CREDIT CARDS
37. The credit card networks involve each retailer
having a contract with an acquirer, which will usually handle
credit card transactions for a number of different credit card
networks (e.g. Visa and MasterCard in the United Kingdom) and
associated debit cards. The acquirer pays the retailer the value
of the transaction (less a transaction charge), and collects the
money from the appropriate credit card issuer, who then debits
the customer.[71]
38. While MasterCard/Europay UK welcomed the Government's
proposal to extend the role of the OFT rather than creating a
new regulator,[72]
they and Europay International cast doubt on the need for regulation
as proposed by Cruickshank on the grounds that the networks were
already regulated at both a European and a global level, and fees
to retailers were low compared to elsewhere in the EU.[73]
They also opposed the recommendation that any organisation should
be allowed to join them; currently their members were all required
to be authorised credit institutions and to relax this requirement
might cause risk to the stability of the system if a member body
were unable to meet its obligations.[74]
39. The British Retail Consortium, however, pointed
out that the Cruickshank Report had estimated that more than 90
per cent of transactions were charged at a "default"
rate set collectively by the member banks of a payment scheme,
and said that there was "little scope for negotiation of
lower merchant charges".[75]
The Minister rejected both the objections to regulation made by
MasterCard/Europay and Europay International: she said that a
lack of competition in the credit card area justified the decision
to regulate; and that the FSA would be able to check that those
joining the network were financially viable and that their membership
was not likely to give rise to systemic risks.[76]
We are persuaded that credit card networks need to be regulated
along the lines suggested by the Government.
40. A criticism made by the Consumers' Association
of some credit card companies was a delay in sending out statements:
some were sent outby second class postseveral days
after the date on them, thereby reducing the period for the customer
to pay the bill without incurring interest charges.[77]
The MasterCard/Europay witness doubted whether this affected the
number of card-holders paying interest, but undertook to investigate
the issue.[78]
We welcome this undertaking.
41. We observe that one of the suggested terms for
a CAT-standard credit card is that the deadline for payment to
avoid paying interest should be 25 days from the statement date.
If the period allowed for payment of a credit card bill is
to be meaningful, there should be no delay in sending out the
statements.
Cross-subsidy and transparency
of charges
42. An issue which arose in connection with payment
systems, and also more generally, was the extent to which different
banking activities are cross-subsidised, or more generally the
relation between the cost to banks of a particular service and
the charges made to customers. The NCC, for example, pointed out
that banks were absorbing the transaction costs for personal customers
(cash withdrawals and others) by paying very low interest rates
(or none at all) on current account balances and by their overdraft
charges.[79]
The BBA rejected the idea that product pricing should always be
related to cost, on the basis that "variety and flexibility
in the market" were needed. However, the charges should be
clear and customers should be able to compare them to satisfy
themselves that they were receiving good value for money.[80]
The Royal Bank of Scotland pointed out that there were already
regular surveys of comparative prices, such as those in Which?
and Money Facts magazine, but that comparisons were not
always simple because of different terms and conditions: price
was not the only issue. However, the new CAT standards for basic
accounts should help.[81]
The Minister reminded us of the comparative tables which the Financial
Services Authority would be publishing for some types of financial
product later in the year.[82]
43. The measures proposed on the regulation of payment
systems are intended to increase competition at the wholesale
level, that is for dealings between banks; the Consumers' Association
said that there was "insufficient data" to prove whether
there was any link between a fair money transmission system (at
the level where different banks make charges to each other) and
a fairer retail banking system (how, if at all, these charges
are passed on to retail customers), and called for OFT to be given
the role of "publishing information on the relationship between
the retail charges and wholesale charges within that system".[83]
44. The Minister did not go as far as this, but said
that the aim was "for the OFT to have access to things so
that it can make a very clear diagnostic analysis of what is going
on in the payment system. Obviously, if it is to analyse the payment
system in this way and to come up with effective answers and identify
effectively any problems that are working in it, it needs to be
able to get to the root of the information in order to achieve
that task".[84]
45. The OFT will need access to both bank charges
and their internal cost details if it is to ensure that the market
for banking services is operating competitively. In addition,
consumers need accurate, comparable price information and we look
forward to being able to assess the extent to which the Government's
CAT standard proposals and the FSA's comparative tables achieve
this.
