Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report


The Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed to the following Report:—



1. For the past 60 years, the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States have been close, productive and friendly: the 'special relationship'. At certain times during that period—as the focus of American foreign policy shifted, as the United Kingdom's relations with Europe developed, and as the cold war thawed out—the relationship with the US was perceived as being more or less special than at other times, but throughout the latter half of the twentieth century it endured.

2. The relationship is founded on shared history, shared values and shared interests. While the United States has been proud to be seen as a new country, where peoples of all nations are able to make their homes, to become Americans, and to contribute to American society, it remains a nation with deep roots in the English language and in British cultural, social, commercial, legal and political traditions. These roots form the basis of the relationship, but no less important has been the common cause made by the political leadership and by the people of both countries in response to the many challenges which have faced them over the years. The relationship has been special because it is a forward-looking relationship, as much concerned with building the future as it is has been built on the past. In the early years of the twenty-first century, it is becoming more important to both countries.

3. In this Report, we consider a series of specific issues which we believe are of particular importance within the wider British-US relationship. All of these were high on the agenda before the events of 11 September, although some of them have acquired greater significance or urgency since then. Below, we set out the background to the inquiry and discuss the impact of the September attacks on the United States, before examining a range of multilateral issues, including: the United Nations; missile defence; arms control; NATO; the European Union; and regional conflicts. We then consider two bilateral questions: BBC broadcasts to the United States; and the United Kingdom's representation in the US, including trade promotion. These are not the only issues of importance between the two countries, but they do represent key areas of responsibility for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which it is this Committee's duty to monitor.


4. This Report is the product of our first major inquiry in the new Parliament. On 18 July 2001, at our initial meeting following the Committee's re-establishment after the June 2001 general election, we chose to inquire into British-US Relations. We reached this decision, not because we had identified any particular problem or difficulty with the relationship, but because there is no more important relationship for the United Kingdom, and therefore no more appropriate inquiry with which to begin our work in the new Parliament. The United States is the United Kingdom's foremost political and military ally, its single greatest trading partner,[1] its largest source of investment,[2] its largest recipient of investment,[3] and the world's sole remaining superpower. Notwithstanding Britain's membership of the European Union, the United Kingdom's diplomatic and marketing operations in the United States constitute by far the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's most important single overseas operation.

5. There was a further factor which weighed heavily with us when we considered our programme of work for the new Parliament. In January 2001, a new US President, George W Bush, took office, with a new administration. There was much talk of a new foreign policy, even of a new era of unilateralism.[4] The decision by the United States to reject the Kyoto Protocol on climate change[5] was interpreted as an early signal that the new administration was going to give priority to its own interests. The President's earliest foreign visits were to Mexico and to Ottawa, while his first visit outside the Americas was to Madrid.[6] As recently as 5 September, President Bush spoke of the United States as having "no more important relationship in the world than the one we have with Mexico."[7] The focus of US foreign policy was shifting: it seemed to many that the Middle East peace process was no longer a priority,[8] but missile defence was.[9]

6. Not everyone shared these concerns, and it is important to note that the Prime Minister visited the United States as early as February 2001 and that President Bush visited the United Kingdom in July.[10] Whether or not the concerns were justified, we thought it important to take an early opportunity to discuss them with the governments and others on both sides of the relationship. Our terms of reference for the inquiry into British-US Relations were "to inquire into relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, and the implications of US foreign policy for United Kingdom interests." We could not have predicted in July just how relevant to the United Kingdom's immediate foreign policy priorities our inquiry would become.


7. The terrible events of 11 September occurred during a Parliamentary recess. Parliament was recalled for a sitting on Friday 14 September. The Committee also met that day. Our first concern was for the victims of the outrage, and their families. Reflecting that concern, our Chairman wrote to his counterparts in the United States House of Representatives and Senate, and to the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, expressing our sympathy and assuring them of our support. We then had to decide whether to continue with our inquiry or to postpone it.

8. We decided the inquiry should continue. It was already clear, even days after the tragedy, that the United Kingdom and the United States were working closely and effectively together. The relationship was going to be of greater importance than ever, and our inquiry had assumed an even greater relevance and urgency than it had previously.

9. We therefore continued with our already-made plans to visit New York and Washington DC. In New York, we held valuable discussions with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan, and other key people in the UN. We discussed in detail the work of the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations, and of the Consulate-General in New York, which is responsible for trade and investment promotion throughout the United States. We visited Ground Zero, to pay our respects to those who lost their lives or their loved ones, and to witness at first hand the terrible aftermath of the events of 11 September. This helped us to understand in a very direct manner the suffering of the people of New York and of the United States as a whole and their gratitude for the support given them by the people of the United Kingdom.

10. In Washington, we held meetings in the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and Congress. Wherever we went, we were left in no doubt of the high importance which Americans attach to their alliance with the United Kingdom. While the focus of our discussions was, inevitably, greatly affected by the events of 11 September, we were able to have exchanges on the full range of issues relevant to our inquiry. A list of those whom we met is appended to this Report;[11] we are grateful to them all.

11. We also received written evidence, most of which is printed with this Report, and heard oral evidence from Professor Michael Clarke, of Kings College London, from Professor Fred Halliday of the London School of Economics, from Mr James Rubin, former US Assistant Secretary of State, and from the Rt hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and officials.


12. It was unclear in mid-September whether the United States and its allies were about to commit themselves to a lengthy campaign against terrorism, or—if they were about to commit themselves to such a campaign—what form it would take. By November, the position was much clearer: there was a campaign; it was likely to be long; and it was likely to have several aspects. These aspects include not only military operations, but also those to do with humanitarian aid, homeland defence, financial measures and others. As the Foreign Affairs Committee, we are responsible for scrutinising the policy and work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and we are therefore conducting an inquiry into Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism. The inquiry will last as long as the campaign lasts and we hope to report to the House from time to time, as the situation requires.[12]

13. For the inquiry into British-US Relations, this means that various matters which at the time of preparing this Report are to the fore in that relationship, such as the international coalition against terrorism, the need to achieve peaceful solutions to regional conflicts which have a bearing on the progress of the campaign against terrorism (particularly that in the Middle East), and the requirement to build stable political structures in Afghanistan—on all of which the United States and the United Kingdom are working closely together—will be covered here, but may be dealt with in greater detail in later Reports. We have been concerned in this Report not to lose sight of important bilateral and multilateral issues which have been and will most likely continue to be important aspects of British-US Relations before and after the campaign against terrorism.


14. In its memorandum of evidence to the Committee, the FCO set out its current (i.e., as at October 2001) objectives as follows:

i    To work with the US and others to defeat terrorism world-wide.

ii    To ensure, in working for a secure United Kingdom within a more stable and peaceful world, that the US is supportive of UK security objectives, including policies towards Northern Ireland, enlargement and modernisation of NATO, the European Security and Defence Policy, Russia, the Balkans, Middle East problems and UN Security Council expansion; and that Missile Defence is pursued in a way which protects UK interests and minimises divisions within NATO.

iii    To enhance the competitiveness of companies in the UK by sales to, and investment in, the US and by attracting a high level of quality direct investment from the US.

iv  In seeking increased UK prosperity through a strengthened international economic order, to maintain US support for a new, broad-based, liberalising Trade Round; to prevent trade disputes between the EU and the US damaging the wider relationship; to agree more liberal air services arrangements with the US; to minimise the effect of new US legislation affecting UK financial sector interests; to improve co-operation on competition issues; to secure a new Double Taxation Agreement; and to promote UK business in energy, environmental and other technologies, not least through increased co-operation and technology partnerships with the US.

v    In working for a strong international community and hence improved quality of life world-wide, to secure US policies supportive of UK bilateral and multilateral action to promote democracy, good governance, good health, human rights and the rule of law, and to counter the illegal narcotics trade; to work with the US for action on climate change, environmental integrity and sustainable development; and to secure moratoria on the death penalty in US States.

vi  To influence decisions and actions which affect UK interests through use of modern information and communications technology; to facilitate exchanges at all levels (senior Ministers to students); and to provide authoritative and comprehensive information to UK Government Departments, Devolved Administrations and other public and private bodies in the UK on developments in the US relevant to their work and interests by effective reporting, analysis, exchanges and partnerships.[13]

15. We endorse the importance of each of these objectives, but in recognition of the overlapping responsibilities of other select committees of the House, and in order that we might report our conclusions before the end of the year, we have focused in this Report primarily on the second and third.


16. Time and again in the United States we heard that the United Kingdom's prompt actions immediately after the events of 11 September were regarded by Americans not only as significant, symbolic acts of solidarity, but also as very concrete expressions of the special relationship. From the Prime Minister's private and public pronouncements, through the playing of the US National Anthem by the band of the Coldstream Guards at Buckingham Palace followed by the almost universally-observed 3 minute period of silence, to the cancellation of sporting fixtures and the thousands of expressions of solidarity by the British people at large, the United Kingdom's reaction to the acts of terror was seen as being both genuine and apposite. The very spontaneity of the reaction illustrated perfectly the instinctive nature of the relationship.[14] Other countries, too, offered sympathy and expressed solidarity; only the United Kingdom acted.

17. The United Kingdom acted by offering specified elements of its armed forces to conduct particular operations; by working hard within the United Nations Security Council to gain agreement on what became Resolutions 1368 and 1373; by playing a leading role within NATO in support of the Secretary General's initiative to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; by stepping up intelligence activity and co-operation; by contacting key countries in order to establish at an early stage a degree of international consensus about how to deal with the attacks; and in many other ways. While the United States, understandably, was in a state of shock and preoccupied with the threat that faced it, it was not in a position to identify these priorities. America's gratitude that its foremost ally took on these tasks, without waiting to be asked, is heartfelt.

18. We were struck by the high regard in which not just the United Kingdom, but in particular the Prime Minister, are held in the United States. James Rubin set the scene before our visit when he said that "Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of your Government, has become almost a folk hero in our country."[15] We heard very similar comments when we were in the US, on the street and in the highest echelons of the Administration and Congress. Our time in Washington coincided with the Prime Minister's brief mission to that city, during which he held—by the standards of such visits—lengthy private discussions with President Bush. The personal relations between the two heads of government, characterised by trust and the shared values and interests which underpin the wider relationship, are important; but without that underpinning, as the Foreign Secretary made clear in his oral evidence, they would be insufficient.[16]

19. Ironically, the close personal relationship between the two leaders illustrates this point rather well. As James Rubin remarked:

"What we have seen in these last two months [September and October] is that the special relationship is not about personalities, it is about policy, and that regardless of who the Prime Minister would have preferred won the [US Presidential] election or who is his better friend, the policies of our governments go down so deeply and are in such consonance at deep levels that personalities at the top are really not that relevant."[17]

20. That the Prime Minister and President Bush work well together is at least as much a symptom of the closeness of the two countries' relationship as it is a cause. This does not detract from the Prime Minister's considerable personal achievement, nor does it suggest that personal relations do not matter. Indeed, one of the most important features of the relationship, which has enabled the United Kingdom to act confidently in the United States' best interests, is the impressive matrix of personal relationships at all levels of both administrations. Across the diplomatic, military and intelligence sectors, officials of the two governments are used to working closely together. Outside government, business and cultural links are similarly close. On both sides of 'the pond', people speak the same language, literally as well as figuratively.

21. Thus, the relationship is deep, broad, and enduring. That is why the United Kingdom, through its Prime Minister, was able to act so decisively and to such good effect in the days immediately following 11 September. But what does this mean for the United Kingdom? In the United States, we were told that because the British government had jumped on the 'bus first, it would be able to help steer it. Employing a slightly different metaphor, James Rubin said the United Kingdom "has a seat at the table... now the views of the Blair Government are taken seriously".[18]

22. Influence on important decisions, then, is suggested as the main consequence for the United Kingdom of its decision to identify its interests with those of its ally.[19] No one was able to tell us just how strong this influence is, or whether it will last. Those to whom we spoke in the United States suggested that the United Kingdom has been able to exert a moderating influence on behalf of those parts of the US Administration which opposed a unilateral, early or poorly targeted military response to the events of 11 September; that it has succeeded in persuading the US of the need to fight the peace alongside the war, by making preparations for the reconstruction of Afghan society; and that it has convinced the Americans of the need to engage in a number of international political processes in which it was not previously active. It is too soon to assess the accuracy of these claims, although they are widely held to be credible. We may return to these matters in the course of our inquiry into Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.

