APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND
REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE, SESSION 2001-02
1. The Government welcomes the opportunity to respond
to the Committee's report on The Threat from Terrorism.
The Government has considered carefully the Committee's report
and is grateful for the constructive and positive approach that
the Committee took in its enquiry and for the contribution this
report has made to the ongoing work on the New Chapter to the
Strategic Defence Review. This work is intended to ensure that
we have the right concepts, the right forces and the right capabilities
to meet the additional challenges we face from international terrorism
and other asymmetric threats.
2. This memorandum sets out below the Government's
observations on the main points in the Committee's report, ordered
by the main subject areas. A number of the issues in which the
Committee expressed a particular interest are the subject of its
further enquiry into Defence and Security in the UK following
the 11 September Terrorist Attacks and the Committee will
therefore have a further the opportunity to re-examine or cover
them in more detail.
3. Since receiving the Committee's report, the Ministry
of Defence has published (on 14 February) a public discussion
paper on the New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review. The
Government wants the widest possible audience to understand how
our thinking is evolving, and have the opportunity to express
opinions in time to influence the work and the final conclusions.
The Committee's input will be welcome.
11 SEPTEMBER
2001
"In the longer term these re-orientations
in the terms of the relationships between some of the major countries
and blocs of the world may well have more far-reaching consequences
than any military or other actions taken directly against terrorists
and terrorist organisations. Already the developments in relations
between the United States and Russia appear to have fundamentally
altered the terms of the debates on ballistic missile defence
and the future of NATO." [HC348-I para 14]
4. The Government agrees with the Committee's finding
that the events of 11 September and subsequently have had far
reaching consequences. Within the framework of the wide range
of work that is being undertaken across Government and internationally,
the Ministry of Defence, through its work on the New Chapter to
the Strategic Defence Review, is assessing how 11 September has
changed the strategic context as well as examining the roles of
key international organisations, such as NATO and the EU, and
our regional and bilateral relationships in the new environment.
5. The events of 11 September have had an effect
on many international organisations. The decision by NATO to invoke
Article 5 for the first time in its 52 year history was consistent
with its process of adaptation since the end of the Cold War.
The Alliance will continue to adapt its capabilities to reflect
changes in the security environment.
6. We welcome the fact that the US and Russia are
working together to establish a new strategic framework for their
relationship, based on openness, mutual trust and co-operation.
Both recognise the need to focus on tackling emerging threats,
including international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
THE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
"We fully endorse the actions that the Prime
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have taken both to declare
and to demonstrate our strong support for the United States. If
that support risks making the United Kingdom more of a target
for the sorts of people who attacked New York and Washington,
it is a risk which we must accept. We must take the necessary
steps to counter it; but we must not be dissuaded by it from doing
the right thing." [HC348-I para 47]
7. The Government welcomes the strong support expressed
by the Committee for its stance in the campaign against international
terrorism. The UK stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the United
States in line with our commitment to fight international terrorism.
The attacks on the United States represented an attack on the
free and civilised world. It is in all our interests to act.
The coalition has had significant successes in the
campaign. Our campaign objectives have been made clear from the
outset:
- to bring Usama Bin Laden and other Al Qaida leaders
to justice;
- to prevent Usama Bin Laden and the Al Qaida network
from posing a continuing terrorist threat;
- to this end to ensure that Afghanistan ceases
to harbour and sustain international terrorism and enables us
to verify that the camps where terrorists train have been destroyed;
- and to achieve a sufficient change in the Afghan
leadership to ensure that Afghanistan's links to international
terrorism are broken.
9. Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida have suffered significant
losses, but they still remain a threat and we shall therefore
continue our operations until that threat has been lifted. But
we have achieved the fourth objective and the third is within
our grasp. The welcome establishment of the Afghan Interim Authority
and the deployment of the International Security Assistance Force—in
which the UK is playing a leading role—paves the way towards
cementing both.
10. There remains a significant short-term risk of
further terrorist attacks, and we are conscious that our involvement
alongside the US could raise the profile of the UK as a potential
target. The Government had a wide range of measures in place prior
to 11 September to deal with terrorist threats and has put in
place further measures subsequently. The Government is clear that
the scale of the atrocities that we witnessed, in which UK citizens
were also attacked and killed, means that the opportunity we now
have to tackle international terrorism as a force for change in
the long term is for our own, as well as the common good.
