Memorandum submitted by British Nuclear
Fuels Ltd (BNFL)
Government should decide on an overall policy
for radioactive waste management which recognises:
— that nuclear wastes are currently
managed safely;
— that prolonged safe storage, for
up to 100 years, is a viable approach to the management of intermediate
and high level wastes, whether fuel is reprocessed or not;
— that geological disposal is advocated
internationally as the most appropriate "final" solution
and that barriers tend to be socio-political and socio-economic,
not technological;
— the need to manage legacy waste on
a commercial footing;
— a clear distinction between legacy
wastes and those associated with new and replacement nuclear generation;
— the environment and trade benefits
which ILW substitution would deliver;
— the need for clarity for future nuclear
generators in respect of their obligations for spent fuel management
costs; and
— that the absence of final agreement
of a long term strategy for waste management should not be a barrier
to future nuclear business or new reactor build.
There are a number of inter-connected steps
for safely managing radioactive waste ranging from production
and storage, retrieval and packaging, production during decommissioning
operations and finally implementation of the selected long term
management step (currently disposal). The DEFRA consultation document
focuses heavily on the final management step and raises associated
issues which BNFL agrees warrant full public debate. This inevitably
will be time consuming, as demonstrated in other countries such
as Finland. However, BNFL believe that there are difficulties
with waste management policy as it is currently interpreted by
regulators and others and as it is applied in practice in the
nuclear industry. These aspects have been subject to scrutiny
recently, For example the Sixth Report ("The Environment
Agency") of the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs
Committee recommended in May 2000 "we strongly urge the Government
to produce as soon as possible, in consultation with the Agency
a clear statement of regulatory policy and practice in the area
of radioactive substances and waste".
BNFL's submission concentrates on this lack
of regulator principles, criteria and methodology.
1. THE TIMETABLE
OF, AND
PROGRESS MADE
THUS FAR,
IN THE
CONSULTATION EXERCISE
— Apart from "final" disposal,
there are aspects of waste management policy which Government
needs to clarify on an earlier timescale. For example, DEFRA draft
guidelines on the regulation of radioactive discharges, where
primacy is given to progressive reduction, are already being implemented
by the Environment Agency and have the potential to detrimentally
impact upon the UK's ability to deal safely with legacy radioactive
wastes.
— A seven year timetable for "non-disposal"
issues is too protracted even allowing for the fact that "getting
it right" is more important than meeting an arbitrary deadline;
it perpetuates uncertainty over the appropriate strategy for dealing
with legacy waste and limits the certainty which future owners/operators
of nuclear facilities (existing and new) can have regarding their
obligations in waste management matters.
— The perceived agreement to ILW substitution
should be implemented at the latest at the end of Stage One of
the consultation (2002) since it will realise genuine environmental
and trade benefits.
1.1 International experience (from Finland,
Sweden, Switzerland and USA as well as elsewhere) shows that getting
acceptance for disposal takes considerable time. Experience also
shows that the probability of success is greatly improved if there
is a clear and transparent process with clear associated responsibilities
and a "road map" or plan such that progress can be easily
recorded. The DEFRA document recognises these factors; in particular
there is a proposal for research to examine the feasibility of
waste management options. However, BNFL believes that DEFRA should
recognise at the outset that only sufficient information should
be gathered in order to firm up on future policy. Based on international
experience, the expectation must be that disposal is selected
as the preferred long-term management option. In such circumstances
there is little point in developing all options to an equal and
detailed degree.
1.2 Although it is recognised that it is
more important to "get it right" than to meet arbitrary
timescales, BNFL believe that the proposed timetable is too protracted
from a short term waste management perspective and will generate
continuing uncertainty over the appropriate direction for waste
management.
1.3 During the period to 2007 many key decisions
on the approach to retrieving and packaging legacy waste in particular
will be needed, not only at BNFL Sellafield but almost certainly
at other nuclear sites such as Dounreay and Aldermaston. Although
in principle there are agreed policies and working arrangements
to guide these decisions, in practice the underlying approach
which has traditionally been deployed by the regulators, NII and
EA, can be conflicting.
