APPENDIX
Government Response on Regulatory Reform
Order-Making: Deregulation Committee's 4th Report, 2000-01
Introduction
1. On 2 May 2001, the
House of Commons agreed new Standing Orders for the successor
to the Deregulation Committee, to be known as the Deregulation
and Regulatory Reform Committee. This new Committee is charged
with responsibility for completing the Parliamentary scrutiny
stages of the last tranche of proposals for deregulation orders
and for the scrutiny of any proposals for regulatory reform orders.
2. Its predecessor, the Commons Deregulation
Committee, published its 4th and final report of the 2000-01 Session
on 11 May 2001. This report centres on three final proposals for
deregulation orders [the proposed Deregulation (Correction of
Birth and Death Entries in Registers and other Records) Order
2001, the proposed Deregulation (Bingo and other gaming) Order
2001, and the proposed Deregulation (Restaurant Licensing Hours)
Order 2001.][22]
3. This memorandum does not address the Committee's
recommendations in so far as they concern the proposed deregulation
orders. The Government believes it would be more appropriate to
address such recommendations in detail in separate correspondence
or in the formal statements that will accompany the draft orders
when laid for the final 15 day scrutiny period. Instead, this
memorandum seeks to address the overarching issues raised in the
report as to the operation of the order-making process itself
under the Regulatory Reform Act 2001. The views it contains are
prospective. It may reassure the Committee to note that, during
the passage of the Bill, the Government undertook to report to
Parliament on the third anniversary of enactment. That report
is due in April 2004, and will cover the operation of the order-making
process to that date and any associated constitutional and procedural
issues in short, it will provide a formal opportunity
for debate in Parliament on how the system is working.
4. The Government agrees that it is important
that order-making should be conducted in a transparent and planned
manner, and the Government sets out its proposals later on in
this memorandum. The Government also considers that it is vital
to the success of the regulatory reform order-making programme
that there is a shared understanding as to the extent of the powers
and safeguards in the new Act.
5. Looking ahead, the existence of a suite of
precedents will be of great value to Departments but,
as yet, the principles in the Act have not been tested from start
to finish. Departments will need to overcome their natural caution
when faced with an entirely new, unproven but potentially very
powerful tool. And the Committee and its sister Committee in the
Lords will, therefore, play a highly influential role in shaping
how power is used.
6. One concern that we have for future order-making
is the prospect of abortive work, particularly in view of the
heavily front-loaded nature of the regulatory reform order-making
process and of the scale of some of the RRO proposals. There is
the risk of misunderstandings or the prospect that the Committees
might consider particular technical solutions underpinning large
orders to be flawed and that these may only come to light after
a proposal has been laid for scrutiny. Of course, it is an essential
part of the scrutiny process to probe the robustness of the Government's
case. But the Government hopes that there may well be occasions
where differences on particular technical issues could be identified
earlier on in the process this would benefit the Committees
in freeing them up to concentrate more on matters of substance
and would also reduce the prospect for the Government of abortive
work. It could also help raise public confidence in the order-making
process. While the Government does not want to do anything that
would detract from the highly effective scrutiny that RROs undergo,
we would want to stress the consensual and co-operative nature
of what is essentially a co-decision process. The Government would
welcome any suggestions from the Committee as to how best to approach
this issue and accepts that any mechanism would need to be without
prejudice to the formal elements of the order-making processes.
Regular flow of Regulatory Reform Orders
7. In paragraph 2 of
its report, the Committee expresses its concern that the flow
of RRO proposals coming before it should be such that it allows
the Committee to cope given the resources at its disposal. The
Committee expressed its expectation that the Government "should
aim towards an even flow of regulatory reform business and so
far as possible towards the objective that no more than one proposal
for a Regulatory Reform Order or one draft Order will in normal
circumstances be laid before Parliament in any one sitting week".