23. Apart from a seat at the table, and the genuine gratitude of the American people, the United Kingdom may have gained little from its support for the United States and for the campaign against terrorism. However, unlike some other countries, the United Kingdom gave its support without precondition, and without looking for any reward.[20] If British businesses find that the climate for doing business has improved, we would welcome that, but we have found no evidence that it will be so and nor did we expect to. We hope that Americans will visit this country and spend their dollars here, but the United Kingdom's approach to terrorism has not been predicated on the thesis that it will attract tourists. Instead, it is rightly based on the shared values and the shared interests of the two countries.

24. In the remainder of this Report, we consider various bilateral and multilateral issues on which both countries have strong, not always convergent views, most of which relate to international treaties or other agreements. We consider the BBC's broadcasts to the US, which in a very real way represent the British people to the Americans, before looking at the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's diplomatic representation in the US. But first, we enter into a brief discussion of the place of the United Nations in the British-US relationship.

The United Nations

25. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United States and the United Kingdom are able to co-operate productively on a wide range of foreign policy issues. However, their views differ—albeit on a matter of degree rather than of substance—on a number of questions, including that of enlargement of the UNSC.

26. While both countries support the addition to the permanent membership of the UNSC of Germany, Japan and three developing countries, they disagree on the question of the overall size of the Council. The United Kingdom would be happy to see a larger UNSC of 24 member states than the US, which would prefer to see no more than 21 on the Council.[21]

27. In recent years the United States has been in a difficult relationship with the United Nations (UN). Under the Helms-Biden Act, the US made determination of the question of payment of its contributions to the UN budget conditional on the implementation of a number of reforms, including institutional reforms and reductions in the size of US contributions.[22] In the United States' judgment, sufficient progress on these reforms has now been made to enable payment of the arrears in two tranches.

28. Somewhat in contrast to the US, the United Kingdom has long enjoyed a generally positive relationship with the UN and its institutions. The first meeting of the General Assembly was held in London in 1946. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United Kingdom has played a prominent and constructive role, both in public and behind the scenes. In general, the United Kingdom has gone to great lengths to support the United States in public, while seeking to bring influence to bear on its policies in private. The United Kingdom has at times in effect acted as the United States' advocate in UN proceedings, now and then openly but often without explicit recognition of the fact. The Americans appreciate this.

29. There is now a more positive air about the US's approach to the UN, which derives only in part from resolution of the budgetary contributions issue and of the change in control of the US Senate. We were able to discuss this with Ambassador Jim Cunningham, the US Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, when we visited New York, but it was also evident from our exchanges with others, and from the oral evidence of the Foreign Secretary, that the US has entered a new phase of more constructive engagement with the United Nations and with the international community in general.[23] We welcome this.

30. It appears unlikely that this change would have occurred when it did but for the events of 11 September. The need to assemble and maintain a broad-based coalition of states opposed to terrorism has provided the United States with a powerful incentive to use the medium of the UN to achieve its international goals. The UN has served as a forum within which the US has been able to work to achieve global support for its actions against terrorism. UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1368 and 1373, together with the right to take action in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, are regarded by the US (although not by all states) as offering full endorsement of the military and other actions of it and its allies.

31. Whether it sanctions military action or not, UNSCR 1373 is far-reaching in the demands which it makes of member states. The Resolution requires all states to:

"(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;

(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;

(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;

(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons."

32. Later in the Resolution, the Security Council further decided:

"to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution."

33. Finally, the Resolution directs the Committee to delineate its tasks and to submit a work programme,[24] and expresses the determination of the UNSC to take all necessary steps in order to ensure full implementation.[25] States are required to make a full report to the Committee not later than 27 December 2001.[26] Sanctions monitoring committees of the UNSC already have responsibilities which extend to monitoring implementation of UNSC Resolutions, but as an initiative which lies outside the established procedures for enforcing sanctions this far-reaching commitment by the Security Council breaks new ground in its determination to ensure compliance. By setting up a Committee with an explicit duty to monitor and report on compliance, the UNSC has signalled its intention to deal firmly with the terrorism issue.

34. For a UNSC Committee to be chaired by the Head of Mission of one of the permanent five members of the Security Council also breaks with precedent. That Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative, was invited by the non-permanent members to chair the Committee is an indication of the high regard in which he and the United Kingdom's Mission are held.

35. We conclude that the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council is an important development in the work of the United Nations and in the war against terrorism. We recommend that the Government ensure that the Counter-Terrorism Committee receives whatever support it may require in order for it to be effective in its work of holding states to account for their compliance with the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions on terrorism.

36. The United Kingdom's diplomatic mission to the United Nations is widely respected for the excellence of its work. This has always been so, but it is particularly so now. We believe that the United Kingdom's standing within the UN rests on the quality of its representation as well on respect for its policies.

37. We note with satisfaction the deservedly very high reputation of the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations and its excellent working relationship with the Missions of other countries, notably that of the United States. We recommend that the Government ensure that the provision of human, financial and other resources appropriate to the vital role of the Mission continues to be given the highest priority.

Missile defence and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty


38. The Bush Administration's determination to develop a ballistic missile shield for the United States stems from its conviction that the security environment in which the US and its allies operate has changed profoundly. On 1 May 2001, in a speech to the US National Defense University, President Bush set out the rationale underlying his Administration's decision to develop a limited system of ballistic missile defence. The President described a "vastly different world" from that of the Cold War, which remains "dangerous" but is also "less certain, less predictable." He stated that "today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles" possessed by "some of the world's least responsible states... for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life."[27]

39. The vision of defence described by President Bush and his senior officials requires a "new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today's world."[28] Missile defences, the Administration believes, are crucial because "our lack of defenses against ballistic missiles creates incentives for missile proliferation which, combined with the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, will give future adversaries the ability to hold our populations hostage to terror and to blackmail... Effective missile defense could... discourage potential adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles that threaten the US and allied population centres."[29]

40. The current US Administration's overall decision to develop a system of ballistic missile defence is similar in many respects to that of the Clinton Administration, although the Bush Administration has highlighted some specific areas of policy difference. One such difference is that the ballistic missile defence programme was initially described by the Clinton Administration as National Missile Defence. However, the Bush Administration re-named the programme Missile Defence, to indicate that the programme might also be developed to protect allies, including the United Kingdom. The re-naming was also undertaken because the Bush Administration sees no logic in distinguishing between theatre missile defence and defence against long range threats.

41. The Bush Administration has also undertaken a significant expansion from pursuit of a single, ground based system against long range missiles, to a much broader research, development, testing and evaluation programme which also looks at sea based and space based systems. The technical challenges are greater than the more modest programme being pursued by the Clinton Administration. The political challenges are also greater, because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty specifically prohibits the systems and tests that are being developed under the current Administration.


42. Though the technological challenges to establishing a missile defence system are huge (and insuperable, according to some commentators), the US is confident that it is making progress. A central aim of the current research programme is to establish whether a 'layered' system can be developed. The proposed system should enable the US to have multiple shots at incoming missiles in the boost, mid-course and terminal phases, and also to destroy short, medium and long range missiles.

43. Despite media reports to the contrary, the US already has the capability to destroy missiles in flight. The Patriot system, which hits missiles in the terminal phase of their flight, has been improved significantly since the Gulf War. In tests, eight out of nine attempted intercepts have been successful. The THAAD system protects a larger area than the Patriot system, intercepting intermediate range missiles, and two successful intercepts have been achieved. THAAD might be fielded in 2006-07.

44. The US is also testing an intercontinental missile defence system which is designed to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles high in the atmosphere. Of five trials of this intercontinental system, three have been 'successful,' although critics assert that the trials were insufficiently thorough and were manipulated to ensure success. The most recent test, conducted on 3 December 2001, was delayed for two days because of poor visibility; some scientists have raised doubts about the radar system used to guide the missile interceptor system, arguing that the US could not rely on good weather in war time. All of these systems use kinetic energy alone to destroy incoming missiles.

45. The US is also developing an airborne laser system, which they plan to test in 2004. The purpose of the laser system is to enable the US to hit missiles in the boost phase in regions in which it cannot station anti-ballistic missile launching facilities.


46. Technical challenges are not the only obstacle to progress towards a missile defence shield for the United States. The US is currently bound by the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. The Treaty and its related 1974 Protocol impose strict limits on the number and location of strategic interceptor missiles deployed by both parties. The Treaty was a product of the rough parity between the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers by the late 1960s, and was designed to ensure mutual vulnerability (Mutually Assured Destruction) by preventing the US or the Soviet Union from developing an ABM system capable of nullifying the other's strategic retaliatory forces.[30]

47. The Bush Administration has made it clear that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty will not prevent it from deploying a system of missile defences. President Bush has explained that "No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace."[31] The President, the Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz have all articulated repeatedly their belief that "moving beyond" the ABM Treaty is essential. According to Secretary Wolfowitz, the "ABM Treaty codifies a Cold War relationship that is no longer relevant to the 21st century."[32] Donald Rumsfeld has described the ABM Treaty as "ancient history."[33] In August 2001, President Bush restated his intention to "withdraw from the ABM Treaty on our timetable at a time convenient to America."[34]

48. We heard on our visit to Washington that the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty are currently holding up the testing of some aspects of the US missile defence programme. The Treaty prohibits the testing, development and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land based ABM systems or components, or the deployment of a mobile land based system, and the US currently plans to develop such systems.[35] This accounts for the US Administration's immediate wish to reach a deal with the Russian government over the future status of the Treaty.

49. We were told that the Treaty had been very carefully written, and that there was no flexibility. Even very extensive amendments of the Treaty were therefore unlikely to give the US Government the freedom it requires to pursue its research and testing programme. According to the current US Government, the policy of the previous Clinton Administration was to work to the greatest extent possible within the confines of the ABM Treaty. However, the Bush Administration has clearly articulated its desire to 'move beyond' the ABM Treaty and draw up an entirely new strategic framework with Russia. In the view of the Bush Administration, this represents a significant policy change from that of its predecessor.

50. A clause in the ABM Treaty permits unilateral withdrawal from its provisions by either party on six months' notice, although the US has not yet taken this step.[36] The Foreign Secretary told us that the United States "has made it crystal clear to me, as I think it has publicly, that it has no intention of breaking international law in the steps it is taking."[37]


51. The question of missile defence emerged as a major point of contention with between the US and Russia early in the life of the Bush Administration, with some commentators anticipating an "acute and all-embracing crisis" between the two countries as President Bush made his views on missile defence clear.[38] When Secretary of State for Defence Donald Rumsfeld visited Moscow in August 2001, he was blunt to his hosts about the US approach to the ABM Treaty and other agreements signed during the Cold War: "The Soviet Union is gone," he said, and referred to a "whole network of treaties set up a quarter of a century ago. We don't have that network or system of linkages with other states, friendly states."[39]

52. Following Secretary Rumsfeld's visit, the prospects of reaching agreement with Russia over the future of the ABM Treaty looked fairly bleak. However, following 11 September attacks, Russia's warm and supportive response to the crisis led many commentators to anticipate early resolution of the issue.

53. Presidents Bush and Putin met at Crawford in Texas on 11-14 November, a week after we visited the United States. The summit was hailed by the US Administration as a success in cementing the personal relationship between the Presidents. The two Presidents also agreed at Crawford that over the next ten years they would cut by roughly two thirds the size of their respective strategic nuclear arsenals, to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. However, no agreement was reached over the ABM Treaty, in spite of earlier expectations to that effect.

