Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Professor Graham Pearson[1]



  1.  The Prime Minister in his statement to the House of Commons immediately after the events of 11 September said that "they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons" and the Foreign Secretary said that the instigators of the 11 September attacks "would not be deterred by human decency from deploying chemical or biological weapons" hence "we must therefore redouble our efforts to stop the proliferation and the availability of such weapons." How concerned should we in the United Kingdom be of chemical or biological attacks and what can we do about this danger?

  2.  Chemical and biological weapons go back into antiquity. Chemical weapons were widely used in World War I but fortunately not in World War II although they were used in the Iraq/Iran war of the 1980s. Biological weapons were stockpiled during World War II by the UK so that we could retaliate in kind should such weapons be used against us. Following WW II, the UK and the United States both studied biological weapons and the USA possessed weapons and agent stockpiles at the time of the unilateral decision by President Nixon in 1969 to abandon such weapons, a decision the United Kingdom had taken in the mid-1950s.

  3.  There has rightly been increasing concern about chemical and biological weapons during the past few years. This concern was echoed in the January 2001 US Department of Defense publication[2] "Proliferation: Threat and Response" in which the then Secretary of Defense said that "At least 25 countries now possess—or are in the process of acquiring and developing capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or the means to deliver them." The United States in its Quadrennial Defence Reviews[3] has highlighted the likely threat of asymmetric approaches to warfare, especially involving weapons of mass destruction. President George W Bush in his Inaugural Address[4] said "We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century is spared new horrors" and less than a month later said[5] "First, we must prepare our nations against the dangers of a new era. The grave threat from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons has not gone away with the Cold War. It has evolved into many separate threats, some of them harder to see and harder to answer. And the adversaries seeking these tools of terror are less predictable, more diverse." The Director of Central Intelligence in February 2001 said[6] that "Terrorist groups are actively searching the internet to acquire information and capabilities for chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear attacks. Many of the 29 officially designated terrorist organisations have an interest in unconventional weapons, and Osama bin Laden in 1998 even declared their acquisition a religious duty." The danger from chemical and biological weapons has also been recognised by the UK with the publication[7] by the Ministry of Defence in July 1999 of a detailed review of defending against the threat from chemical and biological weapons.


  4.  International treaties—the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993—totally prohibit the development, production or transfer of such weapons and the corresponding UK Acts make it a criminal offence for anyone to work on or use such weapons. However, these treaties have not prevented some States from seeking such weapons—notably Iraq whose defiance of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) arose primarily from Saddam Hussein's determination to retain his forbidden chemical and biological weapon capabilities. The BTWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling or use of biological weapons or toxins against humans, animals or plants whilst the CWC prohibits the development, production and stockpiling or use of chemical weapons against humans and animals. Whilst attention is often focused on possible use against humans, it is important not to overlook the vulnerability of animals and plants to such attacks.

  5.  Chemical and biological weapons attack human beings or animals primarily by the dissemination of the agent into the atmosphere and its carriage downwind to the target population. The overlap of the two Conventions is evident from consideration of their basic prohibitions. The basic prohibition of the Chemical Weapons Convention is set out in Article I in which:

  Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

    (a)  To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

    (b)  to use chemical weapons.

  Chemical weapons are defined in Article II of the Convention as being the following, together or separately:

    (a)  Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purpose not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;

    (b)  Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

    (c)  Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b);

  th toxic chemicals being defined in the same Article as:

  Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of manufacture, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.

  6.  The prohibition thus applies to all chemicals, however produced, and therefore applies to toxins. Quite correctly there is an overlap between the scope of the Chemical Weapons Convention and that of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in which the basic prohibition is that in Article I where

  Each State Party to the Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

    (1)  Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

  Both Conventions cover toxins. Two toxins—ricin and saxitoxin—are specifically included in Schedule I of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  7.  Both Conventions contain general purpose criteria which ensure that the prohibitions are all embracing as the BTWC covers all microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes and the CWC covers all toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purpose not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes. The general purpose criteria are highlighted in bold.

