SPLITTING-UP THE TREASURY
8. The breadth of the Treasury's responsibilities
is reflected in the fact that it has nine Public Service Agreement
(PSA) objectives, more than any department except the Ministry
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions. Sir Andrew Turnbull, Permanent Secretary
of the Treasury, said that nine objectives was "about the
minimum you could sensibly have without people saying there is
some important part of the Treasury's work that is not reflected"
but acknowledged that in some countries the responsibilities of
the Treasury were shared by more than one Ministry.[23]
In particular, countries such as Germany, Belgium and Italy have
separate finance and economics ministries to undertake the work
handled in the UK by the Treasury.
9. Witnesses expressed little enthusiasm for dividing
the Treasury into separate Economics and Finance Ministries. Sir
Samuel Brittan did not think there was a case for such a change
"because so much of what an Economic Affairs Ministry would
do, especially on the macro side, has gone to the Bank of England".[24]
Professor Deakin, of Birmingham University, said that "there
is no purpose in undertaking such a drastic piece of surgery at
a time when the Treasury has already gone through repeated operations
and has formed itself into a new style operation which is still
untried in circumstances where it would be tested".[25]
Lord Barnett thought that it was "not a proposition that
should be seriously adopted because you cannot separate those
two areas of public concern and the Treasury is bound to be concerned
with both".[26]
Perhaps predictably, Treasury officials did not advocate splitting-up
their department. Sir Andrew Turnbull concluded that "with
its present responsibilities I do not think anybody is contemplating
an option of splitting. Responsibilities could change on the borderline
between benefits and tax, through, for example, the arrival of
an integrated child credit. But there is more likely to be a change
elsewhere in the Chancellor's Departments than the Treasury itself."[27]
10. During the 1964-70 period an attempt was made
to split the Treasury's finance and economics functions with the
creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). The experience
of the DEA does not suggest that such a reorganisation would work
today. Sir Samuel Brittan argued that "the problem with the
Department of Economic Affairs was that it had no role, it had
no power" and Lord Barnett said that the "idea of setting
up a separate Department of Economic Affairs was to solve a particular
political and personal problem and had no reference and relevance
to what the Treasury was doing and continued to do".[28]
One reason why the DEA failed to survive was that the devaluation
crisis after the 1966 election blew the economy off course and
rendered the department's national economic plan redundant. Secondly,
the Treasury's control of short-term economic management and the
Government's finances ensured that it continued to be regarded
as the pre-eminent economic Ministry.
11. We have heard no compelling arguments for
the Treasury to be split into separate economics and finance Ministries.
There are, however, other ways in which the Treasury could be
split, as shown by experience elsewhere in the world. In Australia,
for example, the Treasury is responsible for economic and competition
policy, tax policy and revenue forecasts, international finance
and banking policy while the Department of Finance and Administration
oversees the expenditure budget, public assets and asset sales,
Government accounting policy and resource management.[29]
In New Zealand, the Treasury's work on public expenditure control
is supplemented by the work of the State Services Commission which
advises on the performance of Government departments and agencies
and makes recommendations for improvements.[30]
We will return to possible changes to the UK Treasury's remit
in relation to budgetary policy and the monitoring of the performance
of Government below.[31]
PERCEPTIONS OF THE TREASURY
12. We acknowledge at the outset of this Report
that there are praiseworthy aspects of the Treasury's role and
organisation. Treasury staff are widely regarded as amongst
the best in Whitehall.[32]
The Treasury told us that "we encourage our staff to move
around fairly regularly between different areas of work. This
encourages a broad outlook and promotes the development of a wide
range of skills an essential requirement of flexibility".[33]
We return to the subject of the Treasury's staff below.[34]
The Treasury may also be considered as being on the side of Parliament
and the taxpayer in ensuring that public expenditure is spent
as efficiently as possible. Sir Samuel Brittan told us that the
Treasury "is the only department that stands for the interests
of the taxpayer, the consumer, and the general citizen ... politics
is full of sectional interests of all kinds and the rest of us
only have the Treasury to fall back on ... if the Treasury had
been more powerful we would not have had Concorde, we would not
have had the Pergau Dam and we would not have a lot of dreadful
taxpayer financed aid for arms sales to dubious regimes."[35]
The department has also declared itself to be committed to more
openness, the promotion of innovation and change, and best management
practice.[36]
13. After our visits to overseas Treasury Ministries
and our meetings with experts on the Treasury Ministries in Australia
and New Zealand, we are aware that the UK Treasury is one of
the world leaders in implementing reforms such as resource accounting
and budgeting, the private finance initiative and Public Service
Agreements.
14. Criticisms of the Treasury, perhaps inevitably
for a department which holds the Government's purse strings, are
legion. It is sometimes described as short-termist in its thinking
and overly concerned with finding ways of reducing public expenditure,
at the expense of necessary or desirable public sector spending.
