PASSENGER SERVICES
22. The Authority believes that it would be prohibitively
expensive to measure directly the actual quality of service experienced
by passengers, for example by employing train and station inspectors.
Instead, it has relied mainly on national surveys of passenger
satisfaction. Train operating companies are also required, under
the original franchise agreements, to commission independent passenger
surveys, although the Authority has found the results of these
surveys difficult to interpret.[19]
23. A first National Passenger Survey of 20,000 passengers
was carried out in September 1999 and a second in March 2000.
Key concerns identified were value-for-money, and the way companies
responded to passengers' complaints. In addition to continuing
six-monthly surveys the Authority was also piloting 'mystery shopping'
for two train operating companies, in which passengers were paid
to record and report on the service they received. In new franchises,
companies would also have customer satisfaction targets, for example
for the cleanliness of trains and of toilets.[20]
24. Passengers first address complaints about poor
quality services to the train operating companies. In 1998-99
almost 1.1 million complaints were received, an increase
of 8 per cent on 1997-98. Over half of the complaints
received in 1998-99 were about punctuality and reliability, followed
by the on-train environment (11 per cent) and fares (10 per cent).
Comparable data do not exist for complaints to British Rail. However,
the number of complaints received by the regional Rail Passengers
Committees, which deal with passengers dissatisfied with responses
from the train operating companies (and previously British Rail)
increased by 127 per cent between 1994-95 and 1998-99,
to nearly 19,000. The Authority acknowledged that many passenger
complaints were not handled adequately, and that there was scope
for early improvement. New franchises will require train operating
companies to improve performance in this area.[21]
25. Under current Passengers' Charters travellers
are entitled to compensation when trains are delayed by more than
one hour. As part of the refranchising process the Authority was
asking companies to make proposals to lower this limit. The new
franchises for Chiltern and South Central provide for compensation
after 30 minutes.[22]
26. On whether 30 minutes was too high a benchmark,
the Authority thought that it was deliverable whereas a shorter
one would be more difficult to administer. The benchmark was likely
to be more acceptable the longer the journey, but compensation
which took account of the length of individual journeys would
be complex to administer, since where and when each journey started
would have to be established and checked.[23]
27. The Authority was not aware how many passengers
eligible for compensation actually made a claim. Generally train
companies required a ticket as evidence before paying compensation.
The Authority said that at peak times most passengers would be
season ticket holders, but where passengers' tickets were collected
by machines before a passenger exited the platform, passengers
could use a side gate instead to retain their ticket. Up to four
weeks free travel would be offered to some season ticket holders
to compensate for the disruption following the Hatfield accident.
Train operating companies and the Regional Rail Passenger Councils
had agreed that "proof of travel" would be sufficient
to support a claim, for example a letter from a passenger's employer
confirming that they had travelled to work on that day. The Authority
was trying to protect against widescale abuse but at the same
time recognise that passengers may not have kept tickets.[24]
28. Under Passenger's Charters, companies can exclude
bad performance days from their performance statistics by declaring
them "void" and paying compensation to passengers. If
a day were counted as void a season ticket holder would be compensated
with an extra day's travel. In the case of individual tickets,
a passenger claiming compensation would receive a voucher which
could be used for future travel. This could be unfair on passengers
who might not make a further journey with the company concerned,
and the Authority confirmed that in replacing the franchises,
provision was being made for compensation to be available in cash
as well as vouchers.[25]
29. The second National Passenger Survey showed that
38 per cent of respondents were either dissatisfied
or very dissatisfied with the way in which the train operating
companies had dealt with delays. The industry's ten point plan
for punctuality, published in November 1998, included an
aim to improve information to passengers on delays. The Authority
recognised the irritation caused to passengers when such information
was unavailable or inaccurate, and improvements were being sought
on franchise replacement. Some train operating companies were
already introducing websites, which provided information to allow
passengers to plan their journeys better, and the Authority was
encouraging such initiatives.[26]
30. We asked the Authority about late-running trains
which pass through a number of stations without stopping to make
up lost time. The Authority said that this should not happen,
although there had been occasions when drivers had forgotten to
stop at stations. The Authority identified such events through
its monitoring and could penalise train operating companies. If
the number of such events exceeded the franchise benchmark the
company would be subject to enforcement. The Authority was tightening
up benchmarks in replacement franchises.[27]
31. The March 2000 National Passenger Survey
showed that 36 per cent of respondents were either dissatisfied
or very dissatisfied with the value for money they received from
their journey. Generally, fares had fallen slightly in real terms
since the first franchising agreements were introduced - for example,
19 of the 25 train operating companies had reduced standard class
fares since franchising.[28]
32. However, there were marked regional differences
in the current level of fares. Fares per mile in Greater London
were some 60 per cent higher than in the next most expensive
region, the South East, and almost four times the fare per mile
in Merseyside, the least expensive region. The Authority told
us that these differentials reflected the position at privatisation,
and that fares in London also had to be geared to those of London
Transport. Around 40 per cent of fares were subject to regulation
and under current policy fares should not increase by more than
one per cent less than the retail price index. The Authority had
no plans to change this policy. They did not wish to price people
off the railway, but if fares were reduced more quickly the railway
might not cope with the extra demand.[29]
Conclusions
33. The Authority has relied mainly on six-monthly
satisfaction surveys to monitor the quality of service experienced
by passengers. In two companies it is also piloting "mystery
shopping", where passengers are paid to record and report
on the service they receive. The Authority should encourage the
use of this and other mechanisms, such as introducing forms at
stations on which passengers could comment about service, to obtain
more direct feedback on the quality of services provided.
