Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1400
- 1419)
WEDNESDAY 22 MAY 2002
RT HON
ADAM INGRAM
MP, MR BRUCE
MANN RT
HON JOHN
DENHAM MP, MR
ROBERT WHALLEY
MR CHRISTOPHER
LESLIE MP AND
DR JOHN
FULLER
1400. Can I pick up on the point about trying
to identify and intercept and prevent a potential threat as far
away as possible before it gets anywhere within the United Kingdom
air space? I believe that your own memorandum states that the
defence of the UK rests on the ability of our armed forces to
undertake missions outside the UK, obviously not to concentrate
on their efforts literally on the home ground. However, that contrasts
with the statement in Defence Policy 2001 which said, "The
UK's national security and defence depend fundamentally on the
security of Europe as a whole . . . NATO is and will continue
to be the primary means of ensuring British and European collective
security and defence". Whilst, clearly, the UK's "vital
interests" extend beyond the defence of the UK itself and
I think we all agree our forces' ability to deploy overseas is
an essential means of protecting those interests, just how far
do you think that defence of this island itself is guaranteed
by overseas deployments? I think it is something that is often
raised by the public as the balance between to what extent our
armed forces are deployed overseas and to what extent they feel
they are here to defend the home territory.
(Mr Ingram) Yes—are we doing too much abroad
and therefore neglecting home defence as a consequence?
Jim Knight
1401. Is that a statement?
(Mr Ingram) No. That is me trying to articulate the
public mood, the headline mood that could apply in all of this.
That argument is out there. The ethos of what we seek to do, not
just in this country but as part of our NATO response and other
coalition responses, of course would be to identify where the
threat is. If it is an aggressive country that is clearly easy
and obviously if that is a country which is beginning to show
that level of aggression against us all the mechanisms would come
into play as to how that should then be dealt with, through all
the diplomatic processes, all the other processes, but then, if
war is inevitable, is it a threat against NATO? Is Article 5 then
triggered? Where stands the UN? Immediately there is a multiplicity
of responses. Is it within the confines of Europe? Where stands
the combination of European countries alongside NATO and all of
that? That is against the aggressive country. If it is against
a threat of aggression, in this case from international terrorism,
it is a different quality of aggression. It is not armies marching
against us. It is not necessarily sophisticated weapons of destruction.
It may be crude weapons of mass destruction which may be located
here, so intelligence gathering and best use of intelligence will
become a critical factor in all of that to identify where the
source of the threat is, how then we can deal with that particular
threat. If it is within a country with which we have good relationships
they may be able to tackle that domestically. If it is a hostile
environment then we may have to take international or unilateral
action depending on the circumstances, again depending on the
nature of the threat, specific or general. It goes across that
layer of issues which we have now identified within the SDR new
chapter of the prevention approach, the deterrence approach, the
coercion to try and encourage action to be taken within that area
of where the threat is coming from and then to seek to disrupt
it if it is being funded by countries encouraging this and by
then taking that on to try and stop the funding route of that
and, as I say, through the diplomatic route as well, but ultimately
to destroy that threat if necessary. Have we by our actions in
recent times, whether in Sierra Leone or the Balkans or Afghanistan,
weakened our resolve in this? The answer to that would be fundamentally
no. If anything, we are doing all of those things. We are identifying
where the threat is, different manifestations of it, how then
it threatens other aspects of this country where terrorism could
grow in countries of potential threat to us and trying to tackle
it there. The best and most graphic example of that, and that
is why I mentioned it in my opening comments, is Afghanistan,
because that was a network of international proportions which
we were tackling; it was tackled at source but recognising that
it could be elsewhere. We are ready in all of those postures but
that does not mean to say that we do not have a look at what those
postures are and see if there are ways in which we could better
refine it and that is what the new chapter examination is all
about.
Chairman
1402. The SDR said something like for the first
time in a generation there is no threat to the UK home base. That
was written in 1998. Experience has shown that there is a threat
to the UK home base and I suppose the question is, have we got
the balance right? I am not in any way opposed to expeditionary
warfare if required, but one has the impression that the events
of September 11 really indicated clearly to us that the use of
the military for homeland security defence purposes was very important.
