Supplementary memorandum from MoD on:
the Ballistic Missile Threat (March 2002)
INTRODUCTION
1. The Committee asked for a supplementary
memorandum describing weapon of mass destruction and ballistic
missile acquisition and development programmes in countries of
concern, and possible future trends. Before turning to possible
future trends, about which it is difficult to make definitive
statements, this memorandum will set out in more detail our assessment
of the current capabilities of North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Libya.
The information set out below does not necessarily indicate the
full extent of our knowledge of their programmes. And we can never
be sure that we have a full picture of all developments. But it
provides a summary of the information that can be made available
at an unclassified level in the time scale requested by the Committee.
We believe it is important to give as full a picture as possible
of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery, and we will continue to release publicly information
as we are able to do so.
NORTH KOREA
2. North Korea has some hundreds of SCUD
missiles in service, with ranges of up to 500km. It can produce
these itself and they are available for export. It also has in
Service No Dong missiles, with a range of up to 1,300km. This
missile is available for export, and the technology has enabled
Iran and Pakistan to acquire their own versions. In August 1998,
North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 as a satellite
launch vehicle. This demonstrated that North Korea could produce
a missile with a range of about 2,000km. It also demonstrated
expertise in multistage missile technology. A two-stage Taepo
Dong-2 missile, which could have a range in excess of 5,000km,
is under development. A three-stage Taepo Dong-2 missile could
have intercontinental range. North Korea has since 1999 observed
a moratorium on flight-testing. However, ground-testing and other
development activities have continued and a flight test of the
Taepo Dong-2 might be carried out were the moratorium to end.
A particular cause for concern is North Korea's willingness to
sell its missiles and technology to any country prepared to pay
for them; it has sold hundreds already.
3. North Korea is believed to have diverted
sufficient fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon prior
to its agreement with the US to freeze plutonium production in
1994. It has sufficient plutonium in spent fuel rods under International
Atomic Energy Authority supervision for additional nuclear weapons.
And concern remains that North Korea might still be pursuing a
covert nuclear programme. North Korea has the infrastructure to
support the development of chemical and biological weapons.
IRAQ
4. Iraq fired large numbers of SCUD-type
missiles during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf conflict. It covertly retained
a small number of SCUD-type missiles called the Al Hussein, with
a range of around 650km, after the Gulf conflict. UNSCR 687 permits
Iraq to develop missiles up to a range of 150km, and since the
Gulf conflict Iraq has been openly developing Ababil 100 and Al
Samoud short-range missiles. In the absence of UN inspectors,
we believe Iraq has worked on extending their range beyond the
permitted limit. Iraq has long had ambitions to develop longer-range
missile systems with ranges of over 1,000km; we believe work on
such systems continues, but is only able to make relatively slow
progress while UN restrictions remain in place.
5. Iraq has admitted to having had offensive
chemical and biological weapon capabilities, which included warheads
for the Al Hussein missile filled with nerve agent, anthrax, botulinum
toxin and aflatoxin. It has used chemical weapons against the
Iranians and the Kurds. Iraq sought to conceal these programmes
from UN inspectors and did not acknowledge its biological weapons
programme until 1995. It failed to convince UN inspectors of the
accuracy of its declarations about these programmes. It failed
to account to UN inspectors for significant amounts of material
produced under these programmes. And since 1998 it has refused
to allow UN inspectors into Iraq to continue to investigate these
programmes. We believe that Iraq has retained precursors, equipment
and expertise, and continues to pursue covert chemical and biological
weapon programmes. Iraq has also long sought a nuclear weapons
capability, and continues to do so. We believe it has retained
much of its former expertise, but currently lacks certain key
components and materials. We believe that if sanctions were lifted,
Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in as little as five years,
and less if it were able to obtain fissile material from an external
source rather than produce it itself.
IRAN
6. Iran currently has in service several
hundred SCUD and SCUD-type missiles with ranges up to 500km. Based
on North Korean No Dong technology, Iran is developing the Shahab-3
missile, with a range of up to 1,300km. It would be able now to
field a limited number, and is working to produce a substantial
force. Iran has made no secret of its aspirations to develop a
satellite launch vehicle capability. This technology is very similar
to that required for longer-range and intercontinental ballistic
missiles. We believe that Iran could test such systems by the
end of the decade, and possibly sooner depending on how much external
assistance it receives. If it acquires complete systems, it could
achieve such a capability more quickly.
7. Iran is seeking to master the full nuclear
fuel cycle so that it can develop a totally indigenous civil nuclear
power programme. This legitimate programme could be exploited
for use in a covert nuclear weapon programme. We have long-standing
concerns that Iran may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in
breach of its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993, and
has acknowledged a past chemical weapons programme. It would also
be capable of producing biological weapons.
LIBYA
8. Libya has an ageing force of SCUDs. It
is now seeking to produce extended range SCUD missiles, with extensive
North Korean assistance that includes the provision of components
and equipment. Libya also has an interest in procuring a longer-range
capability. We believe Libya also has weapons of mass destruction
aspirations. We believe progress has so far been relatively slow,
but are concerned by the possibility that external assistance
could speed their efforts.
THE OVERALL
THREAT: TODAY
AND IN
THE FUTURE
9. We currently assess that there is no
significant ballistic missile threat to the UK. We do not believe
that any of the states listed above currently has the capability
to reach the UK with ballistic missiles. Some states would, however,
be capable of targeting vital UK interests such as the Sovereign
Base Areas in Cyprus, or forces deployed close to them. We also
recognise that some of our NATO Allies are closer to regions of
ballistic missile proliferation and that the US has security commitments
in areas of the world that we do not.
10. We do not have any evidence that any
state with ballistic missiles currently has the intention specifically
to target them at the UK, or UK interests. Of course, intentions
can change quickly. We are therefore very concerned by the trends
described above in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missiles as a means of their delivery, and continue
to monitor developments closely.
11. We believe it is important to tackle
the potential threat with a comprehensive strategy that encompasses
diplomacy, conflict prevention, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation,
export controls, intelligence co-operation, law enforcement, deterrence
and defensive measures. We understand the role that active missile
defences can play as one part of this strategy and as part of
a balanced spectrum of defensive measures.
12. Predicting future developments in the
potential ballistic missile threat, in terms both of time scales
and of likely increases in missile range, is difficult. It will
depend not least on the effectiveness in the future of our comprehensive
strategy to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons
of mass destruction, the efforts we make with our Allies and friends,
and the efforts of the international community as a whole. It
will also depend on how technical capabilities develop within
individual states, on their capacity to procure expertise or complete
systems from proliferators, on a continued political and financial
commitent on the part of individual states to developing these
capabilities, and on their intentions. However, we can state that
were a country in the Middle East or North Africa to acquire a
complete ballistic missile system of sufficient range, a capability
to target the UK could emerge within the next few years.
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