54. Russia and China have, in the recent past, expressed grave concern at the development of the US missile defence programme. In his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the last Parliament, Professor Paul Rogers explained the basis of this concern. The US has made assurances that the missile defence system being developed is strictly "limited," would only counter small salvos of missiles, and would thus have little impact on the strategic balance between the US, Russia and China. However,

"Frankly, in Moscow and Beijing they do not believe a word of it. They see a limited NMD [missile defence system] as the start of a bigger programme, and when you look at the details already coming up from the Ballistic Missile Defence Offices it is clear that there are a number of stages and one would end up with an NMD system which is really quite comprehensive."[40]

55. Professor Rogers' evidence was submitted in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, when relations between Russia, China and the US were distinctly sour. The contrast with the current situation is quite strong: both Russia and China have been supportive of the US response to the 11 September attacks. Both also claim to be facing terrorist threats on their own territory. President Putin was the first world leader to contact President Bush in the aftermath of the attacks, and has since indicated that Russia wishes to co-operate fully with the US, the European Union and other coalition partners in eliminating international terrorism. In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, the Russian President stated that he is prepared to review Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement: Russia's relations with NATO are dealt with in more detail below.

56. President Putin did state after the conclusion of the Crawford Summit that he was optimistic about the prospects of reaching agreement over missile defence: "We differ in the ways and means we perceive that are suitable for reaching the same objective." He went on to argue that, "given the nature of the relationship between the United States and Russia, one can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten or put to threat the interests of both our countries and of the world. And we shall continue our discussions."[41]

57. After the Crawford Summit, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice described the relationship between Russia and the United States as "substantially changed." The difference over the issue of missile defence is now, in her assessment, a "smaller element of the US-Russia relationship than it was several months ago, and certainly than it was before September 11th." Rice said that Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, rather than differences over missile defence, were the main topics of conversation between Presidents Bush and Putin at the Summit.[42]


58. Britain "shares US concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology and agrees on the need to counter these developments."[43] The Prime Minister stated in the House on 24 October that the United Kingdom's broadly supportive position on US plans for missile defence had not changed as a consequence of the events of 11 September: "We believe that it is important to tackle the potential threat from ballistic missiles with a comprehensive strategy that includes arms control and counter-proliferation, diplomacy, deterrence and defensive measures . . . We understand the role that missile defence can play as one element of that comprehensive strategy, but as yet we have had no specific proposal from the United States."[44] The Foreign Secretary told us that he believed that the "overall case for new forms of missile defence has been strengthened since 11 September, not least because the world is much more aware than it was of the extreme nature of the threats that we can face."[45]

59. In our discussions with officials in Washington, we heard that the United Kingdom is a valued partner to the US in the development of missile defence systems, because the United Kingdom and the US share technologies. The use of the United Kingdom base at Fylingdales would also improve the effectiveness of the proposed US system: the closer the radar sensors are to the threat, the greater likelihood that ballistic missiles will be intercepted. However, the Government says that it is "too early to say whether a role for facilities in the United Kingdom might be envisaged" in US plans.[46]

60. We were reassured that the destruction of warheads armed with chemical or biological agents above the United Kingdom would have no effect on the United Kingdom, because agents would be destroyed by the sheer impact of the missile and interceptor collision.


61. We are aware of a significant level of concern about the US plans for missile defence among sections of the British public. European governments—as well as Russia and China—have also expressed serious misgivings about the missile defence plans of both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. The Oxford Research Group argued that US international security policy during both the Bush and Clinton Administrations had been characterised by a "unilateralist... outlook" which "saw little value in arms control treaties and regarded itself as a fundamentally independent player acting in its own security interests rather than working with its allies in Europe and elsewhere." This attitude, the Oxford Research Group claim, "has created major strains in transatlantic relations... even if most of the criticisms from European political leaders have been expressed in private. Opinion formers and commentators across Europe have expressed much more open dismay and consternation, and their views have been exemplified in many areas of security and foreign policy where clear transatlantic differences are emerging."[47]

62. Our immediate predecessor Foreign Affairs Committee, in its 2000 Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction, also expressed concerns about missile defence. The Committee recommended that "the Government articulate the very strong concerns that have been expressed about NMD [National Missile Defence] within the UK. We are not convinced that the US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community. We recommend that the Government encourage the USA to seek other ways of reducing the threat it perceives."[48]

63. However, against this, in his evidence to us, Dr John Chipman wrote that "If European leaders stand up and argue that the ABM Treaty is a 'cornerstone of strategic stability' the present US Administration will wonder if they were on a different planet on September 11th... As the US gives Home Defence new primacy, it will be hard for outsiders to argue that the US should be denied the right in law to spend its own taxpayers money to erect an imperfect defence against small salvos of ballistic missiles."[49]

64. In this evidence, Dr Chipman articulates a view held by many to whom we spoke during our visit to the US. Indeed, in discussions with senior Administration officials and independent analysts during our visit, we found little comprehension of European concerns about the US's missile defence plans. In the views of their elected representatives, the US public does not share the concern felt by some sections of the British and European publics about the wisdom of scrapping the ABM Treaty, or of developing an extremely costly system of missile defence. Many people in the US think that such a system exists already. With homeland security such an overwhelming priority for the US Government, it would be very hard politically for Senators to oppose the massive expenditure demanded for the continuation of the missile defence programme.

65. Though some officials expressed the belief that the US has not succeeded in winning hearts and minds to the cause of missile defence globally, it seems unlikely that hostility to the programme in European countries is perceived by the US government as a serious obstacle to its progress.

66. Cohesion with respect to matters of defence and security is of crucial importance, especially as the campaign against terrorism is likely to continue for a number of years. We were presented with a strong case for the emerging US proposals on missile defence. We recommend that these proposals are most carefully considered by the Government and that it should have due regard for the concerns expressed in the United Kingdom and among our European partners before coming to a final decision on any definitive proposals.

67. We are also concerned about the possible long term implications of any decision by the US to 'move away' from existing international agreements on missile defences and other aspects of arms control without establishing new, legally binding arrangements.

68. We share the concerns, articulated by the United States Administration, about new threats from proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and ballistic missiles. We also welcome the US Administration's determination to develop a new relationship with Russia which is no longer based on mutually assured destruction. One of the few positive developments arising from the 11 September attacks has been a distinct warming of relations between Russia and the United States, which contributed to the agreements over nuclear weapons reductions at Crawford. China has also reacted in a positive way to the US response to the attacks.

69. However, current goodwill is not sufficient to guarantee a robust international framework for future weapons reductions and for global co-operation against proliferation. Though relations between the US and China are currently quite warm, the development of a missile shield by the United States might, in some foreseeable circumstances, encourage China to develop further nuclear weapons in order to ensure that it could maintain its status as a strategic competitor to the US.

70. Though we do not share all of their concerns, we recognise the validity of arguments presented to us by Dr Stephen Pullinger of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) and the Oxford Research Group with respect to the potential reactions of China to current US policy. Dr Pullinger warned us that "China's reaction to missile defence is likely to be to continue with, and probably accelerate, the modernisation of its strategic nuclear forces, which could have detrimental regional repercussions if India and thence Pakistan felt compelled to respond by weaponising their latent nuclear capabilities."[50]

71. Dr Pullinger also argued that the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and other measures to control nuclear proliferation could also encourage China to "revert to its bad old ways in terms of missile and nuclear exports, a course from which it is still only painstakingly being teased."[51] The Oxford Research Group find it "easy to envisage missile defence as a welcome way of forcing China, " which is viewed as an economic as well as a strategic competitor of the US, "to spend heavily on nuclear forces. This would divert resources and expertise from its civil economy."[52]

72. While it is certainly possible that China may expand its nuclear capability in any event, we recommend that the Government use its influence with the US to ensure that the effects of any missile defence programme on China and on other nuclear powers are carefully assessed.

73. We were also warned that if relations with Russia deteriorate, US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could have serious consequences for British and global security. Dr Stephen Pullinger wrote that "if the ABM Treaty falls, Russian co-operation regarding limitations on its missile technology exports could be jeopardised, along with any prospect of reversing its close nuclear relationship with Iran. It might even halt the current programmes through which it receives assistance with the dismantling of its nuclear weaponry and infrastructure, as part of a general move to become less transparent. In summary, an affronted Russia, seeking ways of annoying the US and maximising its foreign currency receipts could act in ways seriously detrimental to western security interests."[53]

74. The United Kingdom can and should play a role in defining this new security environment. The Foreign Secretary told us that Britain has played an important role in fostering warmer relations between Russia and the United States.[54] We recommend that the Government seek to ensure that if either party to the ABM Treaty exercises its right to withdraw, the United States and Russia establish an alternative mutually satisfactory and legally binding agreement on the development of missile defence systems, which might include other states.

Arms control

75. The United States has, in general, been less willing than the United Kingdom to support international arms control regimes. The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) note that the Bush Administration's policy in this area is characterised by a "dangerous unilateralist approach... that places the fragile international network of non-proliferation regimes at risk. The vast matrix of treaties, agreements, and protocols that help guide government policy and decision-making for nuclear technology and material transfer has been shaken by recent US decisions." BASIC contrast the US approach with that of the United Kingdom, which, it argues, has "over the years... invested extensive time and energy to promote a 'diplomacy first' policy for arms control."[55]

76. The Foreign Secretary also acknowledged that "this is one area where there are significant differences of view between ourselves and the United States and it is important that we should be open about that." In drawing up international regimes for the control of Biological and Toxin Weapons, nuclear weapons testing, the use of anti-personnel landmines and the flow of small arms and light weapons, "the United Kingdom has been in the lead."[56] In contrast, the United States has refused to ratify or to support a number of international agreements in these areas.

77. The United Kingdom has taken a twin track approach to pushing the United States towards a more positive approach to international arms control regimes. The Foreign Secretary told us that, in addition to pressing the United States at a diplomatic and official level to support the various UN conventions and associated verification protocols—often in association with other EU countries—there is also "a process there of education with the US. If we cannot get them in the short term to agree to take part in these conventions and treaty operations, we can sometimes get them to do the same by other routes and to observe effectively their terms without signing up to them."[57] The Foreign Secretary pointed out that it was important to "open up debates" within the Senate and the House of Representatives, both of which determine to a significant extent the "framework in which any President and Secretary of State within the United States can operate." Towards this end, the Foreign Secretary had "made it my business to go and talk to" the appropriate people in the Senate and the House of Representatives, "to maintain relations there."[58]

78. The United States Administration's approach to specific arms control regimes is described below.


79. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996. It has been ratified by thirty one of the forty four states named in the Treaty, but in order for the Treaty to enter into force all these forty four states must ratify.

80. Though the United States did sign the CTBT in 1996, ratification was rejected by the Senate in 1999. Sections of American society still hold to the view that the Treaty is "unverifiable and incompatible with American security."[59] The Bush Administration has stated that it has no plans to resubmit the CTBT for ratification, though it has agreed not to operate nuclear tests and to observe a large part of what is specified in the Treaty in practice. The current US position therefore appears to have become more hawkish in tone since Secretary of State Colin Powell said at his confirmation hearing in January 2001 that

"We also need to review our approach to curbing proliferation. As you know, we will not be asking for the Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in its next session. We are mindful of the work that was done by President Clinton's Special Advisor and my colleague General Shalikashvili. We will examine that work, but we believe that there are still flaws with the Treaty as it was voted down in 1999. Nevertheless, we will continue to examine the elements of that Treaty as part of our overall strategic review."[60]

81. In August 2001, at the CTBT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna, the United States announced that it would restrict its financial contributions to the CTBT Organisation. The US announced that it would only pay that part of its contributions which covered the International Monitoring System to detect nuclear tests (as opposed to other CTBTO activity such as inspections). The United States remains the largest single contributor to the CTBT Preparatory Committee.

82. The United States also vetoed a United Nations General Assembly motion in November 2001, which would enable an early coming into effect of the CTBT. In this instance, the United States' was the sole vote against 140 states in favour of an early coming into effect of the CTBT.

