INTRODUCTION
1. Over the last two decades, successive Defence
Committees have monitored the MoD's performance in procuring equipment
and weapon systems, and have undertaken numerous inquiries on
specific programmes. Their reports over the years, and successive
Major Projects Reports, have highlighted a pattern of frequent
delays and cost escalation. The MoD's 1998 Strategic Defence Review
(SDR) made much of its 'smart procurement' (since retitled 'smart
acquisition'—paragraph 124) initiative, designed to tackle
these weaknesses. Our predecessors examined this initiative in
some detail in their report on the SDR.
2. With the introduction of annual defence equipment
debates in 1998, our predecessors put their monitoring of equipment
issues on a more systematic basis. They initiated annual inquiries,
based on a survey of major procurement projects. Their aim was
to monitor, and report progress on, a selection of the operationally
more significant procurement programmes in a way that could measure
the success of the smart procurement initiative, which would measure
the implementation of projects which were keystones of the SDR
strategy, and which could inform the House's annual defence equipment
debate.
3. Each year our predecessors' inquiries focussed
on those programmes at particularly important stages in their
development:
- In their first report[1]
in the series, in 1999, they examined the UK's then recent withdrawal
from the collaborative 'Horizon' frigate programme and its replacement
by a national Type-45 destroyer programme. They also examined
the vessel's Principal Anti-Air Missile System (PAAMS)—the
other major component of the aborted 'Common New Generation Frigate'
programme—which was to continue as a collaborative programme.
- Their second inquiry[2]
in 2000 focussed on the Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile
for the Eurofighter and the strategic air-lift programme, the
competitions for both of which had then just been decided, and
the Bowman communication system whose competition was then on
the brink of having to be relaunched.
- Our predecessors' third report[3]
in their series reviewed progress on: the Future Aircraft Carrier
and its Future Joint Combat Aircraft; the Advanced Short-Range
Air-to-Air Missile, intended for the Eurofighter and other aircraft;
the Roll-on Roll-off ships; and enhancements to the UK's precision-guided
bombing capability in the light of the lessons drawn from the
Kosovo conflict. The inquiry coincided with last year's general
election, however, and rather than producing a substantive report
the Committee had to content itself with putting the evidence
it had taken in the public domain before it might be lost at the
end of the Parliament.
4. We have decided in this Parliament to continue
this useful exercise, to monitor and report on a selection of
major equipment programmes. We will continue to track the progress
of important specific capabilities identified in the SDR, but
also the growing importance of particular military capabilities
and acquisition routes. Reflecting procedures established by the
previous Committee, our aim has been to produce a report to inform
the House ahead of this year's annual Defence Equipment debate.
Our starting point was to request an MoD memorandum, which we
publish in this report,[4]
covering the following programmes:
- Future Aircraft Carrier
- Future Joint Combat Aircraft (now planned to
be the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter)
- Type-45 destroyer
- Ro-Ro strategic sealift
- Bowman communications system
- Future Rapid Effects System
- Eurofighter
- 'Meteor' Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile
- Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile
- A400M strategic airlift
- Nimrod MRA4
- The follow-on to the cancelled Medium-Range TRIGAT
anti-tank missile
- Swiftsure and Trafalgar submarine update
- Five PFI projects
We also sought information from the Department on
their work on developing warship procurement strategies, which
had implications for the Type-45 destroyer and Future Carrier
programmes, and on the 'warship support modernisation initiative'.
5. We have focussed in this report on a subset of
these areas: warship procurement strategies, including their implications
for constructing the Type-45 destroyer and Future Carrier; the
warship support modernisation initiative; the use of PFIs for
acquiring particular equipment capabilities; and the Sea Harrier's
withdrawal from service. We also examined progress on some of
the projects covered by our predecessors' inquiries.
6. We took oral evidence from Sir Robert Walmsley
(Chief of Defence Procurement), Mr John Coles (Chief Executive
of the Warship Support Agency), Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup (Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability)), and finally Lord
Bach, Minister for Defence Procurement (who was accompanied by
our earlier witnesses).
7. Our session with Sir Jock Stirrup gave us the
opportunity to hear the views of a key player in the MoD's smart
acquisition initiative, only two months after he took up that
post. In the last Parliament the previous Committee took evidence
from three key MoD personnel soon after their appointment. Those
sessions resembled 'confirmation hearings', in that although they
were unable to exercise any approval role, the Committee sought
to examine what skills and philosophies the new officials hoped
to bring to the posts:
- Mr Tony Edwards, as the new head of the Defence
Exports Services Organisation in the MoD.[5]
The Committee examined MoD support for defence exports, which
initiated a wider debate on the costs and benefits of defence
exports more generally.
- Sir Keith O'Nions, as the MoD's new Chief Scientific
Adviser.[6] The Committee
examined his role in relation to trends in Research & Development
in the MoD and the public-private partnership for the then Defence
Evaluation and Research Agency (the subject itself of other inquiries
by our predecessors).[7]
- Sir Michael Boyce, when newly appointed as Chief
of the Defence Staff.[8]
We have determined in this Parliament to continue
the practice of taking evidence from personnel in significant
new appointments, and therefore welcomed this opportunity to have
a meeting with Sir Jock Stirrup. This is an area of select committee
work that was included in suggested core tasks for committees,
proposed by the Modernisation Committee[9]
and agreed by the House recently.[10]
We expect the MoD to notify us of significant new appointments
for our possible examination. Much of the evidence we took from
Sir Jock in this inquiry was concerned with the early withdrawal
of the Sea Harrier, which we discuss later in this report. But
first we examined other maritime matters.
1 Eighth Report, Session 1998-99, Major Procurement
Projects Survey: The Common New Generation Frigate Programme,
HC 544 Back
2
Tenth Report, Session 1999-2000, Major Procurement Projects,
HC 528 Back
3
Ninth Report, Session 2000-01, Major Procurement Projects,
HC 463 Back
4
Ev 66-120 Back
5
Second Report, Session 1998-99, The Appointment of the new
Head of Defence Export Services, HC 147 Back
6
Sixth Report, Session 1999-2000, The Appointment of the new
Chief Scientific Adviser, HC 318 Back
7
Sixth Report, Session 1997-98, The Defence Evaluation Research
Agency, HC 621; Ninth Report, Session 1998-99, Defence
Research, HC 616; Ninth Report, Session 1999-2000, The
Future of DERA, HC 462; Fifth Report, Session 2000-01, The
Draft Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Trading Fund Order
2001, HC 289 Back
8
Minutes of Evidence, HC 298-i, 2000-01 Back
9
First Report of the Modernisation Committee, Session 2001-02,
Select Committees, HC 224 Back
10
HC Deb, 14 May 2002, c715 Back
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