8. The Government's overall aim under this agenda
is to secure an impressive and achievable programme of regulatory
reform that is to the benefit of business, charities, the voluntary
sector and the individual. The Government intends the regulatory
reform process to be an attractive alternative means of legislative
reform and intends to make significant and early progress. It
appreciates that the Committee's predecessor also wanted to see
more reform brought forward.[23]
9. Subject to that overall aim, the Government
accepts that both it and Parliament should work to achieve an
even flow of regulatory reform order-making. It is clearly in
no-one's interests for the Government to over-burden the Committee
with proposals, but the Government notes that, assuming a standard
Parliamentary session, the Committee's proposal would result in
an expected maximum completion rate of only 18 RROs made
per session.[24]
10. The Government is not convinced that the
best or only way to achieve an even flow of work is to apply an
artificial limit at this early stage. In that respect, it notes
that deregulation order-making peaked at 23 orders in 1996 under
the last Conservative Government. The Government would want, if
only in theory, to be ale to achieve at least an equivalent degree
of regulatory reform, but under the Committee's proposal it would
not even be able to match the level of order-making achieved in
1996.
11. The Government is also mindful of the comments
that the Committee has made in the past, deploring the low throughput
of deregulation orders in the past[25]
and anticipating a "full
and appropriate"[26]
use of the regulatory reform order-making power. It also notes
that MPs on either side of the House have through Parliamentary
Questions shown themselves interested in the number and/or scope
of order-making.[27]
12. The Government, therefore, believes that
it is premature at this stage to seek explicitly to restrict the
possible level of order-making throughput. After all, the Committee
has only one draft order before it at present, although more are
in the pipeline as set out at paragraph 23 below. Instead, we
consider there to be two other approaches, which are not mutually
exclusive, that could be adopted:
- Wait and see: we are
at the outset of order-making, and arguably it would be better
to wait until a steady state has been reached and we have sufficient
experience on which to base a judgement before turning the tap
down. This would mean waiting until a sufficient number of RROs
have passed through all stages so that the peaks and troughs of
order-making are clear. At the moment, we do not know whether
there will be such a thing as a "typical" RRO. There
may, for instance, be a learning curve effect if there is a standard
pattern to order-making, which in turn could increase the Committee's
effective capacity. We would not want to rule out these possibilities
at this stage.
- Forward look reports:
a more pragmatic approach would be to keep actual throughput under
constant review and in the light of the forward look reports,
as discussed at paragraphs 18 to 23 below. If the conclusion at
any point is that the workload the Government was placing on the
Committees was in danger of becoming unsustainable, the Committee
could then apply an appropriate, rather than an artificial, limit
to throughput.
13. Subject to the Committee's views and as an
alternative to imposing limitations from the outset, the Government
intends to strive to achieve a regular and predictable flow of
order-making. This will involve monitoring carefully the load
placed on the scrutiny Committees. It expects that, in turn, the
Committee will not hesitate to make their views known should the
forward look reports indicate that the likelihood of an unacceptable
workload.
14. It is the Government's view that, should
the Committee become over-burdened by the scrutiny of a large
and continuous volume of RRO proposals, the level and nature of
the resources available to the scrutiny Committee would be a matter
that is properly for the House to decide. Ministers repeatedly
made this clear during the passage of the Bill. For instance,
Mr Stringer stated that:
"The hon. Member for
South-West Hertfordshire (Mr. Page) ... asked two direct questions:
first, whether the Committee would have the resources to enable
it to carry out its business, and the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire
made a similar point; and, secondly, whether the Committee would
have the right and power to force Ministers to attend. Both issues
are a matter for the House."[28]
Similar statements were made by the Government in
the House of Lords.[29]
The Government notes in passing that the House has
provided for a number of Standing Committees to deal with proposals
for primary legislation.
15. On a more minor note, the Government is not
convinced that the same weight should automatically be given for
scheduling purposes to 2nd stage draft orders as for
1st stage proposals. Those returning to the Committees
for 2nd stage scrutiny will normally have been amended
to reflect the recommendations of both Committees, and the Committee
will be familiar with the issues raised by the proposal. The Government
considers it unlikely that a 2nd stage draft order
would consume anything like the same level of resources as a 1st
stage proposal.
