APPENDIX 11
Memorandum submitted by British Airways
(28 June 2002)
INTRODUCTION
British Airways is pleased to have been offered
the opportunity to submit written evidence to the Defence Select
Committee about the response to the tragic events of 11 September
2001.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT
RESPONSE
British Airways activated its own crisis management
centre at Heathrow, principally to manage the flight operation
as a direct result of the complete closure of North American airspace.
Immediate additional security measures put in
place included plastic cutlery for in-flight catering, the inclusion
of all sharp objects in the list of items prohibited on board,
secondary searches of passengers and cabin baggage at boarding
gates, aircraft guarding and a requirement to lock flight deck
doors. This latter measure was published by the CAA on 12 September
and was one of a number of safety requirements which had resulted
from an internal investigation into an incident on a British Airways
flight to Nairobi the previous December. The other measures were
communicated by the government aviation security regulator, Transport
Security Division (Transec) of the Department of Transport, Local
Government and the Regions (DTLR) in a letter to UK airlines and
airports on 13 September. British Airways implemented these measures
world-wide. British Airways was fortunate in having a well established
relationship with the policy makers in Transec and communication
lines were clear and accessible.
After 48 hours, it became clear that there were
insufficient trained security resources available to sustain this
level of security operation for any lengthy period. Staff were
becoming tired and management volunteers who had been used to
help in the short term needed to return to their principal jobs.
Meetings were held between industry representatives and Transec
which produced two key results. Firstly, the enhanced measures
detailed in the letter of 13 September were communicated to the
US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and were accepted in their
entirety by the USA as an alternative to the US Emergency Amendments
to the US Airline Security Programme. This allowed the resumption
of flights to the USA and Canada by UK airlines, well before other
European carriers. Secondly, the measures in the UK were rationalised
so that resources could be more appropriately deployed, predominantly
focused on flights to North America. Further letters were issued
on 17 and 18 September detailing these measures, and a Direction
to Aircraft Operators, Aerodrome Managers, Listed Air Cargo Agents
and Airline Caterers made them statutory on 26 September. Explanatory
guidance notes were also published. This was extremely helpful
in providing clarity where there had been a degree of initial
confusion.
INDUSTRY CONSULTATION
British Airways was invited to participate in
two working groups constituted under the Committee for International
and Domestic Terrorism (TIDO). Meetings were held in London on
27 and 28 September and addressed a range of security issues relating
to Pre-flight and In-flight Security, respectively. A wide range
of industry bodies and government departments were represented
and the meetings took the form of brainstorming sessions to determine
which of a whole raft of ideas were worthy of further work. The
meetings appeared to us to be quite productive but unfortunately,
were not repeated. Neither have we seen any minutes of these meetings
so it has been difficult to determine the outcome.
We understand that a number of initiatives have
been taken forward by government and there has been some further
consultation. Our perception is that, as time has passed, individual
government departments have settled back into their traditional
separate roles and this has resulted in a lack of cohesive project
management. This is understandable given the pressure of work
and the need to apportion tasks effectively to maximise the use
of resources but it is, perhaps, a shame that the initial TIDO
Working Groups did not continue to meet on a regular basis to
ensure a more cross-functional response.
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act which
received Royal Assent on 14 December 2001, is a comprehensive
piece of legislation which will have far-reaching consequences
for airlines. Whilst we appreciate the urgency and importance
of this Act, the speed of its enactment allowed for minimal industry
consultation. The detail of the requirement to provide advance
passenger and cargo information will, we understand, be the subject
of secondary legislation. We hope that this will not be rushed.
It is important that the UK takes account of the demands being
made in this area by the governments of other countries, particularly
the USA and Canada. The global nature of airline operations merits
a co-ordinated international effort if we are not to incur unreasonable
costs in meeting all these varying demands.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
Europe—It was agreed that the European
Community should be given competence for aviation security following
11 September. This had previously been the province of the European
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and was based on voluntary compliance
by the 38 Member States with the Chicago Convention (Annex 17).
A draft EU Regulation passed its second reading in the European
Parliament on 14 May with some 32 amendments, of which the Commission
have accepted only 16. If the Council of Transport Ministers reject
the amendments, formal conciliation will then take place. Existing
differences fall into two areas, political and technical.
The political problem centres on funding of
the additional security measures. It is our view that there must
be a consistent application of funding arrangements across all
Member States otherwise the principle of the single market is
not upheld because there will be an unfair competitive position
between European airlines and airports. We are keen to see a solution
reached that ensures a level playing field.
The technical difficulties arise between the
pragmatists, who seek to delay or weaken the security measures
on practical operational grounds, and the conscients, who strive
to put in place effective security measures to meet the new threat
and to reassure the travelling public. The UK government has been
instrumental in influencing the design of a European aviation
security regime that is similar to the UK's own national programme.
It is our opinion that the measures proposed are necessary and
would create a harmonised common security area. Compromise on
the security measures would be inadvisable.