  8.  In considering the threat from terrorist use of chemical or biological materials, it is important to focus on available materials rather than on the traditional chemical warfare agents as these were generally produced to provide a retaliatory capability—and consequently, agents were selected which could be stored for extended periods. Iraq has shown in its selection of chemical agents that different agents and different production routes may be chosen for agents that are produced as required. A rogue state or a terrorist group is more likely to seek an agent for immediate use and a material that is available is more likely to be chosen.


  9.  Of all the weapons of mass destruction, biological weapons pose the greatest danger[8] because they have the weakest prohibition regime—the BTWC lacks any provisions for monitoring compliance—yet biological weapons can cause effects comparable to nuclear weapons and are easier to acquire than nuclear or chemical weapons.

  10.  A useful comparison (see Table 1) of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons was made by a US Congressional Committee[9] which although published almost 10 years ago is still valid and shows clearly that biological weapons are the easiest to acquire as many pathogens are endemic—ie occur in nature, have the least cost and least signature yet have comparable strategic effects to nuclear weapons.

TypeTechnology CostSignature Effectiveness
NuclearVery highVery high Very highVery highVery high
BiologicalHigh LowLow LowVery high
ChemicalHighHigh HighVery highLow

  Taken together, it is clear that biological weapons present the greatest danger today of all three weapons of mass destruction as they are the easiest to acquire, have the weakest regime and yet have effects comparable to nuclear weapons. Consequently, countering biological weapons is a key security priority.


  11.  It is useful to consider chemical and biological weapons as a spectrum of agents which overlap in the mid-spectrum region which comprises agents of biological origin that are chemicals and are therefore covered by both the BTWC and the CWC.

  12.  In the case of chemicals, sufficient has to be delivered to cause harm to the victims and for an effective attack significant quantities—tons—need to be available and spread at the right time and in the right way. In the case of biological agents, enough to infect an individual has to be inhaled and quantities needed are correspondingly less—typically kilograms. It is, however, misleading to hold up a bag of sugar and suggest that if this were biological agent then it could kill everyone in the UK—the analogy is to a sharp sword which can kill a lot of people but the sword has to be taken to each and every individual. There are significant technical problems with biological attacks—agent has to be obtained, enough has to be grown, then it has to be disseminated and for effective infection the particle size has not to be so large that they fall harmlessly to the ground or so small that they are inhaled and exhaled without being retained in the lungs. Furthermore, as biological agents are living microorganisms, they are fragile and may be killed through the forces needed to disseminate them or the ensuing exposure to sunlight and the open air. Finally, local micrometeorolgy determines whether dispersion into a turbulent atmosphere is such that the target population fails to receive enough to be infected.

  13.  In comparison to terrorist devices using explosive, chemical and biological weapons offer few attractions and much uncertainty. With explosive devices, the effect is immediate when the device is functioned and effects can be accurately predicted. In chemical and biological attacks, there is much uncertainty—has enough agent been disseminated, is the particle size optimum for retention in the lung, are the meteorological conditions right to spread the agent to the target—to which is coupled the delayed effects—possibly hours for chemical and days or weeks for biological agents.


  14.  If nevertheless, such an attack is made or is threatened, how can the danger be countered? The answer is a web of assurance which together assures the public that all reasonable steps have been taken to prevent and minimise the effects of such an attack. This web is made up of four key strands:

    —  Comprehensive prohibition both internationally through the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and nationally through legislation—the Biological and Chemical Weapons Acts.

    —  Effective controls both internationally of transfers and nationally of the facilities handling, storing or using such materials.

    —  Preparedness and protective measures to counter any threat of use or actual use of such materials; and

    —  Determined international and national responses to all who breach the prohibitions and controls.

  Much can be gained from strengthening all the elements of the web of assurance—which is also a web of deterrence—which may lead the perpetrator to judge that chemical or biological attacks will not serve his aims.

