of evidence that would be acceptable as proof of travel (paragraph 35).

(vii) Compensation for delays may be paid in the form of vouchers that can be put towards the cost of future travel, but such vouchers are of little use to passengers not planning another journey. The Authority's assurance that new franchises will provide for compensation to be payable in cash is welcome (paragraph 36).

(viii) The Authority's surveys of passengers show that the level of fares is a key concern. The Authority's regulation of key fares has contained average fare increases but there are significant price differentials between regions, for reasons that are largely historical. Fares in London can be almost four times as high as an equivalent journey in Merseyside for example. The Authority is concerned that lower fares might generate more demand when services are already overcrowded, and therefore has no plans to reduce these differentials. In our view passengers should not be expected to accept poor service at high cost, and the Authority should focus on providing a good quality service at a reasonable cost for all passengers (paragraph 37).

Overcrowding

(x) Current franchise agreements offer limited scope for addressing the problem of overcrowding. It can be financially advantageous for some train companies to pay penalties for not providing the agreed train capacity rather than increase the size of their train fleet. The Authority should set targets to reduce overcrowding, and provide flexibility within new franchises to allow the agreed capacity levels to be changed in response to changes in demand, where the network can accommodate additional capacity. New agreements should provide stronger penalties to ensure that companies actually deliver the agreed capacity levels (paragraph 48).

(xi) On a number of services, including many London commuter lines and some InterCity services, passengers have to stand because there are insufficient seats. The Authority considers such services to be overcrowded only when the number of standing passengers exceeds a specified level, which is based on an allowance, dating from British Rail, of 0.55 square metres of space for each standing passenger. Some companies are seeking to increase train capacity by reducing the number of seats. The Authority should recognise the importance which travellers attach to having a seat, especially when they have paid high fares for a long inter-city journey or are commuting to or from work. The Authority should scrutinise critically any proposals from companies that reduce the number of seats on trains, and encourage companies to use better methods of reducing overcrowding wherever possible, such as longer trains and double-decker carriages (paragraph 49).

THE AUTHORITY'S STRATEGIC OVERSIGHT OF THE RAIL INDUSTRY

5. The Railways Act 1993 changed the delivery of passenger rail services, resulting in:

twenty five train operating companies, which are responsible for the provision of passenger rail services, and receive their income principally from fares and from subsidies paid by the Authority;

Railtrack, which owns and operates the railway network;

four rolling stock leasing companies, which own the bulk of rolling stock and lease it to the train operating companies.[5]

6. The industry is overseen by a number of public bodies. Initially OPRAF was responsible for awarding, and then administering, franchises to train operating companies. The Authority took on this responsibility in 1999. The franchises set out minimum requirements for the service that each company will provide in return for subsidies expected to reduce over time and in some cases to be replaced by payments to the Exchequer. The Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) is responsible for granting licenses to operate trains and the railway network, regulating access to the network and the charges that train operators pay for its use, preventing anti-competitive behaviour, and promoting consumer interests and the benefits of an integrated network. Seven Passenger Transport Executives support railway services in metropolitan areas, and the Health and Safety Executive has lead responsibility for safety.[6]

7. We asked the Authority whether the process of re-franchising would address the complicated structure of the railway industry. The Authority stated that re-franchising was being carried out within the existing architecture of the industry. The Deputy Prime Minister had asked the Authority to look at the problem areas, and where the existing architecture could be made to work better. In response the Authority had established five working groups covering topics such as performance and the Railtrack contractual regime, and a group looking at the scale of the agenda and whether it is capable of being delivered. These are now constituted as the Rail Industry Group, chaired by the Authority's Chairman. The findings of these groups would be incorporated into the Authority's strategic plan. The Authority was not in a position to change the structure of the industry but aimed to make it work better.[7]

8. In "Transport 2010", the Government's ten year plan for transport published in July 2000, spending on the railways was planned to increase to £60 billion over the following ten years, of which £28 billion would be funded by the Authority directly. The plan also set out the targets for growth and quality that the railways must meet to deliver their part of the overall transport plan. In March 2001 the Authority published for consultation a shadow Strategic Plan setting out the action to be taken in 2001 and beyond on refranchising, freight development and infrastructure. A full Strategic Plan would be published in Autumn 2001.[8]

9. Part of the Authority's investment in the railways is a direct grant of £4.7 billion to Railtrack. The Authority said that the grant was for the renewal of the West Coast Main Line and of signalling and telecommunications. This expenditure would be within the jurisdiction of the Rail Regulator, and it was for the Regulator to ensure that the money was spent appropriately.[9]

