Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1392
- 1399)
WEDNESDAY 22 MAY 2002
RT HON
ADAM INGRAM
MP, MR BRUCE
MANN RT
HON JOHN
DENHAM MP, MR
ROBERT WHALLEY
MR CHRISTOPHER
LESLIE MP AND
DR JOHN
FULLER
Chairman
1392. Gentlemen, I understand that a division
is expected in the next few minutes, so we will have to temporarily
suspend proceedings, hopefully not in mid sentence. At least it
will give you a chance to re-group before you return. Welcome
to this, the Committee's final session in our inquiry into the
defence and security in the UK. This inquiry flows directly from
the attacks of 11 September and the Committee will report probably
by July. We did an earlier report which we published at the end
of last year. It might appear rather strange that some of you
are appearing before the Defence Committee but, although there
are, I understand, 65 committees and sub-committees in the United
States dealing with the events of September 11 and the aftermath,
the figure in the UK is much smaller and you are attending that
one this afternoon. It is also unusual for three Ministers to
appear at one and the same time before a committee. Our inquiry
has crossed many departmental boundaries and issues of co-ordination
and co-operation have been central to it. We are very grateful
to you for agreeing to come and present a truly cross-departmental
approach (I will not say "question mark") to defence
and security in the UK and I am sure you will all be speaking
with one voice. I understand you will each be making short opening
statements, at the end of which maybe we will be saved by a division
and then we can start the questioning immediately upon our return.
Mr Denham, please.
(Mr Denham) Chairman, I am grateful for
the opportunity to introduce the session. With my colleagues,
Adam Ingram and Chris Leslie, I would like to explain briefly
for the benefit of the Committee our arrangements for counter-terrorism
and civil contingencies. I would like to introduce my official,
Bob Whalley, who is Head of the unit in the Home Office which
provides security policy advice to the Home Secretary and to Home
Office Ministers. My colleagues will introduce their officials.
The Home Secretary has lead responsibility within Government for
counter-terrorist policy. His chairmanship of the Ministerial
Committee on Terrorism and the Civil Contingencies Committee allows
him to maintain a clear oversight of the issues and measures being
taken to strengthen the UK's ability to respond to the terrorist
threat. The Home Office's national counter-terrorist contingency
plans are tried and tested. They have existed for many years and
allow the UK to respond to a wide range of terrorist threats including
those which might involve the threatened or actual use of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear materials and new threats.
The assessment of the terrorist threat is a continuous process
and via DOP(IT)T which, as you probably know, Chairman, is the
name of the relevant committee, the threat has been analysed and
planning assumptions made for the prioritisation of protective
and consequence planning across all departments. As a matter of
sad necessity we in the UK have developed considerable expertise
in fighting terrorism. We have learned to be prepared, to plan,
to review and to take further action where required. Following
the tragic events of 11 September, the Home Office, Cabinet Office
and the Ministry of Defence have been at the heart of a major
cross-departmental programme of work designed to enhance the resilience
of the UK and counter the new indiscriminate threat of terrorism
from abroad. I would like to emphasise that, although a great
deal of effort has been expended within the UK since September
11, effective measures to respond to the threat of terrorism were
already in place. The Government not only accepts but actively
embraces the case for contingency planning and for conducting
exercises to test those plans. For many years the Home Office's
national counter-terrorist exercise programme has enabled police
forces around the UK to test their response capability in conjunction
with the military and other departments. Three full-scale operational
exercises have been taking place each year. This is one of the
main reasons why the UK's crisis management machinery works—and
I believe works well—when we have had to deal with real
terrorist incidents. I am not, Chairman, pretending that any of
this makes the UK a risk-free zone. There can be no such thing.
But it is right that we should keep things in context. Our priority
now is to strengthen our response arrangements by identifying
any gaps and weaknesses and by taking the necessary remedial action.
1393. Thank you very much. Mr Leslie?
(Mr Leslie) Mr Chairman, if I may take up the mantle
on the points that Mr Denham has raised, I should for the record
perhaps introduce myself and say how much I welcome the Select
Committee's inquiry. I am Parliamentary Secretary at the Cabinet
Office and, following the machinery of Government changes after
the last general election and the establishment of the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat, I took on responsibilities for emergency planning
activities. To my right is Dr John Fuller who is the Deputy Head
of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and will be aiding and
supporting me throughout the day. I also, following in particular
September 11 and the constitution of the Civil Contingencies Cabinet
Committee, chair one of its sub-committees on UK resilience. All
I want to say in opening is that from what I have seen in work
in this area so far the civil authorities in general have built
up over decades a great deal of expertise, not only in anti-terrorism
activities, but also in emergency planning in general. Our aim
has to be of course to enhance preparedness, to build on partnerships
with others which are so vital in this area and to really embed
a concept of resilience into the mainstream of our work across
all Government departments. As John has already said, we have
to guard against both complacency on our part but also unrealistic
expectations that are out there, but I do believe that we have
raised our game significantly and we are testing our capabilities
at all times and we do stand ready to cope with emergencies and
disruptions whatever their source.
