APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE DEFENCE SELECT COMMITTEE'S
REPORT ON DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN THE UK
1. This memorandum constitutes the Government's response
to the Defence Select Committee's report Defence and Security
in the UK (Sixth report of session 2001-02, HC 518-I published
on 24 July 2002). The Government welcomes the Report as an important
contribution to the continuing effort to strengthen the UK's defence
and security against the terrorist threat.
2. As the Defence Committee noted, the terrorist
attack of September 11 2001 changed our appreciation of the vulnerability
of UK interests to international terrorism, as well as our understanding
of the nature of the terrorist threatboth the sophistication
of the planning and the willingness of terrorists to inflict mass
civilian casualties. In the aftermath of the attacks, the UK Government
instigated a comprehensive review of the UK's preparedness and
contingency plans.
3. Prior to the attacks on the United States, the
UK Government had already begun to review and improve contingency
planning in the UK in response to the disruptive challenges of
the kind seen in the fuel protests, the floods of the winter of
2000 and the outbreak of foot and mouth disease. These experiences
led to the formation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat within
the Cabinet Office to draw together and co-ordinate the different
strands of Government activity that come into play in handling
such difficult challenges.
4. Within Government, the Home Secretary has lead
responsibility for counter-terrorist policy and maintains a clear
oversight of the issues and measures being taken to strengthen
the UK's ability to respond to the terrorist threat. The Home
Office's national counter-terrorist contingency plans are tried
and tested and designed to respond to a wide range of terrorist
threats.
5. The Government's effort to tackle domestic terrorism
has not in any way decreased, but following 11 September 2001,
the Government has been rethinking security across the board to
identify vulnerabilities and tighten existing security measures
to make the United Kingdom even safer from terrorist attack.
6. Further information on this subject is set out
in The United Kingdom and the Campaign against International
Terrorisma Progress Report which the Government placed
in the House of Commons library on 9 September 2002. This report
details the progress made on both a national and international
level since September 11 and sets out the Government's priorities
for further work.
The Armed Forces and Home
Defence
7. We are concerned that as time passes there
is an increasing risk of complacency in respect of the threat
of terrorism. We have found evidence of this during our enquiry.
(Paragraph 15)
The Government recognises the risk of complacency
and the vital importance of remaining vigilant. We continue to
strive to adapt and improve the strong security measures already
in place so that they meet the new challenges we now face. Measures
already taken range from physical protection enhancements through
to better co-ordinated mutual aid arrangements and constant monitoring
of the terrorist threat in the UK. Testing our plans through exercises
also plays a significant part in strengthening our capabilities.
A rolling programme of work is being carried forward under the
supervision of the Home Secretary. This is addressing issues according
to their priority and will remain in place for the foreseeable
future.
8. Over the years since the end of the Cold War,
there has been a significant shift in the Government's interpretation
of how the Armed Forces should discharge their fundamental responsibilities
for the defence of the realm. This has occurred in response to
the changing nature of the military threat to the UK and to developments
in the understanding of where the UK's Armed Forces could most
effectively make a contribution. (Paragraph 25)
11 September may have pointed to the need for
enhancing existing provision in certain areas, but it has not
led to any fundamental re-evaluation of the principles underpinning
the Strategic Defence Review or the roles and responsibilities
which the SDR gave the Armed Forces. (Paragraph 27)
The Committee is correct in its assessment of the
change in the role of the Armed Forces. The role changed with
the disappearance of the threat from the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact. Since then the Armed Forces have responded to the increased
potential for smaller regional conflicts within Europe and beyond
and have consequently evolved a stronger capability to undertake
operations abroad.
The Committee recognises (paragraph 18) that this
evolution was driven in part by the recognition of asymmetric
threats. There was, therefore, no need for a fundamental re-evaluation
of the principles underpinning the SDR. The change which occurred
as a result of 11 September was, however, fully recognised by
the Government as a whole. The White Paper published on 18 July
2002, 'The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter', outlined
the results of the review of MOD capabilities following those
events. It states at paragraph 4 that "¼whereas
the SDR saw these potential asymmetric threats as one of a range
of tactics that an adversary might use, the attacks on the US
on 11 September have shown that such action has the potential
for strategic effect. It is this development that has prompted
the work we are now undertaking." (Paragraph 18)
The SDR New Chapter will lead to enhancements to
the capabilities of the Armed Forces, including an enhanced role
for the Reserves in Home Defence and Security. The Committee rightly
draws attention to the information in paragraph 24 of the MOD
Memorandum (January 2002): "whatever its source, terrorist
activity in the UK is criminal. The operational lead rests, in
most cases, with the police." And as the same Memorandum
points out "Developing and implementing methods of preventing
terrorism in the UK, including threat assessments, and responding
to terrorist incidents in the UK while they are under way, rests
on the activities of a wide range of agencies and Departments.
Cabinet Office groups co-ordinate both the prevention of
terrorism and the response to an incident."
The Armed Forces consequently make a full and effective
contribution to an integrated response, designed to ensure the
defence and security of the UK. Their primary contribution, however,
is their ability to take pre-emptive action abroad against the
threat from international terrorism.
Air Defence
9. Together the requirements to establish hostile
intent and to assess whether the action would be proportionate
in terms of its likely consequences place a high hurdle in the
way of any decision to shoot down a 'rogue' civilian aircraft.
We support this and believe that the MOD's approach to this very
difficult issue has been the right one. (Paragraph 44)
We firmly believe that a decision of this magnitude
should not be delegated to officials, whether civilian or military,
and that any decision to shoot down a suspected rogue civilian
aircraft must be taken by Ministers. (Paragraph 45)
The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement
of its general approach to this difficult issue. As the Committee's
Report makes clear, a robust mechanism does exist to respond to
the threat from renegade civil aircraft. We will continue to ensure
that this mechanism remains both safe and effective in every eventuality.
Response Time
10. We believe that the MOD should continue to
look for suitable air bases close to London at which Quick Reaction
Alert (QRA) aircraft might be stationed, bearing in mind that
the full panoply of support and protection provided by the aircrafts'
current bases would not be necessary for this deployment. (Paragraph
47)
The results of the site assessments were published
at paragraph 87 of the SDR: A New Chapter. Enhancements will be
made to airfields across the UK (RAF Marham in Norfolk, RAF St
Mawgan in Cornwall and RNAS Yeovilton in Somerset) to support
QRA aircraft. Together with the use of existing QRA airfields,
the Government believes that this will give us greater flexibility
and fuller coverage in our response arrangements.
