IV The Role of the Treasury Committee
41. Over the course of this Parliament our Committee
has played an important role in enhancing the transparency of
the framework and the accountability of the MPC. We have called
the MPC to account for their actions and encouraged them to produce
papers on a range of monetary policy related issues. We have raised
questions with the Governor and the Court about the MPC's procedures
and processes and we have conducted confirmation hearings for
all the MPC members.
HOLDING THE MPC TO ACCOUNT
42. In our 1997 Report entitled "Accountability
of the Bank of England" we examined how our Committee might
best hold the MPC to account and concluded that "by bringing
information into the public domain we can help to clarify the
thinking and actions of those responsible for the formulation
and delivery of monetary policy and that the rigorous scrutiny
of the basis for policy decisions will enhance the credibility
and effectiveness of monetary policy framework as a whole."[84]
43. We have endeavoured to bring "information
into the public domain" by holding regular hearings with
the MPC, by asking for additional papers on various aspects of
monetary policy and by publishing regular reports on the performance
of the MPC. During the four years of this Parliament we have taken
evidence from the Governor and members of the MPC on eleven occasions.
We have ensured that every member of the MPC has given evidence
at least once a year. In addition those members of the MPC who
have voted against the majority decision have been asked to explain
their actions at the next hearing alongside the Governor and other
representatives of the majority opinion. We have also published
three reports,[85]
including this one, assessing the performance of the MPC.
44. We have held our hearings with the MPC following
publication of the February, May and November Inflation Reports.[86]
Following our statement in the 1997 report, the premise behind
these hearings has been to devote about a third of each hearing
to recent policy decisions and the remainder to examining the
outlook for future policy and the key issues affecting the economy.
Former members of the MPC were divided about how well we had conducted
our hearings. Professor Goodhart, in an interview for the Spring
2001 edition of Central Banking, said "... the line
of questioning is carefully thought out before hand ... the initial
questions asked by each MP are very well considered."[87]
However Sir Alan Budd and Professor Buiter were more critical.
Sir Alan told us that we "could do this rather more rigorously
and indeed regularly."[88]
Professor Buiter also thought that "the MPC has been given
far too easy a ride by the Committee"[89]
and claimed he had been given a "harder time" by the
House of Lords' Committee on the MPC. He told us he was surprised
that he had not been asked "why you voted the way you did?"[90]
Professor Buiter thought that much of the problem was because
"the TSC ... is under-resourced and under-staffed."[91]
45. Sir Alan Budd and Professor Buiter's recollections
of being questioned on their voting record will in part be based
on the first 16 months of the MPC when the meetings' minutes were
published with a six week delay. This made it impossible for our
Committee to question MPC members on their most recent decision.
It was our concern at not being able to carry out such questioning
that led to our recommendation, which was accepted by the MPC,
that the delay in publication of the minutes be reduced to two
weeks. Since then we have been able to question individual members
on the way they have voted.[92]
We accept that individual questioning is very important for
accountability and we recommend that our successor committee ensures
that over the course of a year each MPC member is called to account
in this way. Professor Buiter is also assessing the questioning
from an academic standpoint, but, as Members of the House of Commons,
part of our role is to provide a forum for the issues which directly
concern our constituents such as jobs, output and the exchange
rate. In terms of holding the MPC to account it is as important
for the MPC to address such concerns as it is to tackle in-depth
technical questions. By asking and getting answers to such questions
we improve the transparency of the process, and hence the credibility
of the framework.
46. We question whether the Committee is as under
resourced as Professor Buiter believes. We may have less support
than our equivalent committee in the United States but this is
because our roles are different. In the US committee members require
staff to draft legislation but this is not a feature of our Committee
system. The Treasury Committee is serviced by two in-house economic
specialists; in addition we are also able to call upon a team
of monetary policy experts,[93]
who have been described by Professor Goodhart as "a group
of very good economic advisers."[94]
One of these experts, Professor Bean, has recently been appointed
to the MPC. The experts brief us comprehensively before each hearing
and we publish this briefing along with the evidence from the
MPC itself. Nevertheless we agree it is important that the
Treasury Committee is adequately staffed and that the House provide
sufficient resources to enable us to continue to recruit and retain
suitably high calibre specialists.
