What specific measures are you undertaking
to protect against CBRN threats at home rather than on deployed
operations?
The Committee will be aware that the Home Office
takes the lead in protection against and the response to CBRN
threats in the UK. The MoD acts in support.
For some years the MoD has provided a capability
to identify and make safe a CBRN device. Information on this capability
was provided in evidence to the Committee during their enquiry
into "Defence and Security in the UK". The Committee
is consequently referred to their Sixth Report of Session 2001-02—Volume
II: Minutes of Evidence and Appendices, and in particular Questions
448 to 495 and supplementary material provided to the Committee
and published at Ev 100 (Q456) and Ev 104 (Q492). Members of the
Committee were, we understand, also briefed on this capability
during this enquiry when they visited AWE Aldermaston and Porton
Down.
This is a significant capability, and is regularly
exercised and updated to ensure that it keeps in step with the
threat. It is available at all times and at short notice. There
was consequently no need to develop a new capability as part of
the SDR New Chapter work, although continual technical up-dating
is of the essence in this field.
Although the lead on the response to the consequences
of a CBRN incident would also rest with other government departments,
MoD can expect requests to provide support to this response should
an incident occur. This response would be drawn from capabilities
and units available at the time. This would include the provision
of regular units, but the SDR New Chapter also identified the
possibility of an enhanced role for the Reserves in providing
support. The Committee will be aware of the Discussion Document
published by the MoD in June, entitled "The Role of the Reserves
in Home Security and Defence" which outlined some of the
roles the reserves might play. Those members of the Reserve Forces
volunteering for this role will be trained to the necessary competence
levels, in order to act in chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological
conditions if necessary.
What lessons has the New Chapter drawn from operations
in Afghanistan and how do these fit in with earlier lessons from
Saif Sareea II?
MoD has produced operational lessons reports
on both Exercise Saif Sareea II[2]
and operations in Afghanistan[3].
Both reports were used to inform the New Chapter work. Further
reports on Ops FINGAL (the ISAF deployment), JACANA (the 3 Commando
Brigade deployment) and VERITAS Volume 2 are currently being staffed
and will help to identify priorities in taking forward the New
Chapter work.
The work on Afghanistan has, in the context
of addressing the wider threat, stressed the importance of Defence
Diplomacy, continued engagement with allies, deterrence, coercion
and the need to address the problems of terrorism at their roots.
In terms of specific capabilities required the importance of network
centric capability, enhanced SF capability, more capable light
forces, enhanced strategic lift, enhanced force protection, increased
intelligence capability (especially HUMINT, ISTAR), and further
development of precision weaponry have all emerged as key lessons.
These themes have been developed in NC work.
Saif Sareea II emphasised the importance of
appropriate training, with allies, in different environments and
at the appropriate scale. The exercise meant the UK was well poised
for subsequent operations in Afghanistan. It also allowed further
refinements necessary to the JRRF capability to be identified,
especially in terms of strategic lift and environmental effectiveness
of equipment—all themes echoed in current reports on Afghanistan.
Are there plans to increase the size of Special
Forces and, or, their budgets, and what sort of equipment enhancements
are you considering for Special Forces.
There are no plans, as a result of the New Chapter
work, to increase the numerical size of the Special Forces. The
number of Special Forces available is sufficient for those high-value
tasks they undertake. As the Defence Secretary has indicated,
it would not be sensible to go into detail concerning SF equipment
enhancements.
Is the MoD planning to change the tempo of operations
and deployments as a result of the pressure on a number of servicemen
and women who "have been working at or near, and in some
cases beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR"
Certain key trade groups have been working beyond
what we assumed would be the case in the Strategic Defence Review.
These groups are mostly in the logistics and support area (chefs,
doctors, movements staffs etc)—often referred to as the
"enablers". The intervals between overseas deployments
for many of these individuals have been less than we assumed in
SDR. On the plus side, other front line units have enjoyed intervals
between operational tours which were longer than we had assumed—though
this conceals the fact that individuals might move between units
and thus go from one operational tour to another rather more quickly.
The tempo of operations is driven by external
factors. However, we can ensure that the force structure is well
balanced to meet our planning assumptions, and we will be considering
this as part of this year's planning process. We are also looking
closely at the ways we carry out training to avoid unnecessary
deployments, while bearing in mind that the vast majority of our
people relish the opportunity to exercise their skills in an operational
setting. We are introducing career management processes that are
more sensitive to individual circumstances, although the Service
needs will always remain paramount. Finally, we will seek to ensure
that the pay and allowance package for our people compensates
them properly for the work they do. The Committee will be aware
that the Armed Forces Pay Review Body takes these factors into
account in making their annual recommendations about pay and allowances.
What specific role does MoD envisage for NATO
in home defence and countering terrorism?