Clearly, hangars and runways must be of the right
size and length and freely available to ensure a rapid response.
As was explained in evidence to the Committee, these conditions
led us to rule out civil airports close to London, even as temporary
locations for QRA aircraft. Whilst aircraft could, of course,
use other airfields in an emergency, we believe that it would
be more prudent in our planning to prepare to provide QRA aircraft
with the support they will need to do their job safely and effectively.
We also have a responsibility to ensure that munitions are effective
at short notice whilst representing no danger to the public.
11. We do not believe that the use of ground based
missiles against civilian aircraft can be justified. Neither do
we believe that they can be an effective deterrent. (Paragraph
51)
The Government welcomes this endorsement of its assessment.
We will keep open the possibility of deploying these assets should
circumstances arise which do justify their deployment. Any deployment
of ground-based air defence systems would be as an integrated
part of the overall air defence system.
Effects on Air Crew
12. We recommend that the MOD and the RAF provide
specific additional psychological advice and training for interceptor
aircrew of the QRA aircraft which may be called upon to respond
to a rogue civilian aircraft incident. (Paragraph 51)
Relevant training and advice is being provided to
these aircrew and the squadrons involved will continue to participate
in the development of all aspects of the operation.
NATINADS
13. We recommend that the Government initiate
within NATO an examination of how NATO's integrated air defence
system should be restructured to provide optimal air defence capability
against new and emerging threats including those from 'rogue'
civilian aircraft. (Paragraph 55)
An examination of NATO's role in the response to
the threat from international terrorism, including its role in
home defence, forms an important part of NATO's wider agenda for
the Prague Summit in November 2002. The UK Government will, as
always, play a full and active part in developing that agenda.
Key Point Defence
14. We look forward to the Government's consideration
of the Armed Forces' role in the protection of key sites in the
SDR New Chapter. (Paragraph 61)
Arrangements are clear cut and precise. The list
of economic and military key points has been reviewed to ensure
that it remains relevant and comprehensive, and that the security
of the key sites can be provided by nominated organisations.
The Government shares the Committee's caution about
extending the role of the Armed Forces beyond those locations
for which they are clearly responsible or have a direct interest.
Nonetheless, should a particular emergency make it impossible
for other organisations to ensure security at 'their' key points,
the police can request support from the Armed Forces. With this
in mind, access control is one of the possible functions for the
Reserves outlined in the MOD Discussion Document, 'The Role of
the Reserves in Home Defence and Security', published on 12 June.
In view of the effectiveness of the arrangements
already in place, we would not see this as the most likely or
common role for the regular or reserve Armed Forces to be given
during an emergency. But we do recognise the need to remain flexible
and responsive to any situation.
Military Sites
15. We welcome the prompt action of the MOD to
increase the level of protection to our Armed Forces and those
of the United States stationed in the UK. (Paragraph 63)
The Government welcomes the Committee's recognition
of the prompt and effective action taken by The Ministry of Defence
and Ministry of Defence Police. Their action was taken as part
of a wider response by police forces across the country, designed
to enhance the protection of the population as a whole.
Ministry of Defence Police
16. In general we have a high opinion of the professionalism
of the Ministry of Defence Police, MDP, but we would be concerned
to see them develop a role as an armed counter-terrorist police
force without appropriate safeguards in terms of governance and
public accountability. (Paragraph 68)
The powers of the MDP under the Anti-Terrorism Crime
and Security Act were granted to bring them in to line with the
powers available to other police forces in the event of terrorist
actions. The contribution they made to the boarding of the M V
NISHA was the result of the mutual aid arrangements that exist
between all police forces in UK. They will continue to make a
full contribution to the response to the threat from terrorists
in the UK but there are no plans to develop them as an armed counter-terrorist
police force. The MDP will continue to be accountable through
existing command chains to the Secretary of State for Defence
and consequently, to Parliament.
17. We recommend that the MOD publishes the conclusions
of Stage 2 of the Quinquennial Review of the, MDP as they relate
to the proposed reserve capability and governance and accountability
issues. (Paragraph 69)
The Government welcomes this recommendation. The
work on establishing the MDP's future surge capacity requirement
is still in progress. The Ministry of Defence should be in a position
to be able to advise the Committee of the outcome before the Christmas
parliamentary recess.
Royal Navy Vessels
18. We accept that security measures at naval
bases and military ports should be based on threat assessment
and intelligence and should be designed to interfere as little
as possible with legitimate civilian activity consistent with
maintaining appropriate levels of security. This balance should
be kept under review. We believe that the threat of asymmetric
terrorist attack on Royal Navy ships is a real one and we recommend
that the MOD take urgent steps to ensure that any capability gaps
in their defences against known threats are closed. (Paragraph
74)
The Government shares the Committee's overall assessment.
The security of Royal Navy ships is a high priority and every
effort is made to close gaps in their defence against known and
emerging threats. The balance between civilian activity and military
security is one we believe we have maintained effectively. In
its evidence to the Committee on 6 March (Ev 98), the MOD emphasised
the potential risk to the public of foolhardy attempts to breach
security measures. The Government would like to take this opportunity
to reiterate this point.
Counter-terrorism
19. We have not examined in detail the case for
a National Counter-Terrorism Service, but we do believe that it
merits further consideration. The Anti-Terrorist National Co-ordinator
should not have to operate by invitation. It is odd that the national
co-ordination of anti-terrorist matters is achieved through a
Committee of ACPO. We do not criticise the present arrangements
which seem to work well, but neither do we believe that they are
incapable of improvements. (Paragraph 81)
The Government agrees that the present counter-terrorist
arrangements work well but there must be a continual search for
improvement. Effective co-ordination is central to the defence
and security of the UK against the threat from international terrorism.
The Government will not hesitate to introduce any necessary improvements.
The effectiveness of these arrangements rests on
the work of police forces across the country, and the expertise
they have all built up. There is a clear role for the Anti-Terrorist
National Co-ordinator, and as the Head of the Metropolitan Police
Anti-Terrorist Branch made clear in his evidence, the mechanism
of an invitation from a Chief Constable before the National Co-ordinator
becomes involved in an incident is not a practical constraint.
Should a problem arise the question can be reviewed very rapidly
by the Government, in consultation with ACPO, ACPO(S) and the
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).