Comprehensive prohibition

  15.  When President Bush addressed[10] Congress on 20 September 2001, he said that to fight and win this war, "We will direct every resource at our command, every means of diplomacy, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war." We need to strengthen all of the tools at our disposal—a call echoed when the UN Secretary-General on 1 October 2001 told[11] the General Assembly that the global norm must be strengthened and efforts redoubled to implement the treaties outlawing biological weapons. The States Parties to the BTWC have over the past decade been engaged in negotiations of a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. These negotiations had essentially been completed by July 2001 when over 50 of the 55 States Parties engaged in the negotiations had spoken in favour of completion of the Protocol prior to the Review Conference to be held in November-December 2001. The quality of the Protocol regime is certainly as good as, if not better than, that of the CWC[12]. Regrettably, the United States on 25 July 2001 rejected[13] the Protocol—which would have brought benefits including provisions to ensure that all States Parties enact penal legislation to make biological weapons illegal and to implement export controls on those biological agents and technology that can be misused to cause deliberate disease. As there appeared to be no political will to go ahead with the Protocol without the participation of the United States, it is a step forward that President Bush on 1 November 2001 proposed[14] a number of measures to strengthen the BTWC as part of a comprehensive strategy for combating the complex threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism which included proposals that all States Parties should:

    —  Enact strict national criminal legislation against prohibited biological weapon activities with strong extradition requirements;

    —  Establish sound national oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic engineering of pathogenic organisms;

    —  Promote responsible conduct in the study, use, modification, and shipment of pathogenic organisms.

  Although these proposals are together less far reaching than those in the rejected Protocol—and as the Presidential statement acknowledged the ideas we propose do not constitute a complete solution to the use of pathogens and biotechnology for evil purposes—they are a step forward and provide at least a starting point for further development.

Effective controls

  16.  The dangers from both chemicals and pathogens to humans, animals or plants has long been recognised and countries have increasingly introduced national regulations and controls on the handling, use and storage of such chemicals and pathogens in order to protect public health and the environment[15]. These controls have frequently required the creation of national inspectorates who may be required to inspect facilities and give approval prior to a facility starting working with a particular pathogen or before pathogens are transferred between facilities. Likewise controls are required of facilities producing or storing large quantities of hazardous chemicals. Such controls have been harmonised regionally—most notably in the European Union—as well as internationally through the WHO, OIE and FAO.

  17.  In respect of transfers, Article III of the BTWC requires that:

  Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organisations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

  d Article I of the CWC requires that:

  1.  Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

    (a)  To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

  This effectively places a responsibility on each State Party to satisfy itself that any transfer of agents or equipment will not be used for prohibited purposes. However, it is important to recognise that the BTWC and CWC requirements are not ones that stand alone without regard to the national and international environment relating to biological and chemical materials and equipment. There are increasing concerns around the world about the possibility that sub-State actors or terrorist groups may seek to use biological and chemical materials and equipment as weapons to achieve their aims. Furthermore, it has to be recognised that increasingly countries are concerned about public, animal and plant health, about the environment and about trade in an increasing variety of goods as all States are keen to live in a safer, more prosperous world.

  18.  To an increasing extent States, both developed and developing, are establishing the national infrastructure and controls to ensure that biological and chemical materials and equipment are handled, used and transferred only to approved facilities, which increasingly are inspected by national agencies on a regular basis, so that public confidence can be built that the public and their environment are not being put at unnecessary risk through uncontrolled handling, use and transfer. The Rotterdam Prior Informed Consent Convention dealing with banned and severely restricted chemicals, the Persistent Organic Pollutants Convention, the Biosafety Protocol dealing with genetically modified organisms and the UN Drug Conventions all require the monitoring of exports and imports of potentially harmful materials. Similar infrastructure and controls are also being sought by States who wish to deny the availability of such agents and materials to sub-State actors or terrorist groups. Furthermore, trade depends on the regular supply of quality goods which need to be inspected and checked to ensure that they are free from disease or harmful contaminants—the recent European concerns about BSE, swine fever and foot and mouth disease in animals underlines the necessity for such controls. The concerns in Europe about genetically-modified foods reflect similar concerns about genetically-modified organisms which led to the entry into force of the Convention for Biological Diversity which opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and in January 2000 to the agreement of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which includes provisions for advanced informed agreement prior to transborder movement of such genetically-modified organisms. It is thus clear that increasingly States are developing the necessary national infrastructure and controls to build public confidence within that State that the public and the environment are not at risk from biological and chemical and equipment.

  19.  Such controls on the handling, use, storage and transfer of biological and chemical materials and toxins contribute to ensuring that such materials are only used for permitted purposes and do not fall into the hands of those who are seeking to misuse them and cause harm whether to humans, animals or plants.