"In conclusion, we can see no reason to dissent
from the general view of our witnesses, and others with whom we
have discussed these issues, that there is a continuing threat
to UK interests posed by the existence of organisations or groups
whose aim is to inflict mass casualties."
[HC348-I para 50]
11. The mechanism for establishing the specific threat
to the UK is co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office, through the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC) process. The lead Agency responsible
for assessment of the threat posed by terrorism to UK interests
at home and overseas is the Security Service. The MOD contributes
fully to this process.
12. The most recent example of threat intelligence
being acted upon led to the boarding of the MV NISHA on 21 December.
As the Committee is aware, while no suspicious substances were
found on the vessel, the Government believes it essential to maintain
its vigilance.
13. Whilst it can be said that the United States
and her interests abroad remain the primary target we do not rule
out the possibility that their allies are also a target, especially
the United Kingdom as a close ally in the fight against international
terrorism. Usama Bin Laden has publicly declared his intention
to attack UK as well as US targets in the Gulf. But it would be
wrong to say that we have evidence of a particular threat.
WEAPONS
OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
"Although, under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
declared stockpiles do not have to be destroyed until 2007, while
Russia retains its large holdings other countries may feel let
off the hook of destroying their own stockpiles. We are concerned
also that expertise may proliferate, but our more immediate concern,
is that weapons themselves may find their way into the hands of
terrorist groups" [HC348-I para 56]
14. The Government notes the Committee's concerns
about Russian chemical weapon stockpiles. The Chemical Weapons
Convention requires all such stockpiles to be destroyed by 2007,
with the possibility of extension to 2012. The Russian Government
has already requested an extension of the deadline to 2012. The
Government is concerned that substantial destruction of Russian
stockpiles has not yet begun, and that delays have either occurred
or are forecast to occur in the destruction programmes of other
states. We therefore announced in July 2000 that, as part of Spending
Review 2000, we would contribute up to £12M over the financial
years 2001/02, 2002/03 and 2003/04 towards high priority chemical
demilitarisation and biological non-proliferation projects in
Russia.
15. On 20 December 2001 in London the Defence Secretary
signed a bilateral treaty with Russia, which provides the essential
legal basis for UK assistance with the destruction of Russian
chemical weapon stocks. UK assistance will be focussed on industrial
infrastructure projects that will contribute to bringing the planned
US-funded chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye
into operation at an early date. Shchuch'ye will be the main facility
for the destruction of Russian nerve agent munitions - the Russian
Munitions Agency plans to use it to destroy over 4 million artillery
munitions from the Shchuch'ye and Kizner storage depots. The UK
Treaty with Russia also provides for third parties to channel
funding through the US assistance programme. Norway has decided
to follow this route in providing assistance at Shchuch'ye, and
it is likely that the EU will also do so.
16. Russia's chemical weapons stockpile is stored
in 7 storage depots, which are guarded by the Russian Armed Forces.
We understand that the US plans to provide funding to improve
security at two storage depots where nerve agent artillery munitions
are stored.
"The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
of 1972 prohibits the development, testing, production and stockpiling
of biological weapons¼
But it does not contain any mechanism for verifying that states
are complying with its terms. Attempts have been made to agree
a verification protocol. In July 2001 such a protocol seemed all
but agreed until the United States rejected it." [HC348-I
para 66]
17. The Government notes the Committee's comments
on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The Government
remains committed to strengthening the BTWC. At the 5th
BTWC Review Conference, which will reconvene in Geneva in November
2002, we will be working with all States Parties to agree a Final
Document which includes effective measures to strengthen the Convention.
We will publish shortly a Government Paper concerning the UK's
view on strengthening the BTWC.
"According to a recent report by the IAEA
'there are currently no comprehensive binding international standards
for the physical protection of nuclear material.' Radioactive
material is even less protected." [HC348-I para 69]
18. The Government recognises the Committee's concerns.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
and recommendations on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
and Nuclear Facilities provides a level of protection for nuclear
material when being transported internationally. In addition,
international agreement has been reached on Physical Protection
Objectives and Fundamental Principles and these have the advantage
of allowing each State to enact measures appropriate to its own
circumstances.