16. The Government also welcomes the Committee's
suggestion that any scheduling arrangements need to be flexible
enough to allow for exceptional circumstances. There will, for
example, be occasions when the Government might need to make speedy
progress. In the case, for example, of the proposal for voluntary-aided
schools[30], the final
order will need to be made in advance of the start of the relevant
financial year in order to allow time for the parties involved
to make any necessary preparations. DfES are planning their work
accordingly, but they may need to move quickly from one stage
to another in order to reduce the possibility of slippage. The
Government believes that it must strike the right balance between,
on the one hand, the desirability of ensuring that RROs implement
what will be generally beneficial change as soon as is reasonably
practicable and, on the other hand, the burden it is placing on
the scrutiny Committees.
17. The Government regrets that it had no alternative
but to table the proposal for the Special Occasions Order for
initial scrutiny before your Committee was established. This was
because, in the event, the timetabling for order-making was such
that it would otherwise have been impossible to make the order
before the Christmas holidays. The Government's reasoning on this
proposed order has been further elaborated in the separate Memorandum
from the Department of Media, Culture and Sport. It is worth repeating
the point from that Memorandum that the Government does not in
any way regard that as setting a precedent for the handling of
any future order and is grateful for the Committee's speedy consideration
of the substance of this particular proposal.
Scheduling the Flow of Order-making
18. In paragraph 3 of
the report, the Committee refers to the 'Forward Look' produced
by the previous Conservative administration when deregulation
order-making started to ramp up. This gave details of upcoming
proposals, along with a timetable for proposals already in the
public domain. This was in addition to an administrative requirement
that the Cabinet Office give a week's notice before laying a proposal
for its first stage scrutiny. The Government notes that the practice
was discontinued as the flow of orders dried up from 1998 onwards.
19. As explained above, the Government recognises
the importance of open and helpful communication with the Committee,
both at Ministerial level and at official level. It agrees that
such a report could form a useful tool for planning purposes and
is happy to provide such a report on a regular basis. The Government
will use its best endeavours through the Cabinet Office to provide
the Committees with the best quality information possible, initially
on a quarterly basis, on the likely flow of proposals for order-making
at consultation, 1st scrutiny and 2nd scrutiny
stages. But the Government believes there would be little practical
value in the Government producing a formal report during Recesses.
The Government therefore proposes reporting for January to March,
May to July and October to November. The Government hopes this
will be acceptable to the Committee.
20. The Government will provide the best and
most up-to-date information possible. But the government hopes
that the Committee will accept that, as a result of the collective
process, it will often be difficult to predict with any great
accuracy the exact date of the publication of a consultation document
or the laying of an order until very shortly before publication
takes place. In such cases, the Government will aim to provide
an ad-hoc report if practicable. The Government also hopes that
the Committee will accept that, as with any forward look, there
will be the possibility of slippage. In turn, the government fully
accepts the desirability of not springing surprises on the Committee.
21. The government wants this new legislative
took to be put to good use as part of the wider regulatory reform
agenda. In order to provide impetus and a more systematic approach,
the Prime Minister has asked "all departments to draw up
a list of wide-ranging and significant reforms which can be delivered
through the new Regulatory Reform Orders so that we can publish
an action plan by the end of the year". This action plan
will also cover measures aimed at improving public sector delivery,
proposals for time-limited regulations ('sun-setting') and post-implementation
reviews of major pieces of regulation. More details are given
in the Press Notice attached at Appendix A.[31]
22. The Government intends that publication of
this regulatory reform action plan will not only help generate
more proposals for RROs but will also set a baseline for future
reporting. Departments are currently working hard to prepare their
contributions to the regulatory reform action plan but
as yet are some way from completion given the target date set
by the Prime Minister. In the circumstances, it would be very
helpful if the Committee were to feel able to accept the publication
in December or thereabouts of the Government's regulatory reform
action plan as its first report on scheduling for RROs, although
it will also cover other regulatory reform issues in the plan.