Preparedness including both active and passive protective measures

  20.  Outbreaks of disease and intoxinations do occur naturally around the world—whether of Ebola virus in Africa or of foot and mouth disease in Europe—and States have developed responses to contain and deal with such outbreaks. Industrial accidents—such as at Bhopal in India and Seveso in Italy—have resulted in releases of harmful chemicals and States require preparation of plans to deal with such accidents. These preparedness plans for naturally occurring outbreaks of disease or accidental releases of chemicals can and should form the basis of plans to counter deliberate outbreaks of disease or chemical attacks—whether caused by a State or by non-State actors. Much attention has rightly been paid by NATO and a number of other nations to ensuring that their armed forces have effective protective measures should chemical or biological weapons be used against them. A few States—notably Sweden, Switzerland and Israel—have also extended such protective measures to their civilian population through the concept, in Sweden, of total defence. There is, however, much variability in the national protective measures against chemical and biological weapons and the importance of achieving more uniform protective capabilities for coalition forces has been recognized. [16]

  21.  Concern about the possible use of chemical or biological materials by terrorists, following the Aum Shinrikyo use of sarin in the Tokyo subway in March 1995 and the subsequent indication that they had also been seeking biological weapons, has attracted much attention in the United States during the past few years with significant resources—in excess of $11 billion—being directed to combating terrorism. Whilst there is undoubtedly a potential for terrorist groups to use chemical or biological agents against humans, animals or plants—and therefore it is prudent to have a preparedness response plan that is exercised—there is some indication that the US response has not been as well focused as it might be. The US Government Accounting Office (GAO) in a series of reports has emphasised the importance of developing a sound understanding of the terrorist threat[17]—and have noted that "terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release many chemical and biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor." and that qualifications such as this are important in avoiding policy makers obtaining an exaggerated view of the terrorist chemical and biological threat. The GAO has also stressed the importance of not using improbable "worst case scenarios" to plan and develop response programmes but rather to counter credible threats. A GAO survey[18] of the way in which Canada, France, Germany, Israel and the United Kingdom respond to terrorist threats has shown that, because of limited resources, response programmes are selected on the basis of the likelihood of terrorist activity taking place, not on the countries overall vulnerability to terrorist attacks. In respect of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks, it was noted that whilst each country may be vulnerable to such an attack, it was felt that such attacks were "unlikely for a variety of reasons, including the difficulties terrorists would face in producing and delivering such weapons." Consequently, these countries "maximise their existing capabilities to address a wide array of threats, including emerging threats like chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear, before they create new capabilities or programs to respond to such attacks."

  22.  It is, however, evident that preparedness will continue to be an important element of the web of reassurance into the future because of the dual-use nature of chemical or biological materials and toxins. Protective measures—both active and passive—have a key role to play in reassuring the public that all reasonable national steps have been taken to be prepared should biological weapons be used—whether by a State or by a non-State actor. Such response plans should be based on the existing plans to counter outbreaks of disease or accidental releases of chemicals—in humans, animals or plants—as such outbreaks, resulting from natural causes, and accidental releases will continue to occur from time to time and will need to be contained and treated effectively and efficiently.

  23.  Preparedness for chemical or biological attacks should build on national preparations to deal with disasters resulting from accidental releases of chemicals from industrial facilities and unexpected outbreaks of disease resulting from a traveller infected with an exotic disease arriving by air in the United Kingdom. Emergency planning in the United Kingdom has long addressed the possibility of disasters however caused. The Home Office website[19] provides guidelines for "Dealing with Disaster" which sets out how the emergency services, central and local government will work together in responding to such an emergency and is an example of truly "joined-up" government. The key elements in the plan for responding to an emergency are rightly identified as comprising assessment, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. Likewise, the guidance[20] in Scotland addressing incidents involving infectious disease in referring to a terrorist or criminal act involving the deliberate release of infectious organisms states that It is most important that arrangements for the management, investigation and control of outbreaks remain consistent with those described for natural outbreaks of disease. This general approach to combatting terrorism in the UK is similar to that adopted in Canada, France, Germany and Israel[21]. This strategy of responding to chemical or biological attacks by building on existing national capabilities to deal with accidental releases and unusual outbreaks of disease is also advocated in the World Health Organization's early provision on its website, following the events of 11 September, of a new book[22] entitled "Health Effects of Chemical and Biological Weapons".