34. Complaints by passengers to train operating companies
increased to more than one million in 1998-1999, and complaints
to the regional Rail Passengers Committees increased by 127 per cent
between 1994-95 and 1998-99. The Authority should establish why
the number of complaints is rising, and the implications for the
terms of new franchises being negotiated.
35. It is not always straightforward for passengers
to obtain compensation. For example, passengers without season
tickets may have difficulty proving that they travelled because
their tickets have been collected at the end of the journey by
station staff or a ticket machine. While proper protection is
needed against fraud, the Authority and the train operating companies
should clarify compensation arrangements, for example by publicising
details of the type of evidence that would be acceptable as proof
of travel.
36. Compensation for delays may be paid in the form
of vouchers that can be put towards the cost of future travel,
but such vouchers are of little use to passengers not planning
another journey. The Authority's assurance that new franchises
will provide for compensation to be payable in cash is welcome.
37. The Authority's surveys of passengers show that
the level of fares is a key concern. The Authority's regulation
of key fares has contained average fare increases but there are
significant price differentials between regions, for reasons that
are largely historical. Fares in London can be almost four times
as high as an equivalent journey in Merseyside for example. The
Authority is concerned that lower fares might generate more demand
when services are already overcrowded, and therefore has no plans
to reduce these differentials. In our view passengers should not
be expected to accept poor service at high cost, and the Authority
should focus on providing a good quality service at a reasonable
cost for all passengers.
OVERCROWDING
38. There are no national measures of overcrowding
on trains. Franchises require overcrowding to be measured only
on peak time commuter trains arriving in London and, since 1998,
on some Scottish commuter trains. Manual passenger counts are
carried out once each Autumn, the peak period for passenger rail
travel, but these are subject to considerable inaccuracy. Instead,
some companies were installing systems to weigh trains, to give
a better idea of the number of people on them.[30]
39. Overcrowding, where measured, grew in the four
years to March 2000 and four operators exceeded the Authority's
overcrowding limits in 1999. Companies added around seven per
cent more services to their timetables but rail journeys grew
by 24 per cent.[31]
40. To calculate overcrowding, the Authority compares
the number of passengers in a carriage to its capacity, which
consists of the number of seats in the carriage plus an allowance
for standing room for passengers whose journeys started within
20 minutes of the monitoring point. A typical modern carriage,
for example, has around 76 seats and standing room for a further
28 passengers. This allowance for standing room of some 0.55 square
metres came from British Rail standards.[32]
41. Under the current franchise agreements overcrowding
does not lead directly to enforcement action or penalties. However,
for 15 of the 25 train operating companies the Authority seeks
to encourage them to address overcrowding through an incentive
payment regime, which imposes a financial penalty if they provide
too few carriages during peak hours. Consultants commissioned
by the Authority in 1999 to review the incentive regimes concluded
that while in some cases the regime ensured high fleet availability,
some companies found it financially advantageous to reduce their
fleet and risk incurring a penalty. Overcrowding is being addressed
in the negotiation of new franchises.[33]
42. The Authority said that it would be impossible
to supply seats for all passengers. Connex had taken some seats
out of trains to see if that provided a more comfortable journey
for passengers by increasing capacity through standing. The best
way to improve overcrowding was increased capacity through more
and longer trains. One of the key elements in the franchise replacement
programme was to provide capacity that matched forecasts of passenger
growth. South West Trains, for example, were looking at double-decker
trains, which, if the company was successful in securing the replacement
franchise, might be operating in five to ten years.[34]
43. Within existing franchises, if a train operating
company put forward a train plan that required more investment,
the Authority could pay for 80 per cent of this investment. Thameslink,
for example, had bought some extra trains and switched others
to where they were most needed. But the Authority recognised that
these were only short-term solutions and in the long term the
issue was about the capacity of the railway infrastructure.[35]
44. The Authority acknowledged that there was a problem
with the acceptance of new rolling stock which would relieve overcrowding.
One issue was whether Railtrack had provided sufficient information
to rolling stock companies and manufacturers so that design and
manufacture could proceed; another was whether the rolling stock
actually met requirements once delivered. Some new trains brought
into service in the Spring of 2000 had been withdrawn because
of poor performance. In the longer term the Authority was encouraging
manufacturers and Railtrack to share more information to make
the acceptance process smoother.[36]
45. We asked the Authority whether there were safety
concerns about large numbers of people standing in carriages.