1.4 The key driver for NII is to ensure
that waste is managed in such a way as to reduce on-site risk
and hazard to acceptable levels. For EA, its driver is to reduce
off-site discharges, continually restricting what is permitted,
not on safety grounds but on public acceptability. Since it is
inevitable that the retrieval and processing of legacy waste will,
in its own right, generate discharges, these conflicting positions
can hinder progress and could ultimately make dealing with legacy
wastes in particular a technical impossibility. This in turn will
prolong the storage of raw waste in old facilities (currently
over 40 years) for longer than should be considered acceptable.
1.5 The fundamental difficulty is that there
is an inappropriate and inconsistent framework for the regulation
of the nuclear industry which requires the industry to understand
and navigate between potentially conflicting regulatory requirements.
The potential consequences are serious and include:
— failure to achieve cost-effectiveness
in the allocation of resources for environmental health and safety
improvements;
— imposition of substantial additional,
but unwarranted, costs for the UK economy; and
— diversion of scarce resources which
could be used for the reduction of more significant environmental
risks or for meeting other social needs.
1.6 These difficulties stem from the fundamental
conflict underlying the principles of regulation adopted by the
NII/HSE (the 1992 Tolerability of Risk (ToR) approach) and the
current proposals for the regulation of radioactive substances
by the Environment Agency published by DEFRA:
— NII/HSE ToR, and its extension to
non-nuclear industries in "Reducing Risk; Protecting People",
has been thoroughly examined at public inquiries, has been subject
of wide consultation, and is internationally recognised;
— ToR delineates three quantified regions
of risk:
— the highest is "intolerable"
where there is no justification on any grounds;
— the lowest is "broadly acceptable",
within which, provided precautions are maintained it would be
unreasonable to insist on expensive further improvements; and
— a "tolerable" central
region, where risk is accepted if its reduction is either impracticable
or if the cost of reduction is disproportionate to the reduction
in risk (BPM/ALARP);
— EA "risk regions" (does
limits, site constraints, source constraints, implied long-term
limiting dose and, doses "of no regulatory concern")
are not consistent with those used in the NII/HSE ToR system;
— EA require discharges to be reduced,
far below values which would correspond to dose (risk) limits
or constraints and with little or no regard to cost benefit; and
— DEFRA's draft guidance to EA emphasises
that where the legal requirement to achieve BPM conflicts with
a requirement to progressively reduce discharges and discharge
limits then the latter takes primacy, apart from safety.
1.7 In addition to the potential conflicts
between limiting discharges whilst reducing on-site hazards, there
is a further conflict. This relates to balancing the short term
hazard and risks associated with raw storage of legacy wastes
with the desire to achieve low risks in the very long term once
waste has been consigned to a deep repository (100,000 years plus).
Without a specific location, design and safety case for a repository,
it is inevitable that the current packaging requirements "imposed"
by the long-term are very conservative. Meeting these requirements,
or in some instances demonstrating that these requirements can
be met, can significantly delay the retrieval and packaging of
legacy wastes thus prolonging the hazards, risks and costs from
old stores. The balance between short and long term risks must
be re-evaluated in a transparent, holistic way.
1.8 With respect to storage, the nuclear
industry has already proved that it can both store spent fuel
and recycle it. Similarly it has demonstrated that the resulting
wastes can be conditioned into safe forms for storage over many
decades (and arguably over centuries) in modern stores ie Interim
Safe Storage. All current operational waste arisings (HLW, ILW
and LLW) at Sellafield will be processed through modern plants
for storage in modern stores or disposal at Drigg. The implementation
of this strategy is not considered to be an issue. Where difficulties
are encountered is in deciding on the immediate end point following
retrieval and processing of the legacy wastes which have been
stored, in some instances, for over 40 years.