23. In the meantime and in time for the return
from Recess, the Committee might find it useful to note for the
period up to the Christmas Recess that it is the Government 's
intention to:
Publish the following consultation documents:
|
1. | Credit Unions
| October |
2. | Amending Charities Act 1993
| January |
3. | NHS Accounting for charitable funds
| early New Year |
|
| |
Table the following proposals for 1st stage scrutiny:
|
1. | Invalid Care Allowance
| November |
2. | Vaccine Damage Payments Scheme
| November |
3. | Voluntary aided schools capital funding arrangements
| November |
4. | Golden Jubilee amendment to Special Occasions
| mid-November |
Order |
5. | Housing renewal
| Mid-December |
6. | Abolition of 20 partner limit
| Early new Year |
|
| |
Table the following draft orders for 2nd stage scrutiny:
|
1. | Housing Transfers
| Late October |
2. | Restaurants licensing hours
| Late October |
3. | Special Occasions Order
| Mid-November |
4. | Births and deaths
| November |
5. | Bingo
| November/December |
The Government must stress, though, that these
plans are provisional and that, despite its best endeavours, slippage
could occur.
The ability of RROs to implement substantial
policy changes
24. In paragraph 8 of
its report, the Committee states that the procedure in the Act
should not be used 'for implementing substantial policy
changes requiring the much higher-profile attention paid by Parliament
to primary legislation'.
25. This has caused us some difficulty
and may be open to mis-interpretation. One interpretation could
be that the order-making process is inappropriate for implementing
any substantial policy change as that is what bills
are for. Another interpretation could be that it is inappropriate
only for those substantial policy proposals that, by both their
controversial nature and scale, require a Bill.
26. The Government hopes that the former is not
the Committee's intention. This is because the Act does not limit
the order-making power in relation to substantial policy changes,
and the Government is concerned to ensure that the Committee should
not construe the Act too restrictively. It notes that every deregulation
order, however minor, reflected a change in policy and implemented
that change.
27. In repealing the 1994 Act, Parliament accepted
the Government's intention that it should be used to implement
substantial and worthwhile change. Lord Falconer (21 Dec 2000:
Column 853) made it clear that the Government "should like
to see a shift in gear. Until now the deregulation process has
produced generally small, but significant, proposals. We should
like to see this high quality scrutiny process used for more substantial
items, such as reform of fire safety legislation currently spread
over 120 Acts; or reform of weights and measures legislation.
Those are the sorts of worthwhile reforms that are well overdue
and may not otherwise see the light of day."
28. The reforms the Government proposes to enact
under the Regulatory Reform Act are not concerned merely with
tidying up unwieldy pieces of legislation or fine-tuning existing
burdensome regimes. On the contrary, as the list of examples shows,
they include major reforms of policy. The Government made no secret
of this during the passage of the Bill, and it was clearly Parliament's
intention to pass a piece of legislation capable of implementing
a very wide scope of reform. It was made very clear that, as Mr
Russell Brown MP a member of the Committee and its predecessor
put it:
"The Government have
important plans to use the powers under the Bill. As already announced,
we plan to use them to reform our cumbersome fire safety and weights
and measures legislation, as well as to free schools to provide
the out-of-hours child care services that are so desperately needed
and so well used in many parts of the country. Those are the sort
of worthwhile changes for which the Bill has been designed."[32]
29. The level of attention paid to such proposals
is certainly no less than primary legislation receives. As Mr
Pike MP himself pointed out during the Bill's 2nd Reading,
the procedures it inherited from the 1994 Act if anything allow
for even greater scrutiny of proposals than the procedures for
scrutinising primary legislation. He said that it had:
"resulted in deregulatory
measures being dealt with in such a way as to be subject to better
consultation and better scrutiny. The procedure is better than
tagging measures on to big Bills. Some Departments and their officials
perhaps have not made more use of the legislation because they
fear that the scrutiny and treatment of proposals would be much
more rigorous."[33]
30. The Government agrees that primary legislation
tends to be of higher profile, but considers that the super-affirmative
order-making procedure, with its thorough consultation and weighing
of evidence, is well suited to the objective consideration of
complex issues. It is ideal where the judgement of experts is
required; for issues on which a group of reasonable people, given
the relevant facts, would be likely to reach consensus without
compromise.
