APPENDIX 5
Memorandum from Saferworld
Introduction
1. The events of 11 September will have
widespread repercussions for US-UK relations. One important area
that may be affected is arms export control policy. The purpose
of this briefing is to highlight current attempts by the Bush
Administration to repeal some arms export control measures, identify
the potential dangers of proliferation at this time, and urge
the UK to maintain and rigorously implement its control and push
for co-ordinated international restraint.
The US Position
2. Subsequent to the attacks in New York
and Washington the Bush administration has sought to establish
a more permissive regime for arms exports from the US. The administration
was reported in the Washington Post[22]
as having proposed in closed-door briefings to members of the
House and Senate to end all congressional restrictions or US military
sales to any country supporting the US fight on terrorism for
the next five years.
3. A State Department legal spokesman was
quoted as saying that the blanket waiver would apply to all current
prohibitions, including those related to human rights, terrorism
and non-payment of debt. "It gives the president authority
to be able to provide assistance even though it might ordinarily
be restricted [by] one or more types" of prohibitions, the
spokesman said.
4. This apparently met stiff Congressional
resistance, and President Bush later denied that any such waiver
was sought[23].
However, embargoes on sales of military equipment to Pakistan
and India have been lifted and there are reports that there are
plans to also lift controls on Indonesia. Inside The Pentagon
reported a State Department spokesperson saying on 4 October that
"At this time we're looking specifically at the needs in
regards to Pakistan and India; however, it is a work in progress
and other actions may need to be taken," she said. "We
are not asking for a broad authority at this time; however, if
the situation warrants we could seek additional authorities. We
will, of course, continue to monitor our needs as the situation
develops."
5. It is vital that combating terrorism
is a key focus of foreign policy at this time. However, Saferworld
is concerned that this must be viewed no in isolation but alongside
other priorities such as protection of human rights, maintenance
of regional stability and controls on weapons proliferation. There
is a danger that these concerns will be sidelined in the current
climate, with an impact on export control policy.
6. The short-term approach of providing
military equipment or assistance to strategically important states
ignores the long-term implications of arming countries in a region
susceptible to change. Whilst the supply of military equipment
may be a useful tool for building coalitions, there are a number
of examples from the recent past where arming states with undemocratic
or unstable regimes to fight for a common cause has had serious
repercussions.
— During the 1970s and 1980s the US
offered military equipment and assistance to Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlevi in Iran, only for a popular uprising to bring an Islamic
fundamentalist government to power with a fleet of F-16 fighter
jets and other weaponry available to them, courtesy of previous
US support.
— Britain and its allies played a part
in substantially increasing Iraq's military capability through
the 1980s in their conflict with Iran, only for those same exports
to be turned against allied forces during the Gulf War.
— When the US intervened in Somalia
in 1992, they faced American-made M-16 rifles, machine guns, howitzers,
armored personnel carriers, and anti-tank missiles, part of the
US154 million worth of weapons earlier supplied to Somalia by
the US Government[24].
— In Afghanistan, the US supplied Afghan
guerrillas with a substantial number of Stinger anti-aircraft
weapons in 1986. Following the Soviet retreat in 1989, the US
tried to buy back the Stingers, but with limited success. The
Taliban are now in possession of these US manufactured weapons,
ready to use them against the country that initially supplied
them. Similarly, Barrett M82A1 sniper rifles, used by US marines
in the Gulf War to attack Iraqi armoured vehicles, are in the
hands of the A1 Qaeda network.
Export policy in the UK
7. UK export control policy is based on
compliance with the eight criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on
Arms Exports, and works is ongoing through the EU Council to improve
the implementation of the EU Code. The UK Export Control Bill,
which is currently going through Parliament, will establish in
law a number of Purposes of export controls which are broadly
consistent with the EU Code criteria (with the exception of the
exclusion of sustainable development from the Bill). Both instruments
reflect an increasing international understanding that arms transfers
should be governed by the consistent application of certain principles,
for example that arms exports should not be permitted where there
is a risk that they may be used to abuse human rights, to undermine
international stability or to facilitate acts of terrorism.