"Biological agents may be more difficult
to obtain or grow, but the international controls over them are
weak." [HC348-I para 73]
19. The Government notes the Committee's comments
on international controls over biological agents. The international
adoption of agreed standards for the protection of dangerous pathogens
has been one of the Government's aims in the negotiations to strengthen
the BTWC.
"Although we have seen no evidence that either
al Qaida or other terrorist groups are actively planning to use
chemical, biological and radiological weapons, we can see no reason
to believe that people, who are prepared to fly passenger planes
into tower blocks, would balk at using such weapons. The risk
that they will do so cannot be ignored." [HC348-I para 79]
20. The Government's objective is the elimination
of international terrorism as a force for change in international
affairs. The Government's campaign objectives, set out at paragraph
7 above, were given to Parliament on 15 October 2001. Usama bin
Laden and Al Qaida have demonstrated their intent to commit atrocities
and would not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction. That
is why the international community must continue with its vigorous
response and defeat international terrorism as well as bearing
down on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
21. The possibility of a CBRN attack on the UK has
been recognised for some time. The risk of such an attack, however,
remains low. Notwithstanding this, the Government agrees with
the Committee that the risk cannot be ignored. Indeed, it is because
of this that a considerable effort has been made to improve the
national capability to respond to a CBRN attack. One example of
this is the significant number of personnel who have received
additional training, with the assistance of the MOD, in CBRN protection
and mitigation techniques. These include the police and other
emergency service personnel who would be in the front line of
any response to an attack. In parallel, funding has been made
available through the Home Office and other Departments for the
procurement of additional equipment and countermeasures for the
emergency services and National Health Service.
"The Government's response to the attacks
of 11 September has also included steps to increase security in
the UK itself. Emergency legislation has been introduced in the
form of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill." [HC
348-I para 88]
22. The Government notes the Committee's reference
to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. The Bill has subsequently
become law and has strengthened the Government's ability to take
action against those seeking to develop, obtain or use chemical,
nuclear, biological or radiological weapons. It is now an offence
for anyone in the UK or a UK person abroad to assist in the overseas
development of chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. There
are new controls over laboratories and other premises handling
potentially dangerous pathogens and toxins. The security of the
nuclear industry has been enhanced and there are stronger sanctions
against those making damaging disclosures of sensitive information
on the security of nuclear sites (including military as well as
civil sites), nuclear material and proliferation-sensitive nuclear
technology. It is also an offence for anyone to use or threaten
to use a biological, chemical or radioactive substance to cause
serious harm.
NEW
CHAPTER TO
THE STRATEGIC
DEFENCE REVIEW
"Taken with the terms of reference set out
in the MoD's memorandum and the list of questions raised by the
Secretary of State, the widening of the SDR's geographical and
regional assumptions strike us as requiring a more fundamental
reappraisal of the SDR than is implied by the phrase 'a new chapter'".
[HC348-I para 101]
23. The Government has no plans to conduct a new
defence review. The Strategic Defence Review left us well placed
to meet the additional challenges we face from international terrorism,
conducted on a scale similar to the 11 September threats. We need
to keep a sense of proportion: but, while not everything needs
to change, the Government is not complacent and is undertaking
additional work to ensure that we have the right concepts, forces
and capabilities. The aim is to build on SDR assumptions and on
the broad direction that the SDR took. The New Chapter is about
ensuring that our Armed Forces have all the tools they need to
do the jobs they might be asked to do in future to prevent, tackle
and defend against the threat from international terrorism and
a range of other possible scenarios.
"We recommend that the MoD makes every effort
to keep to the timetable of Spring 2002 for the publication of
the new chapter for the SDR." [HC348-I paragraph 105]
24. The Government notes the Committee's recommendation
and expects, as it stated in its memorandum to the Committee dated
5 November 2001, "to be in a position to publish some conclusions
in the spring or early summer".