31. That said, the Government repeated on many
occasions during the passage of the Bill that the order-making
power would not be used to enact measures that were both large
and controversial. For example, Lord Falconer of Thoroton said
in the House of Lords during the Report stage of the Bill:
"As has been repeatedly
stated by everyone involved, the power in the Bill is not suited
to large and controversial measures. The entire procedure contained
in the Bill would weed out such proposals. A highly contentious
issue would come up against serious problems during the consultation
period and the Minister, obliged to set all this out in the document
he placed before Parliament, would have to reflect that explicitly.
The scrutiny procedures in Parliament, involving careful examination
by committees and the co-equal status of the two Houses, are such
that any Minister would obviously be ill-advised to choose this
route."[34]
This remains the firm view of the Government. Ministers
made it equally clear during the passage of the Bill that the
power could be used to implement important policy changes: for
example, the proposed reforms to fire safety legislation, which
were cited frequently in debate, would involve a major change
in policy from an inspection and certification regime to a risk-based
system. This would mean that inspectors would concentrate their
time on high-risk premises; and that the occupiers of premises
would be responsible for assessing their own level of risk. The
government is committed to bringing this reform forward as an
RRO. It is clearly a major change in policy, but one that is ideally
suited for the RRO procedure. The proposal will first go out to
thorough and wide-ranging consultation and then be subjected to
the careful weighing of evidence by the Committees. The Government
believes that these changes will be widely welcomed and that they
are not politically controversial, but that they do involve a
significant policy innovation.
32. The list of illustrative proposals announced
during the Bill's passage through Parliament contains many such
examples that involve significant policy changes. These include,
for example, the proposal from the HM Treasury and Office of National
Statistics for a thorough-going review of the Civil Registration
Service. Given the prominence attached to the illustrative examples
of the scope of the order-making power during the Bill's passage,
the Government firmly believes that they should be treated as
an expected use of the order-making power. The Government believes
that the RRO procedure is an excellent tool for implementing such
complex policies.
33. The issue of what would be appropriate subject
matter for RROs was thoroughly explored in debate on the Bill,
and is rehearsed in the Explanatory Notes as finally published
at paragraphs 40 to 46. This can essentially be defined as the
political acceptability and feasibility of the proposal. Clearly
it is not possible to draw up in advance a list of politically
controversial items. It is the Government's opinion that proposals
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. It is likely that,
because of the mandatory consultation on proposed reforms, the
true extent of the controversiality of particular proposals would
be spotted early. The decision could then be made as to whether
it would be better promoted as a bill. Once a draft order has
been tabled, the Committees themselves should reach their own
views as to appropriateness in the light of Parliament's clear
expectations as to the expected uses to which the order-making
power could be put.
34. The Government is happy to repeat its commitment
not to implement measures that are both large and
controversial using the power in the Act, and hopes that the Committee's
interpretation at paragraph 8 of its report (see paragraph 24
above) took account of this undertaking.
35. The Government believes that the consensual
approach enshrined in the Act, together with the extensive public
consultation, is an excellent means of approaching a large range
of policy issues. The Government also considers that the operation
of the order-making power is to some extent self-policing
it would be a foolish Minister who chose to use an RRO to do something
wicked as the process would require him to consult at length and
in detail on the extent of the wickedness of the proposal, and
then document it thoroughly to the Committees so that they could
report publicly on its wickedness.