While I welcome the new chapter to the SDR, were you surprised
or would there have been any evolution of MOD policy if September
11 had not taken place to secure the home base greater than perhaps
the SDR was prepared to project?
(Mr Ingram) Again, one of the other aspects of the
new chapter is looking at specific home defence activities, probably
through the TA or better use of the reserves. That is something
which we are looking at and on which we will probably be announcing
some conclusions at a fairly early stage. Some of the comments
which have been made and some of the examinations which have been
made about that then takes us down particular routes of what then
do we do with that element of our resources and how best do we
utilise them? We are coming to a conclusion on all of that. We
do not yet have a final position adopted in that. That, as I say,
will be determined very shortly and I would hope that you would
find some worth in that when it is published. The question is,
would we have done this without September 11? If not September
11, there may have been something else. There may have been another
greater realisation of a threat to the security of the world in
that sense from growing international terrorism and therefore
do we need to do something? Is it a specific issue for us? I cannot
say with certainty that that would of itself have triggered it
but my assumption would be that that would have been a trigger.
It seems to me that we do a lot on the back of triggers. Something
happens and then we say, "Are we getting this right?",
and then, "Do we need to re-examine it?" The end of
the Cold War caused that type of examination. What was our defence
posture? Did we need to change our defence posture? Yes, we did,
and then it was refined later on in terms of the SDR. By looking
at it in the new way, through the new chapter, we are looking
at certain specific ways in which this can be done with a lot
of the focus on home defence. There are many triggers that happen
in terms of government awareness about threats. Specifically on
the terrorist issue you just need to look at the different types
of legislation we have brought in over time in response to Irish
terrorism, and it is usually when something else happens that
we then say, "Do we now need another set of emergency measures
in response to that?", the most recent of course being the
Omagh tragedy when we brought in a range of new measures and then
on the back of that a new definition of the Terrorism Act which
applies in this country. Triggers can bring about a re-examination
but of itself that does not mean to say that everything that was
there was flawed. It just may mean that we need to do something
better and more focused. That is really the drive and the intention
behind the new chapter. It is better that we take time to get
it right rather than knee-jerk and give an instant response because
we have to examine the totality of where the threat is coming
from.
Chairman: Good. We cannot wait to see the new
chapter.
Mr Crausby
1403. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review told
us that "support against terrorism of all kinds will remain
of the highest priority for the foreseeable future". Mr Denham
told us about the work programme in his opening statement since
September 11 and, to be fair, he also said that effective measures
were in place. Can you tell us what the armed forces have actually
done between 1998 and September 11 2001 in pursuit of defending
us against the threat of terrorism? I just wonder how ready we
would have been if September 11 had been an attack on the UK.
(Mr Ingram) Remembering that the main attack on the
US was a civilian target, of course, and the Pentagon as well,
if the knowledge had been there that those aircraft had been coming
in specifically targeted on targets in this country, we had a
state of readiness. We had mechanisms in place to deal with that
specific threat. We could go through a range of other scenarios
where we could point out what we were doing, whether it was in
terms of an attack on water resources or a chemical attack in
this country or a biological attack or a radiological device attack,
and yes, we have had states of preparedness in advance of the
SDR and so that is part of the overall delivery of this. Then
you need the intelligence to know what the threat is and then
how you respond to that. That is the real key to this, that the
capability is there, but then you need to know that it is going
to happen. The nature of asymmetric threat is that you cannot
predict precisely what is going to happen and therefore you can
only imagine and best define those scenarios and put in place
those mechanisms ready for that. The threshold of the level of
attack has now been lifted post-11 September and it is because
of that that we look at other elements of our preparedness. Since
then we have put in place quite a range of enhancements, correctly
so, building on that which is already there. They are not new
capabilities; they are enhancements to existing capabilities,
more extensive coverage and so on.
1404. If it was of the highest priority in 1998
what is so radically different about 2002 in the sense that we
completely accept that the asymmetric threat is incredibly difficult
to defend ourselves against?
