APPENDIX 8
Memorandum from Professor John Baylis,
Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Wales, Swansea
NEW OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES:
RELATIONS BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND
THE UNITED
STATES, AND
THE IMPLICATIONS
OF US FOREIGN
POLICY FOR
UK INTERESTS
1. Introduction: The Context
1.1 It would be wrong to say that everything
has changed since September 11, but it seems likely that the whole
basis of international relations is entering a new phase. During
the Cold War the structure of world power was essentially bipolar
and, as time went on, a consensus on the "rules of the game"
gave the system some predictability and stability. During the
post-cold war era there has been more uncertainty, with a greater
diffusion of power and one, apparently impregnable, superpower,
supported at times by international coalitions of various kinds.
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon has highlighted
the vulnerability of even the United States, and has potentially
changed the whole structure of world politics. The international
system is now increasingly divided between those engaged in trying
to eradicate terrorism and those involved in, and giving support
to, terrorist activities. It is clear that one of the key questions
for the future is how far the global coalition against terrorism
can hold together over the coming months and years as we move
into what is likely to be a very rocky and unpredictable period
of international relations. If a global coalition can take effective
action the move towards a more co-operative international system
might be enhanced by the events of September 11. If this is not
possible then Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy"
may have arrived already. These events pose new and demanding
challenges for British diplomacy in general, and for Britain's
relationship with the United States in particular.
2. Britain's Relations with the US Prior
to September 11
2.1 Undoubtedly the most important strategic
element of British foreign and defence policy since 1945 has been
the continuous process of building and maintaining the "special
relationship" with the United States. As David Reynolds has
argued (and as a wide of declassified government documents show)
the "special relationship" has been a deliberate tool
of diplomacy, as well as a reasonably accurate description of
Anglo-American relations since 1945, especially in the intelligence
and defence fields. The perception of officials and governments
of both political parties has been that British interests require
a close and, if possible, preferential partnership with the United
States. Sentiment and culture have played their part, but at the
heart of the "special relationship" has been the coincidence
of interests between the two states and a common world view.
2.2 In the cold war, despite occasional
crises (eg Suez and Skybolt), the perception of a common enemy
was relatively easy to maintain. In the more complex post-cold
war period the challenges have been greater, but governments of
both political parties have continued to emphasise the continuing
importance of close ties in an uncertain world. The traditional
conventions of being the first, and most supportive, ally of the
United States in a crisis, and not openly criticising the US when
there have been disagreements, have been maintained. There has
been a continuing belief that the US is only likely to be influenced
through dialogue with close friends who are prepared to share
the burdens with the United States in times of need.
2.3 With the new, sometimes strident, unilateralism
of the Bush era the opportunities for friction in Anglo-American
relations increased. In practice, the Blair government has worked
very hard to ensure that at a personal and a practical level the
"special relationship" remains intact. Despite misgivings
in some influential quarters over NMD, the Kyoto convention, the
Chemical and Weapons convention and US Middle Eastern policies,
Britain has continued the role as America's most supportive ally.
3. The New Global Crisis
3.1 Two things were noticeable about the
reaction of the Blair government in the immediate aftermath of
the attacks on September 11. Firstly, the constant message of
standing "shoulder to shoulder" with the American government
and the immediate offer of support. Secondly, the deliberate search
to build a broad international coalition within hours of the atrocity
occurring. The contentions of the past were immediately on display,
Britain is, and has been seen to be, the most supportive (and
toughest) of America's allies. Britain has been prepared to aid
the US in a practical and major way in their hour of need. Therein,
officials have argued, lies the greatest opportunity to influence
the Bush administration in the dangerous period ahead.
3.2 There have been many period since the
second world war when British Governments have sought to use the
"special relationship" to influence the US when, what
were perceived to be, dangerous policy options were being considered
(eg Korea, the 1950s debates about nuclear pre-emption, the Cuban
Missile crisis). It appears that similar anxieties existed in
Whitehall in the immediate aftermath of September 11. Worries
about the "new unilateralism" in general, and the apparent
decline in the influence of Colin Powell, are likely to have caused
policy-makers in London to fear the prospect of the United States
"lashing out" in rage against those suspected of performing
the atrocities and those suspected of harbouring them. The message
from London appears to have been that determined, sustained and
effective action must be taken but that the implications of such
action must be carefully weighed and that a global coalition against
international terrorism should be involved in the range of responses
(legal, economic, diplomatic as well as military) that would be
necessary. The implication was that strident unilateralism should
have no place in the new post-September 11 era. This message appears
to have reinforced a similar message from certain parts of the
US Administration.
4. British interests in the coming era
4.1 The dreadful events of September 11
have created new and very serious challenges for British diplomacy.
With hindsight, the attempts by the Blair government to sustain
and nourish the "special relationship" have been proved
correct. Through that policy and the immediate response by the
Blair government, Britain has been, and continues to be, in a
unique position to try to influence American policies. How much
influence Britain will be able to exert (as in the past) will
be limited and will depend on how Britain responds to the actions
undertaken by the US in the months ahead (some of which the government
may well not agree with).