36. That it is self-policing is not enough: the
Committees will scrutinise proposals thoroughly, paying specific
attention to appropriateness in doing so, and it will ultimately
be for Parliament itself to decide whether any particular policy
proposal should be made as an RRO. The Government is confident,
as was Parliament in passing the Act, that the safeguards it contains
are more than sufficient to ensure that the power is used in an
appropriate fashion while tackling significant change in major
areas of policy.
Other issues
a.
| Standing order procedures in the event of disagreement: the order-making process is essentially one of consensus-seeking co-decision based on thorough consultation, and the scrutiny Committee acts on behalf of the House in considering proposals for order-making. There is also, of course, the Government's undertaking not to proceed in the face of adverse Committee reports.[35] The Committee will be aware that Standing Order No.18 provides a mechanism for debate in the House to decide cases in which agreement between the Committees and Government cannot be achieved. This is set out in the Explanatory Notes to the Act as recently published, and it is worth noting that this mechanism was never used in the case of deregulation orders.
|
|
|
| While the Government will continue to aspire to unanimity with the Committees on particular proposals, there may occasionally be cases where it disagrees with a particular recommendation by the Committee and, after failing to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution, considers that the matter should be put to each House. This is as provided for in Standing Orders.
|
|
|
| It may be that, where the two Committees take a different view on the same aspect of a proposal and the Government cannot broker a solution acceptable to all parties, the matter should be put to the House of Commons as a whole.[36] The Government envisages that, in the Commons, recourse to the Standing Orders procedure would be very much a last resort, that it would be in relation to disagreements on particular aspects of proposed orders rather than to cases where the Committee had expressed outright opposition to the draft order as a whole, and that it could only take place after attempts to re-lay the order in an acceptable form had failed. But it also acknowledges the need for the Standing Order procedures, given the scale and complexity of some of the proposals, and that it is the Government's expressed intention and Parliament's will in passing the 2001 Act to use the order-making process to achieve a substantial programme of regulatory reform.
|
|
|
b.
| Interpretation of vires: in debating the Bill, Ministers did not attempt to portray the order-making power as tightly circumscribed. Instead, they described it and each House accepted it as a Henry VIIIth order-making power of very broad scope.
|
|
|
| Clearly, the scope of the order-making power will be tested to the full on particular proposals for reform, which will establish and set precedent for key aspects of the vires. But the Government's starting point is that the vires are to be interpreted widely. For example, Parliament accepted that the terms in the Act such as "reform" and "burden" are to be given their natural meaning. The latter is central to the operation of the order-making power, and the Government is preparing on the basis of refined legal advice a guidance note on the meaning of burden which it will circulate widely throughout Whitehall. It is our intention to share that note with the Committee in due course.
|
Conclusion
38. The Government hopes
that this memorandum will be a useful contribution to the debate
on regulatory reform, and looks forward to an open and constructive
relationship with the Committee in delivering an impressive programme
of order-making.