(Mr Ingram) It is on that point that I am saying about
thresholds being lifted. The Sarin attack in Tokyo was another
lifting of the threshold. That made countries aware of the sensitivity
of certain aspects of their infrastructure. How do you deal with
mass contamination and areas beyond an MOD delivery responsibility,
although the MOD can be part of the playing in of how we then
take on the challenge? Whether it is a threat from a rogue ship
or a rogue aircraft, all of these things have been defined, as
I say, before the SDR. To use the phrase that we are ready for
this I think is correct because the threat was out there. International
terrorism was known about. We in any event had 30 years of dealing
with domestic terrorism of quite a dramatic type. Remember that
a particular group, the IRA, tried to take out the Cabinet of
this country. That was not mass death but if they had moved into
a different phase of operation they could have been doing that.
We had to be aware of that right across that period of time. Using
the phrase was a statement of where we were at, not a new understanding
of a new problem. What has happened since then is because of that
lifting of the threshold. Is there anything more we can be doing?
The answer to that is yes, and that is what we are now beginning
to deliver.
Chairman
1405. Mr Denham, are you satisfied with the
arrangements to co-ordinate counter-terrorist work between the
police and the security services and, in certain circumstances,
the military?
(Mr Denham) Chairman, I think the straightforward
answer to that is that I am satisfied that we have the structures
right, that we have the lines of accountability and responsibility
clear, and that they do work well in practice. It is obviously
the case that through the structures that I outlined earlier we
are continuously looking at the risk and the threat and our response
to see if anything further needs to be developed, but I do believe
that the pattern of co-ordination, the understanding between different
agencies, the lines of accountability ministerially through the
Home Secretary, are clear and well understood and also flexible
and able to respond rapidly to new situations. That is not a complacent
statement. It does not mean that we cannot constantly strive to
identify areas where we need to improve, but what has built up
over a 30-year period of time has I think got a lot of good professional
experience and practical knowledge and practical ways of working
built into it.
1406. You could potentially have some quite
sleepless nights worrying if almost a Railtrack crisis could hit
you and that, if there was a crisis, co-ordination proved not
to be successful. I know it is very important that you give reassurances,
but when you go home at night or when you go into the office,
I am sure you are probing and seeking as far as is possible that
the different agencies are working effectively, but do you think
that the exercises you are doing, the strategies you have laid
down would be able to cope in a major crisis?
(Mr Denham) I think the reassurance that I get is
from the ability of myself and indeed other Ministers, particularly
of course the Home Secretary, who has the major responsibility,
to understand and discuss these arrangements with the key people,
many of whom you have spoken to yourselves as a Committee, with
the Head of Anti-terrorism, the representatives of the security
services, and also, of course, as you put it, in a ministerial
sense we have formal ways of doing that through the committee
structure. We are also able to participate as observers or participants,
as appropriate, in the exercises that take place where we are
able to see in real time real decision makers taking part in exercises
and know also that there is a detailed analysis of those exercises
and work is done to identify the things that went well and the
things that need to be addressed in the future. I have been in
the post nearly a year. My very strong impression is of an extremely
professional set of services who understand very well their inter-related
responsibilities and I have been impressed and reassured by that.
1407. When you consider the organisations and
the body of persons that can be involved in various stages of
counter-terrorism, one body of people gets neglected, and I promise
my colleagues this is the only question I will ask. We had people
along from the private security industry. It could be a couple
of hundred thousand people if you added in-house security, who,
as they are in the process of being regulated, could provide,
if properly used, an incredibly useful additional resource. Have
you given much thought to that or could you give more thought
to that involvement of a properly constituted, properly regulated,
professional private security industry as opposed to what has
gone on for much of the last four or five decades?
(Mr Denham) Clearly we are committed to developing
a properly regulated and licensed security industry and you, Chairman,
have probably had as much to do with getting the Government into
a position to do that as anybody in the last 20 years, and you
are very familiar with it. Whether training in, for example, counter-terrorism
work or observance skills or something like that, should be part
of the licensing process is something that could be considered.