Acting against terrorist threats is not a new
mission for the Alliance—it is already encapsulated within
the 1999 Strategic Concept[4].
But, as with all NATO missions, the key to their successful prosecution
depends upon the continued modernisation and adaptation of the
organisation and, in particular, the accelerated acquisition of
effective, deployable and sustainable military capabilities. Much
of our thinking on what NATO can and should do in the war against
international terrorism is predicated against these improved capabilities.
As the White Paper makes clear, NATO has already
acted very positively since 11 September 2001. By invoking Article
5, taking a range of practical measures (including deployment
of early warning aircraft and naval forces), and taking action
against terrorist groups with Al Qaida links in the Balkans, NATO
has sent a clear message to international terrorist organisations
that an attack on one ally will be treated as an attack on all.
This sent a deterrent message to terrorist leaders and any states
contemplating giving them succour. Credible deterrence is a part
of home defence and NATO has a continued pivotal role to play
here.
Deterrence aside, NATO forces and capabilities
could contribute greatly to preserving the integrity of member
states' territorial waters and airspace. In addition, the work
NATO has done to date (and will develop further in future) on
WMD protection has utility not only for the security of deployed
forces but also for supporting national authorities' home defence
and consequence management arrangements and capabilities. UK will
continue to pursue these themes as the Alliance debates the scope
of its response to international terrorism.
By providing a forum for allies, partners (including
Russia) and Mediterranean Dialogue countries to discuss security
risks and develop effective mechanisms to deal with them, NATO
already does much to foster international co-operation in counter-terrorism.
UK wants to see both these initiatives and NATO's wider co-operation
with other security organisations expanded in order to maximise
the benefits derived.
And at the operational end of the spectrum there
is the possibility of counter-terrorist operations being carried
out under NATO command and control, or being facilitated through
NATO structures and operational planning mechanisms. But even
when not involved directly NATO has a fundamental role to play
as the facilitator of (ad-hoc, EU, US or UN-led) coalitions
of the willing through the provision of common doctrines, training
and interoperability—the key to the execution of multinational
operations.
How does the MoD expect ESDP to be influenced
by the New Chapter work?
Since 11 September, many of our EU partners
have also been reviewing their defence and security policy in
the light of the attacks. We have also been working together within
the EU and are taking action together against terrorism through
a co-ordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all EU
policies.
ESDP can play an important part in that approach,
particularly in the stabilisation role identified in the White
Paper. The EU's first crisis management operation—the EU
Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina—is one example of the
shared European commitment to stabilise post-conflict regions,
and to help establish the rule of law. (There are also linkages
between other activities in the White Paper—civil protection,
prevention and disruption—and EU action in areas outside
the scope of ESDP).
And investment in new equipment and capabilities
for counter-terrorism will be mutually reinforcing with capability
development work already in hand to address the Headline Goal
shortfalls.
Is the MoD considering increasing its activities
under Defence Diplomacy and how does it fit in with the NCC and
the New Chapter.
MoD is increasing the effectiveness of Defence
Diplomacy and our other international Defence co-operative activities,
(eg through NATO and Europe) in achieving our national security
objectives, including those which have been identified as part
of the SDR New Chapter. The latter involves using Defence Diplomacy
to maximise the prospects for support from our partners, both
bilaterally and multilaterally, for Defence efforts to counter
international terrorism. These efforts include deploying our Armed
Forces on peace support operations—which aim to increase
stability in regions of concern, operations to disrupt terrorist
support networks and operations which strike at the terrorists
themselves.
The doctrine of fighting abroad rather than at
home and the possible requirement for pre-emptive action may increasingly
require host-nation support. How will such requirements be balanced
with the discussion of the legal context of possible British military
action where HNS is in question?
When considering large-scale or medium-scale
war-fighting abroad, our sea-based forces alone may not be able
to provide the required proximity to the target area or the necessary
combat mass to accomplish all strategic objectives. Therefore
the provision of political and/or practical HNS will be an essential
pre-requisite for mounting credible sustained combat operations
in-theatre.
Our Defence Diplomacy and other politico-military
activities (such as defence export sales, bi-lateral military
exercises and peace support operations) within key geo-strategic
regions aim inter alia to develop an increasing number
of states willing and able to provide suitable HNS thereby offering
us reduced strategic risk and improved operational flexibility.
Practical HNS requires the unequivocal formal
consent of the providing nation and thus, by extension, if the
provision of support is in question official consent must either
not have been received or withdrawn if previously given. In the
absence of such consent, military operations by UK forces could
be undertaken within the land, sea or air borders of another sovereign
state only where such action is fully consistent with international
law.
The Committee is also interested in having a detailed
explanation of the process of the New Chapter. How many staff
were involved; what were the various work streams and who were
the directors of these studies; why was the number of work streams
reduced halfway through the process; what was the extent of MoD's
consultation beyond the occasions listed in the White Paper?