83. Dr Stephen Pullinger described the US policy with respect to the CTBT as "a major setback for the treaty's prospects of entry into force," which "jeopardises efforts to completely de-legitimize nuclear testing. In other words, it threatens to make it easier for rogue states and others to justify testing their nuclear weapons and thereby to develop offensive nuclear capabilities."[61]

84. The United Kingdom, with its EU partners, is on record as regretting the reduction in United States contributions to the CTBT Preparatory Committee. The British Government continues to "discuss the CTBT with the United States Administration and urge a renewal of United States support for the Treaty,"[62] though the Foreign Secretary admitted that on this issue "I doubt we will get them to move, but we might."[63]

85. We note the importance of ensuring a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, and believe that unilateral cuts in the US nuclear arsenal do not substitute for the establishment and maintenance of global non-proliferation agreements. We recommend that the Government renew its efforts to press the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.


86. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) underpins all international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to achieve their complete abolition. The NPT is an agreement between the five powers (the USA, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom), which are permitted to possess nuclear weapons until they can negotiate them away, and all other states parties that are forbidden from possessing nuclear weapons, in return for which they are allowed access to civil nuclear energy.

87. Since its entry into force in 1970, the NPT has been subject to five yearly review conferences, the last of which was held in 2000. The last Review Conference was hailed as a success: Peter Hain, Minister of State at the FCO, stated after the 2000 Conference that the final document of the Conference contained the "most explicit pledge ever made by the Nuclear Weapons States to work for complete global nuclear disarmament."[64]

88. BASIC argue that "no arms control regime will be threatened more greatly overall [by US policy with respect to the CTB and ABM Treaties] than the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While forbidding non-nuclear states from possessing nuclear weapons or participating in their development, it also constrains nuclear weapons states from acting in ways that would cause proliferation. US refusal to ratify the CTBT and efforts to undermine the ABM Treaty contradict the 'practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts' to move towards nuclear disarmament, which were agreed by member states at the May 2000 NPT Review Conference."[65]

89. In its evidence regarding the NPT, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office states that the United Kingdom has agreed with the United States to a review of the "counter-proliferation toolbox," with a view to countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles.[66]

90. The Committee supports the Government in its determination to review the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is currently 'leaking', and we recommend that the Government works in the closest conjunction with the US Administration to devise further specific and effective measures to enforce this crucial arms control agreement. The Committee expects to receive from the Government details of such measures.


91. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which bans the development, testing, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, came into force in 1975. There are currently no agreed procedures to verify compliance with the Convention. The United Kingdom has played a leading role in negotiations among an Ad Hoc Group of states, which has met twenty three times since 1995 to strengthen the BTWC through inclusion of a legally-binding verification protocol.

92. On 26 July 2001 the United States representative to the Ad Hoc Group, Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, announced that, despite six and a half years of arduous negotiations, the United States was "unable to support the current text" of the verification protocol "even with changes, as an appropriate outcome of Ad Hoc Group efforts." Ambassador Mahley claimed that the proposed verification mechanisms would not enable the Ad Hoc Group to "achieve their objectives," and that in the US's assessment "the draft Protocol would put national security and confidential business information at risk."[67] The United States is concerned that its "pharmaceutical industry and defence services might have key intelligence taken from them by the process of verification."[68]

93. Following the United States' rejection of the draft BTW Protocol, the Ad Hoc Group suspended negotiations for this year. The process was not seen as viable without the engagement of the United States.

94. At the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference meeting on 19 November 2001, John R. Bolton, Under Secretary General for Arms Control and International Security at the State Department, proposed some alternative measures to be undertaken by states to strengthen their implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. The US proposal included enactment of national criminal legislation to enhance bilateral extradition procedures with respect to biological weapons offenses, and national measures to ensure more strict standards for the security of pathogenic microorganisms.

95. The United States also proposed the establishment of a "mechanism for the international investigation of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents" which "would require Parties to accept international inspectors upon determination by the UN Secretary General that an inspection should take place." The US would support the establishment of a "voluntary co-operative mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by mutual consent." They also proposed that states adopt and implement bio-safety procedures in co-operation with the World Health Organisation.[69]

96. At the 19 November meeting, Mr Bolton also restated the US's opposition to the "flawed mechanisms" of the Ad Hoc Group's Protocol, which in the United States view would have allowed countries to sign up and then "ignore their commitments," so that such states and "certain non-state actors" (such as al-Qaida) would "never have been hampered by the Protocol."[70]

97. On 20 November, the Foreign Secretary told us that "on the Protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention we have a different view from the United States."[71] The United Kingdom Government believes that establishing international agreement to on the ground inspection procedures, as specified in the Ad Hoc Group draft Protocol, is the only way to ensure verification: in order to be able to push states such as Iraq towards agreeing to inspections of suspected biological weapons development facilities, the United Kingdom, the United States and other major NATO countries must agree to be subjected to inspection in the same way. The Foreign Secretary told the Committee that he believed the United States Government's worries about its pharmaceutical and defence industries "are unfounded and that the benefits of a thorough verifications system are very substantial... Why we need a good verification system is in respect of countries which may or may not have signed up to the Convention but are covertly developing such weapons systems."[72]

98. The Foreign Secretary said that he had "gone into great detail with colleagues in the United States to ascertain the strength of their concerns about this... and to take them through our arguments against the position which they have adopted."[73] He also informed us that the United Kingdom has taken up the question with United States Secretary of State Colin Powell and there has been some movement of the United States position, but "not sufficient."[74] However, negotiations on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention "illustrate the nature of the relationship that... we continue the discussions in a co-operative way and we hope to see some movement on this by the United States."[75]

99. We conclude that the only way to establish whether states are developing biological and toxin weapons is to establish a mandatory, on the ground challenge inspection system to verify compliance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We recommend that the Government work with the US and other allies to agree such a verification regime, by which states' compliance with the BTWC can be established.


100. US Senators Nunn and Lugar championed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act through Congress in 1991. Through the Act, which was renamed the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme in 1993, the US has provided assistance to Russia and other post-Soviet states to minimise the threat of nuclear proliferation, through the destruction of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, fissile material, and associated infrastructure and through establishing verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.[76]

101. Work is still under way in Congress on the Administration's budget request for 2002, which included a proposed reduction from US$872 million to US$774 million for Department of Energy funding for similar CTR programmes. Department of Defence funding will be substantially unchanged by the proposed budget. Congress has yet to respond the budgetary request for such programmes.

102. The FCO has stated that the United Kingdom attaches "great importance to the significant contribution that the US has made to non-proliferation in the former Soviet Union with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons projects." The United Kingdom's response to any change to the US funding of such projects would "necessarily depend upon the decision to be made by Congress in this regard." The mooted US$89 million cut in Department of Energy CTR programmes alone is "many times greater than the current total EU budget in this area."[77]

103. We note the crucial importance of co-operative threat reduction programmes in preventing further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our predecessor Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that "the Government use its position in both the G8 and the EU to accelerate progress in helping the Russian Government to destroy its surplus nuclear materials or convert them to civil use."[78] We welcome the Government's response that "It will continue to work both in the G8 and other fora to develop a cooperative framework and international financing plan to take this work forward."[79] In view of the US Administration's proposal to cut the Department of Energy's funding for Co-operative Threat Reduction programmes, we recommend that the Government continues to stress to the US the utmost importance it attaches to such programmes and reports to the Committee on progress to establish an international financing plan for them.


104. The United Kingdom is a party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space and military activity on the moon and other celestial bodies.

105. We were told that, while the United States was not yet ready to present detailed plans on its missile defence programme, the Rumsfeld Commission's report into missile defence had recommended that the United States make substantial use of outer space. According to the US, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not present an obstacle to this.

106. The FCO informed us that they were "not aware of any proposal amend the Treaty in order to accommodate missile defence, or for any other purpose. None of the proposals we have seen from the US for a missile defence system would violate the terms of the Outer Space Treaty."[80]

107. We recommend that the FCO continues to maintain close scrutiny of the arms control implications of the militarisation of outer space.


108. Differences exist between the United Kingdom and United States Governments in their approach to the control of small arms and light weapons. At the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in July 2001, the United Kingdom supported a Programme of Action which committed states politically to establish measures to ensure the traceability of small arms, to control brokers and to destroy surplus weapons.

109. The United States expressed concern at some aspects of the UN Programme of Action and opposed the holding of a Review Conference in 2006 to assess progress. A senior official in the Administration explained that the United States had supported the UN Programme of Action to the extent that it focused on international problems, but that it did not accept the provisions contained in the Programme which it believes relate to domestic gun ownership laws in the United States. In this official's view, the UN Small Arms Conference agenda had been hijacked to some extent by those who sought to deprive United States citizens of their constitutional right to bear arms. This agenda had diverted the Conference from its objective of arresting the flow of small arms to conflicts in developing countries. Clearly the Administration has adopted the concerns of the domestic gun lobby.

110. The United Kingdom Government does not share this assessment of the work of the Conference. The United Kingdom, working with EU partners and others, was "unable to persuade the United States to agree to the inclusion" of an initiative to restrict the supply of small arms and light weapons to non-state actors, and to tighten civilian possession of firearms, though the Government will continue to push the United States towards accepting these provisions in future.[81] The United States has now lifted the "ad referendum" reserve it had placed on the Programme of Action. The Review Conference will now go ahead.

111. We conclude that the argument that UN efforts to control small arms has been influenced by those seeking to change US domestic gun policy is unconvincing. We recommend that the Government urge the US to support fully the UN Programme of Action on preventing the flow of small arms to developing countries. We fully support the Government's efforts to tighten the supply of arms to non-state parties.

112. Related to the issue of small arms and light weapons is evidence submitted by Saferworld, who note that embargoes on sales of military equipment to Pakistan and India have been lifted by the US. Saferworld also point out that Russia was already supplying arms to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. They argue that, while combating terrorism is a key focus of foreign policy at this time, "this must not be viewed in isolation but alongside other priorities such as protection of human rights, maintenance of regional stability and controls on weapons proliferation." Saferworld suggest that the "short term approach of providing military assistance to strategically important states ignores the long-term implications of arming countries in a region susceptible to change. While the supply of military equipment may be a useful tool for building coalitions, there are a number of examples from the recent past where arming states with undemocratic or unstable regimes to fight for a common cause has had serious repercussions."[82]

113. We recommend that the Government work with the United States for a responsible approach to strengthening the police and security forces of Central and South Asian states affected by the campaign against terrorism.


114. The United States will not ratify the Ottawa Convention banning the manufacture and use of anti-personnel land mines. This decision is based on the Administration's assessment that the Convention does not address the most serious problem, which is the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land mines. The United States believes that, over time, the use of anti-personnel land mines will become a less important aspect of force protection, but to rule out their use altogether would at this stage be unacceptable. In explaining the US policy with respect to anti-personnel land mines, administration officials also pointed out that the United States provides substantial funds for humanitarian de-mining in former conflict zones around the world.

115. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention, and therefore no longer permits the manufacture or use of anti-personnel land mines. The United Kingdom has similar force structures to those of the United States, but has nonetheless found it possible to sign the Convention.

116. As our predecessor Committee discovered when it inquired into this subject in 2000, the differing views of the United Kingdom and the United States reflect their use of different types of land mine.[83] While British forces use anti-tank mines incorporating anti-handling devices, which do not fall within the terms of the Ottawa Convention, in order to deter or delay mine clearing operations, American forces mix anti-tank and anti-personnel mines to achieve the same effect. The Committee learned then that the US intended to sign the Convention by 2006, once it had found a suitable, alternative way of mining.

117. Appearing before this Committee, Mr Stephen Wright[84] stated that "it is possible to demonstrate—and we do seek to demonstrate—to the US Administration that the experience of implementing the [Ottawa] Convention is perfectly consistent with maintaining an effective force posture by our national armed forces. The US, as I understand it, is not currently reviewing its position, but we will continue to work for progress."[85]

118. We recommend that the Government continue in its efforts to encourage the United States to ratify the Ottawa Convention, and to phase out the use of anti-personnel land mines before 2006.