30 Ev p 25. Back
31 Q
191. Back
32 Access
to Financial Services, Report
of Policy Action Team 14, HM Treasury, November 1999, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pdf/1999/pat14.pdf. Back
33 Cruickshank
Report, Chapter 7. Back
34 Q
86, 90-93. Back
35 Visa
Electron and Solo cards require authorisation for every transaction
(APACS, In Brief 2000, p 4). Back
36 As
cash dispensers generally do not issue notes under £10, a
£10 overdraft facility ("buffer zone") is required
to enable customers to withdraw all their money unless cash withdrawals
are also free over the counter (Standards for Retail Financial
Products, p 54). Back
37 Q
489-91; Appendix 8. Back
38 This
is in addition to the services provided at post offices for National
Savings accounts (formerly the Post Office Savings Bank), and
by Girobank, formerly part of the Post Office but now owned by
Alliance & Leicester. Back
39 Trade
and Industry Committee, 13th Report, Session 1999-2000, The
Post Office, HC 724, paras 36-46. Replies by the Government
and the Post Office were included in that Committee's 1st Special
Report, Session 2000-01, HC 141; the Welsh Affairs Committee has
also supported the concept of Universal Banking at post offices
in its Third Report, Session 1999-2000, Social Exclusion in
Wales, HC 365-I, paras 75-84. Back
40 DTI
Press Notice P2000/860, 20 December 2000; Post Office Press Notice,
20 December 2000. Back
41 Q
288. Back
42 Q
469-472. Back
43 See
in particular para 46. Back
44 Q
387, 398-402. Back
45 Q
288. Back
46 Q
468. Back
47 Q
192. See also Q 199-201 and ev p 26. Back
48 Q
404-15. Back
49 The
Money Laundering Regulations 1993 (S.I., 1993, No. 1933). See
particularly Regulations 7 and 11(1). The Government announced
further measures on money laundering in its paper Criminal
Justice: The Way Ahead, Cm 5074, February 2001. Back
50 Q
191; and see Out of pocket: how banking systems fail the poorest,
The Big Issue in the North Trust, November 2000. Back
51 Q
86. Back
52 Q
191. See also "Banks move to adopt an open door policy",
The Independent, 13 January 2001. Back
53 Appendix
1, para 6.3. Back
54 Q
496. Back
55 Q
222; see also Q 224. Back
56 Q
262, 436. For Halifax's view see Q 430. Back
57 Barclays
plc News Release, 4 July 1999. The charges did not apply to Lloyds
TSB or Bank of Scotland customers. Back
58 LINK
Interchange Network Ltd press release, 28 March 2000. Back
59 Q
23 (Mr Peter Ellwood, Lloyds TSB), Q 53 (Mr Matthew Barrett, Barclays). Back
60 The
costs are for 1988. Cruickshank Report, p 284, Table D 4.1. Back
61 Q
42; ev p 17. In written evidence, Barclays said that interchange
fees between banks were not sufficient to fund the expansion of
the network, but a charge on non-customers could have been used
to do this (Appendix 1, para 9.7). Back
62 LINK
estimated in January 2001 that a tenth of their 30,000 machines
were "convenience" machines, and that the usual charge
at them was £1 (information from LINK website www.link.co.uk). Back
63 Q
211-14. Back
64 Q
451. Back
65 Q
165. Back
66 Cruickshank
Report, p 85 para 3.133. Back
67 Q
192. See also ev p 27. Back
68 Q
17 (Lloyds TSB), 437 (RBoS). This point was accepted to be true
in most cases in the Cruickshank Report (p 85 para 3.132). Back
69 Q
267, 442. Back
70 Q
271. Back
71 See
ev p 41. Back
72 Q
261. Back
73 Ev
p 37, 39; see also ev p 44-5, Q 263-4. Back
74 Ev
p 37-8, 46-7. Barclays plc accepted that access criteria should
not act as an artificial barrier to entry (Appendix 1, para 3.5). Back
75 Appendix
6; Cruickshank Report para 3.102. The reference is to the Visa,
MasterCard and Switch networks. Back
76 Q
502-4. Back
77 Ev
p 24; Q 193-4. Back
78 Q
273-80, Appendix 7. Back
79 Ev
p 26. Back
80 Q
282, 301. Back
81 Q
444-9. Back
82 Q
474. Back
83 Q
179; see also ev p 23, and Q 216, 223. Back
84 Q
498. Back