It is not part of our current plans and I think it is one of those
issues that in particular ACPO, as the gold command, for instance,
were to come to us and say they felt it would be useful, that
is something that we would want to discuss. I think it is also
worth pointing the Committee to the current Police Reform Bill
that is going through Parliament which will create a system of
accredited community safety officers. These will be a set of people
not employed by the police but employed as neighbourhood wardens,
street wardens, potentially private security guards and the like,
and it will be possible for chief constables, with the co-operation
of employers, to accredit and train and co-ordinate the activities
of these individuals in the way that often happens informally
at present around securing major out of town shopping centres
and things of that sort. My feeling, Chairman, is that chief constables
who wish to expand that family of people that they were able to
work with would probably work through that accreditation training,
because frankly the levels of training that can be built in and
the levels of specific skills that could be added will be higher
through that system than through the SIA which will be important
but basic standards. That is new legislation and I think the position
at the moment is that those who are responsible for this work
will want to consider how they might use it. The discussion you
have raised is an important one but I have to say it is not on
the agenda as something that is going to happen at the moment,
but I am aware of your interest, Chairman, and I share your interest
in making the best use of this large group of people.
1408. When we spoke to David Veness, and may
I say I think you are incredibly fortunate in having somebody
as competent and as knowledgeable as David Veness, he spoke of
the idea of a National Counter-Terrorist Service as "a very
interesting proposition", and he commented on the current
arrangements and noted that "there are identifiable areas
where we could make progress". Any comment on that, Minister?
(Mr Denham) As I recall from reading his evidence,
that was in the context of the same question. I do believe that
the Metropolitan Police Service have in particular looked at the
way in which they already co-ordinate with private guarding agencies,
for example, in the Docklands area, where there is good practical
co-operation. If somebody in David Veness's position with his
experience wishes to raise these issues, that is a discussion
we would gladly have with the police service. I would say that
in what is essentially an operational matter this is something
in which I would be strongly influenced by an operational police
service view as to whether this would add to their capability,
particularly through the accreditation route that I described
earlier.
1409. When he eventually retires, in about 15
years I hope, I hope his successor is half as good as he is, and
he is not paying me to say these nice things. Following 11 September
the Government of course, as you know, introduced the Anti-terrorism
Crime and Security Act 2001. How much use has been made of those
powers to date?
(Mr Denham) Of course there is a range of powers within
the Act, Chairman. Use has been made of that, though I would have
to come back to you with details of the financial powers that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer has led on. Some individuals have
been detained under the provisions in the Act that were introduced.
I think the Act is proving a useful addition to the fairly comprehensive
terrorism legislation that we had previously.
1410. What about the banned organisations? Can
you give us a clue as to what is happening with the proposed proscribed
organisations?
1411. The position with the proscribed organisations
under the 2000 Act—again I would wish to check the detail—is
that there are a number—I think it is a small number—challenging
the proscription. They have appeals to the Home Secretary and
they are challenging the proscription through the appeals procedure
which has been established. That is ongoing. A number have not
done so. I will be very happy, Chairman, to write to the Committee
with details on where we are with the proscriptions.
Mr Howarth
1412. Would these people have been capable of
being detained under any previous legislation or has the new legislation
provided the authorities with a lever which was not previously
available to them?
(Mr Denham) The problem that the legislation sought
to address was that there were people—I have to choose my
words with care—who essentially we were neither able to
detain because we were not able to bring them in front of the
courts to obtain a conviction but, because of the country from
which they had come and the state of affairs there, we could not
return them to that country. In a sense, whilst they were people
that—and I use this in a non-legal way—we would prefer
not to have in this country, we were not able to deal with them
satisfactorily and so it has given us an additional power which
did not previously exist.
1413. Is that because the courts would not have
allowed us to return them to those countries?
(Mr Denham) That is part of the issue, yes. We, of
course, as a Government have a position on returning people to
certain situations where people's lives would be at risk, extra-judicial
execution, things of that sort.
1414. So we have untied one hand from behind
our back?
(Mr Denham) What we have done is to introduce a necessary
power in a way that means that we are working legally both in
terms of our national and international legal obligations and
I think it is very important in taking forward the action we are
taking against terrorism that as a country we work within a sound
legal framework.
Chairman
1415. Can I come back again to your comments
on a National Counter-Terrorist Service? Mr Veness's views, as
far as I can recall, were along the lines of the possibility of
a National Counter-Terrorist Service on the lines of perhaps the
National Crime Squad or the National Criminal Intelligence Service.
