LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) In the longer
term the re-orientations in the terms of the relationships between
some of the major countries and blocs of the world since 11 September
may well have more far-reaching consequences than any military
or other actions taken directly against terrorists and terrorist
organisations. Already the developments in relations between the
United States and Russia appear to have fundamentally altered
the terms of the debates on ballistic missile defence and on the
future of NATO (paragraph 14).
(b) This is not to
say that the battle against global terrorism cannot be won; it
can be and it must be. But it will not be won quickly, and it
is likely that whatever success is achieved against al Qaeda itself,
a number of groups associated with it or sympathetic to its causes
will continue to pose a threat (paragraph 42).
(c) We fully endorse
the actions that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition
have taken both to declare and to demonstrate our strong support
for the United States. If that support risks making the UK more
of a target for the sorts of people who attacked New York and
Washington, it is a risk which we must accept. We must take the
necessary steps to counter it; but we must not be dissuaded by
it from doing the right thing (paragraph 47).
(d) We cannot assume
that where conflicts in far away places involve British forces,
for whatever reasons, they will necessarily be fought out only
where they arise (paragraph 49).
(e) In conclusion,
we can see no reason to dissent from the general view of our witnesses,
and others with whom we have discussed these issues, that there
is a continuing threat to UK interests posed by the existence
of organisations or groups whose aim is to inflict mass casualties
(paragraph 50).
(f) Although, under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, declared stockpiles do not have
to be destroyed until 2007, while Russia retains its large holdings
other countries may feel let off the hook of destroying their
own stockpiles. We are concerned also that expertise may proliferate,
but our more immediate concern, is that the weapons themselves
may find their way into the hands of terrorist groups (paragraph
56).
(g) Although we have
seen no evidence that either al Qaeda or other terrorist groups
are actively planning to use chemical, biological and radiological
weapons, we can see no reason to believe that people, who are
prepared to fly passenger planes into tower blocks, would balk
at using such weapons. The risk that they will do so cannot be
ignored (paragraph 79).
(h) We support the
measured response taken by the United States to the attacks of
11 September and we applaud the British government's action in
standing shoulder to shoulder with them politically and militarily
(paragraph 84).
(i) Taken with the
terms of reference set out in the MoD's memorandum and the list
of questions raised by the Secretary of State, the widening of
the SDR's geographical and regional assumptions strike us as requiring
a more fundamental reappraisal of the SDR than is implied by the
phrase 'a new chapter' (paragraph 101).
(j) We recommend that
the MoD makes every effort to keep to the timetable of Spring
2002 for the publication of the new chapter for the SDR (paragraph
105).
(k) From the evidence
which we have received so far we conclude, on a provisional basis,
that we in the UK will have to do more to focus our capabilities
on defending our own weak points. We shall return to this issue
in our inquiry into Defence and Security in the UK (paragraph
110).
(l) We do not believe
that concerns over creating public fear or encouraging hoaxers
are sufficient to justify failing to provide balanced and accurate
information to the public on this issue. We shall consider how
this should best be done in our forthcoming inquiry (paragraph
112).
(m) We agree that
the Armed Forces have demonstrated their capabilities in providing
command and control assistance in civil emergencies. But we are
concerned that the present arrangements for involving them were
devised with civil emergencies in mind. We remain to be convinced
that they would prove adequate in the event of a large scale terrorist
attack. In particular we are concerned to see clear, accountable
and co-ordinated leadership across government departments (paragraph
124).
(n) We believe that
a review of the arrangements for the provision of military assistance
to the civil power should be included in the further work on the
SDR (paragraph 125).
(o) We welcome the
Government's openness to reassessing the role of the Reserves.
We have no doubt that they are an under-used resource. We particularly
draw attention to the decision under the SDR to transfer the anti-nuclear
biological chemical weapons (NBC) capability from the Royal Yeomanry
to a regular unit. Because of the assessment of the threat for
such weapons at the time the principal task of this unit is the
protection of Armed Forces deployed overseas. Despite the Policy
Director's reservations about exposing the TA to such threats,
we believe that there are strong arguments for a NBC capability
whose focus would be attacks on and incidents in the UK (paragraph
128).
(p) If the new chapter
of the SDR is to propose a capability for pre-emptive military
action it must also ensure that such action does not lead our
forces to operate outside international law (paragraph 131).
(q) We may need more
specialist and highly-trained agile forces which can be made available
at short notice. If interdiction forces are to be an important
component of the MoD's response to the threat from terrorism,
this issue needs to be tackled with some urgency by the Department;
as is highlighted by readiness capability gaps already evident.
(Paragraph 134).
(r) A greater focus
on 'interdiction' against terrorist threats could place special
forces at the very heart of future operations. In such circumstances,
a sensible debate on our military response to terrorism will have
to deal more openly and frankly with the size, role and utility
on our special forces (paragraph 135).
(s) Taken together
with the conclusion which we have drawn that the role and capabilities
of the special forces will be another central element in the work
on the SDR, the inclusion of work on the question of 'specific
intelligence against general vulnerability' leads us to have serious
doubts over the extent to which the contents of the 'new chapter'
can be openly discussed. We await with interest to see how the
MoD resolves this issue in the consultation/discussion paper which
it plans to publish early next year (paragraph 136).
(t) We believe that,
if it is to be our policy to maintain a wide range of capabilities,
it follows that we must be prepared to pay for them. If we are
to add a chapter to the SDR, we must add the money to pay for
it. The government should therefore make an early commitment that
it will find the necessary extra money to fund those additional
capabilities which may be identified as necessary in the light
of the attacks of 11 September (paragraph 141).
(u) Our conclusion
is that the threat from terrorism has become more pressing and
more dangerous. A threshold has been crossed in terms of scale
and level of casualties (paragraph 143).
(v) The campaign against
terrorism has been described as three-pronged in that it includes
military, diplomatic and humanitarian initiatives. This three-pronged
campaign must be pursued both legitimately and relentlessly. We
must not lose our sense of the urgency and importance of this
task in the months ahead. We must not hesitate to take the necessary
steps to protect the UK and our interests overseas (paragraph
144).
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