The Government will continue to look to ACPO for
the national co-ordination of police anti-terrorist planning,
specifically by ACPO(TAM). The Government's UK-wide mechanism
for co-ordinating anti-terrorist matters was outlined in the Joint
Memorandum by the Home Office, Ministry of Defence and the Cabinet
Office (Ev 258 to 260), and by Mr Denham, Mr Ingram and Mr Leslie
in their evidence of 22 May. The relationship between the police
and Government involvement is also described in this evidence.
Intelligence
20. We recommend that the Government reviews the
arrangements for the transmission of intelligence-based information
to individuals with key responsibilities in local government and
the private sector. We are not satisfied that the current system
is adequate. (Paragraph 92)
The arrangements for transmitting intelligence are
kept under constant review, including the provision of advice
on security to local government and the private sector. Particular
attention has been paid to the subject since the events of 11
September. Security advice is based on generic threats, which
are constantly being reviewed and updated. The advice is designed
to enhance the security and resilience of locations and systems
against a possible attack. New mechanisms have been put in place
since 11 September to provide additional advice, based on generic
threats, to a wider range of private sector operators.
Intelligence of a specific threat against a particular
location requires rapid, and appropriate, handling. Methods exist
to ensure that this intelligence is disseminated to the police
and supporting organisations as soon as possible to ensure that
the best use is made of the time available to take preventive
and ameliorative actions. These methods take account of the need
to ensure that sources and intelligence collection methods are
properly protected.
It is essential to classify some documents relating
to the response to the terrorist threat to ensure that they are
properly handled and do not, consequently, fall into the hands
of terrorists and undermine the response. These documents are
not therefore passed to officials who are not security cleared,
or to locations that are not capable of handling security material.
We note from evidence to the Committee statements that there is
some resistance to security clearance in local government. But
we also note the Committee's understandable interest in effective
security arrangements, which the Government shares. Security clearance
forms an integral part of these arrangements. It is therefore
inevitable that individuals who are not security cleared will
not be given access to all documents. Every effort will, however,
be made to ensure that the key messages about the level of threat,
as opposed to the detail of the intelligence, are passed on to
those who need to know. This can often be achieved in the absence
of formal clearances.
Aviation Security
21. We have not examined aviation security outside
the UK, but clearly, given the nature of the aviation industry,
the security not just of UK airlines but of all air traffic coming
into the UK will depend significantly on the robustness of the
international security regime. (Paragraph 100)
The Government agrees with this statement, which
is why the UK plays an active role in the various international
bodies that set standards for aviation security including the
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European
Civil Aviation Conference. We have also been active in the development
of EU regulations for aviation security. Since 11 September 2001
a considerable amount of work has been done to drive up international
standards. Particularly noteworthy is the start in October 2002
of ICAO audits of aviation security to monitor implementation
of standards by member states.
Because of the complexity of the industry the principle
of 'host state responsibility' has been long established in respect
of the implementation of security measures. This means that the
state of departure of flights is responsible for ensuring compliance
with international standards. The UK can and does set requirements
for UK operators overseas, but has no power as regards overseas
operators flying to the UK.
22. We welcome the improved performance in baggage
screening. However, as the fact that there was room for such improvement
illustrates, X-ray screening cannot be guaranteed to be 100 per
cent effective. And that in turn reinforces the need to ensure
that each of the different elements which contribute to the overall
security of airports is as robust as possible. (Paragraph 106)
The Government agrees that there is always room for
improvement in any system, be it manual or technology based, or
a combination. This is why we have developed a programme based
on a combination of measures and processes that support one another,
and that use the best available technological support. We are
never complacent about the security programme and are always looking
at ways to improve it. We also invest in research and development,
and share in other states' work, to ensure the best available
technological support. It is important to remember, however, that
a balance must be maintained to ensure both that the inconvenience
to the travelling public and to trade is minimised, and that all
elements of airport security are as robust as possible. The introduction
of new technology allows improvements to be made whilst maintaining
the efficient and safe flow of passengers and freight. It is a
continuous process of improvement.
23. Airport security involves the contributions
of many different agencies. We welcome the Government's determination
to improve co-ordination between them and to create a more strategic
approach. We look to them to report progress on this in their
reply to our report. (Paragraph 112)
We welcome the Committee's support for our proposals
to improve co-ordination and adopt a more strategic approach.
The Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Transport have
commissioned an urgent study on airport security from Sir John
Wheeler JP, DL. Sir John's report was received on 13 September
and is now being considered by the Government.
Port Security
24. The catastrophic scale of the potential consequences
of a terrorist attack [using containers] requires us fundamentally
to re-examine our security measures. And to do so promptly. We
were concerned, for example, by the apparent lack of real urgency
in the work on improving CBRN detection for containers. (Paragraph
116)
The Committee is aware of the complexity of this
issue and the need to ensure that security requirements do not
hinder trade and business. Careful consideration has therefore
been given to establishing the right way of approaching this issue.
Scanning shipping containers is only one option and
a number of actions have been taken since 11 September 2001, to
improve the deterrence and detection of a possible CBRN attack.
This includes international initiatives to improve generally the
security of containers in transit and the identification of those
that are considered suspicious.
A trial at selected ports to assess the feasibility
of routinely scanning port traffic for the illicit movement of
the radioactive and nuclear material that could be used by terrorists,
will be completed in October. A decision will then be made on
the value and effectiveness of carrying out such scanning on a
regular basis. This work has been taken forward as quickly as
it reasonably could be and good progress has been made in considering
the issues and logistics involved.
As the Select Committee acknowledges, the success
and effectiveness of much of this work relies on good intelligence
and targeting.
Networks and Systems
25. We are not persuaded that the Government has
understood the vulnerabilities of an interdependent highly connected,
technically dependent yet open society or has incorporated that
understanding into its policy and planning. (Paragraph 119)
The Government shares the Committee's view on the
increasing vulnerability of modern society. The Government's systems
reflect its understanding of the need to counter asymmetric threats.
The Prime Minister has approved the creation of a new Ministerial
Group on Consequence Management and Resilience (DOP(IT)R) to support
the his Committee on International Terrorism. It keeps the Government's
policy for managing the consequences of major terrorist or other
disruptive incidents in the United Kingdom under review. This
Group represents a wide range of Departments and Agencies, who,
in turn engage with the industries and economic sectors for which
they are responsible.
26. We agree with the CCS that there is much work
to be done to identify and protect the vulnerabilities of networks
and systems and we expect to be kept abreast of progress. (Paragraph
123)
In particular, and as the Committee's Report makes
clear, work has been under way since 1999, to protect critical
networks from electronic attacks. The particular threat of electronic
attack falls, as the Committee recognised, to the National Infrastructure
Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC).
