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Mr. Laws: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs what her estimate is of the incidence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in each year since 1997; and if she will make a statement. 
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|Passive surveillance(5)||Active surveillance(6)|
(5) Animals reported as showing clinical sign suspicious of having BSE.
(6) Animals tested on presentation for slaughter, without showing clinical signs suspicious of having BSE.
(7) To 28 June.
(8) 70 results pending at 28 June 2002.
(9) 22 results pending at 28 June 2002.
Mr. Laws: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs how much land was covered by the major agri-environment schemes in (a) 1990, (b) 1995, (c) 1997, (d) 1998, (e) 1999, (f) 2000 and (g) 2001; and if she will make a statement. 
Mr. Morley: Details for the Environmentally Sensitive Areas, the Countryside Stewardship and the Organic Farming Schemes are set out in the table in hectares. The area of land under these schemes continues to increase. The Government are firmly committed to agri- environment schemes, and a significant increase of funding was announced in 2000 at the beginning of the England Rural Development Programme.
(10) Total for 199195 when the scheme was operated by the then Countryside Commission. The former MAFF assumed responsibility for the scheme in 1996.
(11) Provisional estimates.
Organic Aid Scheme operated until 1999 when it became the Organic Farming Scheme.
Mr. Breed: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, pursuant to her answer of 3 July 2002, Official Report, column 383W, on EU Directive 1999/74/EC, if she will place the (a) full and (b) partial regulatory impact assessments in the Library. 
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Mr. Breed: To ask the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, pursuant to the answer of 3 July 2002, Official Report, column 383W, for what reasons she will not carry out a full regulatory impact assessment ahead of her Department's consultation. 
Mr. Morley: A partial regulatory impact assessment is included with all public consultations. Subsequently, a full regulatory impact assessment will be produced, including the results of the consultation and will be submitted to Ministers.
Mr. Cousins: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether units of the British armed forces are equipped with full body armour based on ceramic plates; and what distribution of body protection (a) has been made and (b) is planned. 
Mr. Ingram: Units of the United Kingdom armed forces, in operational theatres, are issued with the general service combat body armour (CBA), which is a vest designed to provide protection to the chest and much of the abdomen. There is also an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) suit that provides head-to-toe protection for EOD units. Both are manufactured from textile ballistic fabric. Two ceramic plates can be added to the CBA vest, for extra front and back protection, if required. The current EOD suit does not have ceramic plates but a new lightweight EOD suit, which like the CBA would have ceramic plates to the front and back, has recently been trialled.
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on a case-by-case basis in the light of this, and their priority within the programme. From 1 June 2001 to 31 May 2002, four of the 13 exercises not offered Tac AT support were cancelled.
Dr. Moonie: The Strategic Defence Review required the re-organised Territorial Army to be operationally effective by 31 March 2000. All units formed as required, although some units were retained beyond this date until such time as regular units could assume their role as planned. The process of converting to new roles is continuing, and shortfalls in manpower in some areas (in particular the Army Medical Service(TA)) are also being addressed.
Mr. Joyce: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Territorial Army intelligence specialists called out into service last February are to be replaced; and if he will make a statement. 
Dr. Moonie: As a result of the significant increase in intelligence work following the events of 11 September, the need to augment the Defence Intelligence Staffs and other headquarters organisations by some 55 reservists continues. It is therefore necessary to call out compulsorily a second tranche of intelligence specialists to relieve the majority of those called out last February who now wish to resume their civilian employment. The individuals involved in the second tranche will primarily come from the Territorial Army, but a small number will also come from the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. They will commence their appointments in mid-August. We recognise the essential contribution made by these reservists to the operations against global terrorism and are grateful to them, their families and their employers for their support.
Dr. Moonie: There are no plans to cut back trees and gorse at Browndown site. As this is a site of specific scientific interest, we would have to consult with English Nature before undertaking such work, and in any event, work would not start before the growing season ended in the autumn.
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Llew Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will set out the types of circumstances in which he has judged it would be legal for the United Kingdom to use nuclear weapons; and whether it is United Kingdom policy never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. 
Mr. Hoon: As the Government have made clear on many occasions, we would be prepared to use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence. We would not use our weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, contrary to international law.
A policy of no first use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with our and NATO's doctrine of deterrence, nor would it further nuclear disarmament objectives. We have made clear, as have our NATO allies, that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. Our overall strategy is to ensure uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the exact nature of our response, and thus to maintain effective deterrence.
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