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That is a very serious matter indeed. On the face of it, the House appears to have been grievously misled in exactly the terms set out in "Erskine May" and the ministerial code. Can we therefore expectindeed, demandthe earliest possible statement and apology to the House from the Secretary of State, to set the matter straight? We deserve no less. Admittedly, there have been recent rare examples of Cabinet Ministers coming to the House and apologising for errors, even though they were less serious than this. However, this is a matter of such public interest and gravity that I hope that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will agree that it is no less than the Secretary of State's duty to come to the House immediately and set matters straight. If necessary he should apologise, and preferably he should resign.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Michael Lord): I have listened very carefully to what the right hon. Gentleman has said. I have no knowledge of any statements of that kind being proposed at the moment. It is not the job of the Chair to rule on ministerial statements that have been made earlier in the House, but I have no doubt that the whole House will have heard the points that the right hon. Gentleman has made this afternoon.
Mr. Paul Burstow presented a Bill to make it unlawful to discriminate against persons on grounds of age in connection with employment or the provision of goods and services; to establish an Age Equality Commission with the function of working towards the elimination of such discrimination and promoting age equality generally; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 10 May, and to be printed [Bill 133].
If it were suggested that one runner in a race should be able to fire the starting pistol at a moment of his choosing and, moreover, that that runner should be the one who had won the race last time, it would be considered absurd and monstrously unfair, although, no doubt, there would still be those who would defend the practice as traditional and having the merits of flexibility. Yet that is precisely what we allow in relation to general elections.
Of course all parties, all Governments and all Prime Ministers see this issue through the distorting lens of their own interests. Indeed, when I asked one of my colleagues what he thought about fixed-term Parliaments, he said, "What a good idea. What shall we say, 20 years?" It is not difficult to understand why a proposal that seems eminently sensible in opposition should begin to look less attractive in governmentexcept that the Government have presided over a bold and ambitious programme of parliamentary and constitutional reform, which will be their great historical legacy. They have done so because they believe in reform, often against their immediate political or party self-interest, and it is in that spirit that I wish to add this further item to the programme.
Why is it possible for a Government, in the person of a Prime Minister, to fix the date of a general election? It is possible because it is a prerogative power, formerly exercised by the monarch, but, in practice, it is passed to the Prime Minister. That is why a letter arrived to tell me that I shall need to get the permission of the palace, through the good offices of the Home Secretary, before the Bill can proceed any further.
It is surely no longer acceptable to the House for the prerogative to be used in that way, as a legitimising cloak for Executive and prime ministerial power. It could also put the monarch in an invidious position, which has been glimpsed at certain politically sensitive times in the past. Not the least of the benefits of constitutionalising the prerogative power of Dissolution would be to protect the Crown against possible political difficulty and embarrassment. That would surely be an admirable golden jubilee gift from a grateful Parliament.
The Bill would fix general elections at four-yearly intervals, which reflects a post-war average of 3.7 years. It would allow departures from that in the event of Governments' losing the confidence of the House, while preventing Governments from engineering bogus no-confidence votes to trigger Dissolutions. It would also give the Electoral Commission a role in setting precise dates for the election timetable.
The question of when elections are held is, or should be, a basic part of a democracy's infrastructure. In local government, it is accepted practice that they be held at regular and fixed intervals. The same practice was accepted when this House legislated to set up the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales; there was no suggestion then that the Executives of those bodies should be able to decide when they wanted to hold elections. The same practice is also accepted by the European Parliament and, indeed, by most of Europe, in which fixed four-year electoral cycles are common.
The time has surely come for Westminster to catch up. Indeed, a Prime Minister who will be the first since the war to agree to appear before a Select Committee of this House is well equipped to be the first to relinquish this prerogative power. If he remains unpersuaded, a word with Lord Callaghan might be enough to convince him that the power can be a curse, as well as a blessing. A change such as I am proposing might help him with other difficulties, too. For example, the Government would like elections to a reformed House of Lords to be tied to general elections, but as the Public Administration Committee's recent report on House of Lords reform pointed out, it is very difficult to fix the terms of those elected without first fixing general election dates.
Similar difficulties exist in relation to the new legislation on party funding. Spending controls are imposed on parties and groups for one year before a general election, but given that election dates are not fixed, the timing of that period is unclear. That creates problems for parties, pressure groups and the Electoral Commission, so it is not surprising that the commission itself is taking an interest in fixed-term Parliaments. As I said, such new factors add weight to the traditional case.
There is a further factor. We are all preoccupied with how to counter the electorate's cynicism about, and detachment from, the political process. The spectacle of parties and politicians manipulating election dates to their own advantagea process that has intensified in the past 30 yearsdoes nothing to counter, and much to reinforce, such cynicism. We live in a different world from the one in which Sir Stafford Cripps, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, persuaded Clement Attlee to call an election in advance of the 1950 Budget, lest the charge might be made that the electorate were being improperly bribed. On that ground alone, the case for change is surely made.
I offer one final consideration. It will not be long before speculation about the date of the next general election begins in earnest, and pencil marks around certain dates have doubtless already been made on someone's calendar. A change of the kind that I propose would close down that industry at a stroke, and would be received by the electorate with a huge collective sigh of relief. Of course, there would be losers. I am thinking of all those journalists who spend a happy year or two writing endless columns of, and filling many hours with, speculative nonsense about election dates, and who would be obliged to give their attention to something else. To be deprived of the product of their labours is, I suggest, a cross that we should all just have to bear. I commend the Bill to the House.
Bill ordered to be brought in by Tony Wright, Mr. Graham Allen, Kevin Brennan, Mrs. Annette L. Brooke, Sir Patrick Cormack, Mr. Frank Field, Mr. Mark Fisher, Helen Jackson, Mr. Mark Oaten, Mr. Paul Tyler and Brian White.