1394. Thank you very much.
(Mr Ingram) Chairman, you are familiar with me as
the Minister for the Armed Forces. You know that I always welcome
your inquiries. We always wait for the conclusions with some anticipation.
1395. I am sorry about the last one, Minister.
It did not go down too well in the MOD, did it?
(Mr Ingram) We could spend the next two hours debating
that one. I have with me Bruce Mann, who is the Director General
for Financial Management within the MOD. The primary role of the
armed forces is the defence of the United Kingdom against external
threats. The Committee will be well aware of the work that is
still being done by the armed forces to combat the threat from
international terrorism at its source. Six months ago Afghanistan
was a haven for Osama bin Laden and his network. There is still
work to be done but along with our many allies we have made it
plain that we have the will and the ability to ensure that there
are no safe havens for him and his kind anywhere in the world.
Of course there remains a risk of a terrorist attack in this country.
I know my officials and those from other departments you have
questioned have made it clear to you that the prime responsibility
for combating this threat lies outside the MOD. That does not,
of course, mean that the MOD contributes nothing. We fully recognise
the importance of the task and our ability to provide specific
specialist capabilities in the fight against terrorism in the
UK. My Department has already given you a great deal of information
on these capabilities, much of it classified, and further classified
information can be provided, in writing, if you wish. The MOD
contributes to a comprehensive response which combines the resources
at the Government's disposal. The Government mechanisms, which
are summarised by important phrases such as "the Home Office
lead" and "police primacy", are both determined
and able to combine resources—including those of the armed
forces—to combat this threat.
Rachel Squire
1396. I would like to pick up on where the last
Minister to speak left off, namely with a couple of questions
on military defence and how many of us have looked again at what
ways the events of September 11 require us to look at how the
armed forces fulfil their duty to defend the United Kingdom, in
particular that it is when we are talking about the land mass
of the United Kingdom it is largely limited to securing UK air
space and UK waters. We recognise, obviously, far more clearly
than we did how rogue civilian aircraft can potentially threaten
UK air space and yet it seems that the last time additional home
defence measures were taken was more than ten years ago during
the Gulf War. Can I ask the Minister why similar measures to those
that were taken then do not appear to have been taken in response
to the attack of September 11 on the United States?
(Mr Ingram) I interpret that question as meaning about
point defence on sensitive sites. Would that be the direction
you are coming from on this, or specifically in terms of what?
I am not quite clear as to what you are seeking.
1397. We are focusing specifically on the defence
of the homeland when we are talking about this island territory
of ours and how we are reacting to preventing aircraft that are
just targeted to land and cause maximum death and damage.
(Mr Ingram) So specifically on the aircraft?
1398. How are we responding to that?
(Mr Ingram) There is a general issue underlying that
as well in relation to the last time we were in a conflict, although
this is a different set of circumstances. The SDR came into play
and of course that laid down new precepts, new concepts and a
new focus on how we should be addressing our defence posture and
taking that capability to where the threat lies, which we believe
is beyond the shores of this country because we are not under
direct attack in that sense. The SDR dealt with the generality
of that and of course the new chapter to the SDR then looks at
events post-11 September to make sure that we have got our posture
right. It is not a new overall review but it is to make sure that
the things that need to be done will be done based upon that examination
and then upon that analysis and then best delivery of what is
required. As to the air defence of the United Kingdom, I think
you have had detailed information on this in confidence as to
the mechanism by which this applies. It would be wrong for me
to go into timings of response and again I think that possibly
has been made available to you. The coverage of the United Kingdom
we believe to be sufficient in terms of that air response but,
having said that, that does not mean to say that we would not
examine the basics of the aircraft in terms of response time because
we have to look at where possible attack points could be. However,
the use of aircraft must be the line of last defence because that
is a point at which the threat is then going to impact. Our best
option is to try and deter that from happening, either before,
if it is a civilian aircraft, it takes off or, if it is in flight,
knowledge which then gives us a better ability to deal with this
before it comes into our territorial area. There are a number
of mechanisms which can apply in the countries in which aircraft
take off, in-flight if an awareness is made, and the alerts that
can then happen to the possible country of attack before we then
have to deploy in country if it is then directly threatening an
immediate target within the UK. I do not know if that answers
our question.
1399. Yes, it does. I wondered if you wanted
to make any further points on this occasion about issues we have
certainly raised in this Committee previously about the Rapier
air missile defence system that the US certainly seems to have
considered very seriously following the 11 September as an additional
way of securing air defence.
(Mr Ingram) You are talking about ground defence.
Again, I think this would be better dealt with—and I am
not dodging the question—in private session because one
then has to examine the nature of the sites, the location of the
sites, and then what do you do? Is it one site, is it a multiplicity
of sites? What do you do in terms of readiness and the utilisation
of those resources? It is an easy response and a defined response
but then a judgement has to be made: is it the best response in
all circumstances? I have tried to define the way in which the
threat should be tackled as far away from the shores as possible
and then to have in place mechanisms which then specifically deal
with that response covering the whole of the UK and not necessarily
one specific site. Ground defence, by its very nature, would be
likely to be located around one or more sites. That may not be
the target.
|