8. Saferworld has raised concerns in the
past about the need for the UK Government to rigorously implement
its export controls. The export criteria state that export licence
will not be issued "if there is a clear risk that the intended
recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another
country or to assert by force a territorial claim". Yet the
Government's Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls for 2000
highlights that the UK is exporting equipment with a potentially
offensive use to India and Pakistan (in dispute over Kashmir).
These cases are of particular concern given the current environment
(see below). The following licences were granted last year:
India—699 Standard Individual Export
Licences (SIELS), including components and technology for combat
aircraft and combat helicopters, components and technology for
surface-to-air missiles;
Pakistan—88 SIELs, including components
for combat helicopter, 171 shotguns, military communications equipment;
and
9. Now more than ever, it is vital that
the UK apply a restrictive interpretation of the EU Code criteria,
especially for arms transfer to those states most closely affected
by the situation in Afghanistan. Commentators have raised potential
concerns over internal uprisings in certain countries (eg Pakistan),
renewed regional conflict (eg between India and Pakistan in Kashmir),
increased regional instability (in the Middle East) and prospects
that other states in the region may use the current climate as
a pretext for clamping down on other forms of internal dissent.
Now is a time for increased restraint in arms exports and it is
important that the increasing moves towards relaxing export controls
in the US do not have a knock-on effect on UK and EU policy.
10. There have been signs in recent weeks
that the current crisis is impacting on British foreign policy.
British opposition to Russian involvement in Chechnya has softened
with Prime Minister Blair quoted as saying: "It is very obvious
to us that those militants who are trying to oppose [Russian forces]
in Chechnya are connected with international terrorism"[25].
And The Guardian has reported that "Mr Blair has even
promised to renew defence links with Pakistan."[26].
At International Question Time fringe meeting at the Labour Party
Conference in Brighton, Ben Bradshaw, the Minister responsible
for arms exports in the Foreign Office, questioned whether it
was right to refuse to export weapons to Algeria, Indonesia and
Sri Lanka as they were democratically-elected governments facing
internal terrorist threats. It is important that the new climate
does not lead to countries' attitudes to terrorism overriding
other concerns about the impact exports may have on exacerbating
internal conflict or fuelling internal repression.
— Saferworld recommends that the UK
Government institute a policy of presumption of denial for arms
exports to all countries in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle
East. This would mean that export licence applications would be
refused unless there was demonstrable proof that the arms were
necessary for self-defence.
11. As one of the main arms-supplying states
of the EU, the UK should also take a lead in encouraging other
EU states to implement responsible arms export policies at this
time. Furthermore, as a key ally of the US and as its main supporter
in this conflict, the UK should seek to act as a restraining influence
upon the US. There is also a need to co-ordinate restraint with
other partners in the new "coalition against terrorism".
The Pakistan News Service reported on 9 October that Russia
is planning a shipment of $45 million of arms to the Northern
Alliance, including tanks, combat vehicles, small arms and ammunition.
Given the past experiences listed above of arming unstable actors
in pursuit of short-term foreign policy goals, the UK should work
with all its partners in ensuring that these earlier mistakes
are not repeated.
12. The current situation also highlights
the value of parliamentary scrutiny of arms export licences in
advance of a final decision by Government. Consideration by experienced
parliamentarians of licence applications will be important to
ensure that all the export control criteria are implemented rigorously
and given equal weight.
— Saferworld therefore recommends that
the Government reconsider the proposals by the Quadripartite Select
Committee to institute a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny
of export licence applications.[27]
Saferworld
October 2001
22 "Bush Seeks Wider Foreign-Aid Power-Waiver
Could Entitle Past Terror Sponsors to Military Assistance."
The Washington Post, 24 September 2001. Back
23
"Bush retreats over controls on arms sales," Edward
Alden, Financial Times, 26 September 2001 Back
24
"If the US hates terrorists, why do we keep arming them?",
Steve Dasbach, 5 October 2001, available at http://www.1p.org/press/op-eds.php?function=view&record=16. Back
25
"EU caves in to Putin over Chechnya," David Cronin,
European Voice, 4-10 October 2001. Back
26
"Musharraf dismisses two Islamist Generals," Luke Harding,
The Guardian, 9 October 2001, p.4. Back
27
"Strategic Export Controls: Annual report for 1999 and parliamentary
prior scrutiny." Third Report of the Quadripartite Select
Committee, HC212, 14 March 2001. Back
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