NISCC is, in effect, a coalition of a number of Government
departments and agencies. Representatives of the CCS and the Office
of the E-Envoy sit on the NISCC management board to ensure that
the process of enhancing resilience in the electronic CNI does
not take place in isolation from the broader programme of protecting
UK plc from all kinds of threats. NISCC has a clear remit to focus
on protecting the truly critical information components of the
CNI and does not have the resources to protect business systems
generally nor the private computer user, except to the extent
that they are themselves dependent on component parts of the critical
national infrastructure. Information sharing and reporting about
the threat and vulnerabilities is important within the CNI, but
NISCC's efforts to promote this also extend out to a wider range
of public and private fora, both international and national. One
of NISCC's principal functions is to work in partnership with
CNI organisations, both in the private and public sector, in order
to help protect them from electronic attack. NISCC's relationship
with CNI organisations is not regulatory but is based on mutually
productive and long lasting partnerships.
Until recently, costs fell directly on the individual
component parts of the NISCC coalition. The Home Office now has
a small separate budget (currently £2 million) which will
be used to help NISCC expand its capability to counter the threat
of electronic attack. Areas which will be particularly strengthened
are NISCC's capacity to issue alerts, assess intelligence, carry
out analyses of key systems, and make assessments of vulnerabilities
and actual attacks. It will also work with the Central Sponsor
for Information Assurance in order to help develop a national
information strategy.
Nuclear Installations
27. We invite the Board of POST to consider the
proposal for an investigation into the possible consequences of
a terrorist attack on a nuclear installation. We believe that
this investigation should examine the physical robustness of installations
against such attacks as well as the potential consequences of
an attack in terms of the amounts of radioactive material liable
to be released and its effects. (Paragraph 131)
It is for POST to take its own view on whether to
undertake any investigation and the Government would co-operate
to the full extent possible. However, much of the information
that POST would require to undertake the proposed investigation
into the physical robustness of installations against attack is
not in the public domain. The Director of Civil Nuclear Security
does not permit the disclosure of information relating to the
physical structures of installations that is potentially of use
of terrorists.
The Government has considered the vulnerabilities
of nuclear installations and the consequences of a terrorist attack.
It has initiated a major programme of activities to reduce the
vulnerabilities and strengthen the arrangements for consequence
management.
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
28. It is a matter of regret that the CCS was
not able to respond more positively and energetically to the events
of 11 September. Instead of using its unique position at the heart
of Government to lead a strategic response it seems to have become
bogged down in the details of the plans of individual departments
and the relationships between them. Instead of being the solution
to the habitual 'departmentalism' of Whitehall, it has become
a casualty of it. (Paragraph 153)
The Government is disappointed that the Committee
has failed to recognise the energy and exceptionally hard work
that the CCS put in after 11 September, in co-operation with departments,
to deliver the Government's high-level objective of making the
country better prepared to manage the consequences of catastrophic
incidents.
The CCS is a Cabinet Office Secretariat and its function
is to support and co-ordinate the collective effort of Ministers
and their Departments to ensure that the necessary plans and capabilities
are in place should such incidents take place. The collective
effort co-ordinated by the CCS over the past year has improved
our state of readiness in numerous ways. For example:
- a dedicated crisis co-ordination centre has been
created so that there can be a seamless transition under Home
Secretary chairmanship from the preventative phase of a potential
terrorist threat to the management of the consequences of an actual
event;
- alongside the existing machinery focused on foreign
and terrorist threats, CCS is now working systematically with
departments to assess the implications on potential domestic disruptive
challenges so that Ministers are enabled to consider preventative
or ameliorative measures before crises develop;
- new command and control arrangements have been
introduced for London, with a 'diamond' level police control,
and government co-ordination agreed with the Mayor;
- the procurement process has been launched to
ensure full compatibility between the communication systems of
the emergency services.
Under the guidance of Sir David Omand, recently appointed
to the post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, the CCS
is improving its ability to develop the UK's resilience to disruptive
challenge through working with others on anticipation, preparation,
prevention and resolution. The CCS is now organised around three
core functions: assessing potential challenges, managing the domestic
impact of crises, and giving assurance that departmental plans
will improve the country's overall capability to prepare for,
withstand and recover from disasters. This effort will, in the
future, be driven and overseen by the new Ministerial Group on
Resilience and Consequence Management (DOP(IT)(R)).
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) will be
placing additional emphasis on involving local authority emergency
planners and local authorities in order to ensure that the UK's
contingency planning is as robust as possible. The Secretariat
will work to build successful and mutually beneficial relationships
with local authorities.
Emergency Planning Review
29. Ten months have now passed since the terrible
attacks of 11 September and nearly a year since the publication
of the emergency planning review document. We believe that the
Government has had time enough to address the issues raised by
the review. It should now as a matter of urgency publish its proposals
for civil contingencies legislation, with the explicit aim of
introducing that legislation in the 2002-03 parliamentary session.
(Paragraph 158)
The Government shares the Committee's regret that
the timetable of the Emergency Planning Review was delayed by
the need to respond immediately and effectively to the events
of 11 September. At the same time, the Committee's Report, and
much of the evidence received by the Committee, highlights the
many complex issues involved in the reform of contingency planning
and response arrangements. It also makes clear the need to involve
all the many interest groups involved in developing a clear understanding
of the issues and the proposals for their effective resolution.
That is the basis of the work now underway to prepare the ground
for new legislation in this area.
It is not the practice of any Government to make
a firm commitment to the introduction of any individual piece
of legislation in a particular session prior to the Queen's Speech
for that session. The Government's position remains that it will
introduce new legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows.
Role of Central Government
30. We believe that there should be national performance
targets for local authorities' and other agencies' emergency plans.
We accept that there may be difficulties in imposing such targets
in the absence of a statutory duty to prepare emergency plans.
We recommend that once that duty is in place targets should be
imposed and performance against them monitored. In the meantime
we encourage local authorities and others to introduce such targets
on a voluntary basis. (Paragraph 161)
The Government is grateful for this advice, and recognises
that it isin broad terms consistent with good management
practice. We would also encourage local authorities to note the
advice. The incorporation of this mechanism into the statutory
reform of civil emergency planning mechanisms will be given careful
consideration.
31. We believe that consideration should be given
to the alternative proposition that the Government's role in all
emergencies which make a call on central government (including
the more frequent and localised emergencies) should be co-ordinated
by the central co-ordinating machinery which would have to respond
to a major emergency. This would be for two principal reasons.