Is his idea a runner in the light perhaps of the alternatives
I have mentioned?
(Mr Denham) I am sorry if I referred to a different
section of Mr Veness's evidence. I have to say I read his evidence
as somewhat equivocal on this point. My interpretation of it was
that he said that in establishing NCIS and the National Crime
Squad this was meeting a very clear need, a very clear gap in
our criminal intelligence services and our criminal investigation
services, but I do not think he was making a case that such a
similar gap exists in the organisation of counter-terrorism activities.
As I said at the outset, I think that the arrangements that we
have at the moment do seem to me to be, certainly in terms of
the way they are structured and the way they inter-relate, both
robust and flexible.
Syd Rapson
1416. Could I return to the Anti-terrorism Crime
and Security Act 2001? Some of the powers under that particular
Act are exercised specifically for detention by relying on a derogation
by the UK Government from Article 5 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. There is a derogation under that power but the
derogation can only be made "in time of war or other public
emergency threatening the life of the nation", and at the
time all of us collectively felt that that was a real possibility
when this derogation under the new powers was brought in. How
will the Government judge whether the circumstances continue to
apply for that and how long will the derogation continue for?
I think we have only got nine people in detention at the moment
from an original 144 arrested. Forty six were charged but there
were no convictions, and there are ten awaiting trial, but apparently
there are only nine in detention. How long is the derogation going
to apply and how long can we keep that up because of the threat
to the nation state?
(Mr Denham) That is a difficult question to answer,
Chairman, because we do not know what will happen internationally
in this country or in other countries on the anti-terrorism front.
Suffice it to say at the moment that nothing has happened since
the House judged that this legislation was necessary to lead any
of us to conclude that it is no longer necessary. These are things
that have to be kept under review. There is of course a procedure
through SIAC which is capable of reviewing the use of the Act.
That I believe is a place where these arguments could be aired,
but I would say that the decision of Parliament to make these
powers available was a correct one because, as I say, circumstances
have not changed to suggested that it was wrong. I would also
comment briefly on the numbers. At the time concerns were expressed
that this was a power that would be used indiscriminately, that
there would be fishing expeditions against anybody who looked
a bit suspicious, that people would be locked up all over the
place. The figures you have given suggest that this is a power
which every attempt is being made to use responsibly.
1417. Can I address the derogation on Article
5 which was given because of that severe worry that we had? Is
it endless? We made the derogation because we felt it was necessary.
Does it expire after a period of time? You said there is a review.
I just wondered, once you have given that derogation, do you then
say, "Okay, we can turn a blind eye to the Convention on
Human Rights because of this overriding worry"?
(Mr Denham) If the derogation is applied in the case
of an individual and somebody is detained under the power, and
part of the argument that has to be used is that the derogation
applies, then there is no time limit. It does not say, "After
three months we will assume that whatever reason it was that we
had the derogation must have passed". It clearly has to depend
on the actual circumstances and that will depend on the progress
on action against terrorism at home and abroad over the months
and years to come.
1418. I have probably misunderstood. The derogation
is on the individual, not on the ability to use the Act for detention
purposes?
(Mr Denham) Either way round the argument is exactly
the same. You cannot artificially apply a deadline to something
that depends on the international situation. Having said that,
the Act itself will fall to be renewed by Parliament. I have to
confess, Chairman, that I would have to come back to the Committee
with the detail of the date, but one of the agreements that was
made with the Act was that that provision would have to be renewed.
That is built into the process of that, but the principle that
I argued was that you would not say, three months after you had
started using it, you simply assumed that the derogation did not
apply. Clearly that would not work.
Mr Howarth
1419. Is it up to the United Kingdom Government
to determine that we are entitled to a derogation and can we be
challenged in the European Court? I think people here would regard
it as being very much a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament
to determine. I wondered whether we do have as much freedom of
action as you are suggesting.
(Mr Denham) It is for the United Kingdom Government,
with of course Parliament, to judge whether this is appropriate.
Parliament passed the legislation and the Government has to use
it. That does not take away from individuals the power through
the appeals procedure which was laid down to challenge that decision
or to challenge the decision in another legislative forum. Both
Government and Parliament have set out their will on this.
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