Making government work at the
centre
41. We heard much evidence on the question of whether
greater strategic direction at the centre would involve a strengthening
of the Prime Minister's office or some other alternative, such
as a strengthened Cabinet Office. Our view is that the key issue
here involves extending strategic capacity at the centre, and
that which particular mechanism is favoured is rather a secondary
issue. Strategic capacity to co-ordinate policy and think ahead
could be strengthened in a number of ways, involving new relationships
between No 10 Downing Street, the Treasury and the Cabinet Office,
the key central players. Our preference is for a model which strengthens
Cabinet government as a whole, rather than for one which supplants
it with something else, although the case for a Prime Minister's
Department needs to be properly assessed. This means that the
Treasury should not be the sole custodian of the PSAs, which now
underpin the Government's spending programme. Working closely
with the Prime Minister's office and headed by a powerful Cabinet
Minister charged by the Prime Minister with delivering the Government's
strategic objectives, the Cabinet Office should play a central
role. But this requires that the Cabinet Office becomes less of
the 'bran tub'[52]
described to us by Michael Heseltine, and more of a central strategist
and performance monitor with real clout within government. We
note that the recent peer review of the Cabinet Office concluded
that it should have fewer priorities and focus on these more strongly.[53]
42. The 'Modernising Government' programme as a whole
is complex and has multiple elements. It is not always clear where
the really key priorities are, with the resulting danger that
civil servants will endeavour to work methodically on all of them
at once. This is a great virtue; but it is also a considerable
disability in terms of putting first things first. In our view
the immense checklists contained within the 'Modernising Government'
programme need to be converted into a much stronger definition
of what the key priorities for action are, with clear responsibilities
assigned for delivering them. The same applies to the Civil Service
reform programme. One key reason for the difficulty in determining
priorities is the highly complex organisation of the Cabinet Office
itself, with a profusion of small units and divisions all exercising
surveillance and issuing instructions from the centre of government.
Many of the unitssuch as SEU, PIU, OeE (and its predecessor
the Central IT Unit)have produced some excellent reports.
But it remains to be seen how effective they will be in producing
durable results. One concern is their ability to implement their
own recommendations. Geoff Mulgan told us that it was the job
of departments to implement the findings of PIU reports[54],
since staff only serve short secondments with it. The relatively
small size of the cross-cutting units makes it difficult for them
consistently to monitor the implementation of results. We look
to the Cabinet Office to simplify and streamline its own patterns
of internal organisation, including the briefs of senior staff
and Cabinet Office Ministers, in order to express in a much more
ordered and integrated programmatic way what the Government wishes
to be done by way of 'Modernising Government' and implementing
Civil Service reform. There is also a case for the Cabinet Office
to consider what more needs to be done to get to grips with the
risk assessment and risk management issues that are central to
modern government.
Conclusion
43. Making government work better is a process. It
is a continuing task, with many strands to it. We commend the
Government for the vigorous way in which it has approached the
task, its attempt to grapple with some key issues, and for a range
of important initiatives. We hope to continue to monitor progress
of the bold programme of the 'Modernising Government' White Paper.
In this report we have sought to identify some emerging issues
that we believe need to be addressed if this programme is to be
carried forward successfully. Some fundamental issues we have
not addressed: the fact that public services will only work well
if people are prepared to pay enough for them, and if they are
staffed by people of high quality who are properly rewarded and
highly motivated; nor how much the state should do, whether as
direct provider or enabler or partner; nor if radical changes
to the pattern of public provision are required. These are important
matters, but they go beyond our brief here. What is certain is
that government has a permanent obligation to ensure that it is
working as effectively as possible for the citizens who pay for
it; and that public service should genuinely mean service to the
public. This is what making government work means.
13 Cabinet Office Press Release 30 March 1999 Back
14 Prime
Minister's message to public servants, Modernising Government
(1999) Cm 4310 Back
15 For
projects and contacts, see Annex Back
16 HC
(2000-200) 235 Back
17 HC
(2000-2001) 293 Back
18 HC
(2000-2001) 367 Back
19 Cm
4506 Back
20
HC (2000-2001) 94-vii Q 1259 Back
21 Cm
4310 Chapter 6 Back
22 First
Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life
Cm 2850-I, p14 Back
23 HC
(2000-2001) 94-i Q738 Back
24 HC
(1999-2000) 87 Back
25 HC
(1999-2000) 87 Back
26 HC
(1999-2000) 433 Administrative Failure: Inherited SERPS Back
27 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iii Q889 Back
28 HC
(2000-2001) 66 p xiii Back
29 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iii Q897 Back
30 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iii Q840 Back
31 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iv Q916 Back
32 The
Civil Service in the New Millennium,
May 1999 Back
33 HC
(1999-2000) 238-ii Q173 Back
34 Ibid
Q184 Back
35 The
Government's Response to the Sixth Report of the Committee on
Standards in Public Life Cm
4817 p8 Back
36 HC
(1999-2000) 238-iii Q214 Back
37 HC
(1999-2000) 94-i Q747 Back
38 HC
(2000-2001) 94-ii Q769 Back
39 The
Civil Service Reform Programme Annual Report 2000
p 23 Back
40 HC
(1999-2000) 238-vi Q446 Back
41 HC
(2000-2001) 94-vi Q1051 Back
42 HC
(2000-2001) 94-v Q1007 Back
43 HC
(2000-2001) 94-vi Q1047 Back
44 HC
(1999-2000) 238-v Q339 Back
45 HC
(2000-2001) 94-xiv Q1051 Back
46 HC
(2000-2001) 94-vi Q387 Back
47 Holding
to Account: The Review of Audit and Accountability for Central
Government. A Report by
Lord Sharman of Redlynch 2001 Back
48 HC
(2000-2001) 94-vii Q1203 Back
49 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iv Q925 Back
50 The
NAO has recently published Measuring the Performance of Government
Departments HC (2000-2001) 301 Back
51 Sharman
Op Cit Back
52 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iv Q963 Back
53 Be
the Change: Peer Review Report of the Cabinet Office Role in Modernising
Government, December 2000 Back
54 HC
(2000-2001) 94-iii Q843 Back