IMPROVING PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES
47. It is the role of the Non Executive Directors
of the Court of the Bank of England to oversee the procedures
and processes of the MPC. However, as we noted in paragraphs 40
and 41, they have not always been able to resolve internal disputes
in a timely manner. We have therefore used our position to question
the Governor about such issues when necessary. We believe that,
in the case of research and support staff for MPC members, this
has led to a speedier resolution of internal disputes than might
otherwise have been the case. We intend to continue to raise issues
concerning the internal processes and procedures of the MPC if
we think it will aid the resolution of disputes.
48. We have also aided transparency by reviewing
the publications of the Bank and pressing for the publication
of additional material when we think it will help improve understanding
of the monetary framework. As a result of our recommendations
the Bank has published a paper on the transmission mechanism,
explained and published its forecasting models, and, in the inflation
report, set out an assessment of its forecasting record.[95]
We recommend that our successor committee continue to consider
whether further explanatory work by the Bank would be beneficial
to Parliament and the general public.
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
49. We noted in our first report on the accountability
of the Bank of England that "the involvement of the Executive
in the selection process [for members of the MPC] appears to be
considerable since candidates for the Governorship and Deputy
Governorships will be recommended by the Prime Minister, while
the Chancellor will be consulted on the appointment of the two
other Bank representatives on the MPC and will select the four
members of the MPC appointed from outside the Bank."[96]
We therefore concluded that "in our view the independence
of the appointment process would be enhanced by giving the Treasury
Committee power under the new Bank of England Act to confirm nominations."[97]
We believed that this would increase both the accountability and
openness of the process. In the event our recommendation was not
accepted by the Government though we still believe that confirmation
hearings should be put on a statutory basis.
50. We decided to hold hearings on a non statutory
basis assessing an individual's personal independence and professional
competence. We have conducted thirteen confirmation hearings and
one reconfirmation hearing. On all but two occasions, we have
confirmed the nominations unanimously. On the first of these occasions
we confirmed the candidate, Dr Wadhwani, on a majority decision.[98]
We noted in our report following the hearing[99]
that Dr Wadhwani's replies to our questionnaire "relied heavily
on the replies given by the existing MPC members in last year's
confirmation hearings" and that this cast doubt on his ability
to formulate his own opinions. We therefore cautioned that Dr
Wadhwani should remember "... that he is a member of the
MPC as an individual with individual responsibility and independent
views."[100]
We note that, since his hearing, Dr Wadhwani has been one of the
most prolific members of the MPC producing papers on a range of
issues, most notably the new economy, and it was his research
work that led to the Bank revising the exchange rate assumption
used in its inflation forecast.
51. On the second occasion, again on a majority decision,[101]
we did not confirm the candidate, Mr Allsopp, and asked the Chancellor
to reconsider his nomination. The Chancellor responded by stating
that "Mr Christopher Allsopp fully satisfies the criteria
for appointments to the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee.
He is one of a line of distinguished academics who serve on the
MPC ... His appointment has been widely welcomed, including personally
by the Governor and Deputy Governor."[102]
Mr Allsopp subsequently took up his place on the MPC.
52. Our rejection of one nominee and the Chancellor's
subsequent overruling of our decision raised questions about the
purpose of our non-statutory confirmation hearings. The Committee
did not take its decision lightly but it was perhaps inevitable
that the Chancellor should override our decision, as to do otherwise
would have led to questions about his own judgement over choice
of candidate. This does not however mean that our hearings are
without purpose. We think that confirmation hearings, even
on a non-statutory basis, act as a stimulus to the Chancellor
to choose candidates who are competent and independent. We also
believe that our questionnaire and hearings provide essential
information about the background of the appointees which is not
otherwise readily available. Above all, the hearings underline
the fact that MPC members are accountable to Parliament and to
the public.