119. In his evidence, Dr John Chipman wrote that, with reference to its approach to international treaties and commitments, there has been "no sea-change... in the instincts that animate the Bush Administration... Indeed the current [terrorist] campaign will make it likely that the United States takes harsher judgements about the relevance to its own security about actual or proposed international instruments and will be more, rather than less, vigorous in ensuring that, in its view, it is not constrained by them when it seeks to act in self-defence."[86]

120. United States Under Secretary of State John Bolton called in a speech in November 2001 for states to "set aside years of diplomatic inertia," and stressed the need to "move beyond traditional arms control measures." Mr Bolton asked rhetorically:

"Will we be courageous, unflinching and timely in our actions to develop effective tools to deal with the threat as it exists today, or will we merely defer to slow moving multilateral mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening in the real world?"

He went on to state that the United States

"will continue to reject flawed texts like the BTW [Biological and Toxin Weapons] draft Protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States and many other countries represented here today... The time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over."[87]

121. We recognise that the United States does not wish to sign what it perceives to be 'bad treaties.' However, we believe that legally binding international agreements, with mandatory verification mechanisms, are essential to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical, toxin, radiological and other weapons of mass destruction. This is particularly important with respect to biological weapons, the development of which is almost impossible to detect without on the ground inspection regimes. We recommend that the Government highlight to the US Government the value and importance of securing legally-binding multilateral agreements to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We welcome efforts made by the Government to curb the flow of small arms to developing countries through the UN system, and to ban the use of anti-personnel land mines, and endorse its efforts to persuade the US to support such initiatives.

Other international agreements


122. In 1998, the UN held a conference in Rome to establish an International Criminal Court, the objective of which was to provide a tribunal with international standing to prosecute war criminals. In 1998, more than 120 countries signed the resulting Treaty and 21 abstained. The only six countries to reject the Treaty were Libya, Qatar, Yemen, Algeria, China and the United States.

123. On 31 December 2000, outgoing United States President Clinton signed the ICC Treaty. However, two thirds of the United States Senate must vote in favour of any Treaty before it becomes binding, and the current Bush Administration has shown no intention even of submitting the Treaty to the Senate.

124. Enough states have ratified the ICC for it to be established even without the endorsement of the United States, and the ICC may therefore be established within two years. Unusually, the ICC would bind the citizens even of those countries which had not ratified the Treaty: it has jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes committed in the territory of a country that ratified the Treaty or that consents to the Court's jurisdiction; and it has jurisdiction over crimes committed by persons who are nationals of a ratifying party. Even without United States ratification, United States nationals could therefore be subject to prosecution by the ICC if an alleged crime took place in the territory of any state that ratified the ICC.

125. We were told by one official in Washington that the United States made a mistake in appearing to base its rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on an argument about America's national interest. The United States had been misunderstood on this issue. In fact, it was suggested, the main reason for the United States rejection of the Treaty establishing the ICC is that it is simply a bad Treaty, with both technical and conceptual flaws in its design. The establishment of the ICC as set out in the Treaty would therefore subject United States citizens and also the citizens of other states to substandard jurisprudence.

126. Another senior official told us that the United States was not opposed to international tribunals per se, and that it had supported ad hoc international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. However, the United States was concerned that the work of an ICC with a global mandate would be interminable, and for this reason its establishment made little sense. The United States and other states which would be required to pay for the ICC—and those states that were meant to benefit—would simply not get very much justice in exchange for the cost of establishing a vast international institution. In the United States view, funds would be deployed more effectively if they were spent on training personnel and establishing effective judicial institutions at the national level.

127. Another argument deployed by the United States against the ICC was is that no 'one size fits all' solution exists for achieving justice in post conflict situations. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was one example of a 'home grown' institution to deal with the crimes of the apartheid years, but such a solution could not really be imposed on other states from outside, nor would it always be a suitable way to ensure that justice was perceived to have been done. Introducing international institutions would not in general be the most effective way to ensure that people "owned" the judicial process, and would also discourage states from taking responsibility themselves.

128. The United Kingdom has a different assessment of the value of the ICC, and has signed and ratified the Treaty. We recommend that the Government continue its dialogue with the US Administration on the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court.


129. The United Kingdom Government "regretted the decision of the US Administration to reject the Kyoto Protocol" early in 2001.[88] The Protocol is designed to establish an international system for limiting emissions of greenhouse gasses. The United States is responsible for 25 per cent of global emissions, and therefore without its involvement the United Kingdom Government believes that "there can be no lasting solution" to the problem of climate change.[89]

130. At the EU-US Gothenburg Summit in June 2001, the United Kingdom with EU partners agreed to "disagree on the Kyoto protocol but... to work together in all relevant fora to address climate change." The United Kingdom's overall policy is to "encourage the US to re-engage with the Kyoto process in the medium to longer term."[90]

131. The Committee was told that the US recognises its responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, and that the administration was looking for more effective means that the Kyoto Protocol to control climate change.

The US and NATO

132. We were told on many occasions during our visit to Washington that the decision of NATO members to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty meant a great deal to the United States. Some officials believed that the United Kingdom had played an important role in "delivering" Article 5, and this was cited as another example of the United Kingdom's impressive leadership in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks.

133. Military co-operation through NATO does not, however, appear to be a priority for the United States. While the United States clearly recognises the symbolic value of Article 5, with other NATO actions such as the deployment of five NATO AWACS aircraft to patrol United States airspace, the practical value of NATO to the campaign against terrorism is less evident. We were told that the United States is picking and choosing its allies, forging different alliances for different purposes.

134. Co-operation with the United Kingdom in the military aspects of the campaign is clearly extremely close, and this has been greatly helped by long-established mechanisms such as the placing of eighty British intelligence personnel in the United States Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida. No other NATO country enjoys this close intelligence relationship with the United States. Britain's "systems are more integrated [with those of the United States] and our forces are modern, [so] we are more able rapidly to deploy in that kind of theatre than our partners".[91] [92]

135. We heard, during our discussions, some frustration expressed by United States officials that NATO's military capabilities had not been enhanced as much as the United States had hoped by the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). Though the United States has no explicit policy to pull back from operations in Europe, it is felt that the Europeans should be able at least to manage peacekeeping operations without extensive United States involvement. The DCI had so far failed to ensure that this was possible. The question of the "division of labour" between the United States and Europe in peacekeeping duties in and around Europe is dealt with more thoroughly below, in the section on European Security and Defence Policy.

136. We were told that the United Kingdom believes, for political reasons, that it is important for the United States to accept military contributions from other NATO members: Britain has therefore been pushing the United States quite hard in this direction. We were also informed that discussions are taking place, under the leadership of Lord Robertson, about "the degree to which NATO, as NATO, could be assisted in the Afghanistan region in the current situation."[93] However, it seems clear that military co-operation with other NATO countries is far from automatic for the United States.

137. The United States' response to the campaign against terrorism raises some interesting questions about how it perceives NATO's current and future role. Professor Michael Clarke told us that the US had found NATO Command Structures "extremely irksome" in the Kosovo crisis, and was demonstrating "a determination in the present crisis not to be bound by them."[94] He wrote that NATO was "struggling to remain relevant to the US in the present crisis."[95]

138. Nothing we heard in the United States suggested that the US no longer considered NATO valuable. However, some of those to whom we spoke believe that its role as an organisation addressing broader political and security issues, including international crime and terrorism, might grow. This transformation of its role might allow for a fairly radical redefinition of NATO's relations with Russia.

139. In the view of some senior administration officials, President Bush believes that the US faces an historic turning point in its relations with Russia and that President Putin now genuinely wishes to anchor Russia firmly in the West. President Bush wishes to take advantage of this historic opportunity by moving definitively beyond the Cold War relationship, particularly with respect to strategic relations. The events of 11 September have been to some extent a catalyst for this new relationship: President Putin's rhetoric since the attacks has been noticeably warmer, and he has toned down considerably his opposition to NATO enlargement, though full NATO membership for Russia appears unlikely in the medium term. However, the recent Russian troop movement to Kabul is reminiscent of Russian action to take Pristina airport during the Kosovo conflict, and constitutes a reminder to us that Russia is still prepared to take unexpected military action.

140. The United States Government appears to be considering carefully a redefinition of NATO-Russia relations as part of its overall objective to move definitively beyond Cold War strategic frameworks. Senior United States officials visited expressed the belief that the Permanent Joint Council had not succeeded in establishing an effective, co-operative relationship between NATO and Russia. The United Kingdom Government shares the United States' view of the need to reform NATO-Russia relations, as evidenced by the Prime Minister's recent proposal for a new NAC-Russia Council, described in a letter to President Putin in November 2001. The Foreign Secretary told us that the proposal had been "the subject of intensive discussion with Washington and Moscow," as well as with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson.[96] The proposal is intended to establish a "more intensive relationship" between Russia and NATO. The Foreign Secretary expressed the belief that, if the proposals develop, they will "be a good example of where, in our position... as a bridge between the United States and Europe in its widest sense, we have been able to develop an initiative which I think will turn out to be acceptable to the United States and also to Russia."[97]

141. We recognise the value that NATO has provided to British security as both a military and political institution over the past fifty years. We support the Government's efforts to work with the US and Russia to ensure that the Alliance evolves to reflect the new security environment. We recommend that the Government ensure, in its policies towards NATO, that the Alliance's cohesion and effectiveness as a military organisation with full US engagement is maintained.

The European Union

142. Many commentators have claimed to see a significant difference of approach between European governments, which show a deep commitment to multilateralism, and a more unilateralist and isolationist stance taken by the United States. The row between the European Union and the US over the Kyoto Protocol[98] was the most prominent early example of this apparent difference of approach to international co-operation between the Bush Administration and the European Union.

143. Dr Steven Everts of the Centre for European Reform notes the "mixed reception" the Bush Administration has received in Europe. "While the foundations for close and constructive relations between the United States and the European Union are strong, many European policy-makers are worried about the overall neo-conservative bent of the Bush team and its hard-line attitude on many foreign policy issues." Dr Everts notes a "trend that unnerves many leaders and officials across Europe" towards "ever-growing 'US unilateralism'." He claims that "the Bush team has, so far, displayed a marked indifference, if not outright hostility, towards international agreements that the Europeans consider important."[99]

144. Dr Everts argues that "there has been for years a sense of drift in transatlantic co-operation on foreign policy" with respect to approaches to "rogue states (such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea)," to the use of economic sanctions, and to Middle East policy. He also notes US irritation with European Union countries over their

"distinctly underwhelming military capabilities and their continued reluctance to agree to a more equitable 'burden-sharing'; Europe's endemic inability to overcome its diplomatic incoherence and turn the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy into something credible and meaningful; the inexcusable foot-dragging on EU enlargement... and the sanctimonious grandstanding from Europeans on topics that the US deems unsuitable for transatlantic dialogue, such as the death penalty."[100]

145. In assessing differences of approach to foreign policy between the Clinton and Bush Administrations, some commentators suggested earlier this year that the Bush Administration wished to disengage from Europe, and to establish a clearer global 'division of labour' between the United States and Europe. Proponents of this view cited comments by Condoleezza Rice and others during the 2000 Presidential election campaign about possible withdrawal from military commitments in the Balkans, and a greater focus by the United States on the pursuit of foreign policy goals in the Pacific and Asia.

146. European fears about US disengagement from European security commitments were apparently refuted early in 2001 by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said that the United States had gone into the Balkans with its European allies and that it would pull out of the Balkans with them. However, the events of 11 September may have changed this policy to some extent. Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, addressing fellow NATO members shortly after 11 September, said that United States troops would be "less available"[101] for peacekeeping in the Balkans as a consequence of new military commitments in Afghanistan. Apparently the Pentagon, State Department and Department of Defence do not agree entirely on the role of the US in Europe.

147. Professor Michael Clarke argued that the US attitude towards European security has become clearer since the Kosovo crisis: "Where US policy-makers determine that a structural issue is at stake in European security, they will be heavily engaged; where they feel that a crisis will not affect the generally favourable security situation in Europe, they will look to their allies to deal with it themselves. In a serious crisis involving Russia in Europe, one would expect the US to be fully committed. In any subsequent crises in former Yugoslavia, such a commitment is now extremely doubtful."[102] While we see that this is a useful distinction, the boundary may not always be easy to define.

