Scientific uncertainty and the
precautionary principle
47. A central issue for Government is how it handles
scientific uncertainty and risk. This has been a recurring theme
in our inquiry, and is one of the central issues of the Phillips
Report. The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, in
its Report on Science and Society, addressed the problem of communicating
uncertainty and risk, and concluded that there were no easy answers.[82]
In our climate change Report, we commend the formula for expressing
degrees of uncertainty which is adopted in the IPCC's summaries
for policymakers, and suggest that this could usefully be adopted
by other advisory bodies.[83]
We believe that the public is well able to understand uncertainties,
if they are clearly presented.
48. When faced with scientific uncertainty, the Government
may be required to apply the precautionary principle. In the Government's
words, the precautionary principle "holds that absence of
scientific proof should not delay or prevent proportionate measures
to remove or reduce threats of serious harm".[84]
The precautionary principle, or approach, is frequently applied
by policymakers. We have seen it applied in our case studies.
It is applied in the Government's response to climate change,
in the labelling requirements for GM foods, and in preventing
people with diabetes from driving. In each case there was some
evidence, not yet overwhelming, of a problem which might lead
to serious circumstances. Sadly, the precautionary principle was
not applied by Government in relation to policy on BSE. As the
Phillips Report finds, "the importance of precautionary measures
should not be played down on the grounds that the risk is unproved".
We welcome the Government's commitment to applying the precautionary
principle where appropriate.[85]
We recognise, however, that whether to apply the precautionary
principle in a particular case is essentially a political decision,
and rightly the responsibility of elected Ministers. While scientists
can offer useful advice about the magnitude of the risks involved,
public opinion plays a major part in persuading Government to
apply - or not to apply - the precautionary principle.
49. Firmly linked to the precautionary principle,
however, is a principle of proportionality. The Government should
take that action which is proportionate to the risk. In its Interim
Response to the Phillips Report, the Government states that its
approach is "to make available to the public sufficient information
about a risk, in a form that is easily understood, so that individuals
can make their own choices"; but that where "the risks
are taken involuntarily, affect vulnerable groups, such as children,
or where the hazard is widespread the public expects government
to ensure that measures are in place to protect them". The
Government acknowledges that "a balance needs to be struck
between intervening too much ... and failing to help protect them
sufficiently from actual or potential hazards".[86]
In our Diabetes Report, for example, we concluded that the outright
ban on insulin-treated diabetics from driving heavier road vehicles
was an unjustifiably severe application of the precautionary principle.[87]
The Government must ensure that its response is proportionate
to the potential threat. The Minister for Science, through the
Chief Scientific Adviser, should ensure that the precautionary
principle is properly understood, and applied where appropriate,
across Government.
Intragovernmental co-ordination
50. In a number of areas we have found that communication
of advice between Government Departments, and even within Departments,
is inadequate. We have noted, for example, the importance of effective
co-ordination between the several Whitehall departments involved
in responding to climate change, and also between central and
local government. The Phillips Report has emphasised this point,
calling for advice to be "circulated to all within government
with responsibility for policy decisions in respect of which the
advice is relevant".[88]
In response, the Government has acknowledged that, while papers
are routinely circulated around Departments, there may be a need
for supplementary guidance on the internal handling of scientific
advice within Departments.[89]
The Government must ensure that scientific advice is disseminated
effectively amongst policymakers.