1.9 In the event of accidents, the robust
design of stores and the waste products themselves, provide environmental
protection. The stores are high integrity structures, designed
to be resistant to accidental impacts and fires. For example at
Sellafield they are designed to withstand seismic events and are
generally heavily shielded with reinforced concrete walls, typically
greater than one metre thick. Tests in the USA have illustrated
the ability of thick reinforced concrete walls to resist aircraft
impacts and therefore demonstrate that modern stores are very
resistant to energetic impact. Furthermore, full scale trials
on encapsulated waste forms have shown that the effects of a fire
at 1,000°C produce insignificant degradation.
1.10 Interim safe stores already exist and
provide evidence that wastes associated with nuclear power can
be cost-effectively and safely managed whilst the disposal issues,
or other long term solutions, are resolved—even though this
may be many decades into the future. Hence, nuclear waste should
not be a "show-stopping" issue as far as the Energy
Policy Review is concerned.
1.11 The management of over 40 years worth
of legacy wastes should be viewed as a national issue since the
wastes in question have arisen from past national decisions to
have an independent nuclear deterrent and a programme of Magnox
nuclear power stations with subsequent reprocessing of fuel. Those
responsible for the physical day to day management of this legacy
recognise the need to make timely progress to improve the current
situation. The seven year delay, implicit in the proposed consultation,
before a clear coherent UK policy is established, is potentially
damaging to the short and medium term actions which must be taken
to ensure the safe management of legacy wastes.
1.12 In addition to the difficulties which
a seven year programme would create for legacy waste it could
also prolong a debate on waste substitution which has already
been underway for over six years and for which BNFL believes there
is both strong independent support and significant support from
customers. Activity in waste arising from overseas fuel reprocessing
will be returned; the debate is entirely on what form the returned
activity will take:
— HMG, acting on the advice of RWMAC,
has already endorsed, within an extensive range of all credible
scenarios, that there would be no net detriment to the UK environment
from ILW substitution. By offering ILW substitution, the UK would
not be foregoing options about how to deal with its own wastes,
be this long-term storage or eventual disposal arrangements. Furthermore,
BNFL believes ILW substitution to be the Best Practical Environmental
Option for implementing waste return for overseas reprocessing
contracts;
— in Cm 2919, the Government noted
that the LLW and ILW retained in the UK as a result of substitution
"represent only a small proportion of the volumes of wastes
of domestic origin and do not create any novel waste management
problems". BNFL firmly believes therefore that the small
incremental portion is likely to be within the error band associated
with estimates of the total UK waste inventory. Therefore any
difference in assessed environmental impact upon any credible
long term waste management strategy would not be significant and
would not impact upon the strategy eventually adopted arising
from the consultation process;
— The Commons Trade and Industry Select
Committee's 11th Report, July 1998, recommended that: "It
is important that the question of substitution be recognised as
having significant trade implications, and as being very much
more than a technical or scientific issue";
— in addition to a long period of uncertainty
being a difficulty within the UK, it also creates major uncertainty
for BNFL's overseas customers;
— a number of BNFL's overseas customers
have confirmed a keen interest in the implementation of waste
return by substitution; and
— BNFL believes that the link between
ILW substitution and the availability of an ILW repository within
a 25 year timeframe should be removed quickly.
1.13 As part of the current waste management
consultation DEFRA has requested views on "the link between
waste substitution and the availability of a long term management
strategy". BNFL urgently requests HMG to give its approval
for the Company to offer unconditional and irrevocable substitution
of ILW (as well as the currently approved LLW substitution) on
an early timescale in order to enable BNFL to realise genuine
environmental and trade benefits. The seven year timescale for
the consultation process, if it were to preclude early resolution
of the ILW substitution issue, would very likely jeopardise achievement
of the potential trade benefits. Therefore, BNFL strongly urges
separation of the ILW substitution issue from the remainder of
the consultation process and its early resolution.