United States of America—The USA, understandably,
has also passed legislation in a somewhat hasty fashion. The creation
of the federal Transport Security Agency (TSA) is still incomplete
and it has set itself timescales for implementation of enhanced
security measures that appear almost impossible to meet. In addition,
the USA has not shown any reluctance to impose its version of
an aviation security regime on the rest of the world, with little
or no recognition of host state responsibility or international
standards. After the initial acceptance of the UK's enhanced National
Aviation Security Programme, there has been minimal reciprocity
between the US and the UK over security measures. This has led
to airlines operating from the UK to the USA being required to
introduce measures which take no account of the mature programme
already in place in the UK as a result of the Lockerbie crash.
Some of these measures appear illogical and, as a consequence,
are difficult to explain to the staff that carry them out. This
leads to inconsistent performance.
United Kingdom—Conversely, the UK demonstrates
great respect for host state responsibility, adhering to all the
international conventions. This is generally commendable but,
on rare occasions, may not be commensurate with the threat and
may actually act contrary to the interest of the UK. We believe
that the UK intends to follow the US lead on setting the date
for implementation of reinforced cockpit doors as April 2003,
although nothing has been published to date. If this is the case,
the UK government is clearly acting in a manner appropriate to
counter the threat of an attack on the UK using an inbound aircraft
as a missile. However, unlike the USA, the UK only has legal authority
to require this of UK registered airlines. This means that, until
the target of November 2003 set by the International Civil Aviation
Conference (ICAO) is reached, there remains a vulnerability from
inbound foreign registered aircraft, and maybe for longer if not
all contracting states follow the standard. British Airways would
like to see the government take the necessary legal powers to
require reinforced cockpit doors on all inbound flights.
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
British Airways employs a team of international
auditors to inspect all of our overseas operations on a regular
basis. Where we have concerns about security standards and are
unable to secure an adequate response from the host state by way
of improvement, we implement additional measures solely for the
departure of the British Airways flights. Transec provide assistance
by writing letters expressing our concerns and by visiting countries
on a threat and risk basis to persuade the authorities to introduce
the necessary measures for UK carriers.
Global aviation third party insurance against
war and associated risk was withdrawn by the underwriters after
the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. The assistance
from government to airlines and security suppliers in the form
of the UK government Troika scheme has been absolutely essential
to our continued operation.
Although the UK government provided apportioned
financial compensation to the UK airlines affected by the four
day closure of North American airspace, no other financial assistance
has been forthcoming to date. This puts European airlines at odds
with the position of US carriers who have been offered financial
assistance with the costs of installing reinforced cockpit doors
and the installation of screening equipment at airports.
The immediate and significant drop in passenger
traffic, particularly on transatlantic routes, gave rise to genuine
concern for the profitability of the business. Revenue was badly
affected. Market research conducted by British Airways identified
that customers were concerned about safety and security, but the
fear of displacement caused by military action taken by the US
and the UK in the war against terrorism was the key factor which
prevented them travelling by air. The American market was significantly
affected by this. The government could, perhaps, have done more
to reassure the public and restore confidence in flying. The widely
televised scenes of President Bush visitng US airports and meeting
aviation industry employees was a good model.
MILITARY RESPONSE
There has been much debate on the question of
whether the UK should have available an armed sky marshal response.
We have yet to be persuaded of the benefits of such a response.
A considerable amount of effort is expended at airports in preventing
weapons being taken on board our aircraft and the routine presence
of armed personnel would necessitate a significant degree of expensive
aircraft modification. We cannot envisage a scenario where British
Airways would request the presence on board of a sky marshal and
it is unlikely that we would choose to operate a flight where
the threat was deemed sufficiently high to merit provision of
sky marshals.
The subject of military response to a rogue
aircraft was briefly discussed at the TIDO In-flight Working Group
in September 2001. The matter was deemed to fall within the province
of the Ministry of Defence and National Air Traffic Control and
there has been no further discussion with British Airways. In
the immediate aftermath of 11 September, we were concerned about
possible precipitate military action in the event of an aircraft
momentarily losing contact with ATC or temporarily deviating from
flight path, both of which are not uncommon occurrences or an
aircraft inadvertently communicating the transponder code for
hijack, a less common occurrence. However, as time has passed,
we have been reassured that our concerns appear to have been unfounded
in respect of UK airspace. We have experienced an increase in
the number of military interceptions over mainland Europe.
FUTURE RESPONSE
British Airways is participating in the independent
review of airport security being undertaken by Sir John Wheeler
on behalf of the Home Office. This review was set in train following
the recent robberies at Heathrow. We are also participating in
other initiatives being led by Transec under the auspices of the
National Aviation Security Committee (NASC). It would be helpful
to have a co-ordinated government approach to industry consultation
across the multiplicity of government projects which have arisen
following 11 September, either through the NASC or through TIDO.
Perhaps it would be timely, before the first anniversary, to reconvene
the TIDO Working Groups to review progress since 11 September
with the industry and to set the agenda for further work. It would
be reassuring to feel that we had considered all the options,
made appropriate decisions and were confident in the resulting
programme.
SUMMARY
The attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001
were of such an unprecedented nature and on such a scale that
it is not surprising that the international aviation community
needs time to assess the new threat and appropriate response.
In general, the response of the UK government has been effective
although it could have benefited from better co-ordination. It
has also, at times, been a little slower to respond to subsequent
events and new intelligence than the industry would have liked.
British Airways is fully committed to supporting government in
restoring and maintaining public confidence in aviation.
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