Firstly, as we have already discussed, the lack of clarity amongst
non-central government agencies as to which department is responsible
for what, is one of their major complaints. They believe that
they need a single central co-ordinating body; in other words
a one-stop shop. Secondly the experience gained by the officials
in such a body from dealing with smaller scale emergencies would
be of huge help to them if they ever had to deal with a massive
disaster caused by a terrorist attack. (Paragraph 173)
On 24 July, the Home Secretary wrote to the Chairman
of the Committee. He set out the outcome of recent work on lead
government departments.
'Since 11 September, the main focus of the CCC
has been to check and confirm the country's preparedness for an
exceptionally serious or widespread disaster that could lead to
massive devastation and widespread casualties and fatalities.
But in "normal" times, most emergencies
are handled at the local level by the emergency services and by
the appropriate local authority or authorities with no direct
involvement by central government.
Where central government does become involved (because
the incident is of such a scale or complexity as to require central
co-ordination or support), it is essential that it has been established
in advance which department is in the lead.
All government departments have a responsibility
to plan, prepare, train and exercise for handling incidents and
emergencies that might occur within their field of responsibility.
They will take on the leading role on behalf of central government
in managing the initial response to a crisis, mitigating its immediate
effects and organising the development of a recovery plan.
The CCC has had an up-to-date list of pre-nominated
leads produced in order to reflect the devolution settlement;
the changes to the machinery of government made by the Prime Minister
since the general election; and incidents which were not covered
in the earlier Dealing with Disaster guidance document.
I have placed a copy of this list in the library
of the House explaining the roles of lead government departments
and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This information is also
available on the Government web site www.ukresilience.info.'
The paper deposited in the library explains the role
of the CCS as follows.
'The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was not
set up, and nor is it resourced or designed, to manage all crises.
The CCS's role, under the leadership of the CCC, is to provide
the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency
commitment, co-ordination and co-operation necessary if the UK
is to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises.
This focus goes beyond first response and consequence management
and applies to our systems for identifying new challenges, for
assessing risks, for anticipating, planning, preparing and exercising
for crises, for building up our resilience to them, and for systematically
applying the lessons learned from particular incidents.
In the event of an emergency of a scale, or of a
kind notified by the lead government as requiring central involvement,
CCS will engage in a way designed to enable the department's Ministers
and senior officials to concentrate on strategic decisions. Key
objectives will be smooth working between organisations and seamless
transition to central co-ordination if required. Working very
closely with the department concerned, the CCS will:
(i) provide an assessment of immediate
needs, and support their provision;
(ii) establish possible scenarios up to
worst case and plan for scaling-up, logistical management and
exit;
(iii) ensure that the centre and other interested
departments are kept informed and are prepared to engage;
(iv) help establish structures, rhythms,
routines and data flows for managing the responsein particular
facilitating augmentation of the department's resources and public
information systems;
(v) connect the department with agencies
able to provide specialist advice and information;
(vi) decide whether and when to approach
the Chairman to convene a meeting of CCC, thereafter providing
ongoing support from the centre.
In all its work, the CCS starts from the premise
that the ability of central government to manage effectively our
national capacity and capability to deal with disruptive challenges
is a vital component of enhancing the country's resilience. The
Secretariat therefore will seek to work in close partnership with
lead departments, helping them to:
(vii) enable and protect their own
decision takers;
(viii) develop their own early warning systems;
(ix) prepare plans against various eventualities
and make sure those plans are properly integrated with those of
other departments and agencies;
(x) identify the training and exercises
needed to test the plans and enable continuous improvements;
(xi) build up the necessary management and
professional expertise to maintain and activate the plans and
to know where to turn for reinforcement and augmentation;
(xii) learn, and share their learning, with
other departments
The Government stands by the division of labour between
departments and the centre, but it recognises that the CCS should
do more to explain its role to non-central government agencies.
It also shares the Committee's view that CCS staff would benefit
from training and exercise programmes that exposed them to the
handling of local emergencies and brings them into closer contact
with colleagues working on emergency planning and management at
the local level. This will be taken into account in planning the
cross-Government exercise and training programme.
32. The proposed Civil Contingencies Bill will
place a statutory duty on local authorities and other local agencies
to have in place civil contingency plans and will require those
agencies to co-operate in the preparation of the plans. Central
government should be prepared to accept a similar responsibility.
To do so will require not only central co-ordination but also
central enforcement. (Paragraph 176)
As yet the Government has made no decisions on the
content of a Bill. However, the work it has set in hand to prepare
the ground for a Bill includes determining the relative roles
and responsibilities of government at the local, regional and
central levels. Setting the legislative position aside, the Government
accepts that civil protection is one of its fundamental responsibilities
and that is why it gives such high priority to being prepared
to deal with disaster whatever the causenatural, accidental
or terrorist.
33. We believe that the CCS should be renamed
the Emergency Planning Agency (or Centre); it should be given
a clear role as the public face of the Government's response to
emergencies; it should be a one-stop shop for government assistance
and support to local agencies in the event of an emergency; and
it should take the lead in co-ordinating central government's
response to massive and cross-departmental emergencies. It should
have adequate resources and authority to carry out its terms of
reference. (Paragraph 181)
The co-ordination of the Government's response to
major, cross-cutting civil emergencies is led by the Civil Contingencies
Committee, chaired by the Home Secretary, and supported by the
CCS. It has the authority of the Prime Minister and includes every
department involved in the management of a major crisis. The Committee
has access to all the resources and authority necessary to resolve
a crisis. Its purpose is long established and well recognised
as the focus of Government's civil emergency management.
Local agencies have strong links with their sponsoring
Government departments, which are familiar with their business
and through which they can request help quickly. In a major emergency,
departments can also use the Civil Contingencies Committee to
seek resources and support.
These arrangements have worked well for many years,
and they have been reviewed and updated in the light of the events
of September 11. The CCS's internal structure and the committees
that it supports have been simplified and streamlined. The Government
is not complacent and will continue to keep all these arrangements
under review. However, it sees no purpose in changing the Secretariat's
title.
34. We believe that such an organisation will
require strong and dedicated political leadership. We believe
that leadership should be provided by a Cabinet Minister. We are
not convinced that the Home Secretary, given his many other responsibilities,
is best placed to deliver it. (Paragraph 182)
The Government does not accept this recommendation.
The Home Secretary has responsibility for the security of the
citizens of the UK and chairs the Civil Contingencies Committee.
He has the collective support of Ministers from all Departments.