2. WHAT DIFFICULTIES
ARISE FROM
CURRENT RADIOACTIVE
WASTE POLICY,
INCLUDING CONSIDERATION
OF WHAT
SHOULD BE
DEFINED AS
WASTE
— The hazard reduction driver for retrieval
and treatment of legacy wastes and the pressures to reduce off-site
discharges, are in conflict.
— The programme for short term hazard
reduction for legacy wastes could be jeopardised if all the (theoretical)
very long term requirements for deep disposal have to be resolved
before any progress can be made; a phased approach is essential.
— ILW substitution should be confirmed
quickly, after stage one of the consultation exercise.
— There is a suggestion that some plutonium
should be declared as a waste—it should not be. BNFL however
realises that there is debate about this issue and that for planning
purposes it may, on balance, be appropriate to consider in outline
what the long-term consequences of future policy changes in this
area might be.
2.1 BNFL adheres to the well-established
regulatory system for radiological protection, which has been
developed within an international framework. The UK's Health and
Safety law and requirements for environmental control all rely
upon the principle of proportionality, which requires that action
taken is commensurate with the risks involved. This principle
requires a balance to be struck between a reduction in risk and
the practicality and cost of the measures to reduce it.
2.2 BNFL is committed to an Environmental
Impact Strategy that is justified on health and safety, science,
environment and economic grounds. This offers the best overall
way forward in terms of the health and safety of our workforce,
the general public and the environment.
2.3 BNFL believes that there are aspects
of proposed regulation and legislation that are not "joined-up",
consistent or logical. A transparent, quantified evaluation of
the balance of benefit and detriment would enable both the Government
and the public to appreciate the full implications of any policy
or regulatory decision.
2.4 This is particularly the case for decisions
involving large spend for small health, safety or environmental
benefit, since these have potential impacts upon the national
economy, and there is a real danger of inappropriately focusing
the nation's resources.
2.5 The majority of the Sellafield facilities
are the result of two national strategic programmes, namely the
independent nuclear deterrent and the nuclear electricity generation
using the Magnox fuel cycle. Many of these facilities contain
potentially hazardous radioactive waste (liquids, solids and sludges)
from these programmes. This waste will have to be retrieved, conditioned
and consigned to appropriate long-term storage. These activities
will increasingly dominate Sellafield operations and will inevitably
result in some liquid and aerial discharges.
2.6 It is of national importance that legacy
wastes are retrieved and conditioned in a timely, safe and effective
manner. The primary driver for legacy management must be hazard
and risk reduction and progress must not be constrained by overly
restrictive discharge limits or over conservative waste specifications
for disposal.
2.7 The current formal policy, as defined
in Cm 2919 does not create difficulties. However, difficulties
are introduced by various regulatory interpretations and published
guidelines. As described in item 1 above there are inconsistencies
between NII and EA:
— the EA Explanatory Document to assist
public consultation on future regulation of Sellafield discharges
proposes that discharge reduction should take primacy in the regulation
of the site. BNFL do not consider that the EA proposals are either
risk based or proportionate and as such we consider that they
will potentially restrict BNFL's ability to undertake retrieval
and conditioning of legacy wastes in a timely and efficient manner;
and
— the regulation of Sellafield should
be risk based, aligning with the HSE's Tolerability of Risk methodology
and proportionate (ie the measures and resources committed to
reducing risk should be proportionate to the likely benefits achieved).
2.8 With regard to separated UK plutonium
product, of which there will be about 100 tonnes by 2010, (equivalent
to over 700 million barrels of oil in energy terms) the suggestion
has been made by the House of Lords Select Committee that a proportion
of it should be declared a waste and then packaged accordingly.