10. Data recorded for the Passenger's Charter show that punctuality improved in both 1996-97 and 1997-98, around the time of the initial franchising of services, but declined since then. From October 1997 OPRAF also collected and analysed data on the lateness of all passenger trains, in order to develop a better performance measure for punctuality. These data show that in the two years between April 1998 and March 2000, 87 per cent of trains arrived within five minutes of schedule. Over the same period, over 90 per cent of trains arrived within the Passenger's Charter standard of 10 minutes of their scheduled time for inter-city services or 5 minutes of their scheduled time for other services.[10]

11. In May 2000 the Authority announced an "aspirational" target of 15 out of 16 trains (93.75 per cent) arriving within five minutes of schedule (ten minutes for long distance trains). The Authority told us that it considered this target achievable as it was well within the bounds of normal railway operation for countries such as the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and France. The Authority was trying to achieve the target through franchise replacement. Of the two franchises replaced so far, one operator planned to achieve the target by 2004 and the other by 2010. However, achievement of the new target was dependent on improvements in the infrastructure, which could take a considerable amount of time, and in some cases it might well be 20 years before the target for punctuality was achieved.[11]

12. The Authority's March 2001 Strategic Agenda reiterated the 15 out of 16 punctuality target, and identified it as one of the Authority's priorities in delivering the rail component of the Government's ten year transport plan. However, the strategic agenda did not commit to achieving this target within ten years in every case. It recognised that the target was demanding and might take years to deliver nationally, and stated that each replacement franchise agreement would include an agreed timetable for when the target would be achieved.[12]

13. Franchises provide the Authority with two main ways of securing improvements in services:

Each franchise agreement provides for incentive and penalty regimes under which the Authority rewards good performance or penalises poor performance in respect of punctuality, reliability and train capacity.

The Authority has enforcement powers allowing it to take action against companies in response to failure to meet capacity or reliability benchmarks, or to meet other franchise conditions.

Additionally, under franchise agreements all train operating companies are required to have a Passenger's Charter with arrangements to compensate passengers for poor performance. The Authority can take enforcement action in the event of non-compliance.[13]

14. These powers have done little to improve performance. The performance benchmarks which trigger enforcement action were largely based on the performance achieved by British Rail, and the incentive and penalty regimes are therefore the only mechanism to promote directly improvements beyond these levels. However, consultants employed by the Authority had found that even where trains were punctual the maximum incentive payment would still represent only 2 to 3 per cent of an operator's revenue. They concluded that the relationship between incentive payments and better performance was "mainly insignificant". Enforcement had sometimes had perverse effects, for example companies running trains very late to avoid breaching thresholds for cancellations, and thereby causing disruption to other services.[14]

15. On what action could be taken to make the incentives more effective, the Authority told us that in new franchises penalties would be doubled and the enforcement regime would be extended to punctuality. Whereas current franchises are open to amendment only with the consent of the franchisee and, where appropriate, a Passenger Transport Executive, new franchises would include provision for benchmarks to be raised throughout the life of the franchise to achieve continuous improvement in performance.[15]

16. The current franchises were awarded for periods of between five and 15 years and, with one exception, they have three or more years to run. In 1999, however, the Authority began a process of inviting some train operating companies to rebid voluntarily for their franchise in competition with outside bidders. The aim of this programme was to stimulate investment in additional capacity and improve the quality of service for passengers. The Authority also hoped to remedy shortcomings in the initial franchise arrangements.[16]

17. The Authority told us that the refranchising programme was proceeding apace. It had reached agreement with bidders for a replacement Chiltern Railways franchise and for the South Central Franchise. It had also announced a two year extension of the Midland Main Line franchise. These agreements had secured investment totalling more than £2 billion and planned improvements in services. The Authority expected to reach agreements with preferred bidders to replace a total of 18 franchises by the end of 2001.[17]

18. The Authority told us some companies had made good profits, for example South West Trains and the First Group, but others had found it extremely difficult to live with the current franchises. The first franchises had been let on more generous terms but as franchising progressed terms had become much tighter. Unlike the original franchises, new franchises would allow for profit sharing through the clawback of excess profits. The definition of excess profits was a matter for negotiation with each train operating company. When a company passed the benchmark over a five year period the Authority would claw back in the fifth year and keep doing so on a rolling five year basis.[18]

Conclusions

19. The current structure of the rail industry is complex with passenger rail services provided by 25 passenger train operators overseen by two government supervisory bodies and seven Passenger Transport Executives, with rail safety regulated separately by the Health and Safety Executive. The Authority has established the Rail Industry Group to help make this structure work better. The Authority will need to give leadership and direction to the Group, setting milestones for progress for the benefit of passengers.