As was explained in Section 7 of the SDR New
Chapter White Paper, Supporting Information and Analysis, a number
of Working Groups were set up at the start of the process, each
led by a senior official or senior military officer. Details are
given below:
| Working Group |
Chair (and post held during New Chapter process)
|
| Strategic Issues | Air Vice Marshal David Hobart, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Policy)
|
| Overseas Relations & Deterrence | Mr Brian Hawtin, Director General International Security Policy
|
| Home Defence and Security | Mr Bruce Mann, Director General Financial Management
|
| Overseas Operations | Phase 1: Major General Tony Milton RM, Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts
|
| Phase 2: Major General Rob Fulton RM, Capability Manger Information Superiority
|
Work was split over two phases, the first focused on the
policy and conceptual framework, the second on potential capability
and resource implications. Only the latter two groups carried
their work forward into the second phase. In each of the work
groups, sub-groups formed as required to tackle particular elements
(such as science and technology, airspace integrity or defence
diplomacy). Issues with implications across all working groups,
principally personnel, were co-ordinated centrally.
About 150 staff, both military and civilian, were involved,
from a variety of government departments, and beyond.
We consulted widely outside government, at the various events
described in the White Paper. In addition, senior officials throughout
the Department discussed the issues with their international partners,
and with the academic world whenever possible.
How did the MoD consult with the members of the individual
services themselves? What consultation with Allies in Europe and
outside Europe took place that fed into the New Chapter process?
In the first instance, consultation with the Services was
facilitated through the involvement of the single-service programming,
planning and secretariat staffs in the New Chapter work. Wider
consultation was achieved through the publication and dissemination
of the New Chapter "Discussion" document on 14 February.
The document, together with a summary leaflet, was sent to every
Service officer at one-star level and above, with the request
that personnel were made aware of the consultation and told how
to pass their comments to the New Chapter team. The discussion
document was also covered by the main internal newspapers/magazines
(FOCUS, Navy News, Soldier and RAF News) and published on the
MoD Intranet and Internet sites to maximise its availability to
members of the armed forces. Hard copies of the document were
also sent to individual forces' organisations and clubs and to
former Chiefs of Defence Staff in the House of Lords.
Separately, the discussion document was circulated widely
for comment particularly to NATO and EU allies and aspirant states,
to the NATO Secretary General and the EU's High Representative,
and to Foreign Defence Attaches resident in London. We also used
regular formal contacts with bilateral partners to air our New
Chapter thinking and gauge their reaction. The New Chapter initiative
also featured regularly on MoD ministers' and senior officials
agenda with in-coming dignitaries.
On 12 June we issued a second discussion paper—this
time on the Role of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security.
Reservists were the primary focus of this consultation exercise.
Consultation has been undertaken through the Chain of Command
and responses were received back on 13 September. As with the
first consultation exercise, we covered the main internal newspapers/magazines
(FOCUS, Navy News, Soldier and RAF News) and published on the
MoD Intranet and Internet sites to maximise its availability to
members of the armed forces.
The committee would like to see copies of the responses to
the public exercise, if necessary in confidence.
The public consultation was intended to stimulate a full
and frank discussion of the issues and, as such, the individuals
who responded were not specifically asked for permission to publish
their responses. Before agreeing to provide the 252 responses
to the public consultation exercise that were highlighted in Section
8 of the SDR New Chapter Supporting Information & Analysis
document, we are obliged first to seek permission from each of
the respondents.
What further publications in the New Chapter Process can be
expected?
It is our intention to publish our conclusions on the roles
of the Reserves in Home Defence and Security this winter, following
the completion and review of the consultation process we initiated
on 12 June.
The Secretary of State has stated that work on next year's
White paper was already underway—in which month will the
2003 White Paper be published? How does the New Chapter fit into
other work underway in the Ministry and in what ways will these
efforts be co-ordinated?
Our intention remains to publish the White Paper next year.
The New Chapter is being fully co-ordinated with, and integrated
into, the Department's annual processes through the strategic
planning and equipment and programming mechanisms that already
exist. A One-Star official has now been appointed to oversee the
New Chapter implementation phase and to facilitate the co-ordination
and integration work. He will deliver the agreed New Chapter measures,
take forward further detailed policy and force planning development
particularly in the Home Defence and Security area, and act as
the Department's focal point for external interest in the implementation
process.
2
Appraisal of Exercise SAIF SAREEA II-D/DOC/9/7/1 dated 10 April
2002 (not published). Back
3
op VERITAS Vol 1-D/Doc/12/36 dated 20 March 02 (not published). Back
4
Paragraph 24: "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies,
from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6
of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also
take account of the global context. Alliance security interests
can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts
of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption
of the flow of vital resources. Arrangements exist within the
Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of
the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of
their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind." Back
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