"From the evidence which we have received
so far we conclude, on a provisional basis, that we in the UK
will have to do more to focus our capabilities on defending our
own weak points. We shall return to this issue in our inquiry
into Defence and Security in the UK." [HC348-I para 110]
25. The Government notes the Committee's finding.
Dealing with terrorist acts within the UK falls within the operational
responsibility of the police. While the Armed Forces have a role
to play in domestic counter-terrorism, the development of preventative
measures, including threat assessment, rests with a wide range
of agencies and Departments who have the expertise and the resources
to ensure efficient security. There has never been any question,
however, of the Government's determination to provide the best
possible protection for the country, its citizens, interests and
infrastructure from available resources.
26. The MOD has provided the Committee with detailed
information on the improvements that have been made to our overall
capability to protect against terrorism and respond to it. Security
at key sites and economic key points is the responsibility of
a number of Departments whose work is co-ordinated by the Cabinet
Office.
"We agree that the Armed Forces have demonstrated
their capabilities in providing command and control assistance
in civil emergencies. But we are concerned that the present arrangements
for involving them were devised with civil emergencies in mind.
We remain to be convinced that they would prove adequate in the
event of a large scale terrorist attack. In particular we are
concerned to see clear, accountable and co-ordinated leadership
across government departments." [HC348-I para 124]
27. The Armed Forces have well developed command
and control capabilities which have been exercised, practised
and tested in the most demanding environments. In addition, the
logistic management capability and the wide range of other skills
within the Armed Forces can offer significant contributions to
the resolution of various crises, both civil and military. It
is for this reason that they have been used during recent civil
emergencies, such as last year's foot and mouth outbreak and floods.
28. Although existing contingency plans in place
were not designed specifically for events such as those of 11
September, their generic nature makes them flexible and adaptable
to new requirements. All those involved in developing the response
to civil emergencies are aware that it must be able to deal with
the worst case. The UK Government's review of civil emergency
planning arrangements, which will ensure that they are fully effective,
predated 11 September. The Ministry of Defence is playing a full
part in the review and would be a contributor to the response
should a major terrorist incident occur in the UK. The lead, however,
rightly falls to other agencies, departments and authorities that
are best able to respond in the first instance.
29. Regular Home Office exercises are conducted to
test mechanisms involved in counter terrorism. There is a major
exercise this month which will test a wide range of assets, mechanisms
and systems at all levels. Such exercises are invaluable in maintaining
the effectiveness of all those involved in the counter-terrorist
response.
"We believe that a review of the arrangements
for the provision of military assistance to the civil power should
be included in the further work on the SDR." [HC348-I para
125]
30. There are well-founded and tested procedures
for support from the Armed Forces to the civil authorities for
counter terrorism. But this support also goes wider: for example,
the Armed Forces have in the last 18 months responded to requests
from civil authorities for assistance with the fuel strikes, floods
and the foot and mouth outbreak.
31. The Ministry of Defence already has work in hand
through the New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review and is
seeking to address a range of questions, such as:
- How should we strike a balance between the defence
role in helping to protect the UK, and contributing to operations
against international terrorists and other asymmetric threats
overseas?
- Are there ways in which military support to the
civil authorities can be improved?
- Are there additional or enhanced roles for our
Reserve Forces (both in home defence and security and in overseas
operations)?
The Armed Forces of course already play an important
part in the defence of the homeland, but it must be recognised
that the lead for domestic security lies with the civil agencies—and
with the police in particular.
"We welcome the Government's openness to
reassessing the role of the Reserves. We have no doubt that they
are an under-used resource. We particularly draw attention to
the decision under the SDR to transfer the anti-nuclear biological
chemical weapons (NBC) capability from the Royal Yeomanry to a
regular unit. Because of the assessment of the threat for such
weapons at the time the principal task of this unit is the protection
of Armed Forces deployed overseas. Despite the Policy Director's
reservations about exposing the TA to such threats, we believe
that there are strong arguments for a NBC capability whose focus
would be attacks on and incidents in the UK." [HC348-I para
128]
33. The Government takes note of the Committee's
view that there should be a NBC capability whose focus would be
attacks on and incidents in the UK. The MOD provides a national
capability designed to make safe a discovered CBRN device. This
capability is permanently available in the UK, part-funded by
the Home Office, and combines MOD's military and scientific expertise.