35. We welcome Sir David Omand's appointment and
the bringing together of intelligence and consequence management
which it implies. (Paragraph 183)
36. We believe that Sir David's new post will
give him a unique opportunity to reinvigorate the central government
machinery for co-ordinating and directing national security and
consequence management functions. (Paragraph 184)
The Government notes the welcome given to the appointment
and role of the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator.
Mutual Aid
37. We recommend that the Department of Health
and the Fire Service Inspectorate ensure that their work to provide
mutual aid and reinforcement on a national basis is completed
by the end of the year. (Paragraph 195)
The Ambulance Service Association is currently working
to develop a national doctrine and a standard pre-hospital approach
to CBRN incidents and intends to complete that task before the
end of the year. That approach will be based on defined mutual
aid arrangements. The Department of Health will monitor progress.
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (HM Fire
Service Inspectorate) are taking forward, in discussion with the
representatives of Fire Authorities, the development of a national
mutual aid agreement, with the aim of concluding this by 31 December
2002.
Communications
38. We are very concerned that the communications
system which would be used in the event of an emergency have unknown
but potentially fundamental vulnerabilities. We note the lack
of confidence in the reliability of the Government's Emergency
Communications Network. We recommend that an urgent review is
conducted into the potential vulnerabilities and reliability of
the communication networks which responding agencies would have
to rely upon in an emergency. (Paragraph 199)
We welcome the decisions by the Government to
ensure interoperability of communications between the emergency
services and other responders, including the military, although
we believe that this result could have been more effectively achieved
by earlier co-ordination between government departments and the
services concerned. (Paragraph 204)
We recommend that Airwave and the other compatible
new systems should be included in the review into communications
resilience which we recommend. Any contract entered into for the
procurement of these systems must guarantee a robust level of
resilience throughout all parts of the system. (Paragraph 205)
The Government notes the Committee's concern about
the Emergency Communications Network. In view of the importance
of effective communications, we are seeking further information
from the LGA on the weaknesses they perceive in the system, their
views on why these occur, and on means of enhancing the system.
Working with the government departments concerned,
and the emergency services, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat
co-ordinated the development of an agreed operational requirement
for radio interoperability between the emergency services and
for resilience. Cross-service agreement on this requirement is
fundamental to effective co-operative working between the services.
The Home Office, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
and the Department of Health have fully supported the co-ordinating
role of the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat in
securing agreement on the appropriate level of interoperability
between the emergency services' radio systems, in order to handle
post-11 September scenarios. The MOD has also supported this work
with the objective of ensuring wider interoperability during civil
emergencies.
The agreed requirement for interoperability and resilience
forms the basis of the performance specification with which any
bidder must comply before any future contracts for wide-area radio
systems can be let by the emergency services. It does not specify
a technical standard nor limit it to the product of a particular
supplier.
MmO2's Airwave service has been developed to meet
the requirements of the police service. It is also available as
an option which other emergency services might choose to provide
their radio communications. But whether or not they adopt this
option will depend on the outcome of technology-neutral procurement
competitions which take account of the extent to which proposed
solutions meet their requirements, and costs. No final decision
has been taken.
All emergency service radio systems will need to
provide a robust level of interoperability and resilience throughout
all parts of the system.
The Private Security
Industry
39. We believe that there is an opportunity to
increase the involvement of the private security sector in counter-terrorist
reinforcement. But this should only be done in step with the raising
of standards in the industry. It is disappointing that the licensing
regime for the industry will not be introduced before 2004-05.
If the private security industry and its staff are to play an
effective role they will need the appropriate training. We look
to the police and the private security industry jointly to bring
forward detailed proposals as a matter of urgency, for consideration
by the Home Office and the Security Industry Authority. (Paragraph
212)
The Government notes the views of the Committee.
The Government agrees that any moves to utilise the
resources of the private security industry in the fight against
terrorism should be made within the context of a regulated and
increasingly professionalised industry. The Security Industry
Authority, which will come into being on 1 April 2003, will lead
on the raising of training and performance standards in the industry
within the regulatory framework established by the Private Security
Industry Act 2001. The Authority will also provide a new framework
under which the industry, the police and other stakeholders can
better collaborate and exchange ideas and proposals.
The guarding sector of the industry appears to offer
the most likely potential suggested by the Committee, and is the
second of the Authority's planned tranches of regulation, beginning
in 2004.
Military Support
40. We cannot understand why a process which was
planned to be completed by April has in fact only entered its
consultation period in mid-June, and seems unlikely to be completed
until late autumn at the earliest. (Paragraph 221)
At the evidence session on Wednesday 13 February
2002, the Director Military Operations indicated that 'it would
be quite wrong, until we have conducted the consultation process
with employers, with the TA, with the chain of command and other
interested bodies, to go firm on what the eventual findings [of
proposals for the reserves within the SDR New Chapter] might be.'
In the first SDR New Chapter discussion paper, published on 14
February 2002, we asked, amongst other questions, for views on
whether there were additional or enhanced roles for the Reserve
forces. The views received were then added to ideas being generated
within the MOD (including by Reserve officers) to form a series
of detailed proposals. These were published in the second discussion
paper on 12 June 2002. In order to allow these to be discussed
widely within the Reserves community this discussion period was
set for the summer period, when many Reserve units come together
to undertake their annual training camps.
41. It is not clear to us how the MOD will ensure
that the necessary skills and training for even these tasks are
to be found in a volunteer reserve force of 500 persons per region
and only 5 or 6 days training a year. (Paragraph 232)
The MOD Discussion Document provides a significant
amount of detail on the enhancements proposed to existing MOD
arrangements. A recommendation to the MOD to deploy a Reaction
Force would be made by the regional commander, who would exercise
his judgement as to which of the forces at his disposal, including
the Reaction Force but also Regular Forces, best matched the requirements
of the situation.
In prior planning work, Reaction Force capabilities
would be matched to the particular needs of each region, through
discussion with lead local civil agencies including civil police
commanders, and may therefore include particular specialisms if
required. But a substantial element would be personnel prepared
to carry out a wide range of general duties, both before an incident
and in consequence management tasks if necessary after an incident
has arisen.
Local civil agencies including the police will retain
the lead in responding to an event. The Armed Forces would provide
support from resources available at the time and in particular
for aspects of the problem for which the Armed Forces are particularly
suited. Enhancements to the arrangements for liaison with civil
agencies in the regions are outlined at paragraph 12 of the Discussion
Document. They are mentioned, with approval, by the Committee
at paragraph 237 of its Report. It is essential in considering
the Discussion Document and the future deployment of the Armed
Forces in support of the civil power that these arrangements are
not overlooked.