Although this is not current Government Policy it has a major
impact in conditioning the thinking of the Regulators and other
stakeholders and can bring BNFL into sharp conflict with other
organisations. Despite these difficulties, BNFL is firmly of the
view that:
— the UK stockpile of separated plutonium
represents a considerable financial and technological investment
in a significant potential future energy resource;
— having invested significantly to
create this potential source of energy it appears to be illogical
to invest again to convert it to a waste form without at least
extracting some benefit from it. The waste form has not yet been
defined and immobilisation has technical, economic and political
uncertainties. In contrast, MOX fuel is well established and has
been used safely for over 30 years with more than 1,500 tonnes
HM MOX fuel produced worldwide;
— it does not appear to be sensible
to declare a valuable nuclear fuel such as plutonium as a waste
during a period when there is an ongoing debate about energy policy,
including nuclear energy;
— declaring plutonium as a waste and
packaging it as such, will deny future generations access to a
very considerable energy resource, in direct conflict with the
principles of sustainability;
— MOX fuel, after use in a reactor,
could be considered to be a suitable waste form for long term
storage and disposal or a future energy resource following further
recycle; and
— further, two AP1,000 reactors built
to replace the current Magnox fleet would generate electricity
and use the plutonium available at 2010 in about 30 years. Compared
to the cost of direct conversion to waste, this would result in
a net financial benefit of about £1 billion to the UK.
2.9 Technically, all of the UK's separated
plutonium stocks could be made suitable for fabrication as MOX
fuel for reactor use; it is a question of the degree of work needed
to bring it to satisfactory condition for such fabrication. The
pre-treatment may be unacceptable in terms of hazard incurred
and hence cost. BNFL therefore, recognises that there is a need,
in any long term management plan to consider, alternative ways
of dealing with such material.
2.10 As with plutonium, there are now suggestions
that some uranium should be declared and treated as waste. BNFL
considers that to take such a step would be to foreclose potential
future business options when there is no overriding necessity
to do so now. To date, over 15,000 tU has been recycled into fresh
fuel in the UK and a number of overseas customers are making arrangements
for recycle of their own material. Meanwhile all uranium, whether
from Magnox or Thorp reprocessing or from the enrichment process,
is stored in safe, monitored and retrievable form. In the UK there
is no agreement on what form any uranium which may be declared
as waste would need to take in order to make it compatible with
current UK disposal concepts.
3. THE IMPACT
THAT FUTURE
DECOMMISSIONING OF
NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS, ANY
CONSTRUCTION OF
NEW PLANTS
AND THE
COMMENCEMENT OF
MOX PRODUCTION AT
SELLAFIELD WILL
HAVE ON
RADIOACTIVE WASTE
POLICY
— The strategy for decommissioning
nuclear reactors should continue to be based on a balanced view
of many factors (such as safety, environmental, financial).
— Some parts of nuclear stations will
be decommissioned early whereas other parts will be deferred to
give quantifiable environmental and safety benefits.
— A successor for Drigg will be required
and this should be seen as a national (not a BNFL) issue.
— Modern reactors generate significantly
less waste than the existing Magnox and AGR fleets.
— It would be wrong for legacy waste
to colour the positive contribution which modern reactor designs
can make to environmental issues and energy policy.
— A single new LWR would only increase
existing/committed waste volumes by about 1 per cent.
— There is a need for clarity for future
nuclear generators in respect of their obligations for spent fuel
management costs.
— The production of MOX fuel only marginally
increases the quantities of wastes generated in the UK and does
not pose any new technical challenges.
Decommissioning of nuclear power plants
3.1 BNFL performs a rigorous analysis of
potential decommissioning strategy options for its reactor sites.
In selecting our preferred option we balance a wide range of relevant
safety, environmental, technical, regulatory, socio-political
and financial factors as mentioned in paragraphs 3.15 to 3.32
of the DEFRA consultation document. It is vitally important however,
that provided safety can be maintained, no single issue should
dominate the selection of an acceptable strategy, nor should relevant
issues and criteria be ignored.