The Department also works closely with the Home Office, emergency
services and other Departments and agencies to ensure that there
is an effective capability for dealing with hoax and suspect devices,
and on the detection of radiological, nuclear and other devices.
34. It is too soon to set out possible new roles
for the Reserves. The future role of the Armed Forces in
managing the results of a terrorist attack is under consideration
in the context of the New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review
and the Committee's advice will be considered. It would, however,
be inappropriate for the Armed Forces to attempt to duplicate
the roles of other agencies, such as the emergency and health
services.
"If the new chapter of the SDR is to propose
a capability for pre-emptive military action it must also ensure
that such action does not lead our forces to operate outside international
law." [HC348-I para 131]
35. The Government affirms its commitment to operate
within the framework of international law. The work is addressing
how we engage the causes of international terrorism in terms of
five broad conceptual aims: how we prevent the conditions that
allow international terrorists organisations to operate; how we
deter would-be attackers; how we coerce with military force would-be
attackers if other means fail; how we disrupt the activities that
support international terrorism; and, ultimately, how we destroy
active terrorist cells with military action.
OPENNESS
"We do not believe that concerns over creating
public fear or encouraging hoaxers are sufficient to justify failing
to provide balanced and accurate information to the public on
this issue. We shall consider how this should best be done in
our forthcoming inquiry" [HC348-I para 112]
"Taken together with the conclusion which
we have drawn that the role and capabilities of the special forces
will be another central element in the work on the SDR, the inclusion
of work on the question of 'specific intelligence against general
vulnerability' leads us to have serious doubts over the extent
to which the contents of the 'new chapter' can be openly discussed.
We await with interest to see how the MoD resolves this issue
in the consultation/discussion paper which it plans to publish
early next year" [HC348-I para 136]
36. The Government has been and will be as open and
realistic as it can be about the terrorist threat to the UK homeland.
But, as the Committee has noted, we must strike the right balance
between informing the public and creating unnecessary anxiety—itself
a key aim of international terrorism.
37. Since 11 September, the Government has made numerous
public statements setting out both the threat and our responses
to it. A good example of this has been the way in which we have
been encouraging a public debate about the work we are currently
undertaking in connection with the New Chapter to the Strategic
Defence Review. To help promote that debate we published on 14
February a discussion paper entitled "The Strategic Defence
Review: A New Chapter". This is available in public libraries
and on the internet. This provides an opportunity for members
of the public, members of Parliament and others with specific
interest or expertise to contribute.
38. The Government continues to place a high priority
upon the provision of timely, accurate public information, using
a wide range of communications tools.
SPECIAL
FORCES
"A greater focus on 'interdiction' against
terrorist threats could place special forces at the very heart
of future operations. In such circumstances, a sensible debate
on our military response to terrorism will have to deal more openly
and frankly with the size, role and utility on our special forces."
[HC348-I para 135]
39. The Government has in the past made it known
that the UK has Special Forces which, as well as their war-fighting
roles, are used in support of its counter-terrorist policy, and
to provide assistance in this area to the law enforcement agencies.
However, successive governments have adopted a policy of not commenting,
save in exceptional circumstances, on Special Forces matters.
The effectiveness of the Special Forces in the counter-terrorist
role depends on maintaining secrecy about their operations, methods,
capabilities (including numbers) and equipment. Moreover, we need
to protect their identities because they and their families are
at risk from terrorist groups. This therefore constrains what
we can say in public about our plans for Special Forces. However,
the Government believes there is scope for a general debate about
the utility and role of military forces in dealing with terrorist
threats in terms of how:
- We can try to prevent the conditions that
allow international terrorist organisations to operate, and help
less capable states build better capabilities to counter terrorism
themselves. And by contributing to peace support operations we
can prevent instability or assist in stabilisation. Where prevention
has failed we can assist in the post-conflict recovery, to help
create the conditions for stability. The UK has particular expertise
and experience in leading initial short duration peace support
operations in higher risk environments, encouraging others to
take over once the conditions for stabilisation have been set
(eg Macedonia in 2001).