4.2 Britain would seem to have had three
immediate objectives. The first was to provide support for those
in the Administration, like Colin Powell, who were arguing for
a careful, thoughtful assessment before action was taken. The
second was to continue to argue that, despite some of the operational
difficulties, maintaining a global coalition should be a key element
in American strategy. Britain has an important interest in helping
to sustain a multilateral approach to the crisis (with states
making different contributions to the joint cause) and, as Mr
Blair has shown, the government is in a good position to use its
broad diplomatic expertise to try to achieve this task. The third
objective has been to argue that British experience suggests that
an effective counter-terrorism strategy requires a multi-dimensional
approach, with co-ordinated economic, financial, diplomatic, psychological
and military approaches being pursued simultaneously. In such
a strategy military action has to be carefully calibrated to the
broader objectives of the campaign. The importance of the parallel
campaigns of forceful action and humanitarian support for the
people of Afghanistan, in particular, seems to have been a useful
British initiative.
4.3 This said, whatever, the definition
of a "proportionate" response, military action sustained
over a considerable period is likely make the task of sustaining
the global coalition extremely difficult to achieve. If significant
"collateral damage" is inflicted even the most supportive
Muslim states will find it difficult to continue their support
of the US. Opposition, over time, is also likely to emerge amongst
other allies if the actions taken are not seen to be effective.
Should this happen, and the coalition begins to break up, the
danger will be that demands will grow in the UK for even more
unilateral action. The mind-set of a state at "war"
might lead to tougher responses against perceived enemies. There
are already influential voices in the administration calling for
a small tight alliance of states to assist the US, rather than
a loose and potentially unreliable, broad coalition. The dilemma
for the government in such a situation will be that, given the
strong commitment given to the US, they will have to continue
to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with the Bush administration
to achieve any influence, but there may be more and more actions
being undertaken unilaterally with which they (and an increasing
number of British citizens) do not approve. The fragmentation
of the coalition will clearly pose enormous dangers for the future
of international security.
4.4 One of the issues preventing this from
happening, and in keeping the coalition together, will be whether
the broader multi-dimensional approach to terrorism includes significant
changes in UK policies, especially those towards the Middle East.
Without a serious, sustained and balanced attempt to re-ignite
the Middle East Process the task of maintaining the involvement
of moderate Muslim states in the coalition is likely to prove
difficult, if not impossible. There would appear to be a clear
British interest in reinforcing the emerging consensus in the
US that this is necessary and playing a diplomatic role, in conjunction
with the EU, in helping to overcome the very dangerous impasse
which currently exists. It should be noted that, for the moment
at least, there does appear to be some sensitivity to these issues
in the US, especially with the unprecedented talk about a Palestinian
state. Britain can play an important role in sustaining these
sensitivities and what appears to be a new and very positive direction
to US policies.
4.5 Above all, British interests demand
that the actions taken against the terrorist threat are effective.
US policy makers are clearly aware of the multi-dimensional requirements
of dealing with terrorism, but Britain has an important role to
play in sustaining this emphasis on a broader strategic vision
in its talks with US officials. Britain will also need to play
a key role in the wide range of legal, financial, economic, political,
psychological and security measures which will be necessary. These
measures will clearly require much greater and more effective
international co-operation than has been achieved in the past.
Only time will tell if this can be achieved.
CONCLUSION
5.1 The potential for a sustained period
of intense international instability and economic crisis is clearly
very considerable. While our close ties with the United States
will give us some influence over US policy-making, past experience
suggests that there is a limit to that influence. The US government
will do what it feels is in its own security interests.
5.2 It seems that the whole context of the
debate about NMD, for example, in the slightly longer term, will
be very different in the aftermath of 11 September. For the moment
it seems likely to move to the diplomatic back-burner. In the
medium to longer term, however, it is likely to return to centre
stage. Although NMD would be irrelevant in the face of determined
low-tech terrorist attacks, the events of 11 September, will undoubtedly
be used by supporters to argue that ballistic missile defences
against "rogue states" or terrorist groups with access
to missile technology are even more important now than they were
before the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.
It is likely that America's allies will be expected to see the
logic of this and provide the necessary support. Opposition or
even qualified support may well be difficult to sustain. The key
issue here, however, is not so much NMD itself, but its implications
for arms control in general and the maintenance of strategic stability,
whatever form that will take in the post-11 September period.
Britain would seem to have an interest in helping to preserve
an arms control regime which reflects a new consensus on what
is required to maintain international stability. Prior to 11 September,
the first tentative steps were being taken to open a dialogue
with Russia on a new concept of strategic stability which might
not be based so centrally on the ABM Treaty of 1972. If the multilateral
coalition against terrorism can be maintained, it might make it
easier to develop a consensus on a new concept of strategic stability
which reflects the changing perspectives of the major powers,
particularly those with nuclear weapons. Should the coalition
fragment, this task will clearly be more difficult, with all of
the implications for the future of international security. Britain
would appear to have an important role to play in helping to engage
the United States, Russia, China, France, India and Pakistan,
as well as other members of the international community, in a
dialogue about the future of arms control and the form a new concept
of strategic stability should take. A vital part of this policy
will be to bolster support for the new interest in multilateralism
in the US. Whether this can be achieved remains far from clear
at present.
5.3 In the light of Mr Blair's broad vision
of what is needed to establish a new international order (expressed
at the Labour Party Conference) and in the context of the prevailing
view in Washington that "those that are not with us are against
us", British diplomacy is likely to face important and significant
challenges in the months and years ahead. Translating the Blair
doctrine into reality is going to require enormous political skills
and financial resources. Equally, influencing the US in a way
that serves these expansive British diplomatic and strategic interests
is likely to be a delicate and sensitive task.
Professor John Bayliss
Director of the Centre for the Study of Conflict,
University of Wales, Swansea
October 2001
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