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Bob Spink: To ask the Secretary of State for Health (1) if the Gluco Watch Biographer will be available on prescription to diabetes sufferers in the NHS; [18145]

Jacqui Smith: In order to be prescribed by general practitioners on the national health service, appliances must be listed in Part IX of the Drug Tariff. Such listings are made only in response to, and after consideration of, applications from the manufacturers. No application has been made by the manufacturer of the Gluco Watch Biographer or its accessories. We would expect the applicant to provide any evidence needed to support the application.

5 Dec 2001 : Column: 377W


Graham Browne

Mr. Cousins: To ask the Solicitor-General what the prosecution costs were in the case against Graham Browne; what the result of the prosecution was; and what further costs arose from the result of the prosecution. [20903]

The Solicitor-General: Graham Browne stood trial at the central criminal court between 29 October 2001 and 7 November 2001 on a charge of blackmail. It was alleged by the Crown that he, a former employee of Barclays bank and the head of an encryption team, wrote to them under an assumed name, informing them that their security was at risk and demanding that 14 named individuals (of whom he was one) should be employed at a cost of £25 million to ensure that security was not breached. Key security codes were included in the correspondence. The jury returned a majority verdict of not guilty.

The time and overhead costs of the lawyer caseworker and administrative staff engaged in the case were about £10,000. A total of £1,942.65 has been paid in witness expenses. The actual costs to the Crown Prosecution Service in bringing the prosecution have not yet been finally determined. These costs do not include the fees of prosecution counsel which are currently being negotiated.



Rail Track Capacity

Mr. Pickles: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions what timetable he has for (a) work on upgrades to rail track capacity around (i) Birmingham, (ii) Manchester and (iii) Coventry, (b) construction of the (1) Thameslink 2000 rail project, (2) west coast main line rail project, (3) upgrade to the London to Stansted train route, (4) upgrade to the north Transpennine train route, (5) Brighton train line upgrade, (6) east coast main line, (7) Sunderland Metro and (8) rail flyover at Shortlands in Kent, (c) train station upgrades to comply with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, (d) redevelopment of Gatwick train station and (e) implementation of (x) the programme of platform extensions and stations into London Waterloo and (y) the Train Protection Warning System; and which targets have been put back in the past month. [13520]

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Mr. Spellar: The Strategic Rail Authority will publish shortly their Strategic Plan, setting out their priorities for investment in rail projects to deliver the Government's 10 Year Transport Plan core targets of 50 per cent. passenger growth, 80 per cent. freight growth and a reduction in London overcrowding to SRA standards, by 2010. The SRA continues to base its investment plans on the delivery of these targets. There has been no change to this approach.

London Underground

Mr. Pickles: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions what the latest available figure is on capacity on the London Underground, broken down by (a) movement of passengers per 15 minutes at peak times for each line, (b) the amount of spare capacity as expressed in potential passenger movement per 15 minutes at peak times and (c) the use of capacity at peak times, expressed as a percentage for each line. [13998]

Mr. Spellar: This is an operational matter for London Underground (LU), but they advise that the measures requested do not form part of their regular monitoring and management reporting process. I understand that the most recent available survey on passenger numbers at peak times was completed by London Underground during 2000 and the resulting information on this and on measures of capacity was given by the then Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Keith Hill), in answer to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake) on 22 March 2001, Official Report, column 283W. Regrettably, some of the information given in answer to that earlier PQ was inaccurate and the table provides corrected information.

For each line, the table provides a snapshot of the busiest quarter-hour period on the busiest section. The table shows in columns D and E the figures which London Underground record as the "theoretical design capacity" of trains, as determined by the manufacturer and set out in an earlier answer of 2 February 2001, Official Report, column 315W; and in columns F and G the actual numbers of people they recorded as using those lines at the busiest period. I regret that the earlier figures were misleading: the corrected figures show that the Underground is not as crowded as the previous answer appeared to show.

However, it should be noted that in practice some trains may have a higher and some a lower crowding. This could be caused by either any unevenness in the time between consecutive trains or in the uneven distribution of customers along platforms.

Design capacity Actual numbers of people
LineBusiest sectionTimeHour capacity(41)/ 4 hour capacityHour demand(41)/ 4 hour demand
BakerlooCharing Cross to Piccadilly Circus08:45–09:0027,9546,98913,2603,315
CentralBethnal Green to Liverpool Street08:45–09:0045,58211,39522,3285,582
VictoriaVictoria to Green Park08:45–09:0042,36310,59122,0165,504
Waterloo & CityWaterloo to Bank07:45–08:0014,8183,7046,8001,700
JubileeSt John's Wood to Baker Street08:45–09:0022,8205,70513,1083,277
NorthernClapham North to Stockwell08:45–09:0035,0118,75317,0964,274
PiccadillyEarl's Court to Gloucester Road08:30–08:4533,2168,30417,4524,363
CircleSloane Square to Victoria17:30–17:458,9582,2403,948987
H&CLiverpool Street to Moorgate08:30–08:458,9582,2405,2761,319
MetropolitanFinchley Road to Baker Street08:30–08:4535,9648,99111,6162,904
DistrictVictoria to St James's Park08:30–08:4530,3807,59516,0924,023
East London LineSurrey Quays to Canada Water08:15–08:306,8151,7043,908977

5 Dec 2001 : Column: 379W

Chris Grayling: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions who will bear the financial risk for unforeseen circumstances in improving the London Underground under PPP. [20115]

Mr. Jamieson: The Government's modernisation plans for the London Underground follow the principle that risk should be allocated to whoever is best able to manage it. The aim is not to transfer risk for its own sake, as this would lead to a decline in value for money, but rather to optimise the transfer of risk. The private sector infrastructure companies will be liable for all cost overruns that result from their acting in an uneconomic or inefficient manner. However, the financial risks associated with 'force majeure' events are retained by London Underground, as long as they are not caused by and are beyond the control of the infrastructure companies.

Chris Grayling: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions if he will make a statement on the changes in London Underground's costs since 1997. [20112]

Mr. Jamieson: London Underground's costs have primarily increased because of work to maintain and improve performance and reliability against a background of increased demand and past underinvestment.

The increase in London Underground's operating costs also, however, reflects its adoption in 1999 of the mandatory Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 15, which set out revised principles of accounting for tangible fixed assets. The impact of the adoption of FRS15 on London Underground's accounts for 1999–2000 was set out in the reply given by the then Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Keith Hill), to my hon. Friend the Member for Hammersmith and Fulham (Mr. Coleman) on 23 January 2001, Official Report, column 525W. The full impact on its accounts was also confirmed in London Transport's Annual Report 2000–01, published in July of this year.

John McDonnell: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions how many delays of 15 minutes or more of trains on the London Underground were caused by problems with (a) track, (b) signals and (c) rolling stock for (i) 1994–95, (ii) 1995–96, (iii) 1996–97, (iv) 1997–98 and (v) 1999–2000. [20596]

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Mr. Jamieson: This is an operational matter for London Underground who inform me that this information is not held in the form requested for full years before 1999–2000, and could only be provided at disproportionate cost. The table shows the requested information as measured by London Underground during 1999–2000.

Train delays of 15 minutes or more in 1999–2000

(a) Track142
(b) Signals713
(c) Rolling Stock608

Mr. Bercow: To ask the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions what changes there were in the rules during the bidding for the public-private partnership for the London Underground. [20362]

Mr. Jamieson: The rules under which these procurements are conducted are determined by European law and have not changed during the procurements.

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