20. "Transport 2010", the Government's ten year plan published in July 2000, increases planned spending on the railways to a total of £60 billion over the following ten years. Nearly half of this amount, some £28 billion, will be funded by the taxpayer through the Authority, including a grant of £4.7 billion direct from the Authority to Railtrack.

21. The Authority intends to publish in the Autumn a Strategic Plan setting out its plans for using this money to improve the railway, but the only specific target we were given was an "aspirational" target that at least 15 out of 16 trains (93.75 per cent) would be on time, compared to around 90 per cent in the two years to March 2000. The Authority considers that some companies may need as long as 20 years to achieve this target, although it has secured commitments to earlier improvements in the two franchises that have been re-let to date. The Authority should set more demanding timescales for improvement, and interim targets for progress towards the 15 out of 16 target where it cannot immediately be achieved.

PASSENGER SERVICES

22. The Authority believes that it would be prohibitively expensive to measure directly the actual quality of service experienced by passengers, for example by employing train and station inspectors. Instead, it has relied mainly on national surveys of passenger satisfaction. Train operating companies are also required, under the original franchise agreements, to commission independent passenger surveys, although the Authority has found the results of these surveys difficult to interpret.[19]

23. A first National Passenger Survey of 20,000 passengers was carried out in September 1999 and a second in March 2000. Key concerns identified were value-for-money, and the way companies responded to passengers' complaints. In addition to continuing six-monthly surveys the Authority was also piloting 'mystery shopping' for two train operating companies, in which passengers were paid to record and report on the service they received. In new franchises, companies would also have customer satisfaction targets, for example for the cleanliness of trains and of toilets.[20]

24. Passengers first address complaints about poor quality services to the train operating companies. In 1998-99 almost 1.1 million complaints were received, an increase of 8 per cent on 1997-98. Over half of the complaints received in 1998-99 were about punctuality and reliability, followed by the on-train environment (11 per cent) and fares (10 per cent). Comparable data do not exist for complaints to British Rail. However, the number of complaints received by the regional Rail Passengers Committees, which deal with passengers dissatisfied with responses from the train operating companies (and previously British Rail) increased by 127 per cent between 1994-95 and 1998-99, to nearly 19,000. The Authority acknowledged that many passenger complaints were not handled adequately, and that there was scope for early improvement. New franchises will require train operating companies to improve performance in this area.[21]

25. Under current Passengers' Charters travellers are entitled to compensation when trains are delayed by more than one hour. As part of the refranchising process the Authority was asking companies to make proposals to lower this limit. The new franchises for Chiltern and South Central provide for compensation after 30 minutes.[22]

26. On whether 30 minutes was too high a benchmark, the Authority thought that it was deliverable whereas a shorter one would be more difficult to administer. The benchmark was likely to be more acceptable the longer the journey, but compensation which took account of the length of individual journeys would be complex to administer, since where and when each journey started would have to be established and checked.[23]

27. The Authority was not aware how many passengers eligible for compensation actually made a claim. Generally train companies required a ticket as evidence before paying compensation. The Authority said that at peak times most passengers would be season ticket holders, but where passengers' tickets were collected by machines before a passenger exited the platform, passengers could use a side gate instead to retain their ticket. Up to four weeks free travel would be offered to some season ticket holders to compensate for the disruption following the Hatfield accident. Train operating companies and the Regional Rail Passenger Councils had agreed that "proof of travel" would be sufficient to support a claim, for example a letter from a passenger's employer confirming that they had travelled to work on that day. The Authority was trying to protect against widescale abuse but at the same time recognise that passengers may not have kept tickets.[24]

28. Under Passenger's Charters, companies can exclude bad performance days from their performance statistics by declaring them "void" and paying compensation to passengers. If a day were counted as void a season ticket holder would be compensated with an extra day's travel. In the case of individual tickets, a passenger claiming compensation would receive a voucher which could be used for future travel. This could be unfair on passengers who might not make a further journey with the company concerned, and the Authority confirmed that in replacing the franchises, provision was being made for compensation to be available in cash as well as vouchers.[25]