42. We believe that it is irresponsible to offer
to put volunteer Reserves into such a situation without also explicitly
providing for their protection. (Paragraph 235)
As paragraph 15 of the Discussion Document makes
clear, 'Reaction Forces would encompass the capability to act
in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological conditions if
necessary.'
43. We recommend that MOD publish estimated costs
of the Reserve Reaction Forces, including illustrative costs for
their deployment, and indicate where it expects these costs to
fall. Without adequate information on the level and attribution
of costs, it will not be possible for local authorities and others
to include the Reserve Reaction Forces in their plans. (Paragraph
236)
The MOD will fund from within the Defence Budget
the costs of providing the enhanced Reserve Force capabilities
identified within the Discussion Document.
The Government will continue to draw the distinction
between circumstances in which costs will be waived, and circumstances
in which they will not waived. Charges will not be made for a
rapid response, when lives are in imminent danger, if relevant
Armed Forces resources are available.
Civil authorities can already gauge the approximate
cost of deploying the Armed Forces (see Ev 131). Further information
can be provided at their request for contingency planning purposes,
though much would be dependent upon the assumptions made about
the circumstances of the deployment.
44. Provisionally, we welcome the thrust of the
proposal insofar as it gives back to the Reserves a role in home
defence. We also welcome the proposal to establish single 'joint'
points of liaison on all emergency planning matters in each military
region. We do not, however, believe that these proposals excuse
the regular forces from being considered for an additional role.
(Paragraph 237)
The Government welcomes the Committee's support for
the proposals for the creation of Reaction Forces from the volunteer
Reserves, and for the appointment of Joint Regional Liaison Officers.
The consultation process finished on 13 September 2002, and we
are now analysing the many inputs received and developing the
proposals in the light of those comments, prior to reaching and
announcing to Parliament, our final conclusions.
The creation of the Reaction Forces would not in
any way 'excuse the regular forces from being considered'. The
regional commander would use the most appropriate military capability
under his command to respond to any request from the civil authorities,
including available regular forces.
45. We believe that the SDR New Chapter should
include a commitment to making available, in the context of a
terrorist incident, certain capabilities from the regular Armed
Forces. These might include specific capabilitiesfor example
in the CBRN fieldon a national basis as well as more general
assistance at a regional level. The commitments from the Reserves
and Regulars taken together should meet as far as possible the
skills and capabilities required by the civil authorities, who
should be closely involved by the MOD in identifying those skills
and capabilities. (Paragraph 240)
The Government's position on the use of the Armed
Forces in home defence and security was outlined in the Strategic
Defence Review New Chapter published on 18 July 2002. In particular:
'We have made clear that we are not going to allow threats at
home to tie up significant numbers of our high readiness Armed
Forces and prevent us from acting abroad.'
The civil authorities have primary responsibility
for home defence and security. The Armed Forces would supplement
and support the civil authorities but the latter retain responsibility
for undertaking the necessary tasks. There is no intention to
restructure the Armed Forces, or change their role, in order to
provide capabilities already provided by the civil authorities.
The Committee will, however, be aware from evidence
provided by the MOD (Ev 29, paragraph 17; Qs 450 to 456 and Ev
100) that support is already provided in the CBRN field. It is
in the nature of the way in which the Department responds to requests
for assistance that all support is in effect provided 'at a national
level', though this does not preclude regional liaison.
The skills and capabilities that might be provided
will thus be those available from the whole of the Armed Forces.
46. We recommend that the MOD identify what provision
of airlift capacity, both fix-wing and rotary, can be committed
to the response to a major terrorist incident. (Paragraph 241)
No MOD airlift capacity is permanently committed
to the response to a major terrorist incident. The Armed Forces'
airlift capacity, which combines both military aircraft and civil
aircraft on contract, is designed to enhance the ability of the
Armed Forces to undertake the full range of their missions at
home and abroad, including in this context, missions to pre-empt
terrorist attacks within the UK. If civil authorities have a requirement
for an airlift capacity within the UK it can be provided through
civil resources without disruption to the military capability
and the missions of the Armed Forces.
Military Civil Liaison
47. We regret the absence of any reference to
the contribution of Armed Forces in the Emergency Planning Review
consultation paper and the failure of the MOD to engage in the
consultation process. (Paragraph 244)
The MOD did engage in the Emergency Planning Review,
before during and after the consultation process. It continues
to be closely engaged in the process resulting from that Review.
The MOD is not responsible for civil emergency management.
Consequently, they did not feature in a document designed to seek
views on enhancements to those mechanisms. Clearly the MOD, as
part of the Government, supports the need for very significant
improvements in the civil emergency management mechanism, especially
at the regional and local level, and consequently supports the
outcome of the consultation process completed in March.
48. We believe that joint exercises between the
Armed Forces and the emergency services should be increased and
should include other agencies as well. (Paragraph 245)
The Government recognises the need for some enhancement
to Armed Forces liaison and the MOD has announced its intention
to appoint Joint Regional Liaison Officers, as single 'joint'
points of liaison on all emergency planning matters within each
military region. These appointments will clarify the co-ordination
arrangements.
The Government supports the principle that all relevant
agencies should be involved in the exercise programme.
Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear.
49. We welcome the proposed creation of the Health
Protection Agency. (Paragraph 256)
The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement
of this Agency, which will allow for the re-deployment of funding
to the front-line services. By bringing together the various agencies
and front-line staff, the Agency will be better equipped to deal
with a range of emergencies, and provide a comprehensive, unified
national response.
50. We recommend that the Government report progress
on the PCTs preparation of emergency plans and the arrangements
for including the ambulance service in that process in their response
to this report. (Paragraph 259)
Work has been proceeding through Regional Directors
of Public Health and Regional Health Emergency Planning Advisers
to assist PCTs to develop appropriate emergency plans. This is
being monitored by the Department of Health. The progress has
been hampered in some areas by delays in Directors of Public Health
coming into post but is generally on schedule. Regional Health
Emergency Planning Advisers work closely with their counterparts
in the Ambulance Service and work collaboratively in planning
and assessing plans.
51. If ambulance and fire crews are expected to
respond to a CBRN incident, they must have the necessary training
and protective equipment. Now there is a real threat of a CBRN
attack on a scale not previously planned for, the Government must
provide the additional resources needed. We were pleased to hear
that progress was being made with the introduction of properly
constructed decontamination facilities. We look to the Government
to ensure that the resources are available to build on this beginning
(Paragraph 263).