Cabinet Office
October
2001
22 The outstanding proposal - the proposed Deregulation
(Disposals of Dwelling-houses by Local Authorities) Order 2001
- was dealt with in the Committee's 3rd Report. Back
23 "Overall,
the draft Regulatory Reform Bill represents a sensible and welcome
step forward in the process of facilitating greater use of the
Deregulation procedure", paragraph 78, Deregulation Committee's
3rd Special Report, 1999/2000. Back
24 The
Modernisation Committee, at paragraph 14 of its 1st Report of
the 1998/99 Session, said that a "typical Parliamentary session
(the session which has just ended, being the first of a new Parliament,
was not typical) involves about 160 sitting days, spread over
36 weeks, some of which are part weeks". Back
25 "In
view of our concern, we took evidence in April 1998 from the then
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, the Rt. Hon. Dr David Clark,
and in June from Lord Haskins, Chairman of the Better Regulation
Task Force. Both acknowledged in their evidence their disappointment
at the small number of proposals coming forward under the procedure,
and indicated the being made to raise interest within Government
Departments. But Dr Clark in particular felt that the powers
in the 1994 Act were restrictive, and he indicated that, largely
as a result of the Committee's initiative in taking evidence at
that time, he was then embarking on a re-assessment of the Act,
with the possibility of an amending Bill coming forward during
the life of the present Parliament.", paragraph 12, Commons
Committee's 2nd Special Report, 1999/2000. Back
26 We
look forward to being apprised of the means by which the Minister
will encourage full and appropriate use of this new legislation,
and keep us informed of progress in so doing, and remind him that
we have given notice of our intention to take evidence from the
relevant Ministers and their successors on their use of the powers",
paragraph 11, Deregulation Committee's 3rd Special Report, 1999/2000. Back
27 A
sample of PQ's tabled in the last 2 sessions on deregulation and
regulatory reform is set out below:
MP |
Question |
Date laid |
Hansard ref |
Peter Pike MP
|
To ask the Minister for Cabinet Office, How many deregulation proposals her Department expects to be introduced in 2000.
|
06/12/99
|
101570
|
Peter Pike MP
|
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, What action she has taken to improve the scope of deregulation since October 1999.
|
27/07/00
|
128671
|
John Bercow MP
|
To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, how many deregulation orders have been passed in each of the last three years.
|
01/11/00
|
136407
|
Desmond Swayne MP
|
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, How many deregulation orders she plans to introduce in the next 12 months
|
16/11/00
|
139193
|
Dr Douglas Naysmith MP
|
To ask the Minister for the Cabinet Office, What further items of regulatory reform he plans to introduce following the implementation of the Regulatory Reform Act
|
27/06/01
|
1891
|
John Bercow MP
|
To ask the minister for the Cabinet Office, How many draft regulatory reform orders have been published since the passage of the Regulatory Reform Act 2001.
|
27/06/01
|
1875
|
Back
28 Commons
Hansard: 2 May 2001, Column 899. Back
29 Lord
McIntosh (LH 13 Feb 2001, Column 202 - 2003) explicitly stated
that "the resourcing and structure of the committee is a
matter for the House, not for the Government. My noble and learned
friend Lord Falconer and I have both said more than once that
we support any move to look in detail at the issue of the resourcing
of the committee. That is as far as we can go. The argument
for resourcing ... s not one which we can accept. It would involve
the Government usurping the privilege of the House. We are not
in a position to dictate to the House how it should run its own
affairs." Back
30 Voluntary
Aided (VA) Schools in England: Proposals For Governing Body And
Local Education Authority Financial Liabilities and Funding For
Premises, available from http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/regulation/act/condocs.htm#vaschools. Back
31 Not
printed. Cabinet Office press notices are available on the World
Wide Web: http://www.nds.coi.gov.uk/coi/coipress.nsf Back
32 Commons
Hansard, 19 March 2001, Column 93. Back
33 Commons
Hansard, 19 March 2001, Column 48. Back
34 Lords
Hansard, 13 February 2001, Column 186. Back
35 Mr
Stringer stated during the first committee stage of the then Bill:
"I am happy to give the hon. Gentleman the commitment that,
in the light of an adverse report, the Government will not proceed,
but will reconsider the proposal. They would either withdraw
it or represent a different order." This reiterated an undertaking
given in the Lords: "it gives me the opportunity to repeat
the assurance given by my noble and learned friend in May of last
year. At that time the Government undertook to continue to respect
the convention that no measure under the Deregulation and Contracting
Out Act should be forced through in the face of the committee's
opposition... I am happy to repeat the undertaking today."
(Lord McIntosh of Haringey, 21 December 2000: Column 899.) Back
36 Procedures
in the House of Lords differ slightly. In that House, all deregulation
or regulatory reform orders are debated on the floor of the House,
regardless of whether there is any disagreement between the two
Committees. Back
|