APPENDIX 9
Memorandum submitted by Mr Robert Datnow
UNPICKING THE
LOCK: WORLD
ATHLETICS IN
THE UK
In response to the Committee's invitation for
written evidence, I make this submission in my personal capacity
as a professional athlete, a solicitor and as a London resident.
I have appeared before this committee to give oral evidence on
Staging International Sporting Events (2000-01) and have submitted
written evidence to the Committee's previous inquiries into Staging
International Sporting Events and Wembley National Stadium in
my former capacity as in-house lawyer to the British Olympic Association
(1999-2001). In my time at the BOA I attended meetings of the
Picketts Lock Forum. I also assisted the BOA's work assessing
the feasibility of a London Olympic bid.
A. Available options for a UK World Athletics
Championships in 2005
1. Originally, the UK's bid to host the
World Athletics Championships 2005 proposed Wembley Stadium as
the main stadium location and was accepted in this form by the
IAAF. When athletics was removed from Wembley in December 1999,
the bid committee, with the Government's support reverted to the
IAAF in early 2000 confirming that London still wished to host,
proposing to leave the precise stadium location within London
to be decided upon by April 2000. By April 2000, Picketts Lock
was proposed.
2. It was on this basis that the IAAF confirmed
its award of the World Athletics Championships 2005 to London.
The Championships were awarded to the city and not to the stadium.
The function of naming the stadium location and providing assurances
about its construction was to satisfy the IAAF to enable it to
confirm its award. It is my understanding that provided the UK
is able to offer a suitable venue in London, which satisfies the
IAAF's requirements, the terms of the award will continue to be
met. History supports this view. Wembley was proposed then withdrawn
and London remained. Picketts Lock was proposed and has now been
withdrawn. Presumably London should still remain.
3. If this is correct key stakeholders must
now examine available options in London and present those to the
IAAF without delay. In addition, my understanding is that the
IAAF is under no obligation presently to consider any proposal
from any city other than London.
4. Of course there are other available options
in London which have as yet not been fully explored.
(a) In February 2000, in the search for a
venue in London with the potential to host the World Athletics
Championships which would not rule out Olympic potential, Sport
England produced a list of nine possible stadium locations. By
March 2000, the key stakeholders decided on three preferred sites
and the possible adaptation of two existing stadia as reserve
options. The Stakeholders chose Picketts Lock by the end of March
2000.
It took the Government the following 18 months
to reach a decision that Picketts Lock was not viable. It stands
to reason that the remaining sites (considered as preferred or
reserve options in March 2000) are unlikely to have been subjected
to the same scrutiny as Picketts Lock over the same period. It
is therefore logical that it would be premature to discount those
venues without further close examination on the issues which proved
fatal for Picketts Lock.
(b) Escalating and excessive costs of the
stadium development and proposed transport improvements were decisive
factors in ruling out Picketts Lock. Presumably key stakeholders
examined all the available alternatives to Governmental and public
subsidy. If not, those should now be considered. Options include
project-financing, venture capital, issuing debt and/or equity,
debentures, pre-sale of other event rights and leasing rights
(as a development financing) and other public/private arrangements.
Equally, although costs may have mounted, it
remains to be seen whether the cost/benefit analysis of Picketts
Lock (or other London venues) would have left the venture as a
whole in profit. Staging major international sporting events is
costly. If cost alone was the issue, the country would be unlikely
ever to bid. However, there are of course many major compensating
benefits to hosting. When the costs of staging are set-off against
the revenue produced from the sale of broadcasting and sponsorship
rights, ticket sales and other games related revenues and other
economic benefits to tourism, the sports sector and the business
community in general the benefits might well exceed the costs.
5. The IAAF has every right not to consider
Sheffield as an alternative venue. London was awarded the Championships
on the basis of its formal bid. If the IAAF were seriously to
consider Sheffield, they would be required to re-open the entire
2005 bidding process to compare the merits of Sheffield with any
other bidding cities. There would of course be no guarantee that
Sheffield would win and Britain could lose the Championships altogether.
If stakeholders search for and find an alternative venue in London,
they do not run this risk to the same degree.