Determined national and international response

  24.  Any use or threat of use of chemical or biological weapons needs to be countered by a determined response, ranging from diplomatic demarches, through sanctions to armed intervention, both nationally and internationally. The international prohibition regimes need to be implemented nationally and any breach—or threat of a breach—dealt with firmly and effectively so sending the message to other would be perpetrators that the acquisition of chemical or biological weapons will not be tolerated. The Harvard-Sussex Programme initiative[23] to prohibit chemical and biological weapons under international criminal law as a crime against humanity akin to piracy, torture and hijacking is to be commended as it underlines the message that such weapons are totally prohibited.

  25.  Unfortunately, the developments internationally in regard to determined responses to any use or threat of use of chemical and biological weapons in the last few years in this respect have been decidedly mixed—the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which covers chemicals and toxins came into force in 1997 and has successfully been implemented although it has been plagued by late submissions of declarations and bureaucratic difficulties. The trilateral agreement between Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom intended to build confidence that the former Soviet Union's offensive biological weapons programme has indeed been dismantled has run into the sand. The language addressing the status of this trilateral process in successive US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) reports has been unchanged[24] noting that "while there has been progress . . , the progress has not resolved all US concerns."

  26.  The situation in respect of Iraq is decidedly gloomy with the suspension of UNSCOM in December 1998 and the lack of progress with UNMOVIC which has yet to commence its responsibilities in Iraq. There has been a disturbing lack of unanimity in the Security Council with the P5 members being split on how best to deal with Iraq. The fact that Iraq had developed significant chemical and biological weapons capabilities—and had deployed these with predelegated authority to use these weapons in the Persian Gulf war of 1990-91—and has consistently refused to give up these capabilities seems to be forgotten by some members of the P5 giving a hollow ring to their commitment almost 10 years ago:

  "The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end."

  It is shortsighted and foolish not to appreciate the danger posed to international security by biological weapons—an attack in one country could easily spread to other countries through international travel and trade causing immense harm. There is a need for the P5 to recognise that there are strategic issues—such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—which demand unanimity of purpose rather than promotion of purely national interests.


  27.  The following are the principal observations that can be drawn:

    a.  Chemical and biological attacks continue to be a concern especially in regard to rogue states and terrorist groups;

    b.  Biological attacks pose the greatest danger of all weapons of mass destruction because they have the weakest prohibition regime, require the smallest quantities (kg) and can cause significant effects against humans, animals or plants.

    c.  Counters to chemical and biological attacks need to be focussed on available hazardous materials and pathogens. Materials previously selected for use in weapons may not be chosen by rogue states or terrorist groups.

    d.  Genetically-modified biological agents are unlikely to be selected by terrorist groups as the genetic modification may reduce the ability of the organism to survive in the atmosphere and thus reduce its effectiveness. Traditional pathogens are more likely to be selected.

    e.  Chemical attacks are less likely because of the quantities—tons—required to be effective.

    f.  Chemical and biological attacks are more uncertain than are attacks using explosives. Whilst chemical or biological attacks are possible, they present much uncertainty to the perpetrator and are unlikely to be a weapon of choice.

    g.  Counters to chemical and biological attacks should be based on all elements of the web of assurance—any single element will not suffice.

    h.  A strengthened web of assurance will also serve as a web of deterrence to the would-be user as it reduces the likelihood that the attacks will be effective.

    i.  The international and national prohibition regimes against biological weapons need to be strengthened. The current BTWC regime lacks teeth and urgently needs to be strengthened.

    j.  International and national controls of hazardous chemical and biological materials need to be strengthened to ensure that such materials are only available for permitted peaceful purposes.

    k.  Preparedness plans need to be reviewed and exercised to ensure that any chemical or biological attack is countered effectively. A vital element in the response plans is the assessment of the danger at each stage of the incident so that the response can be tailored so as to be appropriate.

    l.  Preparedness plans need to address attacks against animals and plants as well as humans. The recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the UK has shown how an outbreak of disease in animals can cause enormous damage.

    m.  In the event of an attack, care needs to be taken to ensure that the steps taken are appropriate to contain and minimise the hazard. It needs, however, to be recognised that analytical techniques may detect the presence of chemical or biological materials at concentrations far below those presenting any danger to humans, animals or plants.

    n.  Any threat of use or actual use needs to be dealt with firmly and unequivocally thereby sending the clear message that such breaches will not be tolerated.

