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European Communities (Amendment) Bill
Mr. Wilkinson: I beg to move amendment No. 40, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 1),'.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Sir Michael Lord): With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 41, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 2),'.
No. 42, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 3),'.
No. 43, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 4),'.
No. 44, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 5),'.
No. 45, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 6),'.
No. 46, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 7),'.
No. 47, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 8),'.
No. 48, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 9),'.
No. 53, in page 1, line 9, after "(i)", insert—
'Article 1 (other than paragraph 15),'.
No. 78, in page 1, line 9, after "10", insert—
'other than Article 2, paragraph 47'.
No. 29, in page 1, line 12, after "occasion", insert—
'except for Article 3, paragraph 1(b) of the Protocol on the Enlargement of the European Union in so far as that relates to the appointment of a special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy'.
New clause 1—Special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy—
'In relation to Article 1, paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Nice, amending Article 23(2) TEU, prior to a vote in the Council on the appointment of a special representative in the area of common foreign and security policy, Her Majesty's Government shall lay a report before Parliament setting out its preferred candidate for the post and shall lay a further report after the Council meeting if that candidate has not been adopted.'.
New clause 2—International agreements under Article 24 TEU—
'In relation to Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Treaty of Nice, amending Article 24 TEU, prior to casting a vote in the Council on any such international agreement, Her Majesty's Government shall lay before Parliament a report setting out the implications for the United Kingdom of such an agreement.'.
New clause 7—Western European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—
'This Act will not come into effect until Her Majesty's Government has laid before Parliament a report showing the implications for the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, for the future functioning of these organisations, and for the United Kingdom's role therein, of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Nice Treaty, revising Article 17 TEU, and Article 1, paragraph 5 of the Nice Treaty, revising Article 25 TEU.'.
New clause 8—Adoption of decisions under Article 17, paragraph 1, TEU—
'For the purpose of Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Nice, the constitutional requirement of the United Kingdom before any decision under that paragraph (common defence) may be adopted by the United Kingdom shall be that the decision shall have been approved by an Act of Parliament.'.
'This Act shall not come into force until Her Majesty's Government has obtained, and laid before Parliament, legal advice from the Attorney General on the effect on the criminal and judicial processes in the United Kingdom of Article 1, paragraph 8 of the Nice Treaty, revising Article 31 TEU, as they relate to the provisions on Eurojust.'.
Mr. Wilkinson: I speak in support of new clause 7 in particular, which is of great significance. Under the treaty of Nice nearly all the functions of Western European Union, as laid down in the treaty of Brussels and modified by the Paris protocols of 1954, are taken over by the European Union. Only two remain, and to some extent there is a third, residual, function as well. The first is the mutual defence obligation under article 5 of the treaty of Brussels. The second is the existence of the Assembly of Western European Union, which sits in Paris and of which I have had the honour to be a member for some twelve and a half years. The third is the residual function relating to armaments co-operation—the supervision of the West European Armaments Group.
Article 5 of the Brussels treaty is the fundament and heart of European defence. It is the mutual security guarantee among the European members of the alliance to come to the defence of a member state if it is subject to aggression. It is an explicit, clear and total guarantee. It is a commitment to mutual defence, and nothing less. Interestingly, article 5 of the Washington treaty commits the signatories to consult in order to take appropriate action, or words to that effect, but article 5 of the Brussels treaty is firmer even than the Washington treaty in the obligations that it places on member states. I am pleased that this function, which is regarded as residual by European Union policy makers, is retained as Western European Union's raison d'être in its remaining form.
8.15 pm
The Parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union is an invaluable body. It is a forward-looking institution that has produced countless reports, often well ahead of their time. It brings together representatives of no fewer than 28 states, which is significant because it bridges the gap between the European Union and the wider Europe. The security of our continent has to be considered in that wider context.
The aim of the treaty of Nice is to narrow European security and defence to member countries of the European Union. When a crisis emerges, they have an obligation to consult on what response should be taken. Of course, they voluntarily commit themselves to inviting other members of the alliance into the consultation procedure, but those countries are not part of the decision-making process to the same extent as the EU member states. European NATO countries such as Norway and Turkey and others that have more recently joined the alliance, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are therefore second-class citizens within the security apparatus of their own continent. It is a particularly grotesque fact that Norway and Turkey, which were literally in the front line against the former Soviet Union during the cold war inasmuch as they shared a boundary with the Soviet Union, should be deemed in any way to have a lesser share in decision making about the security of our continent.
We would do well to bear in mind the fact that, apart from the virulent and dangerous phenomenon of terrorism from ETA in Spain and the Irish Republican Army and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, there is no immediate security threat within the EU itself. There are, however, grave developments of major consequence to the security of our continent of which we are all too well aware in parts of Europe that lie outside the EU. This is especially true in the Balkans, with the threat of civil war in Macedonia and the difficulties of maintaining an uneasy peace in Kosovo and of retaining a presence of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The non-EU countries have just as great an interest in the security of our continent as do the EU nations.
It is a thoroughly retrograde step to arrogate to the European Union a more exclusive right to a premier role in European security. Indeed, it is a somewhat perverse arrogation of duty to the EU nations, inasmuch as many of them are neutral states which throughout the long period of the cold war deliberately eschewed membership of NATO and of WEU. Furthermore, we are reminded of the implications of this fact by the outcome of the Irish referendum, which came about to some degree because a significant number of Irish electors believed that by virtue of the treaty of Nice they were giving away their treasured neutral status and that Irish forces might find themselves under British or NATO command. That was anathema to a significant minority of voters in Ireland who, with other strands of opinion, came together to form the majority who voted down the treaty of Nice.
I urge Her Majesty's Government to think long and hard and to recognise the implications. Our Turkish friends, who are in a pivotal strategic situation, feel especially disadvantaged. It is from Turkish bases that British and other allied aircraft fly missions over northern Iraq under the policy of restraining Saddam Hussein in the no-fly zones. It is the Turks who, as the bridge
between Asia and Europe, are vital in the Balkans. It is also the Turks who, with their perspective to the Caucasus and other zones of conflict and threat, are especially interested in those areas. To give the Turks a lesser status in decision making over European security, which is inherent in the Nice proposals, is anathema to the Turkish Government and they have not been able to acquiesce in that initiative.
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