The public too has every right not to consider
Sheffield as an alternative venue. After long and detailed consultation
and consideration of the relevant issues on cost, value for money,
transport, urban re-generation, the environment, the provision
of a legacy stadium, existing ancillary facilities and the need
for London to have an international standard track and field venue,
Sport England agreed to spending public funding on Picketts Lock
and the Government agreed to underwrite certain commitments. If
public and/or exchequer money is to be spent on staging in Sheffield,
the public has a right to be certain that Sheffield has been subjected
to at least the equivalent consultation, value for money and long-term
strategic considerations and has passed those tests in all areas.
B. Implications of the Government's decisions
for future UK bids
6. The Government's decision to withdraw
its support for plans to build a stadium at Picketts Lock is extremely
unhelpful. It risks jeopardising (a) Britain's prospects of hosting
the World Athletics Championships 2005; (b) Britain's prospects
of attracting the event in the future; (c) London and the country's
chances of attracting other major international sporting events;
(d) Britain's track athletes' chances of gaining the home competitive
advantage on an international stage; (e) the creation of an essential
London training and competition venue of international standard;
and (f) delaying the success of ongoing work on the feasibility
of hosting a London Olympic Games.
7. A failure for Britain to host the World
Athletics Championships will also increase the focus on the Commonwealth
Games, Manchester 2002. Those Games could now set the standard
by which Britain's ability to host major international sporting
events is judged.
8. The sense of disappointment and loss
of expectation amongst Britain's track and field community is
immense.
9. Other implications might well include:
(a) Britain being viewed by the international
sporting community as being unable and/or unwilling to build new
international sporting facilities in the capital;
(b) the IAAF perhaps understandably feeling
derided and International Sports Federations becoming uneasy about
awarding major events to Britain, thus refusing to do so in the
future;
(c) the British Government creating the impression
that whilst they are content to bid, they are not committed to
hosting major international sporting events in London;
(d) setting a precedent for the Government
to encourage bids, to spend large (but appropriate) amounts of
public money on feasibility studies, to build up the expectations
of the public and international sporting community only then unilaterally
to decide to abandon major sporting events;
(e) forming the conclusion that the British
Government has no clear (or at least no fixed or logical) medium
or long-term strategy for hosting international sporting events
in the UK;
(f) the loss to Britain's business and economy,
not least to the tourist industry;
(g) delaying still further the development
of a London branch of the UK Sports Institute; and
(h) raising further questions again about
the suitability or otherwise of Wembley to host track and field
athletics.
C. Lessons arising from the Picketts Lock
proposals and the UK's bid for the 2005 championships
10. The principal lesson arising from the
proposal and subsequent withdrawal of Picketts Lock must surely
be that the necessary feasibility work (on cost, transport, planning
etc) must take place before any bid is lodged. The potentially
substantial negative impact of the Government's eleventh hour
withdrawal could have been avoided, had the relevant information
on lack of viability been available prior to bidding or proposing
the stadium. With the benefit of hindsight, one of the major shortcomings
of the Picketts Lock project was to have proposed the venue to
the IAAF before establishing whether the project was viable.
11. The essential work required prior to
bidding to host major international sporting events in future
ought logically to include:
(a) establishing the feasibility of hosting
on all main issues (cost, transport, planning, funding, time-scales,
environment, legacy, viability of any new facilities, compliance
with a UK strategy for hosting international sporting events etc);
(b) working with the International Federation
within their framework and to meet their requirements;
(c) securing the use of any existing appropriate
venue(s) as required;
(d) ensuring and maintaining the support
of all key stakeholders; and
(e) procuring adequate funding (or sufficient
funding guarantees) from the public and/or private sector.
12. The British Olympic Association's initiative
in examining the feasibility of hosting a London Olympic Games,
their measured step-by-step approach to securing Governmental,
GLA and other key stakeholder support prior to bidding, (and prior
even to announcing an intention to bid) should be considered as
a template in preparing to bid to host any future international
sporting event in the UK.
13. The lessons from the Picketts Lock and
Wembley sagas are plain—what is required is broad early
consultation and support from all relevant stakeholders, adequate
preparation prior to bidding and the need for a co-ordinated UK-wide
strategy on facilities provision and hosting international sporting
events.
14. The two sagas continue and the lessons
continue to be taught. However, what remains to be seen is whether
anyone is listening and learning.
18 October 2001
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