  14.  The Defence Committee is recommended to:

    a.  To recognise that preparedness for chemical and biological attacks should be based upon the response plans to deal with industrial accidents involving chemicals and natural outbreaks of disease. These response plans should be reviewed to ensure that they are effective should attacks take place of animals or plants as well as humans.

    b.  To recognise that existing preparedness plans should be reviewed to take into account the experience gained in the United States in responding to the recent attacks involving anthrax sent through the postal system.

    c.  To underline the importance of strengthening all aspects of the web of assurance both nationally and internationally.

    d.  To encourage the United Kingdom, as a codepositary of the BTWC, to take the lead internationally in achieving an effective strengthening of the Convention through a legally-binding instrument that is supported by all States Parties—both developed and developing.

    e.  To recognise the synergy between the security non-proliferation regimes and the public health and environment control regimes and the potential that harnessing this synergy will promote universality of both security and health and environment regimes.

1   Professor Graham S Pearson is Visiting Professor of International Security in the Department of Peace Studies. He was previously Director-General and Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down. He is author of the book "The UNSCOM Saga: Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation" (Macmillan, 2000). He has also written over 30 Briefing Papers and some 20 Evaluation Papers for the delegations of the States Parties engaged in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations in Geneva of a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Back

2   U S Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001. Available at http://www. Back

3   United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001. Available at http://www. Back

4   The White House, President George W Bush's Inaugural Address, 20 January 2001. Available at http://www. Back

5   The White House, Remarks by the President to the Troops and Personnel, 13 February 2001. Available at Back

6   Central Intelligence Agency, Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World, Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 February 2001. Available at Back

7   Ministry of Defence, Defending Against the Threat from Chemical and Biological Weapons, July 1999. Available at Back

8   Graham S Pearson, Why Biological Weapons Present the Greatest Danger, Seventh International Symposium on Protection Against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Proceedings, 15-19 June 2001, Stockholm, Sweden. Available at Back

9   US Congress, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 23 February 1993. Back

10   President George W Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001. Available at 20010920-8.html. Back

11   United Nations Secretary-General, Secretary-General addressing Assembly on Terrorism, calls for `Immediate Far-Reaching Changes' in UN Response to Terror. Available at sgsm7977.doc.htm. Back

12   Graham S Pearson, The Composite Protocol Text: An Evaluation Of The Costs And Benefits To States Parties, University of Bradford, Evaluation Paper No 21, July 2001. Available at Back

13   Graham S Pearson, The US Rejection of the Composite Protocol: A Huge Mistake based on Illogical Assessments, University of Bradford, Evaluation Paper No. 22, August 2001. Available at Back

14   President George W Bush, Statement by the President: Strengthening the International Regime against Biological Weapons, 1 November 2001. Available at 20011101.html. Back

15   Graham S Pearson, Article X: Further Building Blocks, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No 7, March 1998. Available at Back

16   Brad Roberts and Graham S Pearson, Bursting the biological bubble: how prepared are we for biowar?, Jane's International Defense Review, No 31, pp 21-24, 4/1998. Back

17   US Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, 26 July 2000. US Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, 20 October 1999. US Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163, September 1999. Available at Back

18   US Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism, GAO/NSIAD-00-85, April 2000. Available at Back

19   Home Office, Emergency Planning. Available at Back

20   The Scottish Office, National Health Service in Scotland Manual of Guidance: Responding to Emergencies. Available at See Annex P, Incidents Involving Infection/Infectious Disease. Back

21   United States General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: How Five Foriegn Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism, GAO/NSIAD-00-85, April 2000. Available at Back

22   World Health Organization, Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons. Available at Back

23   A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Criminal Law, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No 42, December 1998, pp.1-5. Back

24   See for example, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Threat Control Through Arms Control, Annual Report to Congress 1998, 9 November 1999, p.83.  Back

previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2001
Prepared 18 December 2001