148. According to some of those whom we met in Washington, the events of 11 September have diminished the apparent differences between US and European approaches to problem solving in the field of foreign affairs. Some of those to whom we spoke perceived a greater acceptance among European governments of the need to address issues of global terrorism and to engage militarily in support of shared goals.

149. We were also told that the US was now more prepared than it was before 11 September to acknowledge the need to assist failing states, and to engage constructively with states of concern (what used to be termed 'rogue states'). The Foreign Secretary shares this view: he told us that, from his vantage point, the events of 11 September would "shift the balance of opinion in the United States much more towards engagement internationally than was there before."[103] Afghanistan does provide a useful test of degree of difference between the allies.

150. We were told repeatedly in the US that Britain enjoys a closer relationship with the United States than does any other European country. As we have already noted, this 'special' relationship has received a very high level of public prominence since 11 September. However, the Foreign Secretary reassured us that Britain's close relations with the US did not create tensions with partners in the European Union.[104] Mr Straw told us that he had in fact been struck by "the degree to which our other European colleagues have looked to us and to whichever minister has been taking the lead for the United Kingdom for a lead as to what has been happening in Afghanistan during the period of intense military conflict and to offer views about the position of the United States as well."[105]


151. The Bush Administration initially treated European Security and Defence Policy with some caution. The United States Government is clear that its 'bottom line' on ESDP is that European countries' commitments to NATO must take precedence over any to ESDP. ESDP applies only where NATO is not engaged. The worst scenario for European defence, in the view of one administration official, would be if ESDP were not properly resourced, but nonetheless produced a conflict of responsibilities for NATO members who were also members of the EU, thus weakening the Alliance. We were told that, if ESDP was seen to be working—and crucially that the project was generating genuine improvements in European defence capabilities—the United States would be increasingly disposed to lend expensive military assets such as strategic lift capabilities and intelligence to European defence projects. As a product of discussions, the views of the Administration with respect to ESDP appear to have become more positive.

152. Latterly, one of the Administration's concerns with respect to ESDP has been to ensure a satisfactory solution to the question of Turkey's role in the project. We heard during our visit to Washington that while the Administration has some sympathy with the Turkish position, and a strong sense that Turkey's sensitivities must be treated with respect, the United States also believes that the Turks should accept the reasonable propositions that have been offered to them. It appears from press reports that, following an attempt by Britain to broker a deal, Turkey has now accepted these proposals, which if accepted by other states would clear the way for implementation of ESDP with access to NATO facilities.[106]

153. There was no suggestion during our visit to Washington that the US stance with respect to Turkey's role in ESDP had been affected by the war against terrorism and the potential role of Turkey in providing peacekeeping troops for a putative mission to Afghanistan, though it does seem reasonable to assume that this has been a factor. The Administration would be prepared to accept the offer of Turkish forces, if appropriate conditions arose in Afghanistan.

154. The Foreign Secretary told us that ESDP was not a source of irritation in Britain's relations with the US. "In the time that I have been doing this job," he said, "nobody in the US Administration... has said anything disobliging about the ESDP to me, not one word."[107]

Regional conflicts


155. In one of its final reports before the 2001 general election, our predecessor Committee commented in detail on the situation in the Balkans.[108] The Committee underlined that "what happens in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo matters, and influences European security and stability."[109] The Report was the subject of a Commons debate on 6 December 2001, when the Minister with responsibility for South East Europe, Mr Denis MacShane, said that 'this has been a good year for the Balkans... Our concern is to establish regional stability... I think that Britain can take some credit in bringing peace and hope to this corner of Europe.'[110]"

156. In recent months, amendments to the constitution of Macedonia, elections in Kosovo in which both ethnic Albanians and Serbs participated,[111] the reopening of the Danube to shipping on 29 November 2001,[112] the indictment of Milosevic at the Hague Tribunal, and the continuing rehabilitation of Serbia and Yugoslavia in the international community, have contributed to an improvement in the political, economic and security situation in the Balkans. The work of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe has continued.[113] Yet, if the events of 11 September had not occurred, the Balkans would still feature prominently on newspaper front pages and television news bulletins.

157. With the region no longer so much in the news, it is as well to be reminded that NATO forces are still heavily committed in the Balkans: the 18,000 troops of SFOR continue their work in Bosnia and Herzegovina; KFOR, including a large American contingent, remains active in Kosovo in support of the interim administration (UNMIK); while in Macedonia a European-led NATO force polices the still uneasy peace between two ethnic communities, who have thus far avoided a bloody conflict on the scale of that which afflicted their northern neighbours. The Government's evidence to this inquiry mentions all these, and the American contribution to them, but is entirely retrospective.[114]

158. Such is the strength in depth of the US armed forces, there has so far been no sign of overstretch due to their simultaneous engagement in the Balkans and in the war against terrorism. A greater danger for the Balkan states would lie in US political disengagement from the region, followed by a military withdrawal. From our discussions in the United States, and our meeting in London on 29 November 2001 with President Kostunica, we see little prospect of such a disengagement in the short term. Any US withdrawal in the longer term would surely take place only after full consultation with its allies.[115] Nevertheless, the eyes of the United States are presently turned elsewhere, and history serves as a reminder of the folly of relaxing vigilance over the Balkans. We recommend that during the ongoing war against terrorism, the Government act to avoid any loss of momentum for reconstruction in the Balkans, by working for the continued full involvement and active participation of the United States in the region.


The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

159. For many years—and following the historic failures over the past hundred years of the British, French, League of Nations and United Nations attempts first to avoid and later to resolve the causes of the Middle East conflict—the United States has been closely involved in what has become known as the peace process. As Israel's most committed ally, and as the best potential source of the huge sums which will be necessary to reconstruct and guarantee peace in the region, only the United States has the power—"unique leverage on both sides", as James Rubin put it[116]—to force the pace.

160. When we were in the United States, we were able to discuss the peace process at the highest level in the United Nations, and with key people in the US Administration, including State Department Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, William Burns. We learned that there is more than one view about why the peace process has failed so far, but near-unanimity on what has to be done to enable it to succeed. With the latest escalation in violence, however, the chances of success appear to have receded.

161. The greatest obstacle to progress remains intransigence on both sides: the Palestinian Authority claims sovereignty over the Palestinian people but is unconvincing in its commitment to end suicide bombings and to prevent the thousands of lesser acts of violence which occur almost daily; while the Israeli Government maintains an aggressive posture towards the occupied territories and unrealistically demands a complete cessation of all violence before it will even negotiate. All those to whom we spoke agreed that if both sides would move a little, it would open the door to implementation of the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee and of the timetable set out in the Tenet plan, leading successively to negotiations, confidence-building, substantive talks about peace and the possibility of a lasting settlement.

162. In its written evidence, the Government set out its position as follows:

"The US and UK share similar overall aims on the Middle East Peace Process. Our aim is a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the principle of 'land for peace', security for Israel within recognised borders, and an end to occupation."[117]

To the extent that American and British views on the Middle East are "similar" rather than identical, the British have tended to be more willing to engage with the Palestinians, while the US has generally been more protective of Israeli interests. These differences of emphasis may not be unhelpful and may even lend a synergistic edge to the momentum for peace.[118]

163. The need to achieve peace in the Middle East has become more urgent since the terrorist attacks on the United States. These attacks caused the postponement of an important, US-inspired initiative. With the United Kingdom foremost among those stressing the necessity of continued US engagement in the Middle East, the initiative has recently been revived.[119] The role of the United Kingdom in maintaining momentum in the peace process has, we were told, made a difference.[120] For the first time, the United States is talking in terms of a state of Palestine.[121] The British Government has sketched out some of the essential features of such a state: a high degree of territorial contiguity, responsibility for internal security, and the development of a full range of institutions necessary for effective governance:[122] in short, what the Prime Minister has called a "viable Palestinian state."[123] If the Americans are now prepared to pull on the levers of influence which they undoubtedly hold, if the Israelis can be convinced that they have a safe future within secure borders, and if the Palestinians can be persuaded that they stand to achieve the greater part of their aspirations, the process may yet succeed.

164. Britain and its allies, especially the United States, will have to be prepared for a lengthy, sustained commitment to underpin the peace settlement, when it comes. We note Colin Powell's statement that the United States "will work urgently with our international partners on an economic reconstruction effort to help rebuild the Palestinian economy."[124] The price of peace may turn out to be uncomfortably high, but the price of the conflict to date in terms of both economic and human loss has been incalculably and unacceptably high.

165. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office believes that "the effort to counter terrorism has to be accompanied by parallel, sustained efforts to reinvigorate the search for peace in the Middle East. The dispute between Israel and her Arab neighbours remains the most destabilising issue in the region, and will fuel terrorism as long as it remains unresolved."[125] We will continue to monitor developments in the peace process and may return to it in our inquiry into Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.

166. Meanwhile, we recommend that the Government lend its full support to renewed efforts by the United States to achieve success in the Middle East peace process on the basis of the Mitchell Committee proposals, by bringing pressure to bear on the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority and by standing ready to contribute towards such diplomatic, practical and economic assistance as may be required.

Other regional issues of concern

167. Success in the Middle East will not be achieved overnight or even at all by agreement on the relatively narrow dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. There are long-standing enmities between Israel and her Arab neighbours to be resolved, and the region as a whole is unstable. The Foreign Secretary's two visits to Iran, and the Prime Minister's talks with regional leaders, were significant steps towards removing some of the tensions which have contributed to this instability, but their significance also goes beyond purely regional issues. Iran's dual status as a member of the coalition with an active interest in a stable Afghanistan on its border, and as a state of concern with a recent history of extreme hostility towards the West, lends it a particular importance in contemporary international relations. The European Union's External Affairs Commissioner, Chris Patten, has regretted the decision by Congress on 27 July to extend sanctions against Iran for a further 5 years,[126] and the EU has recently approved a proposal for a trade and co-operation agreement with Iran.[127]

168. Iraq remains the greatest threat to a wider peace in the region, but other countries, including Syria (which harbours several organisations listed by the US as terrorist groups) continue to give cause for concern. The stability of pro-Western regimes such as Saudi Arabia is being threatened both internally, by strong social, political and economic pressures, and externally, by the stresses imposed by their support—however lukewarm in some cases—for the campaign against terrorism.[128]

169. The Foreign Secretary showed that he and the Government are aware of the significance of regional stability for global stability. It appears that the United States accepts this too, although it understandably has more pressing priorities in the shorter term and has been disappointed by the less than wholehearted support it has received from some of its regional allies. The role of the United Kingdom, then, is to use its influence with the Bush Administration by continuing to remind the United States of the big picture, while actively engaging—and encouraging US engagement—with the key players in the Middle East, with the exception at this stage of Iraq.

170. We conclude that the Government's and European Union's policies of constructive engagement with Iran deserve full support. We recommend that the Government should continue to be bold in developing these contacts, extending them as appropriate to other countries in the Middle East, in the interests of long-term peace and stability in the region, and that it should seek to persuade the United States of their value. At the same time, the problems and pressures faced by countries with which the United Kingdom and the United States already have friendly relations must not be downplayed or underestimated.


171. In the opinion of Mr Kofi Annan, there are two fault lines which threaten long-term stability in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent: the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. The former of these conflicts (which we deal with in paras 159 to 166 above) has received markedly more attention in the West, particularly in the United States, than has the latter. Yet the parties to the Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan, are both nuclear powers, with a history of mutual mistrust and hostility, which has on several occasions developed into armed conflict. The situation in Kashmir is, arguably, as great a threat to regional and even to global peace and stability as is that in the Middle East.