53. A range of opinions have been expressed on the
conduct of our confirmation hearings. Professor Buiter thought
that "having real confirmation hearings ... in principle
... would be valuable."[103]
However, he cautioned that "this would only work of course
if Parliament [as represented by the Treasury Committee] somehow
could commit itself ... not to turn it into a three ring circus."[104]
However Mr Flemming was against formal confirmation hearings where
"the taking up of appointment would be formally conditional
on approval by the Committee". He thought that it was "...
highly desirable that the people who are doing the implementing
should be unambiguously his [the Chancellor's] nominees, and if
he appoints incompetent people that will show up in the performance
for which he should be held accountable by this Committee and
the House."[105]
The Governor told the House of Lords' Committee that "the
experience of the confirmation hearings that we have had in some
cases do not encourage me to think that that process is a good
one. I do not think they were focusing simply on independence
and professional expertise." He emphasised that if confirmation
hearings were to be held it was "tremendously important that
it were done in a responsible way, focusing on the qualifications
which are necessary for this appointment."[106]
54. We agree with the Governor and Professor Buiter
that it is important that we conduct our confirmation hearings
in a "responsible" manner. However we strongly dispute
the Governor's suggestion that we have not always focused on independence
and professional expertise. Our report following our hearing with
Mr Allsopp explicitly stated that "we were disappointed in
his answers to our questions and believe that this casts doubt
on whether he possesses the skills required to take part in meetings
of the Monetary Policy Committee."[107]
We think it is vitally important that MPC members are able
to express themselves well in public and withstand robust questioning,
as they will undoubtedly face this both from within the MPC and
from the general public. We note Professor Goodhart's comments
that "it is a part of the responsibility of taking a decision
which does affect the lives of everybody to some extent that they
themselves in their own words are able to express their argument
for doing so."[108]
55. We also question the Governor's assertion, made
to the House of Lords Committee, that our hearings may lead to
a situation where "you would find that there were quite a
lot of people who said 'frankly I am not prepared to go through
this process.'"[109]
Any candidate who is worth a place on the MPC should have the
expertise and ability to withstand responsible questioning from
our Committee. If the prospect of a confirmation hearing puts
the candidate off from applying then he or she is probably not
suitable for the post in the first place.
84 First
Report, Session 1997-98, Accountability of the Bank of England,
HC 282, para 61(ii). Back
85 Seventh
Report, Session 1997-98, Bank of England: Operation of Accountability-One
Year On, HC 993; Eighth Report, Session 1998-99, The Monetary
Policy Committee-Two Years On, HC 505. Back
86 See
Annex for details. Back
87 Central
Banking, Volume XI.3 February
2001. Back
88 Q 134. Back
89 Q 137. Back
90 Q 122. Back
91 Q 136. Back
92 For
example see Q 295-300. Back
93 During
this Parliament our expert advisers have been: Professor Charlie
Bean, London School of Economics; Mr Roger Bootle, Managing Director
of Capital Economics; Professor David Miles, Imperial College
Management School; Ms Bridget Rosewell, British Retail Consortium;
Professor Andrew Scott, London Business School; Mr David Walton,
Director of UK Research Goldman Sachs. Back
94 Central
Banking, Volume XI.3, February
2001, p 13. Back
95 This
appears each August. Back
96 First
Report, Session 1997-98, Accountability of the Bank of England,
HC 282, para 46. Back
97 Ibid,
para 47. Back
98 The
Committee voted 4-1 in favour of confirming Dr Wadhwani. Back
99 Fifth
Report, Session 1998-99, The Monetary Policy of the Bank of
England: Confirmation Hearings, HC 476-I. Back
100 Ibid,
para 7. Back
101 The
Committee voted 5-4 against confirming Mr Allsopp. Back
102 Seventh
Special Report, Session 1999-2000, Monetary Policy Committee
of the Bank of England: Confirmation Hearings: the Government's
response to the Committee's Seventh Report, HC 859. Back
103 Q
136. Back
104 Ibid. Back
105 Q
147. Back
106 House
of Lords Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England, First Report, Session 2000-01, HL paper 34,
Vol II, Q 1274. Back
107 Seventh
Report, Session 1999-2000, Monetary Policy Committee of the
Bank of England: Confirmation Hearings, HC 520-I, para 5. Back
108 Central
Banking, Volume XI.3, February
2001, p 13. Back
109 House
of Lords Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England, First Report, Session 2000-01, HL paper 34,
Vol II, Q 1274. Back
|