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MOD Sites (Security)
Mr. Jenkin: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to increase the budget of department bodies to meet security needs following 11 September.[35610]
Mr Ingram: I will write to the hon. Member and a copy of my letter will be placed in the Library of the House.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what role is played by (a) the armed forces and (b) MDP in protecting MoD sites; and if he will make a statement. [38070]
Dr. Moonie: The role of the armed services and the Ministry of Defence police in protecting MoD sites is to protect life, to protect MoD property, assets and interests, and to provide an appropriate interface with the public.
The decision as to which form of guard force is required (armed or unarmed, military or civilian, and with or without constabulary powers) is determined at local level, to best match the prevailing requirements, following central regulations and guidance.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what powers have been given to the MDP for guarding MoD sites; and if he will make a statement.[38069]
Dr. Moonie: The Ministry of Defence Police derive their constabulary powers from the MOD Police Act 1987 which they use in policing MOD sites. A number of limited extensions, to MDP powers, were included within the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
Cluster Bomb
Fiona Mctaggart: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment of ground conditions is undertaken before deployment of cluster bombs; and what alternative weapon is deployed where ground conditions might result in an unacceptably higher failure rate. [37534]
Mr. Ingram: Decisions on the most appropriate weapon for use in attack take into account a wide variety of factors, consistent with our obligations under international law. These factors include the nature of the target, the weapons available to engage the target, and the conditions prevailing at the time of the attack. Specific ground conditions in the location of an attack, the effect of those conditions on failure rates, and the potential impact of a particular failure rate are factors that cannot normally be known by those making the decisions. Using weapons that are not the most appropriate for a target would reduce the likelihood of achieving the military objective and increase the risk of collateral damage. There are often no alternative weapons to cluster bombs that would avoid these negative consequences.
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Royal Ordnance Factories and
Naval Dockyards (Security)
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what changes in security have been made at the Royal Ordnance factories and naval dockyards following 11 September 2001; and if he will make a statement. [38061]
Mr. Ingram: Security arrangements at Royal Ordnance sites are a matter for Royal Ordnance, which is a private company subject to licensing by the Health and Safety Executive and local Home Department police forces. Those Royal Ordnance sites that hold Ministry of Defence classified information are required to protect it in accordance with regulations set out in the Manual of Protective Security produced by the Cabinet Office. Their compliance with these standards is monitored by Government Security Advisers from the Security Service. It is for the Home Secretary to comment on the security of the Royal Ordnance sites in relation to the terrorist threat and to the protection of classified information.
The security of the commercial operations at the naval dockyards is similarly primarily the responsibility of the companies concerned. In the case of Devonport and Portsmouth the commercial operations are conducted inside the perimeters of the two naval bases, and the operators therefore benefit indirectly from the physical security measures against the terrorist and other threats put in place by the Defence Logistic Organisation. The situation at Rosyth is different, in that the commercial site is outside the naval base; however, under the terms of an MOU with the contractor the MOD retains the right to insist on such additional security measures as it considers necessary to protect MOD assets and personnel. This includes the provision of armed security guarding to protect the lives of Service personnel accommodated temporarily on the commercial site. Security at naval bases has been reviewed as part of an overall survey of security of the Defence Logistic Organisation estate. While it is MOD policy not to comment on detailed matters of security, 1 can confirm that the level of security at naval bases is considered appropriate.
Integrated Biological Detention System
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much the trials of the new Integrated Biological Detection System will cost; and if he will make a statement. [38284]
Dr. Moonie: The estimated cost of the trials at Dstl of the new Integrated Biological Detection System is about ÿ1 million.
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what companies are involved in the initial concept of trials being run for a maritime version of the new integrated Biological Detection System; and if he will make a statement. [38283]
Dr. Moonie: The trials, which were held in October last year, evaluated the potential technology options for the Maritime Biological Detection System.
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The main industrial participants were: Graseby Dynamics Ltd of Watford, together with BIRAL of Portishead; Jasmin Simtech of Nottingham, together with Bruker Daltronics, Leipzig; General Dynamics Canada.