172. Like the Middle East conflict, the Kashmir dispute has gained added significance since 11 September, due to its location on the periphery of central Asia and due to the fact that both of the parties to it have a close but incongruent interest in any future settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistan, as a country intimately linked to Afghanistan by historical, ethnic, religious, linguistic and trading ties, faces the danger of civil and even military unrest consequent on its support for the actions of the coalition against terrorism.[129] It cannot afford to be seen to be weak in relation to the Kashmir question and continues to provide a degree of support to separatist movements in the Indian-controlled area. India is not inclined to be seen to give ground in the face of what it sees as acts of terrorism in the areas of Kashmir under its control. It views the coalition action in Afghanistan as bolstering its position: in the words of the Indian Prime Minister, "India's long, lone fight against terrorism has finally become an international coalition against terrorism."[130]

173. We do not intend in this Report to make recommendations about a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Our purpose here is to report to the House that, despite the explicit concern of the United Nations Secretary General and others we met in New York, we gained the impression when we visited Washington that Kashmir is well down the US political agenda, both in the Administration and in Congress. While the Government has told us that it has been working with the US in the region,[131] there has been little to show for it thus far. As early as 1948, India and Pakistan agreed at the United Nations that "the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite."[132] Since then, further UN Resolutions, frequent armed clashes and occasional peace talks have failed to resolve matters.

174. We agree with the Foreign Secretary that "the dispute can be resolved only by bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan,"[133] but, as in the Middle East, it is the United States which holds the biggest levers of influence and it is the United States which will need to act decisively to bring that influence to bear. It may need to be reminded of this by its friends. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United States is fully seized of the importance of achieving a solution to the Kashmir problem, and of the need for it to use its influence to help bring about such a solution.

175. We will continue to keep each of these regional conflicts under review in the course of our inquiry into Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.

BBC World Service radio broadcasts to the United States

176. Lamenting the decision by BBC World Service to cease short-wave transmission of its programmes to North America, Charles Morrill of Charlottesville, Virginia, e-mailed us to say that "the BBC's coverage of world affairs in English for North Americans was some of the best money you folks ever spent. I'm sorry to see it end. Our two countries can only understand each other less and less."[134] BBC World Service acknowledged that "our plan to cut short wave in North America upset some listeners there" but insisted that "our decision went with the grain of emerging listener habits in the USA."[135] They also disclosed that before short-wave transmissions ceased in July 2001, an estimated 1.2 million people in the USA listened on short wave, of whom about 260,000 (10 percent of the total number of listeners) relied on it exclusively. Ten percent may be a small proportion of the total audience, but a quarter of a million people have had their sole means of access to BBC World Service broadcasts removed.

177. It may be that these quarter million people are not part of the BBC's "target audience of opinion-formers and decision-makers (cosmopolitans)" who, apparently, are more likely to listen to FM frequencies or to access broadcasts using the internet or digital audio.[136] We accept the validity of the strategy to target "cosmopolitans", but we are uneasy about the effective cutting off of a significant number of former listeners. We note that the resources saved from the cutbacks in the North America service have been reinvested in the service to Afghanistan.[137] We intend to look into this matter further, assessing the costs and benefits of some of the spending decisions made by BBC World Service, when we undertake our annual inquiry into the FCO's Departmental Report in 2002.

178. For all its targeting of a "cosmopolitan" audience, the BBC World Service's North American service broadcasts exclusively in the English language. This is despite evidence that "many of those accessing [BBC World Service] Arabic, Spanish, Chinese and English sites come from the USA", which might suggest there is a demand for foreign language broadcasts. The demographic profile of the United states is changing, with Spanish-speakers increasing as a proportion of the population, and increased immigration from the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian Sub-Continent. Although there is a large potential audience of Arab, Pakistani and other ethnic minority listeners in the US who will be wishing to listen to news coverage of events in the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region, there is no evidence that BBC World Service is planning to target that audience. We recommend that BBC World Service consider broadcasting to the United States in languages other than English, especially in Spanish and Arabic.

BBC World's television coverage in the United States of the campaign against terrorism

179. While in the United States, we heard some criticism of BBC America's news coverage of the events of 11 September. The points made to us fell into two categories: the suggestion that by switching its service over to BBC World's rolling news service BBC America had failed to provide coverage tailored for its US audience; and the somewhat contradictory point that BBC World news items produced for audiences in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian Sub-Continent, were not used as a source of material for broadcasts which might be viewed by the large expatriate communities from those regions in the US.

180. We invited BBC World—which is an independent company not funded out of the licence fee or FCO grants—to comment on these points. BBC World responded with a very full dossier of plaudits received from viewers, and press articles praising BBC America's coverage of the attacks and comparing it favourably with the coverage provided by other broadcasters. The managing Director of BBC World told us that "we have not received any negative feedback on our coverage or availability in the US post September 11th."[138] Citing various examples of broadcasts from those regions to which the criticisms we had heard referred, he went on to state that "our policy is to provide the same news service everywhere" and that "much of the praise from the US specifically thanked the BBC for providing a global perspective, in contrast to the US centred views available on all other channels." Clearly, the people from whom BBC World has been hearing are not the same people as those we met while we were in the US.

181. Since BBC World is not a publicly-funded body, it is not for us to make recommendations to it or to draw conclusions about it. We have aired the concerns which were raised with us, and we are pleased to be able to place BBC World's response on the record.

Representing and promoting United Kingdom interests in the United States

182. A total of 640 staff work in 18 British diplomatic and consular posts in the United States.[139] Of these, 158 are United Kingdom-based (i.e., have been posted to the US), while 482—some of whom are British nationals—are locally engaged. By far the highest numbers—259—work at the British Embassy in Washington; 181 work in one of the four New York offices, 52 of them at the Mission to the United Nations; the remainder work in the 13 other posts, the largest of which are in Los Angeles and in Chicago, accounting for 41 and 40 staff respectively. The smallest post, in Phoenix, has a staff of only one.

183. These figures reflect the importance of the United Kingdom's operation in the United States and demonstrate a high level of commitment by the FCO to the maintenance of the special relationship. Whenever we travel abroad as a Committee, we regard it as part of our task to assess the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's representation in the countries we visit. This is a particularly important part of our remit, especially when visiting the United States. Below, we consider the United Kingdom's promotion in the US of trade and investment; raise questions about decisions concerning the future of the diplomatic estate in the US; and evaluate the quality of the United Kingdom's diplomatic representation in New York and in Washington.


184. Policy on trade and investment is a matter for our colleagues on the Trade and Industry select committee. British Trade International, the organisation set up in May 1999 to take lead responsibility within Government for trade development and promotion and, since May 2000, for inward investment, reports to both the DTI and the FCO. Our proper concern as the Foreign Affairs Committee is with the promotion, through diplomatic posts, of trade and investment opportunities in other countries.

185. In the United States, the United Kingdom's trade and investment promotion activity is run from the office of the New York Consul-General and Director-General of UK Trade and Investment, Mr Tom Harris. The heads of Invest.UK-USA and of Trade Partners UK USA hold Deputy Consul-General rank. While much activity takes place in New York and Washington, most of the trade work in particular is conducted through a network of regional posts, in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Phoenix, Puerto Rico, San Francisco and Seattle. Each of these posts acts as a regional hub, sponsoring activity in neighbouring cities. This approach has been favoured over the alternative, adopted by some of the United Kingdom's competitors, of a presence in every commercial centre, on the grounds that it is more efficient but no less effective. We heard no evidence that the regional hub model works less well than the alternative, but its success clearly depends in part on correct identification of where the hubs should be situated.

186. The objective of Invest.UK-USA is to promote the United Kingdom as a location for US companies' activities in Europe, and to help maximise the United Kingdom's share of direct investment by US companies within the European Union. Seven of the regional offices in the US listed in para 185 above include a regional inward investment team. The 17 investment officers working in the US, several of whom have been seconded from industry, are supported by 19 other staff in the US and a further 17 in London. In 2000-2001, 421 out of 869 foreign investment projects in the United Kingdom were from the US. Approximately 40 percent of the total stock of foreign investment in the United Kingdom is made by US companies, while the same proportion of US investment in the EU as a whole is in the United Kingdom.[140] This achievement is not thought to be under serious threat from the expected economic downturn in the United States.

187. One notable aspect of trade and investment promotion activity in the US is the high proportion of locally-engaged staff who undertake it. Both Trade Partners UK and Invest.UK regard these staff as a valuable asset. Their local knowledge and familiarity with the American way of doing business add value to the operation. The British American Business Council and British American Business Inc, on the other hand, identified a need to "continue to improve the quality of the sector specialists and locally engaged staff [in] trade/investment offices".[141] We note that, following a 1999 inspection, pay for locally-engaged staff has been increased "significantly".[142]

188. The FCO's Science and Technology Network in the US—with which both Trade Partners UK and Invest.UK work closely—is being strengthened, by the addition to the existing 5 Washington-based posts of a further 8 posts, in Boston, Houston, Los Angeles and San Francisco.[143] The S&T Network works to provide access for United Kingdom companies to US technology, and fosters links between research institutions in the two countries. Its activities are in line with the current priorities for United Kingdom trade promotion in the US and its services are available to posts throughout the US.

189. The new closeness of the relationship with the United States might be seen as representing an opportunity for the United Kingdom to sell into or attract investment from the world's most important market. It is certainly not unreasonable to hope that outstanding differences between the United Kingdom, its EU partners and the US about trade barriers, protectionism and other practices may be resolved with increased understanding and goodwill on both sides. Since September 11th, difficulties for British companies have been compounded by the disastrous effect upon the United Kingdom travel and tourist industry. We were pleased to hear the Foreign Secretary agree that "we need to make use of the relationship in a very active way, to ensure that trade at every level is seen as a two way street."[144]

190. We recommend that the Government, with the United States Government, do all it can to resolve outstanding trade issues between our countries, and to encourage US citizens not to be deterred from travelling to the United Kingdom for their vacations.

191. We welcome the significant investment in human and other resources which is being made in both Trade Partners UK and Invest.UK-USA. However, it is not clear how the effectiveness of this investment is measured and monitored. We would wish to see comparisons drawn with best practice in the commercial sector in analysing returns on marketing investment in terms of value of projects won and jobs secured. This is an issue we may wish to return to when we consider the annual reports of the FCO and of British Trade International.


192. The FCO's written evidence suggests that the United Kingdom is committed to securing an agreement on air services between the United Kingdom and the United States by the end of 2001.[145] The principal attraction to the United Kingdom of securing a liberalisation of the present, restrictive Bermuda II agreement would be access to US domestic routes; for the United States, an agreement would provide access to Heathrow for more of its airlines, and rights to fly on to other EU destinations from British airports. Negotiations have foundered on identifying a suitable mechanism for providing British airlines with access to the US domestic travel market. Some form of alliance between British and American airlines is the most likely solution. We note the Foreign Secretary's expectation that this longstanding dispute "can be resolved quite quickly"[146] and look forward to an announcement very shortly.


193. The FCO owns a large number of properties in the United States, some of them in prime locations.[147] As part of its "asset recycling and estate modernisation programmes", the FCO is selling some of these properties.[148] So far in financial year 2001/02, the FCO has raised £1.6 million from property sales in Washington and New York; further sales worth up to £30 million are planned by the end of financial year 2003/04.[149] Under an agreement with the Treasury, the FCO is permitted to reinvest the proceeds of these sales in "modernisation" of its estate, although money raised from disposals in the US will not necessarily be reinvested in that country.

194. The decision to dispose of a property is based on assessments of a set of key performance indicators, which are intended to identify "under-performing" properties.[150] The indicators should reveal:

  Whether the economic potential of a property is being fully exploited by the FCO;

  Whether a property asset is providing an adequate return on capital invested, as measured in terms of rent savings;

  How the Annual Resource Cost (ARC) of a freehold property (i.e. the capital charge and depreciation costs) compares with the cost of leasing an equivalent alternative;

  How the size of residential accommodation compares with the standard for the grade of the officer housed;

  What density of occupation is achieved in the offices;

  How the net useable floor space in office buildings compares with gross internal area;

  Whether buildings are in good condition and;

  Whether properties are fit for purpose (e.g. compatible with needs of modern IT) and provide adequate security.