The full additional ambulance service costs associated
with developing and maintaining preparedness for CBRN incidents
can only be quantified when the national doctrine has been fully
established. The Department of Health will consider funding requests
when those costs have been identified.
The Government agrees with the Committee on the need
for effective training and protective equipment. Additional resources
have been made available for this purpose. DH made available £5
million for procurement of personal protective equipment (PPE)
and training in its use, and decontamination units for Ambulance
Trusts and major accident and emergency hospitals throughout the
UK. For large-scale incidents, DH has agreed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Fire Service to provide a decontamination service. DH
has also been developing education and training programmes to
improve capability of NHS staff to respond to CBRN incidents.
The Committee will be aware that a Home Office Police Training
Unit has been established, co-located with the Defence NBC Centre
at Winterborne Gunner. Personnel from all the emergency services
attend courses at this centre.
As part of the work to improve the UK's resilience
to a range of threats, including CBRN related incidents, a cross-government
decontamination strategy is being prepared. One of the work streams
within the strategy is to produce agreed high level guidance on
procedures for decontamination. The guidance will specify the
roles and responsibilities of the emergency services, local authorities
and others and is intended to provide a common set of principles,
establish common terminology, and a shared and agreed understanding
of stakeholders' roles and responsibilities.
The Government does not accept that there is 'a real
threat of a CBRN attack on a scale not previously planned for'.
But the Government is equally aware that there is always room
for improvement in the state of preparedness and a great deal
of work has already been undertaken to enhance the existing mechanisms.
This work will continue.
52. We believe that the Government should reconsider
its policy of not providing information on CBRN countermeasures.
We believe that the public has a right to know, to an indicative
level at least, what provisions the Government has made for its
protection. We are not persuaded that such information would materially
assist terrorists. (Paragraph 267).
The Department of Health has explained publicly that
it holds strategic levels of a range of medical countermeasures
for different biological and chemical incidents. However, we consider
it inappropriate to give more detailed information on the types
or level of these countermeasures. Our policy on providing limited
information on medical countermeasures is also in accord with
the approach currently taken by our EU partners. General guidance
concerning the Public Health response to smallpox and other biological
agents was sent to Public Health physicians in October 2001 and
is now available on the DH website at: www.doh.gov.uk/epcu
Regional Co-ordination
53. A major responsibility will fall on the Regional
Directors of Public Health to ensure that PCTs have adequate emergency
plans in place by October 2002, and that these have been prepared
in co-ordination with other agencies, including in particular
the ambulance service. (Paragraph 273)
Regional Directors of Public Health and Regional
Health Emergency Planning Advisers have played a crucial role
in ensuring that PCTs have adequate emergency plans in place by
October 2002. They work as part of a whole systems approach that
links with the NHS, the proposed Health Protection Agency, Local
Authorities, Ambulance Services and other Emergency Services,
the voluntary sector and other agencies and interested bodies.
54. The Government clearly expects the regional
tier to play a significant role in co-ordinating emergency planning
and consequence management. (Paragraph 275)
The Government believes that there is an important
role for the Government Offices in the Regions, where Regional
Directors of Public Health will be based, to play in joining up
departmental emergency plans at a regional level and assisting
in improving preparedness for wide area civil contingencies. Work
on developing the details of this role will be taken forward in
consultation with local authorities, the emergency services and
other key regional players on emergencies.
The Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies
and Executives already play an important role in managing civil
emergencies.
55. There may be role for a regional tier in assisting
with the co-ordination of the response to a civil emergency of
wide geographical extent. But we believe that a major terrorist
incident will require the direct and continuing involvement of
central government including direct and close communication with
the local agencies. If the Government believes that its contribution
can be best delivered through GORs or other regional agencies
it must ensure that their efforts are co-ordinated with and supportive
of the work of local and emergency agencies. (Paragraph 279)
The Government agrees with the Committee's comments
on the need for direct and close involvement of central government
with local agencies during a major terrorist incident. It is not
intended that Government Offices in the Regions should direct
or lead the response to major incidents.
Resources and risk management
56. As time passes and the memories of even such
a terrible events as the attacks of 11 September begin to fade,
the urgency of the priority given to issues of defence and security
may diminish. There is an increasing temptation to impose a conventional
or historic template on the response to a radical new threat.
(Paragraph 283)
We recommend that the Government, perhaps through
the Cabinet Office and the CCS, publishes an annual report on
the measures taken and the expenditure incurred in respect of
home defence and security. This report should bring together the
contributions of all government departments and other relevant
agencies and include reports from the devolved administrations.
(Paragraph 284)
We believe that our recommendations for an annual
report on security will give the Government a regular opportunity
to set out its strategy for delivering home defence and security
in the UK. (Paragraph 293)
The Government recognises the importance of maintaining
vigilance and of keeping Parliament and the public fully informed
of its efforts to secure civil protection and security. This is
why on 9 September; it published 'The United Kingdom and The
Campaign against International Terrorism, Progress Report'.
The Government will continue to produce such reports
as and when it believes there is a need and believes this is the
best way of demonstrating the commitment and vigilance and of
securing the transparency the Committee seeks.
Informing the Public
57. We believe that security against terrorist
attacks in the UK could be improved by constructive public involvement.
(Paragraph 288)
The Government agrees. The public contribution to
the fight against international terrorism is already of great
importance, and that fight will only be won through constructive
contributions from all quarters.
It is important to ensure that the methods used to
encourage public involvement are themselves carefully chosen and
constructive, and that they do not add unnecessarily to public
disquiet, or imply that safeguards are not already in place. The
Government recognises the importance of keeping the public informed,
reassured and engaged.
58. We understand that there is information whose
public disclosure could be of material assistance to the potential
terrorists. We have evidence, however, which suggests that the
Government takes refuge in that argument without always examining
it as rigorously as it should. Information should be withheld
from the public only where its publication would give rise to
a specific and identifiable risk. (Paragraph 291)
The Government shares the Committee's evident frustration
that more information cannot be shared openly with the public.
It is, however, all the more important, given the threat from
international terrorism, to ensure that our key capabilities are
properly protected. International terrorists can access any openly
published information. The risk of useful information reaching
the terrorist should, therefore, be kept to a minimum.
The Government has provided the Committee with all
the information it has asked for, whilst indicating that some
of the information must be kept confidential. We are grateful
for the Committee's continued co-operation in this matter.
|