APPENDIX 10
Memorandum submitted by bmi british midland
(7 June 2002)
INTRODUCTION
British Midland Airways Limited, trading as
bmi british midland ("bmi") is an airline operator whose
activities include the provision of scheduled passenger and cargo
services, engineering services, charter and aircraft leasing.
The airline is a wholly-owned subsidiary of British Midland Plc.
The principal business of bmi is the operation
of commercial scheduled air services on UK domestic and intra-European
routes from London Heathrow. bmi is the UK's second largest full-service
scheduled airline operating over 2,000 flights a week with a fleet
of 60 jet aircraft, serving 30 destinations in 11 countries and
carried seven million passengers in 2001. bmi operates other significant
bases at Manchester and East Midlands airports. In addition, bmi
also operates daily services from Manchester to both Chicago and
Washington DC and is the largest British operator of transatlantic
scheduled services from UK regional airports.
bmi was originally invited to give oral evidence
to the Committee, however, after consultation other UK airlines
and bmi's security expert, decided that our views would be best
represented by Mr Ian Jack, from our international trade body
the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Having attended
the oral session on 8 May, we now wish to submit additional comments
and information with regard to some of the topics discussed at
that session.
"LISTING"
OF PRIVATE
SECURITY FIRMS
The Department of Transport is currently developing
an approval process for private aviation security firms. While
bmi believes it is in the best interests of aviation security
to maintain consistent high standards for recruitment, training,
operational performance testing, and monitoring, we believe that
such standards are already in place and the aim should be to ensure
that these standards are fully applied.
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE AND
THE ARMED
FORCES
The presence of uniformed military personnel
at civilian airports has the potential to be an effective means
of instilling public confidence in aviation security. In an operational
context, however, uniformed military presence only supplements
the security processes already in place. The complex day-to-day
operations of airlines and airports are carried out by staff with
high levels of training and experience—something which non-permanent
military personnel may not be suited to.
CREW TRAINING
The most effective form of defence and the greatest
concentration of effort must be in the process of screening and
assessing passengers prior to their boarding of an aircraft. When
performed in conjunction with airline ground staff, as well as
with the co-operation and participation from airport staff across
all disciplines, the result is an effective network of passenger
screening from land-side airport entry to air-side aircraft boarding.
FLIGHT DECK
SECURITY
The US Transport Safety Authority requires that
strengthened cockpit doors be fitted to all aircraft operating
into the USA as from April 2003. bmi's two A330-200s which currently
operate between Manchester and Washington and Chicago will have
Airbus approved doors fitted at the end of the summer. The International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) has also set a standard for
the fitting of doors to all aircraft by October 2003. bmi is of
the view that future aircraft configurations will be designed
in such a way as to avoid the need for passengers to enter the
front end of the cabin in order to access to the galley or toilets.
The measures being implemented to upgrade the
integrity of the flight deck, combined with the probable introduction
of cabin surveillance systems that can be monitored from the flight
deck serve as meaningful security enhancements and will further
enhance passenger confidence.
THE ROLE
OF CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
The overall success of aviation security processes
relies to a great extent on the ability of the airlines, airports,
and other related service providers to consistently apply the
measures required in an effective and operationally compatible
manner. It is important that Central Government must therefore
ensure that its aviation security policies support this aim. The
tragic events of September 11 necessitated swift and decisive
action on the part of governments and airlines alike in order
to both immediately improve the effectiveness of security measures
and also to boost public confidence in aviation security. While
the immediate response necessary after September 11 did not allow
for a dialogue among all interested parties, in future a fully
inclusive process of dialogue regarding heightened security measures
among all stakeholders is, and should be, followed as a matter
of course.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The impetus following post-September 11 towards
international acceptance of aviation security standards is welcome.
To a large extent, however, the foundations upon which these standards
are being built are modelled on the security mechanisms already
in place in the UK. Initiatives regarding enhanced security measures
are being taken by ICAO, ECAC, the EU and individual states, all
of whom will benefit from increased harmonisation of security
standards. From the industry side, organisations such as IATA
and The Association of European Airlines (AEA), have worked together
with governments to recommend and adopt significant improvements
in airline and passenger security.
Such an international consensus does not exist,
however, with respect to the funding of these heightened security
measures. On behalf of all UK airlines, IATA and the AEA have
advanced the argument that the threat of terrorism is politically
motivated and therefore is a threat against the state. The airline
industry alone cannot and should not be forced to internalise
the full cost of the additional security measures.
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