195. Under the resource accounting conventions which now apply throughout Government, it is the annual resource cost element of this range of indicators which is becoming increasingly important. Where, as in the case of the residence of the San Francisco Consul-General in which our predecessor Committee took an interest,[151] a large building contains rooms which are not fully used, this under-performance of resources—however notional—will show up on the balance sheet as a charge. The combined annual resource cost and depreciation factor for the San Francisco Residence, known as the total capital charge, is £743,000.[152] This figure operates to provide a powerful incentive to the managers of the FCO estate to find an alternative property, with a lower charge.

196. The FCO told us that the key performance indicators "are not... treated as conclusive in themselves, and the FCO is careful to arrive at a balanced overall picture of a property before reaching any firm conclusions."[153] We endorse this approach, provided that it is applied with the intention of achieving a true balance of considerations. We recommend that, when assessing the value of the diplomatic estate to United Kingdom taxpayers, the FCO and Treasury ensure that the 'diplomatic balance sheet' of the contribution made by properties to promoting the United Kingdom's interests is regarded as being no less important than the financial balance sheet.


197. We have already referred to the very high standard of the work of the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations in New York.[154] Of vital importance to the promotion and protection of this country's interests as that Mission is, the bilateral relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States remains, to use the Government's own words "one of the cornerstones of British foreign policy".[155] It is therefore of prime importance that the quality of representation in Washington should be of the highest order.

198. It is worth quoting at length here from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's memorandum of evidence to this inquiry:

"Even with the closer rapport since 11 September, the Government does not and cannot take for granted the long-term health of the UK-US bilateral relationship or the broader transatlantic one. The United States has a complex political system and foreign policy-making process. This requires not just good high level access but a broad range of contacts across various levels of the Administration. It means taking into account the important role of Congress and the increased overlap between domestic and international affairs. It requires the ability to influence the powerful lobby groups, some of whose interests or outlook may be opposed to those of the UK. It means being able to deal directly with the powerful US media and having a presence at State level not just to promote British commercial links but to influence public opinion and opinion-formers throughout the US. With an eye to the longer-term, it also requires an understanding of the increasingly multicultural nature of US society."[156]

199. This statement is, to borrow an American term, insightful. It tallies very closely with what we observed during our visit to Washington, where at every level of the Embassy, from the top down, we encountered thoroughly professional, diligent and successful people who have a well-developed understanding of the country they work in, who make use of their access and contacts in ways which allow them to deal directly with all the important policy-makers and opinion-formers in the United States. We commend the performance of the British Embassy in Washington, and express our appreciation of the excellent work done by its staff at every level.

200. We end our consideration of the United Kingdom's representation in the United States with some further thoughts arising from the terrible events of 11 September. While the destruction of part of the Pentagon in Maryland, which we were able to view from the Pentagon's Naval Annex, is truly appalling, the scenes of utter devastation at the site of the World Trade Center in Manhattan are of a different order. Many Britons, though thankfully fewer than originally feared, lost their lives in the indiscriminate assault on those who worked in or were merely visiting the twin towers on 11 September. As well as paying our respects at the scene of this dreadful crime, we made a point of meeting some of the staff of the New York Consulate-General who, in its aftermath, worked tirelessly on behalf of British victims, their families and friends. Some of these staff themselves had close personal links with people directly caught up in the attack.

201. Again, we reproduce in extenso a section of the FCO's written evidence:

"On and after 11 September, the Consulate-General in New York gave a superb example of what a properly-resourced Post can do in a crisis. Able to draw on over 60 staff (and the resources of the other Posts in New York), the Post set up a 24-hour emergency call centre in close communication with the crisis centres in London and locally in New York. Setting up a separate British Family Centre in a hotel proved invaluable in providing a first class and discreet service to visiting families. This Centre housed the Police Family Liaison Officers and Counsellors, in addition to experienced Consulate-General staff. It allowed the main Consulate-General to move back towards more normal working and to handle reporting requirements, the media and visitors, and the 'UK with NY' Festival, to which the New York authorities attached much value as a demonstration of solidarity."[157]

The Foreign Secretary added his own tribute when he appeared before us.[158]

202. We congratulate the entire staff of the Consulate-General and other posts in New York for their exemplary action on behalf of British victims of the attack on the World Trade Center, and on the consistently high standard of their representation of British interests.


203. We sensed in New York and Washington, if we did not know it already, that now is an extraordinary time in British-US relations. The United Kingdom and the United States are working as closely together as they have ever done. Indeed, on 11 September the immediate outpouring of sympathy by the British people and the immediate expressions of solidarity and practical co-operation by the British Government had a remarkable and positive effect on US public and official opinion. Neither side pretends that there are no differences between them, but both sides know that the relationship is sufficiently mature and enduring to accommodate them. The foundations of British-US relations are broad, deep and substantial.

204. This country's status as a leading member of the European Union adds to rather than detracts from its role as the premier ally of the United States. The United Kingdom is in a position to represent the United States to Europe, and Europe to the United States. Because of its historical experience, and particularly through its Commonwealth links, it offers the United States a depth of knowledge of parts of the globe where America has not traditionally met with understanding. The excellent working relationship at the United Nations is evidence, if needed, of the two countries' closeness.

205. The response of the British Government to September 11 has demonstrated once again that the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States remains special. It is the firm view of the Foreign Affairs Committee that it is in the interests of both countries that it remains so.

1   Q43. Back

2   Ev. p. 17. Back

3   IbidBack

4   Ev. Appendices 8 & 9. Back

5   Ev. p. 23. Back

6   See Back

7   As reported by BBC News, see Back

8   Q18. Back

9   Q23. Back

10   Ev. p. 17. Back

11   Annex p. xliv. Back

12   See Press Notice No. 7 of Session 2001-02: Back

13   Ev. p. 18. Back

14   Ev. p. 17. Back

15   Q1. Back

16   Q51. Back

17   Q1. Back

18   Q2. Back

19   Ev. p. 64, Appendix 8. Back

20   Q41. Back

21   Ev. p. 22. Back

22   Ibid. Back

23   QQ50, 69, 70. Back

24   The work programme was submitted on 19 October. Back

25   For the full text of UNSCR 1373, see Back

26   See Back

27   Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington DC, 1 May 2001. Http:// Back

28   Ibid. Back

29   Deputy Secretary of State for Defence Paul Wolfowitz, "Building a military for the 21st Century", 3 October 2001, Back

30   For further details, see Weapons of Mass Destruction, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, HC 407, paras. 31-33. Back

31   Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington DC, 1 May 2001. Http:// Back

32   Deputy Secretary of State for Defence Paul Wolfowitz, testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on Ballistic Missile Defence, 19 July 2001 Back

33   The Guardian, 10 February 2001 Back

34   "Bush flatly states US will pull out of missile treaty," New York Times, 24 August 2001 Back

35   Ev. p. 19. Back

36   As at 11 December 2001. Back

37   Q63. Back

38   "Russia wary as Bush orders defence review," The Guardian, 10 February 2001 Back

39   "US dismisses treaty tradeoff for Star Wars," The Guardian, 14 August 2001 Back

40   Weapons of Mass Destruction, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, HC 407, xv, para. 39. Back

41   US Department of State press statement "Bush, Putin Conclude Three Days of Talks on Arms Issues, Afghanistan", 15 November 2001, Back

42   US Department of State press statement "Afghanistan Dominates Bush-Putin Talks, Rice Says", 15 November 2001, Back

43   Ev. p. 20. Back

44   HC Deb, 24 October 2001, cols. 272-73. Back

45   Q61. Back

46   Ev. p. 20. Back

47   Ev. not printed. Back

48   Weapons of Mass Destruction, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1999-2000, HC 407, para. 50. Back

49   Ev. p. 67, Appendix 9. Back

50   Ev. p. 59, Appendix 6. Back

51   Ev. p. 58, Appendix 6. Back

52   Ev. not printed. Back

53   Ev. p. 58, Appendix 6. Back

54   Q44. Back

55   Ev. p. 76, Appendix 11. Back

56   Q55. Back

57   Q57. Back

58   Ibid. Back

59   Center for Security Policy. See­D43.shtml Back

60   See Back

61   Ev. p. 59, Appendix 6. Back

62   Ev. p. 21. Back

63   Q57. Back

64   HC Deb, 8 June 2000, col. 306w. Back

65   Ev. p. 76, Appendix 11. Back

66   Ev. p. 20. Back

67   Statement by the United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological Weapons Conventions States Parties, Geneva, Switzerland, 25 July 2001. Back

68   Q56. Back

69   John R. Bolton, Under Secretary General for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 19 November 2001. Back

70   John R. Bolton, Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference meeting, 19 November 2001. Back

71   Q51. Back

72   Q56. Back

73   Q51. Back

74   Q57. Back

75   Q51. Back

76   See Back

77   Ev. p. 45. Back

78   WMD Report, para 81. Back

79   WMD Government Response, p. 6. Back

80   Ev. p. 45. Back

81   Ev. p. 21. Back

82   Ev. p. 55, Appendix 5. Back

83   WMD Report, para 119 and Ev. App. 51. Back

84   Deputy Under Secretary of State, Defence and Security, FCO. Back

85   Q57 . Back

86   Ev. p. 66, Appendix 9. Back

87   John R. Bolton, Under Secretary General for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons Convention RevCon meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 19 November 2001. Back

88   Ev. p. 23. Back

89   Ibid. Back

90   Ibid. Back

91   Q72. Back

92   We do, however, note Professor Michael Clarke's comment that UK forces face "increasing difficulty" in "keeping up with technological developments within US forces." Ev. p. 2. Back

93   Q72. Back

94   Ev. p. 2. Back

95   Ibid. Back

96   QQ74-77. Back

97   Q76. Back

98   See section above on the Kyoto Protocol. Back

99   Ev. not printed. See A Question of Norms: Transatlantic Divergences in Foreign Policy, International Spectator Vol XXXVI, No. 2, April-June 2001. Back

100   IbidBack

101   Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz speech at NATO, 26 September 2001, US Department of State press briefing Back

102   Ev. p. 1. Back

103  03 Q69. Back

104   Q49. Back

105   Ibid. Back

106   See,,2001540013­2001561492,00.html Back

107   Q68. Back

108   Government Policy towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the wider Region following the Fall of Milosevic, Seventh Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2000-01, HC 246. Back

109   HC246, 2000-01, para. 190. Back

110   See HC Deb, 6 December 2001, cols 139WH-178WH. Back

111   HC Deb, 23 November 2001, col. 526W. Back

112   See Back

113   See FCO website, Back

114   Ev. p. 26. Back

115   On 19 July 2001, President Bush said in the UK that "In the Balkans... we came in together and we're going to leave together." See; see also Paul Wolfowitz cit. para 146 above. Back

116   Q18. Back

117   Ev. p. 26. Back

118   Q46. Back

119   For the full text of Mr Powell's remarks, see Back

120   Q18; see also Ev. p. 65, Appendix 8. Back

121   For the full text of Mr Powell's remarks, see Back

122   See HC Deb, 26 November 2001, col. 650W. Back

123   See Back

124   See Back

125   Ev. p. 26. Back

126   See Back

127   See Back

128   QQ20&21. Back

129   Q27. Back

130   As reported by BBC News, see Back

131   Q85. Back

132   UNSCR 47 (1948). Back

133   HC Deb, 27 November 2001, col. 814. Back

134   Ev. p. 48, Appendix 1. Back

135   Ev. p. 100, Appendix 13. Back

136   Ibid. Back

137   Ibid. Back

138   Ev. p. 102, Appendix 14. Back

139   Not including staff in the Defence Section and the Film Office; see Ev. p. 29. Back

140   Ev. p. 97, Appendix 12. Back

141   Ev. p. 62, Appendix 7. Back

142   Ev. p. 97, Appendix 12. Back

143   Ibid. Back

144   Q54. Back

145   Ev. p. 24. Back

146   Q45. Back

147   Ev. p. 47. Back

148   Ev. p. 41. Back

149   Ibid. Back

150   Ev. p. 46. Back

151   See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2001, Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2000-2001, HC 428. Back

152   Ev. p. 46. Back

153   Ibid. Back

154   See para 37 above. Back

155   Ev. p. 17. Back

156   Ibid. Back

157   Ev. p. 29. Back

158   Q39. Back

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