It has long been alleged that, by controlling public expenditure,
the Treasury also controls or exerts undue influence over policy
matters which are rightly the concern of other departments.[37]
Sir Alan Bailey told us that he was "concerned about the
distractions and the tendency, as I see it, of the modern Treasury
to go after all sorts of other aspects of departments' business
which I would not regard as central and I think get in the way
of departments doing their own jobs".[38]
Sir Michael Partridge, a former Permanent Secretary of the DSS,
argued that "the Treasury can be useful but they can also
destroy good ideas [and] ... they themselves can promote bad schemes".[39]
Another common complaint is that the Treasury is remote, isolated
from the real world, and resistant to parliamentary scrutiny and
accountability. The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, for example,
wrote that "the department's commitment to openness has not
been sustained in practice, giving the impression that the Treasury's
Ministers are more reluctant to meet us than their counterparts
in other Ministries".[40]
15. In this Report we have chosen to concentrate
on three broad areas in which we believe the Treasury could work
better. These are:
the strategic position of the
department within Government and the Treasury's own vision of
its role: whether the Treasury is over-reaching itself by
becoming involved in the detailed management of issues which are
properly the concern of other departments, both directly, such
as in relation to welfare policy, and indirectly, through the
administration of Public Service Agreements
openness, transparency and accountability:
whether the role and influence of the Treasury in Government is
sufficiently clear or well understood, or whether it is adequately
accountable to Parliament for the full range of its activities
the examples of good practice offered
by the Treasury to the rest of Whitehall: whether, given its
central position in Government, the Treasury is well placed to
offer examples of good practice to other departments.
2 Treasury Committee, First Report, 1998-99, Office
for National Statistics, HC43 and Second Report, 2000-01,
National Statistics, HC137 Back
3
Treasury Committee, Sixth Report, 1998-99, Inland Revenue,
HC199 Back
4
Treasury Committee, Tenth Report, 1998-99, Valuation Office
Agency, HC420 Back
5
Treasury Committee, Second Report, 1999-2000, HM Customs and
Excise, HC53 Back
6
Treasury Committee, Sixth Report, 1999-2000, Government's Cash
and Debt Management, HC154 Back
7
Treasury Committee, First Report, 2000-01, Work of the Treasury
Committee and Treasury Sub-committee, HC41 Back
8
This briefing was organised as part of a Treasury Committee visit Back
9
This briefing was organised as part of a Treasury Committee visit Back
10
See paragraph 7. In fact, the only similar inquiry into the work
of the Treasury since 1945 was undertaken by the Estimates Committee,
Sixth Report, 1957-58, Treasury Control of Estimates, HC254-I Back
11
For example, see Treasury Committee, Third Report, 1998-99, Financial
Services Regulation, HC73-I and Eighth Report, 1998-99, The
Monetary Policy Committee - Two Years On, HC505. We did receive
a memorandum from the Bank of England, however, see App 8 Back
12
Ev, p1 paragraph 2.1 Back
13
For further details see The Government's Expenditure Plans:
Chancellor of the Exchequer's Departments 2000-01 to 2001-02,
HM Treasury, Apr 00 (hereafter HMT Annual Report 2000),
section 1 Back
14
Ev, p4 paragraph 4.1, p7 paragraph 5.13 Back
15
Qq112, 115, 162; Ev, p94 paragraph 6 Back
16
Qq69-74 Back
17
Ev, p30 paragraph 2 Back
18
See Treasury Committee, First Report, 1997-98, Accountability
of the Bank of England, HC282 and Sixth Report, 1999-2000,
Government's Cash and Debt Management, HC154 Back
19
See Treasury Committee, Eighth Report, 1997-98, The New Fiscal
Framework and the Comprehensive Spending Review, HC960-I Back
20
Treasury Committee, Second Report, 1996-97, Resource Accounting
and Budgeting, HC186 and Minutes of Evidence, 1999-2000, Resource
Accounting and Budgeting, HC308-i Back
21
Treasury Committee, Seventh Report, 1998-99, Public Service
Agreements, HC378 (hereafter PSAs Report); but also
see App 4 on antecedents Back
22
Q236 and also Q2 Back
23
Q626 Back
24
Q120 Back
25
Ibid. Back
26
Q176 Back
27
Q9 Back
28
Qq119, 179 Back
29
Ev, pp69-74 Back
30
App 9, paragraph 31 Back
31
Paragraphs 38, 42 Back
32
For example Qq181, 254, 529 Back
33
Ev, p4 paragraph 4.1 Back
34
Paragraph 60 Back
35
Q112 Back
36
Ev, pp3-4 paragraphs 3.4-3.6 Back
37
Lord Salisbury observed in 1900, for instance, that "the
Treasury has obtained a position in regard to the rest of the
departments of the Government that the House of Commons obtained
in the time of the Stuart dynasty. It has the power of the purse,
and by exercising the power of the purse it claims a voice in
all decisions of administrative authority and policy" -
The Treasury and Social Policy, N. Deakin and R. Parry, 2000,
p19 Back
38
Q319 Back
39
Q435 Back
40
App 1, paragraph 7 Back