29. The second National Passenger Survey showed that 38 per cent of respondents were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which the train operating companies had dealt with delays. The industry's ten point plan for punctuality, published in November 1998, included an aim to improve information to passengers on delays. The Authority recognised the irritation caused to passengers when such information was unavailable or inaccurate, and improvements were being sought on franchise replacement. Some train operating companies were already introducing websites, which provided information to allow passengers to plan their journeys better, and the Authority was encouraging such initiatives.[26]

30. We asked the Authority about late-running trains which pass through a number of stations without stopping to make up lost time. The Authority said that this should not happen, although there had been occasions when drivers had forgotten to stop at stations. The Authority identified such events through its monitoring and could penalise train operating companies. If the number of such events exceeded the franchise benchmark the company would be subject to enforcement. The Authority was tightening up benchmarks in replacement franchises.[27]

31. The March 2000 National Passenger Survey showed that 36 per cent of respondents were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the value for money they received from their journey. Generally, fares had fallen slightly in real terms since the first franchising agreements were introduced - for example, 19 of the 25 train operating companies had reduced standard class fares since franchising.[28]

32. However, there were marked regional differences in the current level of fares. Fares per mile in Greater London were some 60 per cent higher than in the next most expensive region, the South East, and almost four times the fare per mile in Merseyside, the least expensive region. The Authority told us that these differentials reflected the position at privatisation, and that fares in London also had to be geared to those of London Transport. Around 40 per cent of fares were subject to regulation and under current policy fares should not increase by more than one per cent less than the retail price index. The Authority had no plans to change this policy. They did not wish to price people off the railway, but if fares were reduced more quickly the railway might not cope with the extra demand.[29]

Conclusions

33. The Authority has relied mainly on six-monthly satisfaction surveys to monitor the quality of service experienced by passengers. In two companies it is also piloting "mystery shopping", where passengers are paid to record and report on the service they receive. The Authority should encourage the use of this and other mechanisms, such as introducing forms at stations on which passengers could comment about service, to obtain more direct feedback on the quality of services provided.

34. Complaints by passengers to train operating companies increased to more than one million in 1998-1999, and complaints to the regional Rail Passengers Committees increased by 127 per cent between 1994-95 and 1998-99. The Authority should establish why the number of complaints is rising, and the implications for the terms of new franchises being negotiated.

35. It is not always straightforward for passengers to obtain compensation. For example, passengers without season tickets may have difficulty proving that they travelled because their tickets have been collected at the end of the journey by station staff or a ticket machine. While proper protection is needed against fraud, the Authority and the train operating companies should clarify compensation arrangements, for example by publicising details of the type of evidence that would be acceptable as proof of travel.

36. Compensation for delays may be paid in the form of vouchers that can be put towards the cost of future travel, but such vouchers are of little use to passengers not planning another journey. The Authority's assurance that new franchises will provide for compensation to be payable in cash is welcome.

37. The Authority's surveys of passengers show that the level of fares is a key concern. The Authority's regulation of key fares has contained average fare increases but there are significant price differentials between regions, for reasons that are largely historical. Fares in London can be almost four times as high as an equivalent journey in Merseyside for example. The Authority is concerned that lower fares might generate more demand when services are already overcrowded, and therefore has no plans to reduce these differentials. In our view passengers should not be expected to accept poor service at high cost, and the Authority should focus on providing a good quality service at a reasonable cost for all passengers.

OVERCROWDING

38. There are no national measures of overcrowding on trains. Franchises require overcrowding to be measured only on peak time commuter trains arriving in London and, since 1998, on some Scottish commuter trains. Manual passenger counts are carried out once each Autumn, the peak period for passenger rail travel, but these are subject to considerable inaccuracy. Instead, some companies were installing systems to weigh trains, to give a better idea of the number of people on them.[30]

39. Overcrowding, where measured, grew in the four years to March 2000 and four operators exceeded the Authority's overcrowding limits in 1999. Companies added around seven per cent more services to their timetables but rail journeys grew by 24 per cent.[31]

40. To calculate overcrowding, the Authority compares the number of passengers in a carriage to its capacity, which consists of the number of seats in the carriage plus an allowance for standing room for passengers whose journeys started within 20 minutes of the monitoring point. A typical modern carriage, for example, has around 76 seats and standing room for a further 28 passengers. This allowance for standing room of some 0.55 square metres came from British Rail standards.[32]