The Authority said that safety was a matter for the Health and
Safety Executive, but that rolling stock was designed to run safely
even when fully loaded. There was no statutory safety limit on
the number of passengers that could be carried on trains, and
the Health and Safety Executive had found no evidence that overcrowding
on trains was dangerous.[37]
46. In response to concerns about people standing
on long journeys, for example from Glasgow to London, the Authority
said that the purchase of a ticket did not guarantee a seat, but
that in the new franchise agreements it would be looking at the
train plans to make sure that there was adequate capacity.[38]
Conclusions
47. The franchises for London and some Scottish commuter
services require overcrowding to be measured, but other franchises
do not. Where overcrowding is monitored it is done through an
inaccurate manual count of passengers made once each Autumn. The
Authority should introduce more accurate mechanisms for measuring
overcrowding, such as weighing trains. It should also monitor
overcrowding on a wider range of services, including key long
distance services, and over the course of the year.
48. Current franchise agreements offer limited scope
for addressing the problem of overcrowding. It can be financially
advantageous for some train companies to pay penalties for not
providing the agreed train capacity rather than increase the size
of their train fleet. The Authority should set targets to reduce
overcrowding, and provide flexibility within new franchises to
allow the agreed capacity levels to be changed in response to
changes in demand, where the network can accommodate additional
capacity. New agreements should provide stronger penalties to
ensure that companies actually deliver the agreed capacity levels.
49. On a number of services, including many London
commuter lines and some InterCity services, passengers have to
stand because there are insufficient seats. The Authority considers
such services to be overcrowded only when the number of standing
passengers exceeds a specified level, which is based on an allowance,
dating from British Rail, of 0.55 square metres of space
for each standing passenger. Some companies are seeking to increase
train capacity by reducing the number of seats. The Authority
should recognise the importance which travellers attach to having
a seat, especially when they have paid high fares for a long inter-city
journey or are commuting to or from work. The Authority should
scrutinise critically any proposals from companies that reduce
the number of seats on trains, and encourage companies to use
better methods of reducing overcrowding wherever possible, such
as longer trains and double-decker carriages.
1 C&AG's Report (HC 842, 1999-2000) paras 1.2, 1.6
and 1.13-1.16, Figures 2 to 4 Back
2 ibid,
paras 1, 4 and 1.3-1.4, Evidence, pp 1-3 Back
3 ibid Back
4 A
strategic agenda, Strategic
Rail Authority, March 2001 Back
5 C&AG's
Report, para 1.2 Back
6 ibid,
paras 1.2-1.4 and 1.6 Back
7 Evidence,
Qs 20, 45-48, A strategic agenda, p13 Back
8 Evidence,
pp 1-3, Evidence, Qs 16, 20, 43, A strategic agenda Back
9 Evidence,
Qs 16-20 Back
10 C&AG's
Report, paras 2.1 and 2.2 and Figure 5 Back
11 C&AG's
Report, para 2.7, Evidence, Qs 2-7, 195 Back
12 A
strategic agenda, pp 28,
35 Back
13 ibid,
paras 1.13-1.16, Figures 3 and 4 Back
14 ibid,
paras 6, 2.10, 2.12, 2.16, Evidence, Q97 Back
15 Evidence,
Qs 9-10, 100-101 Back
16 C&AG's
Report, paras 1.6 and 1.10, Evidence, pp 1-3 Back
17 Evidence,
pp 1-3 Back
18 Evidence,
Qs 117, 131, 149-151, 193 Back
19 C&AG's
Report, paras 4.4 and 4.16-4.18 Back
20 ibid,
para 4.4, Evidence, Qs 24, 97-100, 132 Back
21 C&AG's
Report, paras 4.6 and 4.7, Evidence, Q24 Back
22 ibid,
para 4.8, Evidence, Qs 26-31 Back
23 Evidence,
Qs 31, 70, 74 Back
24 Evidence,
Qs 33-36, 84-92 Back
25 C&AG's
Report, para 2.1, Evidence, Qs 78-83 Back
26 C&AG's
Report, Figure 24, Evidence, Q241 Back
27 Evidence,
Qs 124, 218-226 Back
28 C&AG's
Report, para 4.3, Figures 22 and 24 Back
29 Evidence,
Qs 160-167, 201 Back
30 C&AG's
Report, paras 3.6 and 3.7, Evidence, Qs 228-229 Back
31 C&AG's
Report, paras 9, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.8 Back
32 ibid,
para 3.7, Evidence, Qs 145-146 Back
33 C&AG's
Report, paras 3.11 and 3.13, Evidence, Q227 Back
34 Evidence,
Qs 144-146, 153-154, 184-185, 227 Back
35 Evidence,
Q127 Back
36 Evidence,
Q15 Back
37 C&AG's
Report, para 3.6, Evidence, Qs 157-158, 205-217, Evidence, Appendix
1, pp 24-26, section (2) Back
38 Evidence,
Qs 202-203, 245 Back