- We can deter would-be attackers by making
sure that they and their supporters are aware of our capability,
readiness and willingness to act against them.
- We may need to coerce regimes and states
which harbour or support international terrorism if other means
have not dissuaded them. We are looking at a range of technologies
to see if they offer more effective and precise options.
- We can try to disrupt the activities that
support international terrorist groups, by interdicting their
sources and flows of materiel, finance and freedom of movement.
- And we might need, ultimately, to act to destroy
active terrorist cells with military action, such as find and
strike raids on key terrorist facilities which may be widely spread
geographically.
FUNDING/RESOURCES
"We may need more specialist and highly-trained
agile forces which can be made available at short notice. If interdiction
forces are to be an important component of the MoD's response
to the threat from terrorism, this issue needs to be tackled with
some urgency by the Department; as is highlighted by readiness
capability gaps already evident. [HC348-I para 134]
40. The Strategic Defence Review concluded that in
today's world we would need to be able to conduct "frequent,
often simultaneous and sometimes prolonged operations" overseas.
It recognised that rapid deployment is highly demanding, and places
a premium on the flexibility of our Armed Forces. Our discussion
paper on "The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter"
recognises the need to assess, after 11 September, whether our
planned capabilities are the right ones, and indicates that we
want to assure ourselves that we have the right shape and balance
of rapidly deployable forces, and that we are looking closely
at whether we need more of our forces at high readiness.
"Although this might seem encouraging, we
must not forget that our starting point is that the necessary
resources to implement all the commitments under the original
SDR are not yet available. Indeed, the MoD's Performance
Report 2000-01 noted that there remain many areas of
capability with weaknesses, with 'manpower and equipment shortages
... the biggest challenges'" [HC348-I para 138]
41. Progress on implementing the SDR has generally
been good, and operations, including in Kosovo and Sierra Leone,
have shown that we have been able to respond with militarily more
capable forces as a result of the changes we have made. Implementation
has, however, been complicated by a variety of factors, not least
the frequency and concurrency of recent crises, and more remains
to be done.
42. The quotation from The Ministry of Defence's
Performance Report 2000/01 refers only to the ability
of force elements to meet readiness targets. The report went on
to state that problem areas had been addressed, that solutions
are either in place or being sought, and that the training, sustainability,
and overall ability of force elements to meet readiness targets
improved marginally in 2000/01.
43. The Government has taken account of lessons learned
since the SDR and adjusted our planning accordingly. We will continue
to adapt our detailed plans for implementation to ensure that
they remain fully relevant in the light of experience and the
developing strategic context.
"We believe that, if it is to be our policy
to maintain a wide range of capabilities, it follows that we must
be prepared to pay for them. If we are to add a chapter to the
SDR, we must add the money to pay for it. The government should
therefore make an early commitment that it will find the necessary
extra money to fund those additional capabilities which may be
identified as necessary in the light of the attacks of 11 September."
[HC348-I para 141]
44. It is too early to speculate on possible resource
consequences of the work: we are not at that stage. Work to date
has been thinking through a set of policy and conceptual issues
and the Government will want to think through its priorities for
tackling terrorism through military and other means, including
diplomacy, intelligence, economic, financial, humanitarian and
aid policies. Priorities will be resolved in the normal way, including
through the Spending Review process. We are obviously making,
and have made, necessary urgent adjustments to our posture and
capabilities, both in the context of the military campaign and
of arrangements for the defence and security of the UK.
"The campaign against terrorism has been
described as three-pronged in that it includes military, diplomatic
and humanitarian initiatives. This three-pronged campaign must
be pursued both legitimately and relentlessly. We must not lose
our sense of the urgency and importance of this task in the months
ahead. We must not hesitate to take the necessary steps to protect
the UK and our interests overseas." [HC348-I para 144]
45. The Government notes the Committee's recommendation
and shares its sense of urgency and priority. In addition to military
levers, there is also scope for using political, economic, financial
and legal means—all these have already been and will continue
to be deployed as part of the campaign against international terrorism.
The Government will not relent and will continue to play a full
part in the international campaign against terrorism.
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