3.2 The resultant strategy involves a mixture
of extensive early dismantling of some facilities as well as some
deferred dismantling. A consistent approach for decommissioning
BNFL power stations has been developed for use across all BNFL
stations. Since reactors are extremely robust structures whose
activity is dominated by short lived radionuclides (~ five years
half-life) it is possible and beneficial to defer dismantling
for some decades. This allows radioactive decay to reduce the
absolute quantity of waste and avoids the use of complex remote
dismantling techniques. In contrast, for fuel cooling ponds and
other active facilities, where the dominant radioactivity has
a relatively long half-life (~ 30 years), there is little radiological
benefit to be gained from deferral, so dismantling will proceed
soon after reactor shut-down
3.3 Reactor decommissioning generates both
LLW and ILW. Significant quantities of LLW will arise after the
expected closure date of Drigg (about 2050) reinforcing the statement
in paragraph 3.3 of the DEFRA document that a replacement for
Drigg will need to be found. This is not a BNFL responsibility
but should be viewed as a national issue which needs to be addressed
as part of the policy review.
3.4 With respect to ILW, there is presently
no disposal route and a timescale for its availability is uncertain.
In BNFL's view, this reinforces the opinion that, where ILW is
already in a passively safe state, eg reactors, there is no benefit
in dismantling such structures prior to an ILW route becoming
available. Although the reactors could be dismantled before a
repository becomes available, the resulting packaged waste would
still need to be stored, in effect merely transferring the waste
from an existing passively safe form to another form which may
ultimately prove not to be the required form for long term management.
Construction of new (power) plants
3.5 A modern LWR reactor generates significantly
less operational waste than Magnox or AGR reactors. It would also
generate less decommissioning waste.
3.6 Because of these much reduced waste
quantities, a single modern LWR, over its projected lifetime,
will generate less than about 1 per cent of the total UK ILW which
will need to be managed. Such small additional quantities of waste
will also be similar in nature (physical/chemical/radiochemical)
to the existing wastes and hence will not present any new technical
challenges.
3.7 The decommissioning of a modern LWR
will also be simpler than the equivalent process for older reactors.
The technology and experience of decommissioning reactors and
other facilities, safely and to the satisfaction of commercial
customers have already been demonstrated.
3.8 The existing legacy wastes have arisen
because of decisions taken in the past for the UK to have an independent
nuclear deterrent and subsequently that it would have a power
programme using Magnox reactors which in turn gave a fuel cycle
dependant on reprocessing.
3.9 It would be wrong for the legacy of
the past to colour the positive contribution which modern nuclear
designs can make to global environmental issues and future UK
energy policy. The incremental wastes created by replacement reactor
plant would only add marginally to the legacy of nuclear wastes
already being stored, treated and conditioned in the UK. A clear
waste management policy is needed in order to create a clearly
understood playing field for all participants in the construction,
ownership and operation of future nuclear stations. This will
allow plants to be built and run as efficiently and effectively
as possible.
3.10 Given the expected life of modern reactors
(at least 40 years) a financial approach similar to that in the
USA could be used to help provide certainty about future liabilities.
The US Department of Energy (DoE) system levies a small sum per
kilowatt-hour of energy produced. The DoE use this fund to take
and deal with the long-term management and disposal of the spent
fuel arising from USA power stations.
Commencement of MOX production
3.11 The operation of SMP and the production
of MOX fuel using plutonium separated by the reprocessing of overseas
fuel, should be seen as a component of the solution to the issue
of plutonium disposition. It strengthens the arguments presented
above in paragraph 2.8 that plutonium should not be declared a
waste.
3.12 When the Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP)
is fully active it will only generate small quantities of ILW
(about half of one per cent of all the waste to be managed in
total in the UK). The waste types which the plant will generate
are not new and such waste types already exist and are being safely
processed or stored in other facilities at Sellafield. It should
also be recognised that these waste types have been generated
in the past from the MOX Demonstration Facility and other plutonium
plants and that in all cases the encapsulated waste products have
been accepted as meeting currently perceived requirements for
disposal.
3.13 As with wastes from any future new
reactor build, the wastes from SMP:
— are very small by comparison to existing
and committed wastes;
— are of the same type as existing
wastes;
— will be managed using existing facilities
and technologies; and
— will not create any new issues for
their longer term management.
BNFL
12 November 2001
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