30 Evidence HC 796-i, p 6, paragraph 5.3. See also
Evidence, pp 4-6, paragraphs 32-44. Back
31
See www.cst.gov.uk . Back
32
Eg Evidence HC 465, pp 31, 37. Back
33
Evidence received by the Committee in relation to its inquiry
"Are We Realising Our Potential?": to be published. Back
34
Cm 5049, paragraphs 4.7 and 4.10. Back
35
Fifth Report, Session 1999-2000, Government Expenditure on
Research and Development: The Forward Look, HC 196-I, paragraph
134. Back
36
Evidence, p 1, paragraph 4. Back
37
Evidence HC 796-i, p 8, paragraph 5.13, and pp 13-15. Back
38
Evidence, pp 6-7, paragraph 52-54. Back
39
Minutes of Evidence, Wednesday 2 February 2000, HC 196-i, Session
1999-2000: Qq 114-128. Back
40
Fifth Report, Session 1999-2000, Government Expenditure on
Research and Development: The Forward Look, HC 196-I, paragraph
133. Back
41
Q 32. Back
42
Dr Taylor gave evidence to us on the role of the DGRC on 8 December
1999: see Minutes of Evidence, HC 81-i, Session 1999-2000. Back
43
Evidence HC 796-i, p 7, paragraph 5.9. Back
44
The Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC),
the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC),
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Medical Research
Council (MRC), the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC),
the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC) and
the Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils
(CCLRC)). The Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering
are also funded in part from the Science Budget. Back
45
Evidence HC 796-i, p 7, paragraph 5.11. Back
46
Evidence HC 796-i, p 8, paragraph 5.14. Back
47
For a list of PSREs, see Evidence HC 465, p 127, Annex 1. Back
48
Evidence HC 796-i, p 8, paragraph 5.17. Back
49
Evidence HC 465, pp 128-137. Back
50
A number of these are jointly sponsored with another department. Back
51
For example, the UK Climate Change Impacts Programme Steering
Committee, Evidence HC 465, p 131. Back
52
See Evidence HC 465, pp 138-140. Back
53
This is classed both as an advisory body and as a PSRE. Back
54
See Evidence HC 465, pp 128-141. Back
55
See Evidence, pp 1-4, paragraphs 5-31. Back
56
Third Report, Session 1994-95, Human Genetics: the science
and its consequences, HC 41-I, paragraph 287. Back
57
Evidence, p 4, paragraph 26. Back
58
See www.foodstandards.gov.uk ; www.hgc.gov.uk ; and www.aebc.gov.uk
. Back
59
Cm 4814, chapter 4, paragraph 29. Back
60
Evidence HC 796-i, p 33. Back
61
Cm 5049, paragraph 4.14. Back
62
HL Paper 38, paragraph 4.9. Back
63
HC 14, paragraphs 6-9. Back
64
Guidelines 2000, paragraph
13. Back
65
HC 796-i, Evidence, p 8, paragraph 5.18. Back
66
HC 465, Evidence, pp 101-102. Back
67
HC 465, Evidence, pp 65-66, paragraph 8. Back
68
Cm 5049, p 71, finding 108. Back
69
Eg Evidence HC 465, pp 34, 40, 100. Back
70
Evidence HC 465, p 41. Back
71
Evidence HC 465, p 101. Back
72
Second Special Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session
2000-01, HC 226. See also Third Special Report from the Home
Affairs Committee, Session 2000-01, Work of the Committee in
the 1997 Parliament, HC 248,
paragraph 6. Back
73
HC 14, paragraph 20. Back
74
HC 887-I, paragraph 1289. Back
75
See eg Climate change HC 14, paragraph 25. Back
76
Cm 5049, paragraphs 4.24 and 7.7ff. Back
77
HC 887-I, paragraph 1290. Back
78
Cm 5049, paragraph 4.13. Back
79
HC 286-I, paragraph 78. Back
80
HC 887-I, paragraph 1290. Back
81
HC 14, paragraph 8. Back
82
HL Paper 38, Chapter 4, and Summary, paragraph 10. Back
83
HC 14, paragraph 27. Back
84
Cm 5049,paragraph 6.14. Back
85
Cm 5049, p 76. Back
86
Cm 5049, paragraphs 6.5-6.6. Back
87
HC 206-I, paragraphs 13- 24. Back
88
HC 887-I, paragraph 1290. Back
89
Cm 5049, p 74, finding 129. Back