Fast Jet Technology
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans there are to obtain laser and missile approach warners part of the Fast Jet Directed Infrared Countermeasures Laser System Technology; and if he will make a statement. [38229]
Dr. Moonie: The Ministry of Defence is currently funding a Technology Demonstration Programme into Directed Infrared Counter Measures for fast jets. This involves risk reduction work on technology to enable the acquisition and tracking of approaching missiles and the deployment of appropriate laser jamming measures. The programme does not include work on a laser beam illumination warning sensor.
US Bases (Security)
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment has been made of the security risk to US bases in the UK since 11 September 2001; and if he will make a statement. [38064]
Dr. Moonie: Security at Ministry of Defence bases is kept under constant review. It is MOD policy not to discuss detailed matters of security, or to disclose details of threat assessments.
Unmanned Air Vehicles
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of the need for a carrier-based medium altitude/endurance unmanned air vehicle; and if he will make a statement. [38285]
Dr. Moonie: No decisions have yet been taken on the utility and cost effectiveness of unmanned air vehicles as part of the future carrier air group, but they remain under consideration to meet a number of requirements.
Ministry of Defence Police
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what training is given to MDP reserves; and if he will make a statement; [38067]
- (2) if he will make a statement on his Department's policy on its police reserves. [38066]
Dr. Moonie: There are no Ministry of Defence Police reserves, although there is an MDP Operational Support Unit (OSU) of fifty police officers based at MDP Headquarters at Wethersfield in Essex. In addition to receiving normal police training OSU officers are trained to provide teams for rope access, Incendiary Explosive Device searches, confined space search, chemical, biological radiological and nuclear response, personal protection for VIPs and public order duties.
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Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the chain of command for MOD police deployed on US bases in the UK since 11 September 2001 is; and if he will make a statement. [38062]
Dr. Moonie: The Senior Ministry of Defence Police Officer at a US base remains responsible to the Chief Constable in respect of his units' constabulary duties, through the Operational Common Unit Commander. The US Station Commander is responsible for the Security of the site, and exercises day-to-day operational control over the MDP under delegated authority from the Chief Constable, MDP.
Foreign Military Staff (UK Training)
Mr. Hancock: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many military staff from (a) Macedonia, (b) Bulgaria, (c) Slovakia, (d) Slovenia, (e) Albania, (f) Romania, (g) Estonia, (h) Latvia and (i) Lithuania have been involved in training in the UK in the last five years; at what cost; and if he will make a statement.[38055]
Mr. Ingram: Approximate numbers of personnel involved in training in the UK through the Outreach programme during the last three years are given below (figures are not held centrally prior 1999). These figures may include some civilian personnel working for the Defence Ministries of the countries referred to, as it is not possible in all cases to differentiate them.
Personnel from countries covered by the Outreach programme come to the UK for a wide variety of training, ranging from Staff courses lasting up to one year, to seminars and short educational visits for as little as three days. Included in these figures is Arms Control training, which in some cases (XOpen Skies") involves the use of an aircraft, at high cost.
Indicative costs are shown for 2001 only as detailed costings are not held for previous years. Places on year-long courses, which by their nature are expensive, are allocated between countries on rotation and those countries shown below with higher costs are likely to have benefited from at least one such course and in some cases from XOpen Skies" training during 2001. Not all costs involved in the activities covered in this answer fall to centrally controlled funds (i.e. support to individuals while visiting units), and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
| 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Numbers | Numbers | Numbers | Cost ÿK | |
| Macedonia | 20 | 27 | 17 | 126 |
| Bulgaria | 57 | 51 | 52 | 300 |
| Slovakia | 70 | 73 | 46 | 250 |
| Slovenia | 50 | 37 | 29 | 131 |
| Albania | 10 | 27 | 14 | 43 |
| Romania | 66 | 85 | 56 | 475 |
| Estonia | 36 | 18 | 24 | 55 |
| Latvia | 28 | 17 | 20 | 190 |
| Lithuania | 31 | 20 | 19 | 94 |
These activities form part of the Outreach programme in central and eastern Europe which, in turn, is part of the wider Defence Diplomacy mission. Outreach contributes to international stability by assisting countries in the region to establish democratically accountable, cost-effective armed forces capable of contributing both to national and regional security and, increasingly, to international security through participation in peace support operations.
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