41. Under the current franchise agreements overcrowding does not lead directly to enforcement action or penalties. However, for 15 of the 25 train operating companies the Authority seeks to encourage them to address overcrowding through an incentive payment regime, which imposes a financial penalty if they provide too few carriages during peak hours. Consultants commissioned by the Authority in 1999 to review the incentive regimes concluded that while in some cases the regime ensured high fleet availability, some companies found it financially advantageous to reduce their fleet and risk incurring a penalty. Overcrowding is being addressed in the negotiation of new franchises.[33]

42. The Authority said that it would be impossible to supply seats for all passengers. Connex had taken some seats out of trains to see if that provided a more comfortable journey for passengers by increasing capacity through standing. The best way to improve overcrowding was increased capacity through more and longer trains. One of the key elements in the franchise replacement programme was to provide capacity that matched forecasts of passenger growth. South West Trains, for example, were looking at double-decker trains, which, if the company was successful in securing the replacement franchise, might be operating in five to ten years.[34]

43. Within existing franchises, if a train operating company put forward a train plan that required more investment, the Authority could pay for 80 per cent of this investment. Thameslink, for example, had bought some extra trains and switched others to where they were most needed. But the Authority recognised that these were only short-term solutions and in the long term the issue was about the capacity of the railway infrastructure.[35]

44. The Authority acknowledged that there was a problem with the acceptance of new rolling stock which would relieve overcrowding. One issue was whether Railtrack had provided sufficient information to rolling stock companies and manufacturers so that design and manufacture could proceed; another was whether the rolling stock actually met requirements once delivered. Some new trains brought into service in the Spring of 2000 had been withdrawn because of poor performance. In the longer term the Authority was encouraging manufacturers and Railtrack to share more information to make the acceptance process smoother.[36]

45. We asked the Authority whether there were safety concerns about large numbers of people standing in carriages. The Authority said that safety was a matter for the Health and Safety Executive, but that rolling stock was designed to run safely even when fully loaded. There was no statutory safety limit on the number of passengers that could be carried on trains, and the Health and Safety Executive had found no evidence that overcrowding on trains was dangerous.[37]

46. In response to concerns about people standing on long journeys, for example from Glasgow to London, the Authority said that the purchase of a ticket did not guarantee a seat, but that in the new franchise agreements it would be looking at the train plans to make sure that there was adequate capacity.[38]

Conclusions

47. The franchises for London and some Scottish commuter services require overcrowding to be measured, but other franchises do not. Where overcrowding is monitored it is done through an inaccurate manual count of passengers made once each Autumn. The Authority should introduce more accurate mechanisms for measuring overcrowding, such as weighing trains. It should also monitor overcrowding on a wider range of services, including key long distance services, and over the course of the year.

48. Current franchise agreements offer limited scope for addressing the problem of overcrowding. It can be financially advantageous for some train companies to pay penalties for not providing the agreed train capacity rather than increase the size of their train fleet. The Authority should set targets to reduce overcrowding, and provide flexibility within new franchises to allow the agreed capacity levels to be changed in response to changes in demand, where the network can accommodate additional capacity. New agreements should provide stronger penalties to ensure that companies actually deliver the agreed capacity levels.

49. On a number of services, including many London commuter lines and some InterCity services, passengers have to stand because there are insufficient seats. The Authority considers such services to be overcrowded only when the number of standing passengers exceeds a specified level, which is based on an allowance, dating from British Rail, of 0.55 square metres of space for each standing passenger. Some companies are seeking to increase train capacity by reducing the number of seats. The Authority should recognise the importance which travellers attach to having a seat, especially when they have paid high fares for a long inter-city journey or are commuting to or from work. The Authority should scrutinise critically any proposals from companies that reduce the number of seats on trains, and encourage companies to use better methods of reducing overcrowding wherever possible, such as longer trains and double-decker carriages.

1 C&AG's Report (HC 842, 1999-2000) paras 1.2, 1.6 and 1.13-1.16, Figures 2 to 4 Back

2 ibid, paras 1, 4 and 1.3-1.4, Evidence, pp 1-3 Back

3 ibid Back

4 A strategic agenda, Strategic Rail Authority, March 2001 Back

5 C&AG's Report, para 1.2 Back

6 ibid, paras 1.2-1.4 and 1.6 Back

7 Evidence, Qs 20, 45-48, A strategic agenda, p13 Back

8 Evidence, pp 1-3, Evidence, Qs 16, 20, 43, A strategic agenda Back

9 Evidence, Qs 16-20 Back

10 C&AG's Report, paras 2.1 and 2.2 and Figure 5 Back

11 C&AG's Report, para 2.7, Evidence, Qs 2-7, 195 Back

12 A strategic agenda, pp 28, 35 Back